Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language
1| Or rather this does not signify 'at some time' either, but 'to one who is disposed in a certain way'; for it makes no difference at what time, provided only that he is so disposed. What holds 'without qualification' is what you will say is fine, or the opposite, with nothing added. For instance, you will not say that sacrificing one's father is fine, but that it is fine for certain people; it is not, then, fine without qualification. But you will say that honoring the gods is fine without adding anything; for it is fine without qualification. So whatever, with nothing added, seems to be fine or shameful or anything else of that sort, will be said to hold without qualification. Book Three.
2| Which of two or more things is more choiceworthy or better must be examined on the basis of the following. First let it be determined that we are conducting this inquiry not concerning things far apart and having a great difference from one another (for no one is at a loss whether happiness or wealth is more choiceworthy), but concerning things close together, and about which we are in dispute as to which one we ought rather to side with, because we see no superiority of the one over the other. Clearly, then, in such cases, once a superiority, whether of one point or more, has been shown, the mind will agree that this is the more choiceworthy one, whichever of the two happens to be superior. First, then, what lasts longer or is more secure is more choiceworthy than what is less so. And also whatever the practically wise man, or the good man, would choose rather, or correct law, or those excellent people who make their choices in each matter insofar as they are such, or those with knowledge in each kind, or whatever most or all choose — for instance in medicine or in carpentry, what most or all doctors choose — or in general whatever most, or all, or all things choose, as with the good; for all things desire the good. What is going to be said must be directed to whatever purpose it may be useful for.
3| Without qualification, what accords with the better knowledge is better and more choiceworthy, but for a particular person, what accords with his own proper knowledge. Next, what is precisely a this-something is more choiceworthy than what is not in the genus — for instance, justice than the just; for the one is in the genus of the good, the other is not, and the one is precisely good, the other is not; for nothing is said to be precisely what its genus is, if it does not happen to be in that genus — for instance, the white man is not precisely color. The same holds in other cases too. And what is choiceworthy in its own right is more choiceworthy than what is choiceworthy because of something else — for instance, being healthy than exercising; for the one is choiceworthy in its own right, the other because of something else. And what holds in its own right is more choiceworthy than what holds accidentally — for instance, one's friends being just than one's enemies being so. For the one is choiceworthy in its own right, the other accidentally; for we choose that our enemies be just accidentally, so that they may do us no harm. This is the same as the previous point, but differs in manner; for we choose that our friends be just in its own right, even if nothing is going to come of it for us, even if they are among the Indians —
4| whereas we choose that our enemies be just because of something else, so that they do us no harm. And what is a cause of good in its own right is more choiceworthy than what is a cause accidentally, as virtue is more choiceworthy than luck; for the one is a cause of goods in its own right, the other accidentally, and likewise for anything else of that sort. The same holds too on the side of the opposite: what is a cause of evil in its own right is more to be avoided than what is a cause accidentally — for instance, vice and luck; for the one is bad in its own right, whereas luck is bad accidentally. And what is good without qualification is more choiceworthy than what is good for someone — for instance, being made healthy than being cut surgically; for the one is good without qualification, the other is good for someone, namely for the one who needs surgery. And what is natural is more choiceworthy than what is not natural — for instance, justice than the just; for the one is natural, the other acquired. And what belongs to the better and more honorable thing is more choiceworthy — for instance, what belongs to a god rather than to a man, and to the soul rather than to the body. And what is peculiar to the better thing is better than what is peculiar to the worse — for instance, what belongs to god rather than what belongs to man; for with respect to what is common to both, they do not differ from one another at all, but in their peculiar features the one exceeds the other. And what resides in better, prior, or more honorable things is better — for instance, health is better than strength and beauty.
