Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language
1| Categories. Things are called homonymous when they have only a name in common, while the account of substance that corresponds to that name is different — for example, an animal, meaning both a man and a picture. For these have only a name in common, while the account of substance corresponding to the name is different; for if someone is to state what it is for each of them to be an animal, he will give a distinct account for each. Things are called synonymous when they have the name in common and also the account of substance that corresponds to that name is the same — for example, an animal, meaning both a man and an ox. For man and ox are both addressed by the common name "animal," and the account of substance is the same; for if someone states the account of each of them — what it is for each of them to be an animal — he will give the same account. Things are called paronymous when they get their designation from something else, differing from it in inflection, in accordance with the name — for example the grammarian gets his name from grammar, and the courageous man from courage. Of things said, some are said in combination, others without combination. Those in combination are, for example, "man runs," "man wins"; those without combination are, for example, "man," "ox," "runs," "wins."
2| Of things that are, some are said of a subject but are not in any subject — for example man is said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject. Others are in a subject but are not said of any subject (by "in a subject" I mean what belongs in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from that in which it is) — for example the individual instance of grammatical knowledge is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of any subject, and the individual white is in a subject, the body (for every color is in a body), but is not said of any subject. Others are both said of a subject and are in a subject — for example knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and is said of a subject, grammar. Others are neither in a subject nor said of any subject — for example the individual man and the individual horse; for nothing of this kind is either in a subject or said of a subject. Speaking generally, individual and numerically single things are said of no subject, but nothing prevents some of them from being in a subject; for the individual instance of grammatical knowledge is among the things that are in a subject but are said of no subject.
3| When one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, everything that is said of the predicate will also be said of the subject — for example man is predicated of the individual man, and animal of man; therefore animal will also be predicated of the individual man, since the individual man is both man and animal. The differentiae of genera that are different and not subordinate one to the other are themselves different in kind — for example of animal and of knowledge: the differentiae of animal are, for instance, footed, two-footed, winged, and aquatic, but none of these is a differentia of knowledge; for one kind of knowledge does not differ from another by being two-footed. But of genera that are subordinate one to the other, nothing prevents their having the same differentiae; for the higher genera are predicated of the genera under them, so that all the differentiae of the predicate will also be differentiae of the subject.
4| Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance, or quantity, or quality, or a relative, or where, or when, or being in a position, or having, or doing, or being affected. Substance is, to give a rough example, a man or a horse; quantity is, for example, two cubits long or three cubits long; quality is, for example, white, grammatical; a relative is, for example, double, half, larger; where is, for example, in the Lyceum, in the marketplace; when is, for example, yesterday, last year; being in a position is, for example, is lying, is sitting; having is, for example, has shoes on, is armed; doing is, for example, cutting, burning; being affected is, for example, being cut, being burned. Each of the things mentioned, taken just by itself, is asserted in no affirmation or denial; it is by the combination of these with one another that an affirmation or denial comes about. For every affirmation and denial is held to be either true or false, whereas none of the things said without any combination is either true or false — for example man, white, runs, wins.
5| Substance, in the truest, primary, and most fundamental sense of the word, is that which is neither said of a subject nor is in a subject — for example, the individual man or the individual horse. Secondary substances are the species in which the primarily-called substances are found, both these species and the genera of these species — for example, the individual man is found in the species man, and the genus of the species is animal; these, then — both man and animal — are called secondary substances. It is clear from what has been said that, of things said of a subject, both the name and the account must necessarily be predicated of the subject — for example man is said of a subject, the individual man, and the name is certainly predicated of it, for you will predicate man of the individual man; and the account of man will also be predicated of the individual man, since the individual man is both man and animal. Hence both the name and the account will be predicated of the subject. But of things that are in a subject, in most cases neither the name nor the account is predicated of the subject; in some cases, though, nothing prevents the name from sometimes being predicated of the subject, but the account is impossible — for example white, being in the subject body, is predicated of the subject (for a body is said to be white), but the account of white will never be predicated of the body.
6| All other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects, or are in them as subjects. This is clear from an examination of particular cases — for example animal is predicated of man, and so it will also be predicated of the individual man; for if it were predicated of none of the individual men, it would not be predicated of man at all either. Again, color is in body, and so it is also in some particular body; for if it were not in some one of the individual bodies, it would not be in body at all either. So all other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects, or are in them as subjects. If, then, the primary substances did not exist, it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist.
7| Of secondary substances, the species is more a substance than the genus, since it is closer to the primary substance. For if someone is to state what the primary substance is, he will give a more informative and more fitting account by giving the species than by giving the genus — for example, in giving an account of the individual man, he would give a more informative account by saying man than by saying animal, since the former is more distinctive of the individual man, while the latter is more general. And likewise in giving an account of an individual tree, he will give a more informative account by saying tree than by saying plant. Further, it is because the primary substances are the subjects for all the other things, and all the other things are predicated of them or are in them, that the primary substances are called substances most of all. And as the primary substances stand to all the other things, so the species stands to the genus; for the species is a subject for the genus (the genera are predicated of the species, but the species are not predicated reciprocally of the genera). Hence on these grounds too the species is more a substance than the genus. But of the species themselves, as many as are not genera, none is more a substance than another; for you will give no more fitting an account by predicating man of the individual man than by predicating horse of the individual horse. Likewise too, of the primary substances, none is more a substance than another; for the individual man is no more a substance than the individual ox.
8| It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, only the species and genera among all other things are called secondary substances; for only they, among the things predicated, make the primary substance clear. For if someone is giving an account of what a particular man is, he will give a suitable account, and one that makes him more familiar, by giving the species or the genus, saying "man" or "animal"; but whatever else he gives, he will be giving an account that is foreign to the thing, as when he gives "white" or "runs" or anything of that sort. So it is reasonable that, of all other things, only these are called substances. Further, the primary substances are called substances in the most proper sense because they underlie all the other things; and just as the primary substances stand to all the other things, so the species and genera of the primary substances stand to all the rest; for all the rest are predicated of these. For you will call a particular man literate; therefore you will also call both man and animal literate. And likewise in the other cases too.
