Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language
1| On Memory and Recollection. We have discussed the sense organs and the objects of sense, both in general and for each sense organ separately. Of what remains, we must first examine memory and remembering: what it is, through what cause it comes about, and to which part of the soul this affection belongs, along with recollecting. For the same people are not good at remembering and good at recollecting; rather, for the most part, the slow are better at remembering, while the quick and the quick-witted are better at recollecting. First, then, we must grasp what sorts of things are objects of memory, since on this point people are often deceived. For it is not possible to remember the future — that is a matter of opinion and expectation (indeed there might even be a kind of knowledge concerned with expectation, as some say divination is); nor is it possible to remember the present — that is a matter of perception. For by perception we know neither the future nor what has occurred, but only the present. Memory, however, is of what has occurred. No one would say he remembers the present white thing while he is seeing it, nor what he is contemplating while he happens to be contemplating and thinking of it; rather, in the one case we say he perceives, in the other that he simply knows. But when someone has knowledge or perception apart from the actual activities, then he remembers — as when he remembers that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles: in one respect because he learned it or worked it out, in another because he heard it or saw it or something of that sort.
2| For always, whenever someone is engaged in the activity of remembering, he says to himself in his soul that he heard, perceived, or thought this before. Memory, then, is neither perception nor supposition, but a state or affection belonging to one of these once time has elapsed. There is no memory of the now in the now, as has also been said before, but rather perception of the present, expectation of the future, and memory of what has occurred. Hence all memory involves time. So of the animals, only those that perceive time remember, and they remember by that very faculty by which they perceive it. Now since we have already discussed imagination earlier, in our work on the soul, and since thinking is not possible without an image — for the same affection occurs in thinking as in drawing a diagram: in that case, although we make no use of the fact that the quantity of the triangle is determinate, we nevertheless draw it with a determinate quantity; and the one who thinks does likewise — even if he is not thinking of a quantity, he sets a quantity before his eyes, though he does not think of it as a quantity. And if the nature in question belongs among quantities but is indeterminate, he sets before himself a determinate quantity, but thinks of it only insofar as it is a quantity. For what cause it is not possible to think of anything without something continuous, nor to think of things not in time without time, is another discussion.
3| It is necessary to know magnitude and motion by the same faculty as time, and the image is an affection of the common sense. Hence it is clear that the knowledge of these belongs to the primary faculty of perception. And memory, even of objects of thought, does not occur without an image. Hence it would belong to the object of thought accidentally, but in its own right to the primary faculty of perception. This is why memory belongs also to certain other animals, and not only to human beings and to those that have opinion or practical wisdom. For if it were one of the faculties of thought, it would not belong to many of the other animals — perhaps to none of the mortal creatures — since even as it is, not all of them have memory, because not all of them perceive time. For always, whenever an animal is engaged in the activity of memory, as we said before, it perceives in addition, along with the fact that it saw, heard, or learned this, that it did so before; and before and after are in time. It is clear, then, to which part of the soul memory belongs — namely, the same part as imagination; and the objects of memory are, in their own right, whatever things are objects of imagination, and accidentally, whatever things are not without imagination. One might raise the difficulty of how it is that, when the affection is present but the thing is absent, what is not present is remembered.
4| For it is clear that we must conceive of what comes to be through perception in the soul, and in the part of the body that possesses it, as being something like a picture — the affection whose persisting state we call memory. For the motion that occurs stamps in, as it were, a kind of imprint of the perception, just as people do who seal with signet rings. This is why in those who are in a state of great agitation, whether through some affection or through their time of life, no memory occurs — as if the motion and the seal fell upon flowing water; while in others, because of wearing away, as with old buildings, and because of the hardness of what receives the affection, the imprint fails to form. This is why both the very young and the old are forgetful: the former because they are in a state of flux due to growth, the latter because of decay. Similarly, neither the very quick nor the very slow appear to be good at remembering: the former are too moist, the latter too hard; in the one case the image does not remain in the soul, in the other it does not take hold at all. But if what happens with memory is indeed of this sort, is it this affection itself that is remembered, or that other thing from which it arose?