5| For health is found in the moist and the dry and the hot and the cold, or, put simply, in the primary elements that make up the animal, while other things are found among the later products - for instance, strength is in the sinews and bones, while beauty of the limbs seems to be a kind of proportion. And the end is more choiceworthy than the things directed toward the end, and of two things directed toward an end, the one nearer the end is more choiceworthy. And in general, what bears on the end of life is more choiceworthy than what bears on something else - for instance, what tends toward happiness rather than what tends toward practical wisdom. And the possible is more choiceworthy than the impossible. Again, of two productive things, the one whose end is better is more choiceworthy. And between a productive thing and an end, judge by proportion: whenever the end exceeds the other end by more than that end exceeds its own proper productive cause, then the thing productive of the first end is better than the second end. For instance, if happiness exceeds health by more than health exceeds the healthy regimen, then what is productive of happiness is better than health. For by as much as happiness exceeds health, by that much what is productive of happiness exceeds the healthy regimen. But health exceeded the healthy regimen by less, so what is productive of happiness exceeds the healthy regimen by more than health exceeds the healthy regimen. It is clear, then, that what is productive of happiness is more choiceworthy than health -
6| for it exceeds the same thing by more. Again, what is fine in its own right is also more honorable and more praiseworthy - for instance, friendship is more so than wealth, and justice than strength. For some things belong among the honored and praised in their own right, while others do not belong there in their own right but on account of something else; for no one honors wealth for its own sake but for the sake of something else, whereas friendship is honored in its own right, even if nothing else is going to come to us from it.
7| Again, whenever two things are extremely similar to each other and we cannot see any superiority of the one over the other, we should look to what accompanies them; for whatever a greater good follows is the more choiceworthy. And if the things that follow are bad, then whichever is followed by the lesser bad is the more choiceworthy. For since both are choiceworthy, nothing prevents some difficulty from being attached to them as well. The inquiry into 'what follows' is twofold, for something can follow either earlier or later - for instance, for the person learning, not knowing follows earlier and knowing follows later. And as a rule what follows later is better. So one should take whichever of the two consequences is useful. Again, more goods are better than fewer, either simply, or when the other goods are present in the first set - that is, the fewer goods are present among the more. An objection arises where one thing exists for the sake of another; for in that case the two together are no more choiceworthy than the one alone - for instance, being healed and health are no more choiceworthy than health alone, since we choose being healed for the sake of health. And nothing prevents things that are not good from being more choiceworthy than goods - for instance, happiness and something else that is not good may be more choiceworthy than justice and courage. And the same things are more choiceworthy with pleasure than without pleasure.
8| And the same things are more choiceworthy without pain than with pain. And each thing is more choiceworthy in the occasion when it has greater power, as, for instance, freedom from pain is more choiceworthy in old age than in youth, since it has greater power in old age. On the same principle, practical wisdom too is more choiceworthy in old age; for no one chooses the young as leaders, on the ground that they are not to be reckoned as possessing practical wisdom. But courage is the reverse; for the activity in accordance with courage is more necessary in youth. Likewise too with temperance; for the young are more troubled than the old by their appetites. And whatever is more useful at every occasion, or at most occasions, is more choiceworthy - for instance, justice and temperance are more choiceworthy than courage, since the former are always useful while the latter is useful only sometimes. And whatever is such that, when everyone possesses it, we have no need of the other, or such that, when we have it, we need the remaining thing in addition, judge as with justice and courage: for if everyone were just, courage would be of no use, whereas if everyone were courageous, justice would still be useful. Again, judge from the destructions and losses and comings-to-be and acquisitions, and from the contraries; for the things whose destructions are more to be avoided are themselves more choiceworthy. Likewise too with the losses and the contraries -
9| for the thing whose loss, or whose contrary, is more to be avoided, is itself more choiceworthy. But with comings-to-be and acquisitions it is the reverse; for the things whose acquisitions and comings-to-be are more choiceworthy are themselves also more choiceworthy. Another commonplace: what is nearer to the good is better and more choiceworthy. And so is what is more similar to the good - for instance, for instance, justice is more similar to the good than a just man is. And And what is more similar to something better than itself, just as some say Ajax is better than Odysseus because he is more similar to Achilles. An objection to this is that it is not true; for nothing prevents Ajax from being more similar to Achilles in some respect other than that in which Achilles is best, while the other man, though good, is not similar in that respect. One should also consider whether the resemblance holds in the more ridiculous respect, as the ape resembles the human being while the horse does not; for the ape is not thereby finer, though it is more similar to the human being. Again, in the case of two things, if the one is more similar to the better and the other more similar to the worse, then the one more similar to the better would be better. But this too admits of an objection; for nothing prevents the one from being only slightly similar to the better while the other is very similar to the worse - for instance, if Ajax is only slightly similar to Achilles while Odysseus is very similar to Nestor.