9| It is common to every substance not to be in a subject. For the primary substance neither is in a subject nor is said of a subject; and of the secondary substances too it is plain, in this way as well, that they are not in a subject. For man is said of a subject, the particular man, but is not in a subject; for man is not in the particular man. And likewise animal too is said of a subject, the particular man, but animal is not in the particular man. Further, in the case of things that are in a subject, nothing prevents the name from sometimes being predicated of the subject, but the account, it is impossible. But in the case of the secondary substances, both the account and the name are predicated of the subject; for you will predicate the account of man of the particular man, and likewise that of animal. So substance would not be among the things that are in a subject. But this is not peculiar to substance; the differentia too is among the things not in a subject. For footed and two-footed are said of man as subject, but are not in a subject; for two-footed or footed is not in man. And the account too of the differentia is predicated of that of which the differentia is said; for instance, if footed is said of man, then the account of footed will also be predicated of man; for man is footed. And let it not trouble us that the parts of substances are in their wholes as in subjects, lest we be compelled to say they are not substances; for that was not the sense in which "the things in a subject" was meant — things present in something as parts.
10| It belongs to substances and to differentiae that all things said from them are said synonymously. For all the predications from them are predicated either of the individuals or of the species. From the primary substance there is no predication at all; for it is said of no subject. But of the secondary substances, the species is predicated of the individual, and the genus is predicated both of the species and of the individual. And likewise the differentiae too are predicated of the species and of the individuals. And the primary substances admit the account both of the species and of the genera, and the species admits that of the genus; for whatever is said of the thing predicated will also be said of the subject. And likewise the species and the individuals admit the account of the differentiae as well. And things were synonymous whose name was common and whose account was the same; so all the things said from the substances and from the differentiae are said synonymously. And every substance seems to signify a this something. Now in the case of the primary substances it is undisputed and true that it signifies a this something;
11| for what is indicated is individual and one in number. But in the case of the secondary substances, it appears, from the form of the appellation, that it likewise signifies a this something, when one says "man" or "animal"; but this is not true — rather it signifies a certain qualification; for the subject is not one, as the primary substance is, but man and animal are said of many things. Yet it does not signify a qualification simply, as white does; for white signifies nothing else but a qualification. But the species and the genus mark off the qualification with respect to substance; for it signifies a substance of a certain qualification. And the genus marks off a wider range than the species does; for one who says "animal" encompasses more than one who says "man." It also belongs to substances that nothing is contrary to them. For what would be contrary to the primary substance — for instance, to the particular man or to the particular animal? Nothing is contrary. Nor again is anything contrary to man or to animal. But this is not peculiar to substance; it holds also of many other things, for instance of quantity; for nothing is contrary to two cubits or to three cubits, nor to ten, nor to anything of that sort — unless someone should say that the much is contrary to the little, or the great to the small. But of the determinate quantities none is contrary to any other.
12| Substance also seems not to admit of more and less. I do not mean that one substance is not more or less a substance than another substance — for that has already been said to be the case — but that each substance, with respect to what it itself is, is not said to be so more or less. For instance, if this very substance is a man, it will not be more and less a man, neither itself than itself nor another than another; for one man is not more a man than another, as white is more white and less white than another white thing, and one thing is called more beautiful and less beautiful than another. And a thing is also called more and less than itself; for instance, a body that is white is said to be more white now than it was before, and a thing that is hot is said to be more hot and less hot. But substance is not said to be more or less anything; for a man is not said to be more a man now than before, nor is anything else that is a substance. So substance would not admit of the more and the less.
13| But the most distinctive mark of substance seems to be this: that while remaining one and the same in number, it is receptive of contraries. In the other cases one could not bring forward anything of this sort, among things that are not substances, that is one in number and receptive of contraries — for instance, color, which is one and the same in number, will not be at once base and excellent; and likewise in the other cases too, among things that are not substances. But substance, being one and the same in number, is receptive of contraries; for instance, a particular man, being one and the same, becomes at one time white and at another black, and hot and cold, and base and excellent. In none of the other cases does anything of this sort appear — unless someone should object, saying that an account and a belief are receptive of contraries. For the same account seems to be both true and false; for instance, if the account that someone is sitting were true, then, once he has stood up, this same account will be false. And likewise too with belief; for if someone should truly believe that a certain person is sitting, then, once that person has stood up, he will believe falsely if he holds the same belief about him.
14| But even if someone grants this too, still substance differs in the manner of it. For in the case of substances, it is the very things themselves, by changing, that admit the contraries: what was hot becomes cold and has changed (for it has been altered), and what was white becomes black, and what was base becomes good. Likewise in the other cases too, each thing itself, by admitting change, is receptive of the contraries. But an account and an opinion themselves remain wholly unmoved in every way; it is the thing that changes, and the contrary comes to hold with respect to them. For the account that someone is sitting remains the same; but when the thing changes, the account is said to be true at one time and false at another. And likewise with opinion. So that, in the manner of it, it would be a property of substance to be receptive of the contraries by its own change. But if someone grants even this much — that account and opinion are receptive of the contraries — this is not true. For an account and an opinion are not said to be receptive of a contrary by themselves admitting anything, but because the affection has come to be about some other thing. For it is by the thing's being or not being that the account is said to be true or false, not by the account itself being receptive of the contraries.
15| For in the strict sense nothing whatsoever moves an account or an opinion, so that they would not be receptive of the contraries, since no affection comes to be in them. But substance is said to be receptive of the contraries by itself admitting them: for it admits disease and health, and whiteness and blackness; and by itself admitting each such thing it is said to be receptive of the contraries. So that it would be a property of substance to be, while remaining the same and one in number, receptive of the contraries by its own change. Let this much, then, be said about substance.
16| Of quantity, one kind is discrete, another continuous; and the one kind is composed of parts that have position in relation to one another, the other of parts that do not have position. Discrete quantity is, for instance, number and speech; continuous quantity is, for instance, line, surface, body, and besides these, time and place. For of the parts of number there is no common boundary at which its parts join together — for instance, if the five is a part of the ten, the five and the five do not join at any common boundary, but are marked off separately; and three and seven likewise join at no common boundary; nor in general could you find any common boundary of the parts in the case of number, but they are always marked off separately. So that number belongs among discrete quantities. And likewise speech too belongs among discrete quantities. That speech is a quantity is clear, for it is measured by short and long syllable. I mean the speech that occurs with spoken sound. For its parts join at no common boundary: there is no common boundary at which the syllables join, but each is marked off, separate in itself.
17| But a line is continuous: for it is possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join, a point — and for a surface, a line; for the parts of a plane join at some common boundary. And likewise in the case of a body you could find a common boundary, a line or a surface, at which the parts of the body join. Time and place too belong among such things. For the present time joins to the past and to the future. Place again is among the continuous things: for the parts of a body occupy some place, which join at some common boundary; and so the parts of the place, too, which each of the parts of the body occupies, join at the same boundary at which the parts of the body join. So that place too would be continuous: for its parts join at one common boundary.
