Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language
1| [1129a] concerning justice and injustice, we must examine what sort of actions they happen to be about, what kind of mean justice is, and between what extremes the just act is intermediate. Let our inquiry proceed by the same method as in the discussions already given. We observe, then, that everyone means by justice that state of character from which people are disposed to do just acts, and from which they act justly and wish for just things; and in the same way, concerning injustice, that state from which people act unjustly and wish for unjust things. Let this, then, first be laid down for us in outline. For it is not the same with sciences and capacities as with states of character. A capacity and a science seem to be of contraries alike, while a state of character that is contrary does not extend to its contrary: for instance, from health the contrary things are not done, but only the healthy things — someone is called a healthy walker whenever his gait matches that of a person in health. Now often one contrary state is recognized from its contrary, and often states are recognized from their underlying subjects: for if good condition is evident, bad condition too becomes evident, and from the things productive of good condition we come to know good condition, and from good condition we come to know what produces it. For if good condition is density of flesh, it follows necessarily that bad condition is looseness of flesh, and that what produces good condition is what produces density in the flesh. It follows for the most part that if one of a pair of terms is said in several ways, the other is said in several ways too — for instance, if the just is, so is the unjust. Justice and injustice do indeed seem to be said in several ways, but because their several senses lie close together, the ambiguity escapes notice and is not as evident as it is in cases where the senses are far apart (for there the difference in kind is great) — as, for example, in the fact that the word
2| "key" is applied ambiguously both to the bone under the neck of animals and to that with which people lock doors. Let us take, then, in how many ways the unjust man is spoken of. It seems that both the lawbreaker and the grasping and unequal man are called unjust, so that it is clear that the just man too will be both the law-abiding man and the equal man. The just, accordingly, consists in obeying the law and being equal, while the unjust consists in lawbreaking and inequality. [1129b] Since the unjust man is grasping, he will be concerned with goods — not all goods, but those with which good and bad fortune are concerned, which are always goods without qualification, but not always good for a particular person. Now people pray for these things and pursue them, but they should not; rather they should pray that things good without qualification may also be good for themselves, while choosing what is good for themselves. The unjust man does not always choose the greater share; sometimes he chooses even the smaller, in the case of things bad without qualification — but because the lesser evil seems in a way to be a good, and grasping is directed at the good, for this reason he seems to be grasping. He is, at any rate, unequal, for that term covers both cases and is common to them. Since the lawbreaker was unjust and the law-abiding man just, it is clear that all lawful things are in a sense just; for whatever the science of legislation has prescribed counts as lawful, and every one of these prescriptions we call just. Now the laws pronounce on every matter, aiming either at the common advantage of all, or at that of the best, or at that of those in power judged by virtue, or at something else of this kind; so that in one sense we call just those things that produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the political community. And the law also commands us to do the
3| deeds of the brave man — for instance, not to leave one's post, nor to flee, nor to throw away one's weapons — and the deeds of the temperate man — for instance, not to commit adultery, nor to commit outrage — and the deeds of the gentle man — for instance, not to strike, nor to speak abusively — and in the same way with the remaining virtues and vices, requiring some conduct and prohibiting other conduct — well, when the law has been well established, poorly, when it has been thrown together carelessly. This justice, then, is a complete virtue, but not without qualification — rather, in relation to another. And because of this, justice often seems to be the most excellent of the virtues, and "neither evening star nor morning star" is so wonderful; and we say proverbially, "in justice is every virtue comprehended in sum," and it is the most complete virtue because it is the exercise of complete virtue. And it is complete because the one who possesses it is able to exercise virtue in relation to another and not only in his own case: for many people are able to exercise virtue in their own affairs, but are unable to do so in their relations to another. [1130a] And for this reason the saying of Bias seems to be well put, that "office will reveal the man"; for a ruler is already in relation to another and in a community. For this same reason justice alone of the virtues seems to be another's good, because it is directed toward another: for the just man's actions benefit someone else, whether a ruler or a partner in the community. The worst man, then, is the one who exercises his vice both toward himself and toward his friends, while the best is not the one who exercises virtue toward himself but the one who exercises it toward another; for this is a difficult task. This justice, then, is not a part of virtue but the whole of virtue, nor is its contrary,