10| And if the one that is similar to the better resembles it in its worse aspects, while the one that is similar to the worse resembles it in its better aspects, judge as with the horse and the donkey, and the ape and the human being. Another commonplace: what is more conspicuous is more choiceworthy than what is less so, and so is what is harder to attain; for we are more pleased to have what is not easy to obtain. And what is more distinctive is more choiceworthy than what is more common. And what has less in common with what is bad; for what no difficulty attends is more choiceworthy than what some difficulty attends. Again, if this is simply better than that, then the best thing in this class is better than the best thing in the other class - for instance, if a human being is better than a horse, then the best human being is better than the best horse. And if the best of one class is better than the best of another, then that class is simply better than the other - for instance, if the best human being is better than the best horse, then a human being is simply better than a horse. Again, things our friends can share in are more choiceworthy than things they cannot. And whatever we would rather do for a friend than for a chance acquaintance is more choiceworthy - for instance, acting justly and doing good rather than merely seeming to; for we want to do good to our friends rather than merely seem to, whereas with chance acquaintances it is the reverse. And things that come from surplus are better than the necessities, and sometimes more choiceworthy too -
11| for living well is better than merely living, and living well comes from surplus, while mere living is a necessity. But sometimes the better things are not also the more choiceworthy; for it does not follow that if something is better it is also necessarily more choiceworthy - at any rate, philosophizing is better than money-making, but it is not more choiceworthy for someone who lacks the necessities. A thing comes from surplus whenever, once the necessities are provided, one further procures some of the fine things in addition. Roughly speaking, perhaps, the necessary is the more choiceworthy, while what comes from surplus is the better. And what cannot be procured from another is more choiceworthy than what can also be procured from another - as is the case with justice compared to courage. And if this is choiceworthy without that, but that is not choiceworthy without this - for instance, power without practical wisdom is not choiceworthy, but practical wisdom without power is choiceworthy. And of two things, if we deny having the one so that the remaining one may seem to belong to us, then the one we want to seem to have is more choiceworthy - for instance, we deny being industrious so that we may seem to be naturally gifted. Again, that whose absence people are less inclined to be blamed for resenting is more choiceworthy. And that whose absence, if a person does not resent it, is more to be blamed, is more choiceworthy.