5| For if it is the affection itself, then we would remember none of the things that are absent; but if it is that other thing, how is it that by perceiving this affection we remember that of which we have no perception, namely the absent thing? Suppose there is in us something like an imprint or a picture: why should the perception of this very thing be memory of something else, rather than of this thing itself? For the one who is engaged in the activity of memory contemplates this affection and perceives it. How then does he remember what is not present? For on that basis one might as well see and hear what is not present. Or is it in fact possible, and does this actually happen? For just as the thing drawn on the panel is both a living creature and a likeness, and this same single thing is both, though what it is to be each of the two is not the same, and it is possible to contemplate it both as a living creature and as a likeness — so too we must suppose that the image within us is itself, in its own right, an object of contemplation, and also an image of something else. As far as it is itself, it is an object of contemplation or an image; but as far as it is of something else, it is, so to speak, a likeness and a remembered thing. Hence, whenever its motion is active, if the soul is affected by it as being itself, then it appears that something like a thought or an image has come upon it;
6| but if the soul is affected by it as being of something else, then — just as in the case of the drawing, someone who has not seen Coriscus contemplates it as a likeness of Coriscus — here the affection involved in this contemplation is different from that involved when someone contemplates it simply as a drawn living creature. In the soul, one case produces something like a mere thought, the other, in the way described, a remembered thing, because it is taken as a likeness. This is why sometimes, when such motions arise in us from an earlier act of perceiving, we do not know whether this happens because of having perceived, and we are in doubt as to whether it is memory or not; but at other times it happens that we come to realize and to recollect that we heard or saw something before. This occurs when someone, who was contemplating the image as itself, shifts and contemplates it as belonging to something else. The opposite also happens, as occurred to Antipheron of Oreus and to others who are deranged: they spoke of their images as though they had actually occurred, and as though they were remembering them. This happens when someone contemplates as a likeness what is not a likeness. Practice preserves memory by repeated recollection; and this is nothing other than repeatedly contemplating something as a likeness rather than as itself. We have now said, then, what memory and remembering are: namely, a state involving an image, taken as a likeness of that of which it is an image; and to which part within us it belongs: to the primary faculty of perception, that by which we perceive time.
7| It remains to speak about recollection. First, then, whatever is true in the argumentative accounts must be laid down as holding good. For recollection is neither the recovery nor the acquisition of memory: for when a person first learns something or is affected by it, he neither recovers any memory (for none has preceded) nor acquires it from the start; it is only when the state and the affection have come to be present that memory exists. So memory does not come to be together with the affection as the affection is coming to be. Further, at the moment when the affection first comes to be present in the individual and ultimate perceiver, the affection is already present in the one affected, and so is the knowledge, if we are to call the state or the affection knowledge (nothing prevents our also remembering, incidentally, some of the things we know); but remembering, strictly speaking, does not hold good before time has elapsed. For one remembers now what one saw or was affected by earlier, not what one is affected by now — one does not remember what is happening now, at the moment it happens. Further, it is evident that remembering is not something that happens to one who has just now recollected, but to one who perceived or was affected from the start. But when one recovers the knowledge or perception one had before, or the state whose possession we were calling memory, this recovery, then, is precisely what recollecting one of the things spoken of consists in.
8| Remembering happens, and memory follows upon it. Nor indeed do these simply occur whenever things that existed before come to be present again; rather, in a way they do, and in a way they do not. For it is possible for the same person to learn or discover the same thing twice; so recollecting must be distinguished from these, and it occurs when there is present some further starting point beyond the one from which people learn in the first place. Now recollections happen because it is the nature of this motion to occur after that one: if the sequence is necessary, then plainly whenever the first motion is stirred, the second will be stirred too; but if it is not necessary but only customary, the second will be stirred for the most part. And it happens that some people become habituated by a single occurrence more than others by many repetitions; that is why we remember some things better from seeing them once than other things from seeing them often. So whenever we are recollecting, we are stirred by certain of the earlier motions, until we are stirred by the one after which that motion habitually follows. That is also why we hunt for what comes next, starting our thinking from the present moment or from something else, and from what is similar, or opposite, or neighboring to it. This is how recollection comes about: for the motions of these things are in some cases the same, in others simultaneous, and in others contain a part, so that what is left over, the small remainder, was stirred right after that other motion. This, then, is how people search when they search deliberately; and they also recollect this way without searching, whenever that motion comes to be after another motion;
9| for the most part it comes about that, when other motions of the kind we have described occur, that motion follows. There is no need to inquire how we remember the far-off things — only the near ones; for it is clear that the manner is the same, I mean the sequence, whether or not one has sought it out beforehand and recollected. For motions follow one another by habituation, this one after that one. So whenever a person wishes to recollect, this is what he will do: he will seek to grasp a starting point of motion, after which that motion will come. That is why recollections happen fastest and best when they start from a beginning: for as the things stand to one another in sequence, so too do the motions. And things that have some order, like mathematical propositions, are easy to remember, while others are remembered poorly and with difficulty. And in this respect recollecting differs from learning again: the person recollecting will, in some way, be able to be stirred through himself to the point that comes after the starting point. But when this does not happen, but only through something else, he no longer remembers. Often, too, a person is at present unable to recollect, but is able to search, and finds it. This happens to one who sets many things in motion, until he sets in motion the sort of motion that the thing will follow. For remembering is the presence, in potentiality, of that which sets the process in motion; and this means being able to be stirred, starting from itself, by the motions it possesses, as has been said.