4| injustice is not a part of vice but the whole of vice. What the difference is between this virtue and justice is clear from what has been said: they are the same, but their being is not the same; rather, insofar as it is in relation to another, it is justice, and insofar as it is simply a state of a certain kind, it is virtue. Yet our inquiry concerns the justice that forms one part of virtue — something that does exist, on our own account of it — and the same holds for the injustice that forms one part of vice. Here is a sign that there is such a thing: in the case of the other forms of wickedness, the man who is active in them acts unjustly but gains no advantage, as the man who throws away his shield out of cowardice, or speaks ill of someone out of bad temper, or fails to help someone with money out of stinginess; but when a man does gain advantage, often it is by none of these vices, and certainly not by all of them, but by some kind of baseness (for we blame it) and by injustice. There is, then, some other injustice that is a part of the whole, and some unjust act that is a part of the whole unjust, which is contrary to law. Again, if one man commits adultery for the sake of gain, taking something in addition, while another spends and loses on it out of appetite, the latter would seem to be self-indulgent rather than grasping, but the former unjust, not self-indulgent; clearly, then, this is because of the gain. Again, in the case of all the other unjust acts the reference is always made back to some particular vice — if a man commits adultery, to self-indulgence; if he abandons his comrade, to cowardice; if he strikes someone, to anger — but if he gains something, the reference is to no vice at all except injustice. So it is plain that there is some other injustice besides the whole, a partial injustice, which shares its name with the whole because its definition falls under the same genus:
5| [1130b] for both have their power in relation to another, but the one is concerned with honor or money or safety, or whatever single term we might use to embrace all these, and it acts through the pleasure that comes from gain, while the other is concerned with everything with which the good man is concerned. That there are several kinds of justice, then, and that there is some other justice besides the whole of virtue, is clear; but what it is, and of what sort, must be grasped. By definition, injustice is what is contrary to law and what is uneven, while justice is what accords with law and what is even. Now the injustice spoken of before is in accordance with the unlawful. But since the unequal and the unlawful are not the same but different, as part to whole (for everything unequal is unlawful, but not everything unlawful is unequal), so too the unjust and injustice in this other sense are not the same as those but different from them, the one as parts, the other as wholes; for this injustice is a part of the whole injustice, and likewise this justice is a part of the whole justice. So we must speak both of the partial justice and of the partial injustice, and likewise of the just and the unjust in this sense. Let us then set aside the justice and injustice that are ranged in accordance with the whole of virtue — the one being the use of the whole of virtue toward another, the other the use of the whole of vice — and it is plain how the just and the unjust in accordance with these are to be marked off; since most legal requirements are simply what virtue as a whole prescribes, and the law commands us to practice every virtue while forbidding us to practice every vice.
6| And the things productive of virtue as a whole are those of the lawful acts that have been legislated concerning education for the common good. But concerning the education of the individual, in virtue of which a man is simply good, whether this belongs to political science or to some other science, must be determined later; since being a good man and being a good citizen of some given city are, perhaps, not identical. Of partial justice, and of the just in accordance with it, there is one species that has to do with distributions of honor or money or the other things that are divisible among those who share in the constitution (for in these it is possible for one person to have an amount unequal to, or equal to, another's), [1131a] and another that is corrective in private transactions. This second kind splits into two: transactions divide into willing ones and unwilling ones. The willing sort includes such things as sale, purchase, lending at interest, surety, lending for use, deposit, and hire for wages (called willing because these transactions begin willingly), while the unwilling sort divides further: some happen in secret — theft, adultery, poisoning, pimping, enticing away a slave, treacherous killing, perjury — and some by force — battery, confinement, killing, plunder, maiming, verbal abuse, outrage. And since the unjust man is unequal and the unjust is unequal, it is clear that there is also a mean of the unequal.
7| This is the equal; for in any action in which there is a more and a less there is also an equal. So, since the unjust is uneven, the just must be even — a view everyone holds even without being argued into it. And since the equal is a mean, the just will be a certain mean. Now the equal requires at least two terms. It follows, then, that the just must be a mean and equal, and relative — that is, relative to certain persons; and insofar as it is a mean, it is a mean between certain things (namely a more and a less), and insofar as it is equal, it is equal between two things, and insofar as it is just, it is just for certain persons. The just, therefore, must involve at least four terms: for those for whom it is in fact just are two, and the things in which it consists, the matters at stake, are two.