12| Again, among things falling under the same form, that which has its proper virtue is more choiceworthy than that which lacks it; and if both have it, the one that has it more. Again, if the one, whenever present, makes its subject good, but the other does not, the one that does so is more choiceworthy, just as what makes something hot is hotter than what does not. And if both make their subject good, the one that does so more is more choiceworthy; or if the better and more authoritative thing produces the good, as when the one affects the soul and the other the body. Again, argue from the cases, the uses, the actions, and the works, and conversely from these to the qualities themselves, since they follow one another: for instance, if acting justly is more choiceworthy than acting bravely, then justice is more choiceworthy than bravery; and if justice is more choiceworthy than bravery, then acting justly is more choiceworthy than acting bravely. The same holds in the other cases. Again, if of some one and the same thing one part is a greater good and another a lesser, the greater is more choiceworthy. Or if one of two things is the greater good relative to a greater thing. But also, if there are two things more choiceworthy than some third thing, the one that is more choiceworthy than the other is more choiceworthy than that less choiceworthy one. Again, that whose excess is more choiceworthy than the excess of something else is itself more choiceworthy than that other thing, for example friendship compared to money;
13| for the excess of friendship is more choiceworthy than the excess of money. And that of which one would rather be the cause to oneself than of the other is more choiceworthy, as friends are more choiceworthy than money. Again, argue from addition: if adding something to the same thing makes the whole more choiceworthy. But one must be careful in proposing cases where the common element cooperates, or is otherwise useful, with the one of the two things added but not with the other, as with a saw and a sickle together with carpentry: the saw is more choiceworthy when paired with carpentry, but not more choiceworthy without qualification. Again, if adding something to a lesser thing makes the whole greater. Similarly also from subtraction: for that thing is the greater, whose subtraction from the same whole leaves a smaller remainder, when the removal in question makes the remainder smaller. And if the one thing is choiceworthy in its own right and the other only for the sake of reputation, as health is more choiceworthy than beauty. The mark of what is choiceworthy for reputation is that one would not care to have it if no one else knew of it. And if the one thing is choiceworthy both in its own right and for reputation, but the other only for one of these, the former is more choiceworthy. And whichever of the two is more honored in its own right is also better and more choiceworthy. A thing would be more honored in its own right if we choose it for its own sake even when nothing else is going to result from it.
14| Again, one should distinguish in how many ways a thing is called choiceworthy, and for the sake of what, for instance the advantageous, the fine, or the pleasant: for what is useful for all purposes, or for more purposes, would be more choiceworthy than what is not useful in the same way. And when the same properties belong to both things, one must examine which one has them more, whether it is more pleasant, or finer, or more advantageous. Again, what is choiceworthy for the sake of a better thing is more choiceworthy, as what is done for the sake of virtue rather than for the sake of pleasure. The same holds for things to be avoided: what is more of an obstacle to choiceworthy things is more to be avoided, as disease is more to be avoided than ugliness, since disease is more of a hindrance both to pleasure and to being a serious person. Again, argue by showing in the same way that the thing proposed is both to be avoided and choiceworthy: for a thing that one would equally choose and avoid is less choiceworthy than something that is choiceworthy only. The comparisons of things with one another, then, are to be made in the manner stated. The same commonplaces are useful also for showing that anything whatever is choiceworthy or to be avoided; one need only remove the reference to comparison with something else. For if what is more honored is more choiceworthy, then what is honored is also choiceworthy; and if what is more useful is more choiceworthy, then what is useful is also choiceworthy. The same holds in the other cases that admit this kind of comparison. For in some cases we say straightaway, on the basis of comparing one thing with another, that each is choiceworthy, or that the one is, as when we say that the one is good by nature and the other not by nature; for what is good by nature is evidently choiceworthy.
15| One should take the commonplaces concerning the more and the greater in the most general form possible, for taken in this way they will be useful for more purposes. It is possible to make some of the ones already stated more general by slightly altering the wording, for instance: what is such by nature is more such than what is not such by nature. And if the one thing, when present or when possessed, produces a certain effect and the other does not, then whatever at some time produces it is more such than what does not. And if both produce it, the one that produces it more is more such. Again, if of some one and the same thing one part is more such and another less; and if the one is more such than something that is such, while the other is such compared to something that is not such, clearly the first is more such. Again, argue from addition: if, added to the same thing, it makes the whole more such, or if, added to something less such, it makes the whole more such. Similarly also from subtraction: for that thing whose removal leaves the remainder less such is itself more such. And things less mixed with their contraries are more such, for instance the whiter thing is the one less mixed with black. Again, apart from what has been said before, whatever admits more fully the proper account of the thing in question, for instance, if the account of white is a color that separates the sight, then the thing that is more a color separating the sight is whiter.