18| Further, some quantities are composed of parts that have position in relation to one another, others of parts that do not have position — for instance, the parts of a line have position in relation to one another: for each of them lies somewhere, and you could distinguish and state where each lies on the plane, and to which of the remaining parts it joins. And likewise the parts of a plane too have some position: for in the same way it could be stated where each lies, and which parts join to one another. And so too with the parts of a solid, and of place. But in the case of number one could not point out that its parts have some position in relation to one another, or lie anywhere, or which of the parts join to one another. Nor the parts of time either: for none of the parts of time endures; and how could something that does not endure have some position? Rather you would say it has a certain order, in that one part of time is prior and another posterior. And likewise with number too, in that the one is counted prior to the two, and the two prior to the three; and so it would have a certain order, but you could not really take it to have position. And speech likewise: for none of its parts endures, but once spoken it can no longer be recovered, so that there would be no position of its parts, seeing that nothing endures. Some quantities, then, are composed of parts having position, others of parts not having position.
19| Properly speaking, only the things mentioned are called quantities; all the others are called so accidentally. For it is by looking to these that we call the other things quantities too — for instance, white is called much because the surface is much, and an action is called long because the time is much, and motion is called much likewise. For none of these is called a quantity in its own right. For instance, if someone states how great an action is, he will mark it off by time, calling it a year long or something of the sort. And in stating how great the white thing is, he will mark it off by the surface: for however great the surface is, so great, he would say, is the white too. So that only the things mentioned are properly and in their own right called quantities, and none of the others is so in its own right, but if at all, accidentally.
20| Further, nothing is contrary to quantity. In the case of the determinate quantities it is clear that nothing is contrary — for instance, to the two-cubit or three-cubit, or to a surface, or to any such thing there is nothing contrary — unless someone should say that the much is contrary to the little, or the great to the small. But none of these is a quantity; rather they belong among relatives. For nothing is called great or small in its own right, but by being referred to something else — for instance a mountain is called small, and a grain of millet large, because the one is greater than things of its own kind and the other smaller than things of its own kind. The reference, then, is to something else, since if great or small were said in its own right, the mountain would never be called small, nor the millet grain large. Again, we say there are many people in the village, and few in Athens, though the Athenians are many times more numerous; and many people in the house, few in the theater, though those in the theater are far more numerous. Further, the two-cubit and the three-cubit and each such thing signify a quantity, but the great or the small does not signify a quantity but rather a relative;
21| For the large and the small are observed relative to something else. So it is clear that these belong to relatives. Again, whether one posits these as quantities or not, they have no contrary; for what cannot be taken in its own right but is referred to something else — how could one say anything is contrary to it? And further, if the large and the small are to be contraries, it will follow that the same thing admits contraries at the same time and is itself contrary to itself. For it happens sometimes that the same thing is at once large and small; for it is small relative to this, but the same thing is large relative to something else. So the same thing turns out to be both large and small at the same time; so it admits contraries at the same time. But nothing seems to admit contraries at the same time — take substance, for instance: it seems to be receptive of contraries, but it is not at the same time ill and healthy. Nor is a thing at the same time white and black. Nor is there anything else that admits contraries at the same time. And moreover it turns out that these are contrary to themselves. For if the large is contrary to the small, and the same thing is at once large and small, then it would be contrary to itself.
22| But it is among the impossibilities for a thing to be contrary to itself. Therefore the large is not contrary to the small, nor the many to the few. So even if one calls these not relatives but quantities, they will have no contrary. Contrariety in quantity seems to hold especially in the case of place; for people set up above as contrary to below, calling the region toward the middle 'below,' because the middle is at the greatest distance from the limits of the universe. And it seems that they derive their definition of the other contraries too from these: for they define as contraries those things within the same genus that stand furthest apart from one another. Quantity does not seem to admit of the more and the less — take, for instance, the two-cubit: one thing is not more two-cubit than another. Nor with number either — for instance three is no more three than five is five, nor is five more five than three is three. Nor is one period of time said to be more a time than another. Nor, in general, is the more and the less said of any of the things mentioned. So quantity does not admit the more and the less.
23| What is most distinctive of quantity is that it is spoken of as equal and unequal. For each of the quantities mentioned is called equal or unequal — a body, for instance, is called equal or unequal, and a time is called equal or unequal. Likewise each of the other things mentioned is called equal and unequal. But of the rest, whatever is not a quantity would not, it seems, be called equal or unequal at all — a disposition, for instance, is not really called equal or unequal, but rather similar; and white is not really called equal or unequal, but similar. So it would be most distinctive of quantity to be called equal and unequal.
24| Things are called relatives when, whatever they are, they are said to be of or than something else, or are related to something else in some other way — for instance, the larger is called what it is in relation to something else, for it is called larger than something; and the double is called what it is in relation to something else, for it is called double of something. Likewise with all other such cases. Also of this kind are: state, disposition, perception, knowledge, position. For all the things mentioned are said to be, just what they are, of something else, and not anything else — for a state is called a state of something, and knowledge is knowledge of something, and position is a position of something, and the others likewise. So relatives are whatever are said to be, just what they are, of other things, or related to something else in some other way — for instance a mountain is called large in relation to something else, for it is called large relative to something; and the like is called like something, and the other such things are likewise called relative to something. Further, reclining and standing and sitting are certain positions, and position is one of the relatives. But lying-down or standing or sitting are not themselves positions, but are called, by derivation, from the positions mentioned.
25| Contrariety belongs among relatives too — for instance virtue is contrary to vice, each being a relative, and knowledge to ignorance. But not every relative has a contrary; for there is nothing contrary to the double, nor to the triple, nor to any such thing. But the more and the less do seem to be admitted by relatives; for like and unlike are said more and less, and equal and unequal are said more and less, each of them being a relative — for the like is called like something, and the unlike unlike something. But not all relatives admit the more and the less: the double is not called more and less double, nor is any such thing.
26| All relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate, as when the slave is called slave of a master, and the master master of a slave; and the double is called double of the half, and the half half of the double; and the greater is called greater than the lesser, and the lesser lesser than the greater. Likewise with the others too, except that they will sometimes differ in grammatical case in the wording — for instance knowledge is called knowledge of the knowable, and the knowable is called knowable by knowledge; and perception is perception of the perceptible, and the perceptible is perceptible by perception. Yet sometimes it will not seem to reciprocate, if the correlative to which it is related is not properly assigned but the one making the assignment errs — for instance if a wing is assigned as of a bird, bird does not reciprocate with wing. For the first term, wing of a bird, was not properly assigned; for it is not insofar as it is a bird that the wing is said to be its, but insofar as it is winged — for many other things too have wings, which are not birds. So if it is properly assigned, it does reciprocate too, as wing is a wing of a winged thing, and the winged thing is winged by a wing. Sometimes it is perhaps even necessary to coin a name, if no name is available to which the assignment could properly be made — for instance if the rudder is assigned as of a boat, the assignment is not proper;
27| for it is not insofar as it is a boat that the rudder is said to belong to it — for there are boats that have no rudders. Hence it does not reciprocate; for a boat is not called a boat of a rudder. But perhaps the assignment would be more proper if it were made something like this: the rudder is a rudder of a ruddered-thing, or in some other such way — for there is no name for it. And it does reciprocate, if properly assigned; for the ruddered-thing is ruddered by a rudder. Likewise too with the others — for instance a head would more properly be assigned as of a headed-thing than as assigned to an animal; for it is not insofar as it is an animal that it has a head, since many animals have no head. In this way, perhaps, one might most easily grasp the terms for which no names are available, if one assigned names based on the primary terms and their reciprocating correlatives, just as in the cases mentioned, 'winged' from 'wing' and 'ruddered' from 'rudder.' So all relatives, if properly assigned, are spoken of in relation to reciprocating correlatives, since if they are assigned in relation to something incidental and not to the very thing in relation to which they are spoken of, they do not reciprocate. I mean that not even among things agreed to be spoken of in relation to reciprocating correlatives, with names available for them, does anything reciprocate, if it is assigned in relation to some accidental attribute and not to the very thing in relation to which it is spoken of — for instance if the slave is assigned not as of a master but of a man, or of a biped, or of any such thing, it does not reciprocate;
28| For the correlate has not been given properly. Further, if something has been given properly relative to that to which it is said, then when everything else that is accidental to it is stripped away, and only that is left to which it was properly given, it will always be said relative to that. For example, take a slave: if he is said relative to a master, then when everything else that is accidental to the master is stripped away — such as being two-footed, being receptive of knowledge, being a human being — and only being a master is left, the slave will always be said relative to that; for a slave is called a slave of a master. But if what a thing is said relative to has not been given properly, then when everything else is stripped away and only what was given is left, it will not be said relative to it. Suppose the slave were given as relative to a human being, and the wing as relative to a bird, and being a master were stripped away from the human being: the slave will no longer be said relative to a human being, for if there is no master there is no slave either. Likewise if being winged is stripped away from the bird, the wing will no longer be among the relatives, for if there is no winged thing there will be no wing of anything either. And so one must give the correlate to which a thing is properly said.
29| And if a name already exists for it, the giving of the correlate is easy; but if not, it is presumably necessary to coin one. When correlates are given in this way, it is clear that all relatives are said relative to things that reciprocate. It is thought that relatives are simultaneous by nature, and in most cases this is true. For the double and the half are simultaneous — when there is a half there is a double — and when there is a master there is a slave, and when there is a slave there is a master; and likewise with the others of this kind. And these also destroy one another together: if there is no double there is no half, and if there is no half there is no double; and likewise with the other such cases. But it does not seem true of all relatives that they are simultaneous by nature; for the knowable would seem to be prior to knowledge. For as a rule we acquire knowledge of things that already exist beforehand; in few cases, if any, could one see knowledge coming into being at the same time as the knowable object. Further, when the knowable is destroyed it destroys knowledge along with it, but knowledge does not destroy the knowable along with it. For if there is no knowable there is no knowledge — since there will then be knowledge of nothing — but if there is no knowledge, nothing prevents there being something knowable, as, for example, the squaring of the circle: if indeed it is knowable, there is not yet knowledge of it, but it is itself knowable.
30| Further, if animal is destroyed there will be no knowledge, but many knowable things can still exist. The same holds for the case of perception. For the perceptible seems to be prior to perception. For when the perceptible is destroyed it destroys perception along with it, but perception does not destroy the perceptible along with it. For perceptions concern body and are in a body, and when the perceptible is destroyed the body is destroyed too (for the body is among perceptible things), and when there is no body perception too is destroyed; so the perceptible destroys perception along with it. But perception does not destroy the perceptible along with it: for when an animal is destroyed, perception is destroyed, but the perceptible will still exist — such as body, hot, sweet, bitter, and all the other perceptible qualities. Further, perception comes into being at the same time as the thing capable of perceiving; for perception comes into being at the same time as the animal. But the perceptible exists even before there is an animal or perception: for fire and water and the like, of which even the animal is composed, exist even before there is any animal at all, or perception. So the perceptible would seem to be prior to perception.
31| There is a puzzle as to whether no substance is spoken of as a relative — as it seems — or whether this is possible in the case of some secondary substances. In the case of primary substances it is true: neither wholes nor parts are spoken of as relatives. For a particular human being is not spoken of as somebody's particular human being, nor is a particular ox somebody's particular ox. And likewise with parts: a particular hand is not spoken of as somebody's particular hand, but as somebody's hand, and a particular head is not spoken of as somebody's particular head, but as somebody's head. And likewise with secondary substances, at least in most cases: for example, man is not spoken of as somebody's man, nor is ox somebody's ox, nor wood somebody's wood, but is spoken of as somebody's possession. In such cases, then, it is clear that they are not among the relatives; but with some secondary substances there is dispute — for example, a head is spoken of as somebody's head, and a hand is spoken of as somebody's hand, and each such case is similar, so that these would seem to be among the relatives. If, then, the definition of relatives has been adequately given, it is either very difficult or impossible to show that no substance is spoken of as a relative;
32| but if it has not been given adequately, and relatives are rather those things for which being is the same as standing in some relation, then perhaps something could be said about these. The earlier definition applies to all relatives, but it is not the same thing for them to be relative as for them to be said to be just what they are of other things. From this it is clear that if someone knows determinately some relative, he will also know determinately that to which it is said. This is clear from the cases themselves as well. For if someone knows some particular thing, that it is among the relatives, and being for relatives is the same as standing in some relation, then he also knows that to which this stands in some relation; for if he does not know at all what it stands in some relation to, he will not know whether it stands in some relation either. This is clear also in particular cases: for example, if someone knows determinately of a particular thing that it is double, he also immediately knows determinately what it is double of; for if he does not know it to be double of any determinate thing, he does not know at all whether it is double. Likewise too, if someone knows of a particular thing that it is finer, he must for the same reason immediately know determinately what it is finer than.