8| And the equality will be the same as between the persons, so between the things also: however the things at stake are related to one another, the persons involved are related in the same way. Persons who are unequal will not end up with equal portions; disputes and grievances spring from exactly this, whenever equals receive and are assigned portions that are unequal, or unequals receive and are assigned portions that are equal. This is also clear from the principle of worth: everyone agrees that what is just in distributions must be in accordance with some kind of worth, but they do not all mean the same thing by worth — democrats mean freedom, oligarchs mean wealth, others mean good birth, and aristocrats mean virtue. The just, then, is a kind of proportion; for the proportional is proper not only to number considered as abstract units but to number in general, since proportion is an equality of ratios, and requires at least four terms. Now that discrete proportion requires four terms is plain. But so does continuous proportion, for it treats one term as two and states it twice, [1131b] as, for example, as A is to B, so B is to C. B, then, is stated twice; so that if B is set down twice, there will be four proportional terms. And the just too requires at least four terms, and the ratio is the same, for the persons and the things have been divided up in the same way. It will therefore be as term A is to term B, so C is to D, and hence, alternando, as A is to C, B is to D. So too the whole will be to the whole; and this is the combination that the distribution pairs together, and if the terms are so combined, it pairs them justly. The joining, then, of term A with C and of term B with D
9| The just in distribution is this, and this is the mean, and the unjust is what goes against the proportion. For the proportionate is the mean, and the just is proportionate. Mathematicians give this sort of proportion the name geometric, since in a geometric proportion the ratio of whole to whole matches the ratio of each part to its corresponding part. But this proportion is not continuous, for there does not come to be one term numerically the same, serving both as numerator and denominator. This, then, is the just — the proportionate; and the unjust is what goes against the proportion. So one share becomes greater, another smaller, which is in fact what happens in practice: the one who does injustice has more, and the one who is treated unjustly has less of the good. In the case of evil it is the reverse: the lesser evil counts as a good relative to the greater evil, for the lesser evil is more choiceworthy than the greater, and what is choiceworthy is good, and the more choiceworthy is the greater good. This, then, is one species of the just. One species remains: the corrective sort, found in dealings between people, whether entered into willingly or not. This kind of just has a different form from the one before. For distributive justice concerning common goods is always in accordance with the proportion mentioned; indeed, if the distribution is made from common funds, it will be in the same ratio that the contributions bore to one another; and the injustice opposed to this kind of just is what goes against the proportion. But the just in transactions is a certain equality, and the unjust is inequality,
10| [1132a] not however according to that (geometric) proportion but according to the arithmetic. For it makes no difference whether a decent person has defrauded a base one or a base person a decent one, nor whether it was a decent person or a base one who committed adultery; rather the law looks only to the difference made by the harm, and treats the parties as equals, if one does injustice while the other suffers it, and if one has done harm while the other has been harmed. So the judge tries to equalize this injustice, which is an inequality; thus when one man strikes and another is struck, or one kills and another dies, the doing and the undergoing fall into unequal portions; but the judge attempts to level them out through the penalty, cutting away at the offender's gain. For it is said, speaking generally in such cases, even if the term is not proper to some of them, that there is a gain, for instance to the one who struck the blow, and a loss to the one who suffered it; but once the suffering has been measured, one part is called loss and the other gain. So the equal is the mean between the more and the less, while gain and loss are more and less in opposite ways: the greater of the good and the lesser of the evil is gain, and the opposite is loss. Of these the mean was the equal, which we say is just; so the corrective sort of just would be the mean between loss and gain. That is also why, when people are in dispute, they take refuge in the judge; and to go to the judge is to go to what is just, for the judge wishes to be, so to speak, justice ensouled. And they seek a judge who is a mean, and some call judges mediators, on the ground that if they hit upon the mean they will hit upon what is just. The just, then, is a kind of mean, since the judge is too. Now the