16| If the problem is proposed in a particular rather than a universal form, then first of all all the universal commonplaces stated above for establishing or demolishing are useful. For in refuting or establishing something universally we also show it of the particular case: for if it belongs to all, it also belongs to some, and if it belongs to none, it does not belong to some either. But the most opportune and common of the commonplaces are those from opposites, from coordinate terms, and from cases: for it is equally plausible to claim, if every pleasure is good, that every pain is bad, as to claim, if some pleasure is good, that some pain is bad. Again, if some perception is not a capacity, then some lack of perception is not an incapacity. And if something apprehensible is knowable, then some apprehension is knowledge. Again, if something unjust is good, then something just is bad; and if something done justly is bad, then something done unjustly is good. And if something pleasant is to be avoided, some pleasure is to be avoided. In the same way, too, if something pleasant is beneficial, some pleasure is beneficial. And likewise with things that destroy, and with comings-to-be and destructions. For if something that destroys pleasure or knowledge, being itself something, is good, then some pleasure or some knowledge would be among the bad things.
17| Similarly too, if some destruction of knowledge is among the good things, or its coming-to-be among the bad things, then some knowledge will be among the bad things, for instance, if forgetting the shameful things one has done is among the good things, or remembering them is among the bad things, then knowing the shameful things one has done would be among the bad things. The same holds in the other cases too, for the plausibility works the same way in all of them. Again, argue from the more, the less, and the equally. For if something from another genus is more such, and none of that genus is such, then the thing in question would not be such either, for instance, if some knowledge is more a good than pleasure is, and no knowledge is good, then no pleasure would be good either. And from the equally and from the less in the same way: for one will be able both to demolish and to establish, except that from the equally one can do both, while from the less one can only establish, not demolish. For if some capacity is equally a good as knowledge is, and some capacity is good, then some knowledge is also good. But if no capacity is good, neither is any knowledge. And if some capacity is less of a good than knowledge is, and some capacity is good, then some knowledge is too. But if no capacity is good, it does not follow of necessity that no knowledge is good either.
18| It is clear, then, that establishing a point is possible only from the lesser degree. But it is possible to demolish a point not only from a different genus but also from the same one, by taking what is most such-and-such, for example, if it is laid down that some kind of knowledge is good, and it is shown that practical wisdom is not good, then no other kind will be good either, since not even the one that seems most so is. Again, from a hypothesis: claiming similarly that if it holds of one, it holds of all, or fails to hold of all, for example, if the human soul is immortal, so are the others, and if this one is not, neither are the others. Now if it is laid down that the attribute holds of some subject, we must show that it does not hold of some subject; for by the hypothesis it will follow that it holds of none. But if it is laid down that the attribute does not hold of some subject, we must show that it holds of some subject; for in this way too it will follow that it holds of all. It is clear that one who lays down the hypothesis makes the problem, though stated as particular, into a universal one; for he demands that the person who agrees to the particular case agree to the universal, since, if it holds of one, you demand that it hold of all alike. When the problem is indefinite, then, it is possible to demolish it in only one way, for example if someone said that pleasure is good, or not good, and defined nothing further. For if he said that some pleasure is good, we must show universally that no pleasure is good, if the thesis in question is to be refuted.
19| Likewise, if he said that some pleasure is not good, we must show universally that every pleasure is good; there is no other way to refute it. For if we show that there is some pleasure that is not good, or that is good, the thesis in question is not yet refuted. It is clear, then, that demolishing is possible in only one way, but establishing in two ways; for whether we show universally that every pleasure is good, or that some pleasure is good, the thesis in question will have been shown. Likewise, if we need to argue that some pleasure is not good, if we show either that no pleasure is good or that some pleasure is not good, we will have argued the point in both ways, both universally and in a particular case, that some pleasure is not good. But when the position is definite, there will be two ways of demolishing it, for example if it were laid down that being good holds of some pleasure but not of another; for whether it is shown that every pleasure is good or that none is, the thesis in question will have been demolished. But if he laid down that only one pleasure is good, there are three ways of demolishing it; for by showing that every pleasure is good, or that none is, or that more than one is, we will have demolished the thesis in question. When the position is defined still more fully, for example that practical wisdom alone among the virtues is knowledge, there are four ways of demolishing it: