Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language
1| An objection to this is that what-is-not follows everything that is coming to be (for what is coming to be does not yet exist) and does not convert (for not everything that is not comes to be); yet what-is-not is not a genus of what is coming to be, for there are simply no species of what-is-not. Concerning genus, then, one must proceed as has been said. E.
2| Whether the thing stated is a property or not must be examined by the following means. A property is assigned either in its own right and always, or in relation to something else and at some time — in its own right, for instance, the property of man that he is by nature a tame animal; in relation to something else, for instance the property of soul relative to body, that the one is commanding and the other subservient; always, for instance the property of god that he is an immortal animal; and at some time, for instance the property of some particular man that he is walking in the gymnasium. When a property is assigned in relation to something else, there are either two problems or four. For if one affirms it of the one and denies this same thing of the other, only two problems arise — for instance, the property of man relative to horse, that he is two-footed. For one could argue both that man is not two-footed, and that the horse is two-footed; in either case one would be attacking the property. But if one affirms of each what belongs to the other and denies of each what does not, there will be four problems — for instance, the property of man relative to horse, that the one is two-footed and the other four-footed. For one can argue both that man is not two-footed and that he is by nature four-footed, and one can argue both that the horse is two-footed and that it is not four-footed.
3| In whatever way, then, it is shown, the proposition at issue is demolished. A property in its own right is one that is assigned in relation to everything and marks a thing off from everything else, as with man, being a mortal animal receptive of knowledge. A property relative to something else is one that marks a thing off not from everything but from something determinate, as with virtue relative to knowledge, in that the one naturally comes to be present in several parts of the soul, while the other comes to be present only in the reasoning part and in things that have a reasoning part. An always-property is one that holds true at every time and is never absent, as with the animal's being composed of soul and body. A sometimes-property is one that holds true at a certain time and does not necessarily always attend the thing, as with a particular man's walking about in the marketplace. Now to render a property relative to something else is to state a differentia, either in all cases and always, or for the most part and in most cases. In all cases and always, for example, is man's property relative to horse, that he is two-footed; for man is always and in every case two-footed, while no horse is ever two-footed at all. For the most part and in most cases, on the other hand, is the property of the reasoning part relative to the appetitive and spirited parts, namely that the one gives orders and the other is subject to them;
4| for the reasoning part does not always give orders, but is sometimes itself given orders, nor is the appetitive and spirited part always given orders, but sometimes itself gives orders, whenever the man's soul is in a bad condition. Of properties, those most suited to argument are the ones in their own right, the always-properties, and the ones relative to something else. For a property relative to something else yields more problems, as we said before as well; for the problems that necessarily arise are either two or four, so there come to be more arguments bearing on them. As for the property in its own right and the always-property, one can attack them in a number of ways, or examine them over a number of times: the property in its own right in a number of ways, since the property must belong to the thing in relation to each of the things there are, so that if it is not marked off from absolutely everything, the property will not have been well assigned. The always-property must be examined over a number of times; for if it does not hold now, or did not hold before, or will not hold later, it will not be a property. As for the sometimes-property, we consider it in no other respect than with reference to the time now in question; so there are not many arguments bearing on it. A problem suited to argument is one on which arguments could arise that are both numerous and good.
5| The property relative to something else, then, once stated, must be examined by means of the commonplaces concerning accident, to see whether it belongs to the one thing but not to the other; but the always-properties and the properties in their own right must be studied by means of the following.
6| First, whether the property has been assigned well or not well. One respect in which it is not well or is well assigned is this: whether the property is stated by means of things better known or not by means of things better known — refuting it if not by means of things better known, establishing it if by means of things better known. Of not being by means of things better known, one case is when the property assigned is altogether less knowable than the thing whose property it is stated to be; for then the property will not have been well laid down. For we render a property for the sake of knowledge; it must therefore be assigned by means of things better known, since only so will it be possible to grasp it adequately. For instance, since the one who said that fire's property is being most similar to soul has used soul, which is less known than fire, in the description (for we know better what fire is than what soul is), the property of fire, being most similar to soul, would not be well laid down. The other case is when this thing is not better known as belonging to that thing. For it is not enough that the term be better known than the thing in question; it must also be better known as belonging to that thing. For one who does not know whether it belongs to this thing will not know either whether it belongs to this thing alone, so that whichever of these is the case, the property becomes unclear. For instance, since the one who said fire's property is being that in which soul first naturally exists has used, as belonging to fire, something less known — namely whether soul exists in this and whether it exists in it first — the property of fire, being that in which soul first naturally exists, would not be well laid down.
7| To establish it, on the other hand, one should see whether the property is stated by means of things better known, and whether it is better known in both these respects. For then the property will have been well laid down in this respect; for among the commonplaces that establish that a thing is well stated, some will show this only in this one respect, others will show without qualification that it is well stated. For instance, since the one who said that the property of animal is having perception has assigned the property by means of things better known, and better known in both respects, the property of animal, having perception, would in this respect have been well assigned. Next, in refuting, see whether any of the names used in the assigned property is said in more than one way, or whether the whole expression signifies more than one thing; for then the property will not have been well laid down. For instance, since perceiving signifies more than one thing — one, having perception, the other, using perception — the property of animal, being naturally disposed to perceive, would not have been well laid down. The reason one must not use either a name said in more than one way or an expression signifying the property in more than one way is that what is said in more than one way makes the statement unclear, since the one who is going to attack it is at a loss as to which of the several things said is meant; for a property is assigned for the sake of learning. Moreover, in addition to this, a refutation necessarily arises against those who assign a property in this way, whenever someone constructs the syllogism on the sense in which the word is said in more than one way, taking the discordant one.
8| To establish it, see whether neither any of the names nor the whole expression signifies more than one thing; for then the property will have been well laid down in this respect. For instance, since neither body nor most easily moved toward the upper region nor the whole composed of these signifies several things, the property of fire, a body most easily moved toward the upper region, would in this respect have been well laid down. Next, in refuting, see whether the thing whose property is assigned is itself said in more than one way, and it has not been determined of which of these the property is being set down; for then the property will not have been well assigned. The reasons for this are not unclear from what has been said before; for the same consequences necessarily follow. For instance, since knowing this signifies many things — knowing it as having knowledge of it, using knowledge of it, having knowledge belonging to it, using knowledge belonging to it — the property assigned for knowing this would not have been well assigned, since it has not been determined of which of these the property is being set down. To establish it, see whether the thing whose property is set down is not said in more than one way but is one and simple; for then the property will have been well laid down in this respect.
9| For instance, since man is said in one sense, the property set down for man, a tame animal by nature, would have been well laid down in this respect. Next, in refuting, see whether the same thing has been said more than once in the property. For people often do this without noticing, in properties just as in definitions. When the property is affected in this way it will not have been well laid down; for being said more than once confuses the hearer, so that the statement necessarily becomes unclear, and besides this such people are thought to be babbling. Saying the same thing more than once happens in two ways: in one way, when one names the same thing more than once, as if someone should assign the property of fire, body, as the finest of bodies (for here he has said body more than once); in the second way, when one substitutes expressions for names, as if someone should assign the property of earth as substance that by nature travels most toward the lower region among bodies, and then substitute for bodies the expression substances of such-and-such a kind; for body and substance of such-and-such a kind are one and the same thing. This person will have said substance more than once, so that neither of these properties would be well laid down. To establish it, see whether he uses no name more than once; for then the property will have been well assigned in this respect. For instance, since the one who said that man's property is an animal receptive of knowledge has not used the same name more than once, the property of man would in this respect have been well assigned.
10| Next, for refuting: see whether he has assigned, as part of the property, a term of such a kind that it belongs to everything. For a term that does not separate the subject from other things will be useless, and what is stated as part of a property must separate, just as the elements in definitions must; so the property will not be well stated. For example: since the one who defined the property of knowledge as "an assumption unshaken by argument, being one" has used, in the property, the term "one," which belongs to everything, the property of knowledge would not be well stated. For establishing: see whether he has used nothing common, but rather something that separates the subject from other things; for the property will be well stated on this score. For example: since the one who said the property of an animal is "to have a soul" has used nothing common, the property of an animal, "to have a soul," would be well stated on this score. Next, for refuting: see whether he assigns several properties for the same thing without specifying that he is positing several; for the property will not be well stated. For just as in definitions nothing further must be added beyond the account that makes clear the substance, so too in properties nothing further must be added beyond the account that constitutes the stated property; for such an addition becomes useless.
11| For example: since the one who said the property of fire is a body "most fine and most light" has given several properties (for each is truly said of fire alone), the property of fire, "a body most fine and most light," would not be well stated. For establishing: see whether he has assigned not several properties of the same thing but one; for the property will be well stated on this score. For example: since the one who said the property of the liquid is a body "brought into every shape" has given one property and not several, the property of the liquid would be well stated on this score. Next, for refuting: see whether he has made additional use of the very thing whose property he is assigning, or of something belonging to it; for the property will not be well stated. For a property is assigned for the sake of learning something; now the thing itself is just as unknown as itself, and anything belonging to it is posterior to it — so it is not more knowable. Hence nothing further comes to be learned through such things. For example: since the one who said the property of an animal is "the substance of which man is a species" has made additional use of something belonging to it, the property would not be well stated. For establishing: see whether he has used neither the thing itself nor anything belonging to it; for the property will be well stated on this score. For example: since the one who posited the property of an animal as "that which is composed of soul and body" has made additional use of neither the thing itself nor anything belonging to it, the property of an animal would be well assigned on this score.
12| One must examine the remaining cases in the same way — those that do or do not make a thing more knowable. For refuting: see whether he has made additional use of something opposite, or altogether simultaneous in nature with the subject, or posterior to it; for the property will not be well stated. For the opposite is simultaneous in nature, and what is simultaneous in nature, and likewise what is posterior, does not make a thing more knowable. For example: since the one who said the property of the good is "that which is most opposed to the bad" has made additional use of the opposite of the good, the property of the good would not be well assigned. For establishing: see whether he has made additional use of nothing — neither of an opposite, nor of anything altogether simultaneous in nature, nor of anything posterior; for the property will be well assigned on this score. For example: since the one who posited the property of knowledge as "the most trustworthy assumption" has made additional use of nothing opposite, nor simultaneous in nature, nor posterior, the property of knowledge would be well stated on this score. Next, for refuting: see whether he has assigned as a property something that does not always accompany the subject, but something that happens only at times, as if it were a property; for the property will not have been well stated. For it is neither the case that, wherever we grasp the thing as present, the name is thereby necessarily truly said of it, nor that, wherever it is grasped as not present, the name will thereby necessarily not be said of it.
13| Moreover, beyond this, not even when he has assigned the property will it be clear whether it belongs, if indeed it is of the kind liable to be absent; so the property will not be clear. For example: since the one who posited "to be at rest at some times and to move" as the property of an animal has given a property of the kind that does not hold as a property at every time, the property would not be well stated. For establishing: see whether he has assigned as property what of necessity always holds; for the property will be well stated on this score. For example: since the one who posited the property of virtue as "that which makes its possessor good" has assigned as property what always accompanies, the property of virtue would be well assigned on this score. Next, for refuting: see whether, in assigning a property that holds only now, he has failed to specify that he is assigning a now-property; for the property will not be well stated. First, because everything that departs from customary usage needs a specification; and it is customary for everyone, as a rule, to assign as property what always accompanies. Second, because one who has not specified leaves it unclear whether he meant to posit a now-property; so no pretext should be granted against censure. For example: since the one who posited "sitting with someone" as the property of a particular man is positing a now-property, he would not have assigned the property well, if he spoke without making the specification.
14| For establishing: see whether, in assigning a now-property, he specified — positing that he is assigning a now-property; for the property will be well stated on this score. For example: since the one who said the property of a particular man is "walking now" made this specification when he posited it, the property would be well stated. Next, for refuting: see whether he has assigned a property that is plainly not present otherwise than by perception; for the property will not be well stated. For everything perceptible, once it falls outside perception, becomes unclear; it is not evident whether it still belongs, since it is known only by perception. And this will hold true in the case of things that do not of necessity always accompany the subject. For example: since the one who posited the property of the sun as "the brightest star moving above the earth" has used, in the property, "moving above the earth," which is known by perception, the property of the sun would not be well assigned; for it will be unclear, when the sun sets, whether it is moving above the earth, because our perception fails us at that time. For establishing: see whether he has assigned a property that either is not plain by perception, or, being perceptible, is plainly present of necessity —
15| for the property will be well stated on this score. For example: since the one who posited the property of a surface as "that which is first colored" has made additional use of something perceptible, being colored, but of a kind that is plainly always present, the property of a surface would be well assigned on this score. Next, for refuting: see whether he has given the definition as though it were the property; for the property will not be well stated — for a property need not make clear the essence. For example: since the one who said the property of man is "a footed, two-footed animal," which signifies the essence, has given this as the property of man, the property of man would not be well assigned. For establishing: see whether he has given the property as something reciprocally predicated, without making clear the essence; for the property will be well assigned on this score. For example: since the one who posited the property of man as "an animal tame by nature" has given the property as reciprocally predicated, without making clear the essence, the property of man would be well assigned on this score. Next, for refuting: see whether the one who assigned the property has not assigned it with reference to what the thing is. For in properties, just as in definitions, the genus must first be assigned, and only then must the remaining elements be attached, and the subject separated from other things.
16| So a property not stated in this way would not be well assigned. For example: since the one who said the property of an animal is "to have a soul" did not posit it with reference to what an animal is, the property of an animal would not be well stated. For establishing: see whether someone, having posited the genus with reference to what the thing is whose property he assigns, then attaches the remaining elements; for the property will be well assigned on this score. For example: since the one who posited the property of man as "an animal receptive of knowledge" assigned the property after positing the genus with reference to what man is, the property of man would be well stated on this score.
17| Whether, then, a property has been rendered well or not well must be examined by means of what follows. But whether what has been stated is a property at all, or not a property, must be considered from the following. For the topics used by those who simply establish that the property is well assigned will be the same as those used by people who establish that it is a property at all; they will accordingly be discussed among those. First, then, in demolishing, one should look to each thing of which the property has been assigned, [for example] whether it belongs to none of them, or whether it is not true in this respect, or whether it is not a property of each of them in respect of that in respect of which the property has been assigned; for what has been posited to be a property will not be a property. For example, since it is not true of the geometer that he cannot be deceived by argument (for the geometer is deceived whenever a diagram is falsely drawn), 'not being deceived by argument' would not be a property of the knower. In establishing, one should look whether it is true of everything and is true in this respect too; for what has been posited to be a property will be a property. For example, since 'animal receptive of knowledge' is true of every human, and true of him qua human, 'animal receptive of knowledge' would be a property of human. This topic, for the demolisher, is: whether the formula is not true of that of which the name is true, and whether the name is not true of that of which the formula is true;
18| for the establisher: whether wherever the name holds the formula is also predicated, and wherever the formula holds the name too is predicated. Next, for the demolisher: whether the formula is not said of that of which the name is said, and whether the name is not said of that of which the formula is said; for what has been posited to be a property will not be a property. For example, since 'animal partaking of knowledge' is true of god, but 'human' is not predicated of god, 'animal partaking of knowledge' would not be a property of human. For the establisher: whether wherever the formula holds the name too is predicated, and wherever the name holds the formula too is predicated; for what has been posited as not being a property will in fact be a property. For example, since wherever 'having a soul' holds, 'animal' is true, and wherever 'animal' holds, 'having a soul' is true, 'having a soul' would be a property of animal. Next, for the demolisher: whether he has assigned the subject as a property of what is said to be present in the subject; for what has been posited will not be a property. For example, since the one who assigns 'fire' as a property of 'the body of finest particles' has assigned the subject as a property of what is predicated of it, 'fire' would not be a property of the body of finest particles. And the reason the subject will not be a property of what is present in the subject is that the same thing would be a property of several things differing in species.
19| For several things differing in species belong to the same thing, each said to hold of it alone, and the subject would be a property of all of them, if a property is posited in this way. For the establisher: whether he has assigned what is present in the subject as a property of the subject. For what has been posited as not being a property will be a property, provided it is predicated only of the things of which the property has been stated. For example, since the one who said that the property of earth is 'the body heaviest in species' has assigned, as the property, what belongs to the subject and is said only of that thing, and it is predicated the way a property is predicated, the property of earth would be correctly posited. Next, for the demolisher: whether he has assigned the property in respect of participation; for what has been posited will not be a property. For what belongs by participation contributes to the essence; and a thing of that kind would be some differentia said of some one species. For example, since the one who said that 'footed biped' is a property of human has assigned the property in respect of participation, 'footed biped' would not be a property of human. For the establisher: whether he has assigned the property not in respect of participation, and not signifying the essence, while the thing is counter-predicated; for what has been posited as not being a property will be a property.
20| For example, since the one who posited 'naturally capable of perceiving' as a property of animal has assigned the property neither in respect of participation nor as signifying the essence, while the thing is counter-predicated, 'naturally capable of perceiving' would be a property of animal. Next, for the demolisher: whether the property cannot belong at the same time as that of which the name holds, but only later or earlier; for what has been posited will not be a property, either never or not always. For example, since it is possible for 'walking through the marketplace' to belong to someone either earlier or later than 'human' does, 'walking through the marketplace' would not be a property of human, either never or not always. For the establisher: whether it necessarily always belongs at the same time, being neither a definition nor a differentia; for what has been posited as not being a property will be a property. For example, since 'animal receptive of knowledge' necessarily always belongs at the same time as 'human,' being neither a differentia nor a definition, 'animal receptive of knowledge' would be a property of human. Next, for the demolisher: whether the same thing is not a property of things that are the same, qua being the same; for what has been posited will not be a property. For example, since 'appearing good to some people' is not a property of the pursuable, 'appearing good to some people' would not be a property of the choiceworthy either;
21| for the pursuable and the choiceworthy are the same. For the establisher: whether the same thing is a property of the same thing, qua being the same; for what has been posited as not being a property will be a property. For example, since 'having a soul in three parts' is said to be a property of human, qua being human, it would also be a property of mortal, qua being mortal: having a soul in three parts. This topic is also useful in the case of the accident; for the same things, qua being the same, must have the same things belong to them, or not belong.
22| Next, for the demolisher: whether the property is not always the same in species for things that are the same in species; for then what has been posited will not be a property of what has been stated either. For example, since human and horse are the same in species, but 'standing by itself' is not always a property of horse, 'moving by itself' would not be a property of human either; for 'moving by itself' and 'standing by itself' are the same in species, in that each belongs to them, as animals, by accident. For the establisher: whether the property is always the same for things that are the same in species; for what has been posited as not being a property will be a property. For example, since 'being a footed biped' is a property of human, 'being a winged biped' would also be a property of bird; for each of these pairs is the same in species, in that the one pair are species falling under the same genus, being under animal, while the other pair are differentiae of a genus, of animal. But this topic is false whenever one of the two things mentioned belongs to only one species, while the other belongs to many, as with 'footed quadruped.' And since 'the same' and 'the different' are said in many ways, it is hard work, for someone taking the terms sophistically, to assign the property of one thing, and one thing only.
23| For what belongs to something to which something is accidental will also belong to the accident when it is taken together with that to which it is accidental -- for example, what belongs to human will also belong to white human, if the human is white, and what belongs to white human will also belong to human. One could discredit many properties by treating the subject as one thing in its own right and another thing together with the accident -- for example, saying that being human is one thing and being white human another, and further treating the state as different from what is said in respect of the state. For what belongs to the state will also belong to what is said in respect of the state, and what belongs to what is said in respect of the state will also belong to the state. For example, since the knower is said to be disposed in accordance with knowledge, 'cannot be talked out of it by argument' would not be a property of knowledge; for the knower too will be unable to be talked out of it by argument. For the establisher, one must say that that to which something is accidental, and the accident taken together with that to which it is accidental, are not simply different; rather, it is called different because being is different for them -- for being human, for the human, is not the same as being white human, for the white human.
24| Further, one must look beyond mere grammatical cases, pointing out that it will not be the knower that is "the thing not to be moved by argument," but the one not to be moved by argument, nor will knowledge be "the thing not to be moved by argument," but the knowledge that is not moved by argument; for against a person who objects on every point, one must take a stand on every point.
25| Next, in demolishing, see whether the person, wishing to render what belongs by nature, has stated it in his wording in such a way that it signifies what always belongs; for what is laid down as a property would then appear to shift. For instance, since the one who says that having two feet is a property of man wishes to render what belongs by nature, but his wording signifies what always belongs, having two feet would not be a property of man; for not every man has two feet. In establishing, see whether the person wishes to render what belongs by nature as a property, and his wording signifies it in that way; for then it will not shift with respect to this property. For instance, since the one who renders "animal receptive of knowledge" as a property of man both wishes and, in his wording, signifies what belongs by nature as a property, it would not shift on this point, so that "animal receptive of knowledge" is a property of man. Further, for all things that are said to belong to something derivatively, through something else being primary, or as belonging to the primary thing itself, it is a task to render the property of such things; for if you render the property of the thing that has it derivatively, it will also be true of the primary thing, while if you posit it of the primary thing, it will also be predicated of the thing that has it derivatively. For instance, if someone renders "being colored" as a property of a surface, "being colored" will also be true of a body, while if of a body, it will also be predicated of a surface.
26| So that it will not be the case that the name is true of exactly what the account is true of. And it happens, in the case of some properties, that a mistake commonly arises from not distinguishing how, and of what things, one posits the property. For everyone attempts to render the property either as what belongs by nature, as "two-footed" belongs to man, or as what merely belongs, as "having four fingers" belongs to some particular man, or as belonging in respect of form, as "finest-particled" belongs to fire, or as belonging without qualification, as "living" belongs to animal, or as belonging derivatively, as "being prudent" belongs to soul, or as belonging to the primary subject, as "being prudent" belongs to the rational part, or as belonging by virtue of having something, as "not to be moved by argument" belongs to the knower (for he will be not moved by argument in no other way than by having something), or by virtue of being had, as "not to be moved by argument" belongs to knowledge, or by virtue of being participated in, as "perceiving" belongs to animal (for something else, too, perceives, for instance man, but it is by participating in this that it perceives), or by virtue of participating, as "living" belongs to some particular animal. Now if one does not add "by nature," one goes wrong, because it is possible for what belongs by nature not to belong to that to which it belongs by nature, as "having two feet" may fail to belong to man. And if one does not specify that one is rendering what merely belongs, one goes wrong because that thing will not always be such as it now happens to belong, as with a man's having four fingers.
27| And if one does not make clear that one is positing it as belonging to the primary subject or as belonging derivatively, then it will not be the case that the name is true of exactly what the account is true of, as with "being colored," whether rendered as a property of a surface or of a body. And if one has not stated beforehand whether he has rendered the property by virtue of having or by virtue of being had, it will fail to be a property; for it will belong—if he renders the property by virtue of being had—to the thing that has it, and if by virtue of having, to the thing that is had, as when "not to be moved by argument" is posited as a property of knowledge or of the knower. And if one has not signified in addition whether by virtue of participating or by virtue of being participated in, the property will belong to certain other things as well; for if one renders it by virtue of being participated in, it will belong to the things that participate, while if by virtue of participating, to the things participated in, as if one should posit "living" as a property of some particular animal or of animal. And if one has not distinguished belonging in respect of form, the property will belong to only one of the things falling under that of which the property is posited; for what belongs in the superlative degree belongs to only one thing, as "lightest" belongs to fire. But sometimes, even in adding "in respect of form," one has gone wrong. For there will need to be one form among the things spoken of, whenever "in respect of form" is added; but this does not hold in some cases, as it does not hold for fire.
28| For there is not one form of fire; for coal, flame, and light differ in form from one another, each of them being fire. And for this reason, whenever "in respect of form" is added, the thing spoken of need not be a single form, because the stated property will belong to some of them more, to others less, as with "finest-particled" in the case of fire; for light is finer-particled than coal and flame. But this ought not to happen, when the name is not also predicated more truly of that of which the account is more truly said; but if it is not so, then it will not hold that of what the account is more truly said, the name too is more truly said. Further, besides this, it will follow that the property is the same both of the thing without qualification and of the thing that most fully is what it is without qualification, as holds for "finest-particled" in the case of fire; for this same thing will also be the property of light, since light is finest-particled. So then, when someone else renders the property in this way, one must attack it, but one must not allow this objection against oneself, but rather, in positing the property straightaway, one must specify in what manner one posits it. Next, in demolishing, see whether one has posited a thing as a property of itself; for the being laid down as a property will not itself be a property.
29| For every thing signifies its own being to itself, and what signifies the being is not a property but a definition. For instance, since the one who says that "the fitting" is a property of "the fine" has rendered a thing as a property of itself (for "the fine" and "the fitting" are the same), "the fitting" would not be a property of "the fine." In establishing, see whether he has posited, not a thing as a property of itself, but something that is counter-predicated of it; for then the being laid down will be a property, even though not being a property in the strict sense. For instance, since the one who posited "ensouled substance" as a property of animal has not rendered a thing as a property of itself, but has rendered something counter-predicated of it, "ensouled substance" would be a property of animal. Next, in the case of things with like parts, one must examine, in demolishing, whether the property of the whole fails to be true of the part, or whether the property of the part is not said of the whole taken together; for then the thing laid down as a property will not be a property. And this does happen in some cases; for one might render a property in the case of things with like parts sometimes by looking to the whole taken together, sometimes by fixing his attention on what is said of the part—and neither will have been rendered correctly. For instance, in the case of the whole taken together: since the one who says that "having for the most part salt water" is a property of the sea has posited the property of a thing with like parts, but has rendered something that is not true of the part (for a particular sea is not "having for the most part salt water"), "having for the most part salt water" would not be a property of the sea.
30| In the case of the part, for instance: since the one who posited "breathable" as a property of air has stated the property of a thing with like parts, but has rendered something that is true of some particular air, while not being said of the whole taken together (for the whole is not breathable), "breathable" would not be a property of air. In establishing, see whether it is true of each of the things with like parts and is also a property of them taken as a whole; for then the thing laid down will be a property, even though not a property in the strict sense. For instance, since it is true of all earth that it is carried downward by nature, and this is also a property of some particular earth in respect of the earth, "being carried downward by nature" would be a property of earth.
31| Next, one must investigate on the basis of opposites — first, on the basis of contraries: to demolish, ask whether the contrary of a thing is not a property of its contrary; for then the contrary will not be a property of the contrary either. For example, since injustice is contrary to justice, and the worst is contrary to the best, and the best is not a property of justice, the worst would not be a property of injustice. To establish, ask whether the contrary of a thing is a property of its contrary; for then the contrary will indeed be a property of the contrary. For example, since bad is contrary to good, and to-be-avoided is contrary to to-be-chosen, and to-be-chosen is a property of the good, to-be-avoided would be a property of the bad. Second, on the basis of relatives: to demolish, ask whether the relative correlate of a thing is not a property of the relative correlate of its correlate; for then the relative correlate will not be a property of the relative correlate either. For example, since double is said in relation to half, and exceeding in relation to exceeded, and exceeding is not a property of double, exceeded would not be a property of half. To establish, ask whether the relative correlate of a thing is a property of the relative correlate of its correlate; for then the relative correlate will indeed be a property of the relative correlate.
32| For example, since double is said in relation to half, and two in relation to one, and it is a property of double to be as two to one, it would be a property of half to be as one to two. Third, to demolish, ask whether what is said in accordance with a state is not a property of the state; for then what is said in accordance with a privation will not be a property of the privation either. And if what is said in accordance with a privation is not a property of the privation, then what is said in accordance with a state will not be a property of the state either. For example, since it is not said that lacking perception is a property of deafness, then having perception would not be a property of hearing either. To establish, ask whether what is said in accordance with a state is a property of the state; for then what is said in accordance with a privation will indeed be a property of the privation. And if what is said in accordance with a privation is a property of the privation, then what is said in accordance with a state will also be a property of the state. For example, since it is a property of sight to see, insofar as we have sight, it would be a property of blindness not to see, insofar as we do not have sight though naturally fitted to have it. Next, from affirmations and negations, first from the predicates themselves.
33| This topic is useful only for demolishing. For example: if the affirmation, or what is said in accordance with the affirmation, is a property of a thing, then its negation, or what is said in accordance with the negation, will not be a property of it. And if the negation, or what is said in accordance with the negation, is a property of the thing, then the affirmation, or what is said in accordance with the affirmation, will not be a property of it — for example, since being ensouled is a property of animal, not-being-ensouled would not be a property of animal. Second, from the things predicated or not predicated, and from the things of which they are predicated or not predicated: to demolish, ask whether the affirmation is not a property of the affirmation; for then the negation will not be a property of the negation either. And if the negation is not a property of the negation, then the affirmation will not be a property of the affirmation either. For example, since animal is not a property of man, not-animal would not be a property of not-man either. And if not-animal appears not to be a property of not-man, then animal will not be a property of man either. To establish, ask whether the affirmation is a property of the affirmation;
34| for then the negation will indeed be a property of the negation. And if the negation is a property of the negation, then the affirmation will also be a property of the affirmation. For example, since not-living is a property of not-animal, living would be a property of animal; and if living appears to be a property of animal, then not-living will appear to be a property of not-animal as well. Third, from the underlying subjects themselves: to demolish, ask whether the attribute given as a property of the affirmation is a property of it; for then the same attribute will not also be a property of the negation. And if the attribute given is a property of the negation, it will not be a property of the affirmation. For example, since being ensouled is a property of animal, being ensouled would not be a property of not-animal. To establish, ask whether the attribute given is not a property of the affirmation — for then it would be a property of the negation. But this topic is false; for an affirmation is not a property of a negation, nor a negation of an affirmation. For an affirmation does not belong to a negation at all, while a negation does belong to an affirmation, but not as a property. Next, from things divided off against one another: to demolish, ask whether none of the things divided off against one another is a property of any of the remaining things divided off against it;
35| for then the thing proposed will not be a property of that of which it is claimed to be a property either. For example, since sensible animal is not a property of any of the other mortal animals, intelligible animal would not be a property of god. To establish, ask whether any one of the remaining things divided off against one another is a property of each of these things divided off; for then the remaining thing will also be a property of that of which it was claimed not to be a property. For example, since it is a property of practical wisdom to be by its nature a virtue of the rational part, and each of the other virtues being taken in the same way, it would be a property of temperance to be by its nature a virtue of the appetitive part.
36| Next, from inflected forms: to demolish, ask whether the inflected form is not a property of the inflected form; for then the inflected form will not be a property of the inflected form either. For example, since finely is not a property of justly, fine would not be a property of just. To establish, ask whether the inflected form is a property of the inflected form; for then the inflected form will indeed be a property of the inflected form. For example, since it is a property of man to be a footed biped, it would be a property of "to man" to be spoken of as "to a footed biped." One must examine this not only in the term itself as stated according to its inflections, but also in the opposites, just as was said in the earlier topics too: to demolish, ask whether the inflected form of the opposite is not a property of the inflected form of the opposite; for then the inflected form of the opposite will not be a property of the inflected form of the opposite either. For example, since well is not a property of justly, badly would not be a property of unjustly. To establish, ask whether the inflected form of the opposite is a property of the inflected form of the opposite; for then the inflected form of the opposite will indeed be a property of the inflected form of the opposite. For example, since the best is a property of the good, the worst would be a property of the bad.
37| Next, from things similarly related: to demolish, ask whether what is similarly related is not a property of what is similarly related; for then what is similarly related will not be a property of what is similarly related either. For example, since the builder is related to making a house in the same way as the doctor is related to making health, and making health is not a property of the doctor, making a house would not be a property of the builder. To establish, ask whether what is similarly related is a property of what is similarly related; for then what is similarly related will indeed be a property of what is similarly related. For example, since the doctor is related to being productive of health in the same way as the trainer is related to being productive of good condition, and it is a property of the trainer to be productive of good condition, it would be a property of the doctor to be productive of health. Next, from things related in the same way: to demolish, ask whether what is related in the same way is not a property of what is related in the same way; for then what is related in the same way will not be a property of what is related in the same way either. And if what is related in the same way is a property of what is related in the same way, then it will not be a property of that of which it is claimed to be a property. For example, since practical wisdom is related in the same way to the fine and the shameful, by being knowledge of each of them, and it is not a property of practical wisdom to be knowledge of the fine, it would not be a property of practical wisdom to be knowledge of the shameful.
38| If it is a property of practical wisdom to be the knowledge of the fine, then being the knowledge of the shameful would not also be a property of it; for it is impossible for the same thing to be the property of several things. This commonplace is of no use for establishing a property, since it compares one thing that is the same to several things. Next, for demolishing: see whether what is said in terms of being is not a property of what is said in terms of being; for then neither will what is said in terms of perishing be a property of what is said in terms of perishing, nor will what is said in terms of coming-to-be be a property of what is said in terms of coming-to-be. For instance, since being an animal is not a property of man, neither would becoming an animal be a property of a man's coming to be, nor would perishing as an animal be a property of a man's perishing. The same procedure must be taken as well from coming-to-be to being and perishing, and from perishing to being and to coming-to-be, just as has now been stated from being to coming-to-be and perishing. For establishing: see whether what is assigned in terms of being is a property of what is arranged in terms of being; for then what is said in terms of coming-to-be will also be a property of what is said in terms of coming-to-be, and what is rendered in terms of perishing will be a property of what is said in terms of perishing.
39| For instance, since being mortal is a property of man, becoming mortal would also be a property of a man's coming-to-be, and perishing as mortal a property of a man's perishing. The same procedure must be taken as well from coming-to-be and perishing to being and to what follows from them, just as has been stated also for demolishing. Next, one must look to the form of what is laid down. For demolishing: see whether it does not belong to the form, or whether it does not belong in the respect in which the subject to which the property was assigned is so called; for then what is laid down will not be a property. For instance, since resting does not belong to man-in-himself insofar as he is man but insofar as he is a form, resting would not be a property of man. For establishing: see whether it belongs to the form, and belongs in the respect in which it is said, of the very thing of which it is laid down, not to be a property; for then what is laid down as not being a property will turn out to be a property. For instance, since being composed of soul and body belongs to animal-in-itself, and belongs to it insofar as it is an animal, being composed of soul and body would be a property of animal.
40| Next, from the more and the less. First, for demolishing: see whether the more is not a property of the more; for then neither will the less be a property of the less, nor the least of the least, nor the most of the most, nor the unqualified of the unqualified. For instance, since being more colored is not a property of a more colored body, neither would being less colored be a property of a less colored body, nor being colored at all be a property of body. For establishing: see whether the more is a property of the more; for then the less will also be a property of the less, and the least of the least, and the most of the most, and the unqualified of the unqualified. For instance, since perceiving more is a property of what lives more, perceiving less would also be a property of what lives less, and perceiving most a property of what lives most, and perceiving least a property of what lives least, and perceiving unqualifiedly a property of what lives unqualifiedly. And from the unqualified one must examine the same points in the same way: for demolishing, see whether the unqualified is not a property of the unqualified; for then neither will the more be a property of the more, nor the less of the less, nor the most of the most, nor the least of the least.
41| For instance, since being excellent is not a property of man, neither would being more excellent be a property of a more excellent man. For establishing: see whether the unqualified is a property of the unqualified; for then the more will also be a property of the more, and the less of the less, and the least of the least, and the most of the most. For instance, since being carried upward by nature is a property of fire, being carried more upward by nature would also be a property of more intensely burning fire. The same procedure must also be examined from the other cases in relation to all of these. Second, for demolishing: see whether the more is not a property of the more; for then neither will the less be a property of the less. For instance, since perceiving is more a property of animal than knowing is of man, and perceiving is not a property of animal, knowing would not be a property of man either. For establishing: see whether the less is a property of the less; for then the more will also be a property of the more. For instance, since being tame by nature is less a property of man than living is of animal, and being tame by nature is a property of man, living would be a property of animal.
42| Third, for demolishing: see whether what is a property of the thing to a greater degree is not a property of it; for then what is a property of it to a lesser degree will not be a property of it either. But if it is a property of the other thing, it will not be a property of this one. For instance, since being colored is more a property of surface than of body, and it is not a property of surface, being colored would not be a property of body either. But if it is a property of surface, it would not be a property of body. This commonplace is not useful for establishing, since it is impossible for the same thing to be a property of several things. Fourth, for demolishing: see whether what is more a property of the thing itself is not a property of it; for then what is less a property of it will not be a property of it either. For instance, since being perceptible is more a property of animal than being divisible is, and being perceptible is not a property of animal, being divisible would not be a property of animal either. For establishing: see whether what is less a property of the thing itself is a property of it; for then what is more a property of it will also be a property of it. For instance, since perceiving is less a property of animal than living is, and perceiving is a property of animal, living would be a property of animal.
43| Next, from things that hold similarly. First, for demolishing: see whether what is a property in a similar way is not a property of that of which it is a property in a similar way; for then what is a property in a similar way will not be a property of that of which it is a property in a similar way either. For instance, since desiring is a property of the appetitive part in the same way that reasoning is a property of the rational part, and desiring is not a property of the appetitive part, reasoning would not be a property of the rational part either. For establishing: see whether what is a property in a similar way is a property of that of which it is a property in a similar way; for then what is a property in a similar way will also be a property of that of which it is a property in a similar way. For instance, since being primarily practically wise is a property of the rational part in the same way that being primarily temperate is a property of the appetitive part, and being primarily practically wise is a property of the rational part, being primarily temperate would be a property of the appetitive part. Second, for demolishing: see whether what is a property in a similar way is not a property of the thing itself; for then what is a property in a similar way will not be a property of it either. For instance, since seeing is a property of man in the same way that hearing is, and seeing is not a property of man, hearing would not be a property of man either. For establishing: see whether what is a property of it in a similar way is a property of it;
44| for then what is a property of it in a similar way will also be a property of it. For instance, since its appetitive part being primary is a property of soul in the same way that its rational part being primary is, and its appetitive part being primary is a property of soul, its rational part being primary would be a property of soul. Third, for demolishing: see whether what is a property in a similar way is not a property; for then what is a property in a similar way will not be a property either. But if it is a property of the other thing, it will not be a property of the one. For instance, since burning is a property of flame in the same way that it is of a live coal, and burning is not a property of flame, burning would not be a property of a live coal either. But if it is a property of flame, it would not be a property of a live coal. This commonplace is of no use for establishing. The argument from things that hold in like manner differs from the argument from things that belong in a similar way, in that the former is taken by analogy, not considered in respect of something's belonging, while the latter is compared on the basis of something's belonging.
45| Next, for demolishing a proprium, see whether, in assigning it by means of a potentiality, he has thereby assigned the proprium in relation to what does not exist, when the potentiality cannot belong to what does not exist; for then the thing posited to be a proprium will not be a proprium. For example, since the one who said that being breathable is a proprium of air has assigned the proprium by means of a potentiality (for what is breathable is whatever is such as to be breathed), he has also assigned the proprium in relation to what does not exist. For even if no animal exists whose nature it is to breathe the air, it is still possible for air to exist; yet if no animal exists, breathing is not possible. So being such as to be breathed will not be a proprium of air either, at a time when there is no animal such as to breathe. Being breathable, then, would not be a proprium of air. For establishing, see whether, in assigning the proprium by means of a potentiality, he assigns it in relation to what exists rather than to what does not exist, when the potentiality cannot belong to what does not exist; for then the thing posited will indeed be a proprium. For example, since the one who assigns to what exists, as its proprium, being capable of being affected or of acting, assigns the proprium by means of a potentiality, he has assigned the proprium in relation to what exists; for whenever a thing exists, it will also be capable of being affected by, or of acting on, something —