33| He will not know indeterminately that this is finer than something inferior; for that sort of thing is supposition, not knowledge. For he will no longer know precisely that it is finer than something inferior — since if it so happened, there might be nothing inferior to it. So it is clear that whatever relative someone knows determinately, he must also know determinately that to which it is said. But the head and the hand and each such thing, which are substances, can be known determinately in what they themselves are, without its being necessary to know that to which they are said. For whose head this is, or whose hand, cannot be known determinately. So these would not be among the relatives. And if these are not relatives, it would be true to say that no substance is a relative. But perhaps it is difficult to pronounce confidently on such matters without having examined them often; still, to have worked through the puzzles concerning each of them is not without use.
34| By quality I mean that in virtue of which people are called qualified in some way. Quality is one of the things spoken of in several senses. Let one kind of quality be called state and condition. A state differs from a condition in being more lasting and more stable. Knowledge and virtue are of this sort; for knowledge seems to be among the things that are lasting and hard to change, if one has acquired even a moderate grasp of it, so long as no great change is brought about by disease or something else of that kind; and virtue is the same way — justice, temperance, and each of the others of that kind do not seem easily changed or easily shifted. Conditions, by contrast, are called those things which are easily changed and quickly shift, such as heat, chill, disease, health, and other things of that sort; for a person is disposed in some way in respect of these, but quickly changes, becoming cold from hot and passing from being healthy into being sick, and likewise with the rest, unless one of these very conditions should already, through length of time, have become ingrained and incurable or very hard to change — a thing one might by then perhaps call a state. It is clear that people wish to call states those conditions which are more lasting and harder to change; for those who do not have a firm hold on the branches of knowledge but shift easily are not said to have a state, even though they are disposed in some way, better or worse, with respect to the knowledge. So a state differs from a condition in that the one is easily changed, while the other is more lasting and harder to change. States are also conditions, but conditions are not necessarily states; for those who have states are also disposed in some way in respect of them, but those who are disposed in some way do not in every case also have a state.
35| Another genus of quality is that in virtue of which we call people good boxers, good runners, healthy, or sickly, and in general whatever is spoken of in respect of a natural capacity or incapacity. For none of these is called qualified by being disposed in some way, but by having a natural capacity or incapacity to do something easily or to be affected by nothing; good boxers or good runners, for instance, are so called not by being disposed in some way but by having a natural capacity to do something easily, and people are called healthy by having a natural capacity to be unaffected by ordinary things easily, sickly by having a natural incapacity to be unaffected by ordinary things easily. Hard and soft stand in a like case: the hard is so called by having a capacity not to be divided easily, the soft by having an incapacity for this same thing.
36| A third genus of quality is affective qualities and affections. Things of this sort are, for instance, sweetness, bitterness, sourness, and everything akin to these, and further heat, cold, whiteness, and blackness. That these are qualities is clear, for the things that have received them are called qualified in respect of them, as honey is called sweet by having received sweetness, and a body white by having received whiteness; and likewise with the rest. They are called affective qualities not because the things that have received the qualities have themselves been affected in some way — for honey is not called sweet by having been affected in some way, nor is any other such thing — but heat and cold, likewise, are called affective qualities not because the things that have received them have themselves been affected in some way, but because each of the qualities named is productive of an affection in respect of the senses; for sweetness produces a certain affection in the taste, and heat in the touch, and likewise the others. But whiteness and blackness and the other colors are not called affective qualities in the same way as the things just mentioned, but by having come about from an affection.
37| That many changes of color come about through affection is plain: a person who feels shame turns red, one who feels fear turns pale, and so for each such case; so that if someone by nature has undergone one of these affections as the result of some natural constitution, it is likely that he has the corresponding color; for whatever bodily disposition now arises in feeling shame could also arise from one's natural makeup, so that a similar color comes to be by nature as well. So whatever cases of this sort of occurrence take their origin from certain affections that are hard to change and lasting are called affective qualities. For whether pallor or blackness has come about in the natural constitution, they are called qualities (for we are called qualified in respect of them), or whether this same thing, pallor or blackness, has resulted from a long illness or from heat, and does not easily go away, or even remains throughout life, these too are called qualities; for likewise we are called qualified in respect of them. But whatever cases arise from things that are easily dissolved and quickly restored are called affections, not qualities; for we are not called qualified in respect of them. For neither is the man who blushes from shame called ruddy, nor the man who turns pale from fear called pallid, but rather he is said to have been affected in some way.
38| So things of this sort are called affections, not qualities. And in the same way, in respect of the soul too, there are affective qualities and affections spoken of. For whatever has come about right from birth from certain affections hard to change is called a quality, such as the manic derangement, anger, and things of that kind; for people are called qualified in respect of these — irritable and manic. And likewise whatever derangements are not natural but have come about from certain other occurrences that are hard to shake off or altogether immovable, these too are qualities; for people are called qualified in respect of them. But whatever arises from things quickly restored is called an affection, as when someone who is distressed is more irritable; for the man who is more irritable in such an affection is not called irritable, but rather is said to have been affected in some way. So things of this sort are called affections, not qualities.
39| A fourth genus of quality is shape and the form that belongs to each thing, and further, besides these, straightness and curvedness, and whatever is like these. For in respect of each of these something is called qualified; a thing is called qualified by being triangular or square, and by being straight or curved. And each thing is also called qualified in respect of its form. Rare and dense, rough and smooth, might seem to signify something qualified, but these appear to be foreign to the division concerned with the qualified; for each of them seems rather to indicate a certain position of the parts. A thing is dense by having its parts close to one another, rare by having them stand apart from one another; and smooth by having its parts lie in some way on a straight line, rough by having some part project and some fall short. There might perhaps appear to be some other manner of quality as well, but those most properly so called are more or less these.
40| These, then, are the qualities that have been named, and qualified things are those called paronymously after them, or in some other way derived from them. Now in most cases, and practically in all, the term is used paronymously, as white is derived from whiteness, literate from literacy, and just from justice, and likewise with the rest. But in some cases, because no names have been established for the qualities, it is not possible to speak of them paronymously from the qualities; for instance, a man called a good runner or a good boxer in respect of a natural capacity is not so called paronymously from any quality, for no names have been established for the capacities in respect of which such people are called qualified, as they have been for the branches of knowledge in respect of which people are called, by a condition, good at boxing or good at wrestling — for boxing and wrestling are called branches of knowledge, and people disposed in respect of them are called qualified paronymously from these. And sometimes, even when a name has been established, the thing called qualified in respect of it is not spoken of paronymously, as the excellent man is not so called from virtue; for he is called excellent by having virtue, but not paronymously from virtue. This is not so, however, in many cases. Qualified things, then, are said to be those spoken of paronymously from the qualities named, or in some other way derived from them.
41| There is also contrariety in respect of quality — for instance, justice is contrary to injustice, and whiteness to blackness, and so on with the rest — and likewise with the things called qualified in virtue of these, for instance the unjust in relation to the just, and the white in relation to the black. But this is not so in every case: for to red or yellow, or other such colors, nothing is contrary, though they are qualities. Further, if one of two contraries is a quality, the remaining one will be a quality too. This is clear if one runs through the other categories: for instance, if justice is the contrary of injustice, and justice is a quality, then injustice too is a quality; for none of the other categories fits injustice — not quantity, not relative, not place, nor anything else of that kind, but only quality. And it is the same with the other pairs that are contrary in respect of quality.
42| Qualities admit of more and less. For one thing is called white, or less white, than another, and one thing more just than another. And a thing itself admits of increase: being white, it can still become whiter. Not everything, however, admits of this, but most things do. For whether justice is said to be more or less justice than justice, one might be at a loss; and likewise with the other states. Some indeed dispute about such cases: they say one ought not, strictly, to speak of one justice as more or less justice than another, nor one health as more or less health than another, though they allow that one person has health in a lesser degree than another, and justice in a lesser degree than another, and likewise grammatical skill and the other states. But at any rate the things named after these unquestionably admit of more and less: one man is called more grammatically skilled than another, and more healthy, and more just, and so on with the rest. Triangle and square, however, do not seem to admit of more: nor does any other figure. For things which admit the definition of triangle, or of circle, are all alike triangles or circles; and among things that do not admit it, none will be called more one than the other — for a square is no more a circle than an oblong is, since neither admits the definition of circle. In general, unless both admit the definition of the thing in question, one will not be called more that thing than the other. So not all qualities admit of more and less.
43| None of the things mentioned, then, is distinctive of quality, but likeness and unlikeness are spoken of only in respect of qualities: one thing is like another in no respect but that in virtue of which it is qualified. So it would be distinctive of quality to be spoken of as like and unlike in virtue of itself. One need not be troubled that, in undertaking to discuss quality, we should be found reckoning in many things belonging to relatives; for we said that states and dispositions are among the relatives. In pretty much all cases of that sort, it is the genera that are spoken of as relative, none of the particulars. For knowledge, being a genus, is called just what it is of something else — for it is called knowledge of something — but none of the particular kinds of knowledge is called just what it is of something else: grammar, for instance, is not called grammar of something, nor is music called music of something. Rather, it is in virtue of the genus that these too, if at all, are called relative: grammar is called knowledge of something, not grammar of something, and music is called knowledge of something, not music of something. So the particulars are not among the relatives. But it is by the particulars that we are called qualified: for it is these that we possess; we are called knowers by possessing some one of the particular branches of knowledge. So these — the particulars, in virtue of which we are sometimes called qualified — would indeed be qualities; and these are not among the relatives. Further, if the same thing should happen to be both relative and qualified, there is nothing absurd in its being reckoned under both genera.
44| Acting and being acted upon also admit of contrariety and of more and less. For heating is contrary to cooling, and being heated to being cooled, and being pleased to being pained, so that these admit of contrariety. And they admit of more and less as well: for one can heat more or less, and be heated more or less. So acting and being acted upon admit of more and less. So much, then, is said about these. It has also been said, in discussing the relatives, about being-in-a-position, that it is spoken of paronymously from the positions. Concerning the remaining categories — the when, the where, and the having — because they are self-evident, nothing further is said about them beyond what was said at the start: that having signifies being shod, being armed, and where signifies, for example, in the Lyceum, and the rest as was said about them there. On the proposed genera, then, what has been said is enough. We must now speak of opposites, of the number of ways in which one thing is customarily opposed to another. One thing is said to be opposed to another in four ways: either as relatives, or as contraries, or as privation and possession, or as affirmation and negation. Each such pair is opposed, to put it in outline, as relatives — for instance the double to the half; or as contraries — for instance the bad to the good; or in respect of privation and possession — for instance blindness and sight; or as affirmation and negation — for instance he is sitting — he is not sitting.
45| Whatever is opposed as relatives is spoken of, in what it itself is, as being of its opposite, or in some other way in relation to it — for instance the double, in what it itself is, is called double of something else, for it is double of something. And knowledge too is opposed to the knowable as relatives, and knowledge is spoken of as being, in what it itself is, of the knowable. And the knowable too, in what it itself is, is spoken of in relation to its opposite, knowledge: for the knowable is called knowable by something, namely by knowledge.
46| Whatever, then, is opposed as relatives is spoken of, in what it itself is, as being of other things, or as related to one another in some way. But things opposed as contraries are, in what they themselves are, in no way spoken of in relation to one another, though they are called contrary to one another: for the good is not called good of the bad, but contrary to it, nor is the white called white of the black, but contrary to it. So these two kinds of opposition differ from one another. Among contraries, those such that, in the things in which they naturally arise, or of which they are predicated, one of the two must necessarily belong — of these there is nothing intermediate. But those of which it is not necessary that one belong, of these there is always something intermediate. For instance, disease and health naturally arise in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that one of the two belong to the animal's body, either disease or health. And odd and even are predicated of number, and it is necessary that one of the two belong to a number, either odd or even. And there is nothing intermediate between these, neither between disease and health nor between odd and even. But of things where it is not necessary that one belong, there is something intermediate: for instance black and white naturally arise in a body, and it is not necessary that one of the two belong to the body —
47| for not everything is either white or black. And base and virtuous are predicated both of man and of many other things, but it is not necessary that one of the two belong to the things of which they are predicated: not everything is either base or virtuous. And there is indeed something intermediate between these: between white and black, gray and yellow and the other colors; between base and virtuous, what is neither base nor virtuous. Now in some cases names are given to the intermediates — for instance gray and yellow and the other colors are intermediate between white and black. But in other cases it is not easy to supply a name for the intermediate, and it is defined instead by the negation of each of the extremes — for instance, what is neither good nor bad, and neither just nor unjust.
48| Privation and possession are spoken of in connection with some one thing, as sight and blindness are spoken of in connection with the eye. And speaking generally, each of them is spoken of in connection with whatever it is in whose nature it is to possess the state. We say that each of the things capable of receiving a state has been deprived of it when the state is not present at all in the thing in which it is natural for it to be present, and at the time when it is natural for the thing to have it. For we do not call a thing toothless simply because it lacks teeth, nor blind simply because it lacks sight, but rather because it lacks these when it is natural to have them. For some things from birth have neither sight nor teeth, but they are not called toothless or blind. Being deprived and having the state are not themselves privation and possession. For sight is a possession, and blindness is a privation; but having sight is not sight, nor is being blind blindness. For blindness is a kind of privation, but being blind is being deprived, not privation itself. Further, if blindness were the same as being blind, both would be predicated of the same subject; but a man is called blind, while a man is never called blindness. These too, being deprived and having the state, do seem to be opposed as privation and possession are; for the manner of the opposition is the same. For just as blindness is opposed to sight, so too being blind is opposed to having sight.
49| Nor again is what falls under an affirmation or negation itself an affirmation or negation. For an affirmation is an affirmative statement and a negation is a negative statement, whereas none of the things that fall under an affirmation or negation is itself a statement. But these too are said to be opposed to one another in the way affirmation and negation are; for in their case too the manner of the opposition is the same. For just as an affirmation is opposed to a negation, as in "he sits" to "he does not sit," so too the thing that falls under each is opposed, sitting to not sitting. That privation and possession are not opposed as relatives are is clear; for a relative is not called what it is of its opposite. For sight is not called the sight of blindness, nor is it in any other way spoken of in relation to it. Likewise blindness would not be called the blindness of sight; rather, blindness is called a privation of sight, but sight is not called a sight of blindness. Further, all relatives are spoken of in relation to their converse, so that if blindness were among the relatives, that in relation to which it is spoken of would convert with it. But it does not convert; for sight is not called the sight of blindness.
50| That the things spoken of in respect of privation and possession are not opposed as contraries either is clear from the following. In the case of contraries between which there is nothing intermediate, it is necessary that one or the other of them always belong to whatever it is natural for them to arise in, or of which they are predicated; for there was nothing intermediate between these, one or the other of which it was necessary should belong to what is receptive of them, as with disease and health, and odd and even. But in the case of things that do have an intermediate, it is never necessary that one or the other belong to everything; for it is not necessary that everything receptive of them be either white or black, nor hot nor cold, since nothing prevents something intermediate between these from belonging to it. Further, among these there was also something intermediate, for which it was not necessary that one or the other belong to what is receptive of it, except for things to which the one belongs by nature, as being hot belongs to fire and being white to snow. In these cases it is necessary in a determinate way that one of them belong, and not whichever it happens to be; for it is not possible for fire to be cold, nor for snow to be black. So it is not necessary that one or the other of them belong to everything receptive of them, but only to those things to which the one belongs by nature, and to these in a determinate way, the one and not whichever it happens to be.
51| In the case of privation and possession, neither of the things just said is true. For it is not always necessary that one or the other of them belong to what is receptive of them; for what is not yet naturally disposed to have sight is called neither blind nor sighted, so that these would not belong to the class of such contraries as have no intermediate. But neither do they belong to the class of contraries that do have an intermediate; for it is necessary at some time that one or the other of them belong to everything receptive of them. For when a thing is already of a nature to have sight, then it will be called either blind or sighted, and of these, not the one in a determinate way, but whichever it happens to be; for it is not necessary that it be blind or that it have sight, but whichever it happens to be. But in the case of contraries that have an intermediate, it was never necessary that one or the other belong to everything, but only to some things, and to these in a determinate way, the one. So it is clear that the opposition of privation and possession is opposed in neither of these two ways in which contraries are opposed.
52| Further, in the case of contraries, where the receptive subject exists, a change into one another is possible, unless the one belongs to something by nature, as being hot belongs to fire; for what is healthy can fall sick, and what is white can become black, and what is cold can become hot, and it is possible to become base from being excellent, and excellent from being base. For the base man, being led into better company and better arguments, might even make a little progress toward being better. And if he once takes even a small measure of progress, it is clear that he would either change completely or make very great progress; for he always becomes more readily moved toward virtue, however small a measure of progress he has taken from the start, so that it is likely he will take on still more progress. And this happening continually restores him completely to the contrary state, provided he is not shut out by time. But in the case of possession and privation, a change into one another is impossible. For a change occurs from possession to privation, but from privation to possession is impossible. For no one who has become blind has regained sight again, nor has a bald man grown hair again, nor has a toothless man grown teeth.
53| As for the things opposed as affirmation and negation are, it is clear that they are opposed in none of the ways already mentioned; for only in their case is it necessary that one of them always be true and the other false. For neither in the case of contraries is it necessary that one always be true and the other false, nor in the case of relatives, nor in the case of possession and privation. For instance, health and disease are contraries, and neither of them is either true or false. Likewise the double and the half are opposed as relatives, and neither of them is either true or false. Nor are the things spoken of in respect of privation and possession, such as sight and blindness. And in general, none of the things spoken of without any combination is either true or false; and all the things mentioned are spoken of without combination. Still, it might seem that this happens most of all in the case of contraries spoken of in combination; for Socrates being healthy is contrary to Socrates being sick. But not even in these cases is it necessary that one always be true and the other false. For if Socrates exists, one will be true and the other false, but if he does not exist, both will be false;
54| For neither Socrates' being sick nor his being healthy is true if Socrates does not exist at all. But in the case of privation and state, if the subject does not exist at all, neither is true, while if it does exist, it is not always the case that one is true and the other false: for having sight is opposed to being blind, as privation and state, and even when the subject exists it is not necessary that one of them be true or false (for when it is not yet natural for it to have the state, both are false), and when Socrates does not exist at all, both are likewise false, both having sight and being blind. But in the case of affirmation and negation, always, whether the subject exists or not, one will be false and the other true. For take Socrates' being sick and Socrates' not being sick: if he exists, it is clear that one of them is true or false, and likewise if he does not exist; for being sick is false if he does not exist, while not being sick is true. So it would be peculiar to these alone, that one of them is always true or false, namely those that are opposed as affirmation and negation.
55| Contrary to good is necessarily bad: this is clear by induction over particular cases, for instance disease is contrary to health and cowardice to courage, and likewise in the other cases. But to a bad thing sometimes a good thing is contrary, sometimes a bad thing: for to deficiency, which is bad, excess is contrary, being bad; and likewise the mean is contrary to each of them, being good. One could see this in a few cases, but in most cases it is always the good that is contrary to the bad. Further, in the case of contraries it is not necessary, if one is present, that the remaining one also be present. For if all people are healthy, there will be health but no disease; and likewise if all things are white, there will be whiteness but no blackness. Further, if Socrates' being healthy is contrary to Socrates' being sick, and it is not possible for both to belong to the same subject at once, then if one of the contraries is present, it would not be possible for the remaining one also to be present: for if Socrates' being healthy is present, Socrates' being sick could not be. It is clear too that contraries naturally occur in relation to the same thing, either in species or in genus: for disease and health naturally occur in the body of an animal, whiteness and blackness in body without qualification, and justice and injustice in the soul of a human being.
56| It is necessary that all contraries be either in the same genus, or in contrary genera, or be themselves genera. For white and black are in the same genus, since their genus is color; justice and injustice are in contrary genera, since the genus of the one is virtue and of the other vice; while good and bad are not in a genus, but happen themselves to be genera of certain things. One thing is said to be prior to another in four ways. First and most properly, in respect of time, according to which one thing is called older than another and more ancient: for it is by having a greater amount of time that a thing is called both older and more ancient. Second, that which does not reciprocate as to the implication of being, as the one is prior to the two: for if there are two, it follows immediately that there is one, but if there is one, it is not necessary that there be two, so that the implication of being does not reciprocate from the one to the remaining term. And a thing seems to be prior when the implication of being does not reciprocate from it. Third, priority is spoken of in respect of some order, as in the case of the sciences and of speeches. For in the demonstrative sciences there is a prior and a posterior in order (the elements are prior in order to the diagrams, and in grammar the letters are prior to the syllables), and likewise in speeches: for the introduction is prior in order to the narration.
57| Further, besides what has been said, the better and the more honorable seem to be prior by nature. And most people are accustomed to say that those they hold in higher honor and love more are prior in their own regard. This way is nearly the most foreign of the ways mentioned. The ways of speaking of the prior, then, are roughly this many. But besides those mentioned there would seem to be yet another way of the prior: for among things that reciprocate as to the implication of being, whichever is in some way the cause of the being of the other might reasonably be called prior by nature. That there are some such cases is clear: for a man's being reciprocates, as to the implication of being, with the true statement about him. For if there is a man, the statement by which we say that there is a man is true; and it reciprocates too: for if the statement by which we say that there is a man is true, there is a man. But the true statement is in no way the cause of the thing's being, whereas the thing does seem in some way the cause of the statement's being true: for it is by the thing's being or not being that the statement is called true or false. So there are five ways in which one thing is said to be prior to another.
58| Things are said to be simultaneous, in the strict and most proper sense, when their coming to be is at the same time: for neither of them is prior or posterior to the other. Such things are said to be simultaneous in time. Things are simultaneous by nature when they reciprocate as to the implication of being, but neither is in any way the cause of the other's being, as in the case of the double and the half: for these reciprocate (if there is a double there is a half, and if there is a half there is a double), but neither is the cause of the other's being. Also things that are derived by division from the same genus, set over against one another, are said to be simultaneous by nature. Things are said to be set over against one another by the same division when they fall under the same division, as the winged does against the footed and the aquatic: for these are set over against one another from the same genus, since animal is divided into these, into the winged, the footed, and the aquatic, and none of these is prior or posterior to the others, but such things seem to be simultaneous by nature. Each of these could again be divided into species, for instance the footed, the winged, and the aquatic. So those too will be simultaneous by nature, whatever is derived from the same genus by the same division. But genera are always prior to species: for they do not reciprocate as to the implication of being, as when there is an aquatic thing there is an animal, but when there is an animal it is not necessary that there be an aquatic thing.
59| Things are said to be simultaneous by nature, then, whatever reciprocates as to the implication of being while neither is in any way the cause of the other's being, and things derived from the same genus by opposed division. But things are simultaneous without qualification when their coming to be is at the same time. Of motion there are six species: coming to be, perishing, increase, decrease, alteration, and change of place. That the other motions are different from one another is clear: coming to be is not perishing, nor is increase decrease, nor is change of place either of these, and likewise for the rest. But in the case of alteration there is a certain puzzle, whether what is being altered must not perhaps be being altered in respect of one of the remaining motions. This is not true: for it happens that we are altered in respect of nearly all or most of our affections without sharing in any of the other motions; for what is moved in respect of an affection is not necessarily increased or decreased, and likewise in the other cases, so that alteration would be distinct from the other motions. For if it were the same, what is being altered would have to be increasing or decreasing as well, or to be undergoing one of the other motions immediately; but this is not necessary. Likewise what is increasing, or moving with some other motion, would have to be altering as well; but there are some things that increase without being altered, for instance the square, when a gnomon is placed around it, has increased, but has become no more altered; and likewise in the other such cases. So the motions would be distinct from one another.
60| Now rest, taken without qualification, is opposed to motion; and and particular motions are opposed by particular ones — destruction to generation, decrease to increase, and rest in place to change of place, decrease to increase, and rest in place to change of place. Change to the contrary place seems most of all to be the true opposite, as change upward is opposed to change downward, and change downward to change upward. But for the remaining kind of motion we have listed, it is not easy to state just what is opposed to it; indeed it seems that nothing is opposed to it, unless one were to set against it, in this case too, rest in respect of quality, or change to the contrary quality — just as, in the case of change of place, we set against it rest in place, or change to the contrary place. For alteration is change in respect of quality. So rest in respect of quality, or change to the contrary quality, will be opposed to motion in respect of quality — for instance, coming to be white is opposed to coming to be black; for a thing is altered by a change occurring between contrary qualities.
61| 'Having' is spoken of in several ways. It is spoken of either as a state and disposition or some other quality — for we are said to have some piece of knowledge and to have virtue. Or as a quantity, as when someone happens to have a certain size — for a thing is said to have a magnitude of three cubits or four cubits. Or as the things around the body, such as a cloak or a tunic. Or as in a part, as a ring is in a hand. Or as a part, as a hand or a foot. Or as in a container, as the bushel has wheat or the jar has wine — for the jar is said to have wine, and the bushel wheat; all these, then, are said to have in the sense of being in a container. Or as a possession — for we are said to have a house or a field. We are also said to have a wife, and a wife to have a husband; but this last-mentioned way of having seems to be the most alien of all the senses, for by 'having a wife' we signify nothing other than that he lives together with her. Perhaps other ways of having might also turn out to exist; but pretty much all the ones customarily spoken of have now been enumerated.