10| One must get hold of a starting point. That is why people seem sometimes to recollect starting from places. The cause is that they pass quickly from one thing to another, for example from milk to white, from white to air, and from air to moisture, from which one remembers autumn, if it is this season one is looking for. And in general the middle term seems to be a starting point for everything: for if not earlier, then when he arrives at this, he will remember, or else he will not remember from any other point either — for example, if someone were to think of the letters A B C D E F G H: for if he does not remember at E, he remembered at E and at H; for from there it is possible to be moved to both, both to D and to E. But if he is not searching for one of these, he will remember on arriving at C, if he is searching for H or for G. If not, he will remember at A; and so on always. As for why sometimes one remembers starting from the same point and sometimes not, the cause is that it is possible to be moved from the same starting point to several things, for example from C to F or to D. If, then, the motion does not go by way of the old path, it moves toward the more habitual one;
11| for habit is by now like a second nature. That is why we quickly recollect the things we think of often: for just as one thing follows another by nature, so too it follows it in actuality; and frequent repetition creates a nature. But since, just as things happen among natural things, they also happen contrary to nature and by chance, this is even more true among things that occur through habit, where nature does not hold in the same way; so that the motion may sometimes go astray there too, and in a different way, especially whenever something pulls it off from there toward itself in some direction. That is why, too, whenever we need to remember a name, we hit on one that sounds similar but we get it wrong for the one we want. This, then, is the manner in which recollecting comes about. But the most important thing is that one must recognize the time — either by a measure or indefinitely. Let there be something by which one judges the greater and the lesser interval; and it is reasonable to suppose it works as with magnitudes: for one thinks of things that are large and far off not by stretching one's thought out there, as some people say happens with sight (for one will think in the same way even of things that do not exist), but by a motion proportional to them; for within the mind there are figures and motions similar to the things. In what way, then, will it differ, when it thinks of the greater things? Is it not because it thinks of those very things, or of lesser ones? For everything internal is smaller, just as, proportionally, the external things are too.
12| It is perhaps possible, just as with forms one can take something else analogous within the soul itself, so too with distances. Just as, then, if it is moved along AB, BE, it produces AD; for AC is proportional to CD. Why, then, does it produce CD rather than FG? Is it not because as AC stands to AB, so H stands to M? These, then, it is moved along together. But if it wishes to think of FG, it thinks of BE in the same way, and instead of HI it thinks of KL; for these stand as FA to BA. Whenever, then, the motion of the thing and the motion of the time occur together, then it is actively engaged in memory. But if one thinks one is remembering without doing this, one merely believes one is remembering; for nothing prevents someone from being deceived and thinking he remembers when he does not. But it is not possible, while actively engaged in memory, not to think one remembers but to remember without being aware of it — for that very awareness was what remembering consisted in. But if the motion of the thing occurs apart from that of the time, or the latter apart from the former, one does not remember. The motion of the time is twofold:
13| For sometimes one does not remember it by a measured interval of time, for instance that he did something two days ago, and sometimes one does remember it by such a measured interval; but one remembers even when not by a measured interval. And people are accustomed to say that they remember something, but do not know when, whenever they do not know the quantity of the "when" by measure. That the same people are not both good at remembering and good at recollecting has been said earlier. Recollecting differs from remembering not only in point of time, but because many of the other animals also share in remembering, while none of the animals we know of, so to speak, share in recollecting, except man. The reason is that recollecting is a kind of syllogism: for the one who recollects reasons that he saw or heard or experienced something of the sort earlier, and it is a kind of search. And this belongs by nature only to those in whom deliberation is also present; for deliberating too is a kind of syllogism. And that the affection is something bodily, and that recollection is a search for an image in something of this kind, is shown by the fact that it troubles some people when they are unable to recollect, even though they apply their thought very hard; and it pursues them none the less even when they are no longer trying to recollect, and especially the melancholic; for images move these people most of all.
14| The reason recollecting is not up to us is that, just as with those who throw something, it is no longer up to them to stop it, so too the one who is recollecting and hunting sets in motion something bodily, in which the affection resides. And those are troubled most in whom a certain moisture happens to be present about the perceptive region; for once set in motion it does not easily come to rest, until the thing sought arrives and the motion runs a straight course. This is also why fits of anger and fear, once something has set them in motion, do not subside when people try to counter-move them, but instead these move again in the same direction. And the affection resembles names and tunes and speeches, when some part of them has been uttered very forcefully through the mouth; for even when people have stopped and do not wish to, it comes upon them again to sing or speak. And those who have larger upper parts, and dwarfish people, are more forgetful than their opposites, because they have a great weight bearing upon the perceptive part, and because their motions are not able to remain steady from the start but rather disperse, nor can they easily run a straight course when recollecting. And those who are altogether young, and those who are very old, are forgetful on account of motion; for the ones are in a state of wasting away, the others in a state of great growth; and further, children too are, up to a considerable age, dwarfish.
15| Concerning memory, then, and remembering, what their nature is, and by which part of the soul animals remember, and concerning recollecting, what it is, and how it comes about, and through what cause, we have now stated.