11| judge restores balance: as though a line had been cut into unequal segments, he removes from the larger segment the amount by which it surpasses the half, and gives that amount to the smaller segment. Once the whole has been split into two, each party is said to hold what belongs to him once he has received an equal portion. The equal amount stands midway between the larger and smaller shares, measured by arithmetic proportion. That is also why it is called just (dikaion), because it is divided in two (dicha), as if one were to say "halved" (dichaion), and the judge is a "halver" (dichastes). For when two equal amounts have had a part taken away from one of them and added to the other, the latter exceeds the former by these two amounts; for if the part had been taken away but not added, it would have exceeded by only one. [1132b] It exceeds the mean, then, by one, and the mean exceeds the amount from which the part was taken away by one also. By this, then, we shall recognize both what must be taken away from the one who has more and what must be added to the one who has less: what the mean exceeds by must be added to the one who has less, and what it is exceeded by must be taken from the greatest. Let the lines AA, BB, GG be equal to one another. From AA let AE be taken away, and to GG let the segment GD be added, so that the whole line DGG exceeds EA by GD and GZ; therefore it exceeds BB by GD. This holds in the other crafts as well; for they would be destroyed if what acts did not act by just so much and of just such a kind, and what is acted upon were not acted upon by just so much and of just such a kind. These names, loss and gain, have come from voluntary exchange; for to have more than one's own is called gaining, and to have less than what one started with is called losing,
12| as in buying and selling and in all other matters in which the law has granted freedom of action. When, however, the outcome is neither greater nor smaller but precisely what each side put in, they are said to keep what is theirs, suffering no loss and making no gain. So the just is a mean between a certain gain and loss in involuntary transactions as well, namely having an equal amount both before and after. Some hold, too, that suffering in return for what one did is justice without qualification — a view the Pythagoreans held, defining the just, without qualification, as reciprocal treatment of another. But reciprocity fits neither distributive justice nor corrective justice — though people do want to identify this with the justice of Rhadamanthys: "if a man should suffer what he did, straight justice would result" — for in many cases it conflicts. For instance, if a man in office strikes someone, he must not be struck back on the same terms; and if someone strikes a man in office, he must not merely be struck but punished as well. Further, the voluntary and the involuntary make a great difference. But in associations for exchange, this sort of just — reciprocity in accordance with proportion and not in accordance with equality — is what holds them together. For it is by proportionate requital that the city is held together. For people seek either to return evil for evil — [1133a] and if they cannot, they think it is slavery — or to return good for good, and if this does not happen, no exchange takes place, and it is by exchange that they are held together. That is why they give the Graces a prominent shrine, so that requital may occur; for this is proper to gratitude — one must render service in return to the one who has shown favor, and in turn take the initiative in showing favor oneself. Now it is the diagonal conjunction that produces reciprocal exchange in accordance with proportion. Let A stand for a builder, B for a shoemaker, G for a house, D for a shoe. The builder, then, must receive from the shoemaker the latter's product, and give in return his own,
13| giving that person a share of what is his own. If, then, first there is equality by proportion, and then reciprocity comes about, what we are describing will hold. But if not, it is not equal, and it will not hold together; for nothing prevents the work of the one from being better than the work of the other, and so these must be equalized. This holds in the other crafts too: they would be destroyed if what the agent produced, and how much and of what quality, were not matched by the patient's undergoing this same thing, of this amount and this quality. A partnership is never formed by two doctors together, but by a doctor and a farmer — that is, generally, by parties who differ from each other and are unequal; even so, these two must be brought to equality. That is why everything that is exchanged must be somehow comparable. It is for this that currency has come in, and it becomes in a way a middle term; for it measures everything, and so measures both the excess and the deficiency — how many shoes, say, are equal to a house or to a given amount of food. As the builder, then, is to the shoemaker, so must such-and-such a number of shoes be to a house or to food. For without this there will be no exchange and no partnership. And this will not hold unless the goods are somehow equal. There must, then, be some one thing by which everything is measured, as was said before. This is in truth need, which holds everything together; for if people needed nothing, or did not need it alike, there would be no exchange, or not the same exchange. But currency has come to be, by convention, a kind of substitute for need; and this is why it has the name 'currency' — because it exists not by nature but by custom, and it is in our power to change it and make it useless. There will be reciprocity, then, when the goods have been equalized, so that as the farmer is to the shoemaker, the shoemaker's product is to the farmer's product.
14| [1133b] One must not bring the parties into the schema of proportion once they have already exchanged (for then one of the two extremes will have both the excesses), but into it while each still holds his own goods. In that way they are equal and partners, because this equality can come about among them. Let a be the farmer, c the food, b the shoemaker, d his product once it has been equalized. If it were not possible for reciprocity to occur in this way, there would be no partnership. That need holds things together as if they were a single thing is clear from the fact that when the two parties do not need each other — either both, or one of the two — they do not exchange (text breaks off) as when someone needs something one has oneself, for instance wine, and the others offer the export of grain (text breaks off). This, then, must be equalized. And as regards a future exchange — that if one has no need now, there will be need when it does arise — currency serves us, in a sense, as a guarantee: one must be able to get the goods by bringing currency. Now currency, too, undergoes the same thing, for it does not always have the same purchasing power; nonetheless it tends to remain more stable. That is why everything must be assigned a price; for in this way there will always be exchange, and if exchange, partnership. Currency, then, like a measure, makes things commensurable and equalizes them; for without exchange there would be no partnership, without equality no exchange, and without commensurability no equality. Now in strict truth it is impossible for things that differ so much to become commensurable, but with a view to need it is possible, sufficiently. There must, then, be some one thing, and this by convention (hence it is called currency); for this makes everything commensurable, since everything is measured by currency. Let a be a house, b ten minas, c a bed. A is half of b, if the house is worth five minas, or equal to it; and the bed, c, is a tenth
15| part, that is, c stands to b as one to ten. From this it follows straightforwardly what number of beds matches a house in value: five. That exchange proceeded in this way before currency existed is clear; for it makes no difference whether one gives five beds for a house, or whatever the five beds are worth. What the unjust act is, then, and what the just act is, has now been stated. Now that these have been distinguished, it is clear that acting justly is a mean between doing injustice and suffering it; for the one is having more, the other having less. And justice is a kind of mean, though not in the same way as the other virtues, but because it is a mean's virtue, while injustice belongs to the extremes. [1134a] And justice is that in accordance with which the just person is said to act justly by choice, and to be a distributor — both to himself in relation to another and to one other person in relation to another — not in such a way as to assign more of what is desirable to himself and less to his neighbor (and conversely with what is harmful), but so as to assign what is equal by proportion, and likewise when distributing between one other person and another. Injustice, on the other hand, is the contrary of the just act. This is excess and deficiency of the beneficial or the harmful, contrary to proportion. That is why injustice is excess and deficiency, because it is a matter of excess and deficiency — in one's own case, excess of what is beneficial without qualification and deficiency of what is harmful, while in the case of others, though the overall pattern is the same, it is a departure from proportion in whichever direction happens to occur. Of the unjust act, the smaller part is suffering injustice, the greater part is doing injustice. Concerning justice and injustice, then, and the nature of each,
16| let this account be given, and likewise concerning the just and the unjust in general. But since it is possible to do injustice without yet being an unjust person, what sorts of unjust acts must one commit while doing injustice in order to already be unjust with respect to each kind of injustice — for instance a thief, an adulterer, or a robber? Or will this distinction make no difference? For someone might have intercourse with a woman knowing who she is, yet not from a principle of choice but on account of passion. In that case he does injustice, but he is not an unjust person — he is not a thief, though he stole, nor an adulterer, though he committed adultery; and likewise in the other cases. How reciprocity is related to the just has been stated before. But one must not fail to notice that what is being sought is both the just without qualification and the political just. This latter exists among those who share a life with a view to self-sufficiency, being free and equal, either proportionately or numerically; so that for those to whom this does not apply, there is no political justice toward one another, but only a kind of justice in a resembling sense. For justice exists among those for whom there is also law governing their relations with one another; and law exists among those among whom there can be injustice, for judgment is a discrimination of what is just and what is unjust. And where there is injustice, there is also the doing of injustice among them (though where there is the doing of injustice, there is not injustice in everyone), and this consists in assigning oneself more of what is good without qualification and less of what is bad without qualification. For this reason authority is entrusted not to a man but to reason itself, since a man who rules acts for his own advantage [1134b] and turns into a tyrant. The ruler is a guardian of the just, and if of the just, then of the equal too. And since he is thought to have no more than his share, if he is just (for he does not assign himself more of what is good without qualification, unless it is proportionate to himself — that is why
17| ...he labors for another. And because of this people say that justice is a good belonging to someone else, as was said before too: therefore some wage must be given, and this is honor and privilege; and those for whom such things are not enough become tyrants. Now the right of a master and that of a father are not the same as these, but similar to them: for there is no injustice, without qualification, toward one's own things, and a possession, and a child until it reaches a certain age and is separated off, is like a part of oneself, and no one chooses to harm himself; hence there is no injustice toward oneself; and so what belongs to political rule is neither unjust nor just — for it existed according to law, and among those for whom law is naturally suited to exist, and these were people who have equality in ruling and being ruled. Hence justice holds more in relation to a wife than in relation to children and possessions: for this is household justice, and even this is different from political justice. Of political justice, part is natural and part is legal: natural is what has the same force everywhere and does not depend on being accepted or not; legal is what originally makes no difference whether it is one way or another, but once it has been laid down, does make a difference — for example, that a ransom be fixed at a mina, or that a goat be sacrificed rather than two sheep; and further, all the laws enacted for particular cases, such as sacrificing to Brasidas, and decree-like enactments. Some think that all such things are of this sort, because what is by nature is unchangeable and has the same force everywhere, just as fire burns both here and in Persia, while they observe that what is just changes. But this is not quite so, though in a way it is: among the gods, perhaps, it is not so at all, but among us there is indeed something even by nature, though changeable
18| all the same — yet nonetheless part is by nature and part not by nature. Which sort, among things that admit of being otherwise, is by nature, and which is not but is legal and by convention, given that both are equally changeable, will be clear. And the same distinction will fit the other cases too: for by nature the right hand is the stronger, and yet it is possible for everyone to become ambidextrous. The just things that rest on convention and on expediency [1135a] are like measures: for wine measures and grain measures are not equal everywhere, but where people are buying they are larger, and where they are selling, smaller. Likewise the just things that are not natural but human are not the same everywhere, since not even constitutions are the same everywhere, though there is only one constitution that is everywhere best by nature. Each of the just and lawful things stands to particular acts as universals stand to particulars: for the acts done are many, but each of those is one, since it is universal. The unjust act differs from the unjust, and the righting differs from the just: for the unjust is so by nature or by ordinance, and this very thing, once it has been done, is an unjust act, but before it is done it is not yet that, only unjust. And the same holds for the righting: the common term used is rather 'doing what is just,' while 'righting' denotes the correction of the unjust act. As for each of these — what species they have, how many, and what they are concerned with — that must be examined later. Given that the just and unjust things are as described, a person acts unjustly or acts justly whenever he does these things voluntarily; but when he does them involuntarily, he neither acts unjustly nor acts justly except accidentally, for people do what happens to be just or unjust only incidentally. But the unjust act and
19| the doing of what is just are defined by the voluntary and the involuntary: for when it is voluntary it is blamed, and at the same time it is then also an unjust act; so that something can be unjust without yet being an unjust act, if the voluntary element is not present. By voluntary I mean, as was said before, whatever a person does knowingly, among things in his own power, and not in ignorance of whom, with what, or for what purpose — for example whom he strikes, with what, and for what purpose — and each of these not accidentally nor by force (as if someone took hold of his hand and struck another with it, he does not act voluntarily, for it is not in his power). It is possible for the one struck to be his father, while he knows only that it is a man, or one of the people present, but does not know that it is his father. Let the same distinction be drawn likewise regarding the purpose, and regarding the action as a whole. What is done, then, in ignorance, or is not done in ignorance but is not within one's own power, or is done under force, is involuntary. For there are many things belonging to us by nature [1135b] which we knowingly both do and undergo, none of which is either voluntary or involuntary — for example growing old or dying. And likewise, in the case of both unjust and just acts, there is the accidental: for someone might return a deposit unwillingly and out of fear, and he must not be said to be doing what is just or acting justly, except accidentally. Similarly one must say that a person who is compelled and, unwillingly, fails to return a deposit, acts unjustly and does unjust things only accidentally. Of voluntary acts, some we do by choice and others not by choice,
20| by choice being whatever we do after deliberating beforehand, and without choice whatever we do without prior deliberation. There being three kinds of harm done in dealings among people, those done with ignorance are errors, whenever a person acts without matching what he supposed as to whom, or what, or with what, or for what purpose: for he thought he was not throwing at all, or not with this thing, or not at this person, or not for this purpose, but what came about was not what he had supposed the purpose to be — for example, not meaning to wound but to prick, or not meaning this person, or not with this thing. Now whenever the harm comes about contrary to reasonable expectation, it is a misfortune; but whenever it comes about not contrary to reasonable expectation, yet without vice, it is an error (for a person errs when the origin of the cause is in himself, but suffers misfortune when it is from outside). But whenever he acts knowingly yet without deliberating beforehand, it is an unjust act — for example whatever comes about through spirit and the other feelings that occur to human beings by necessity or by nature: for in causing harm and erring in these ways, people do act unjustly, and these are unjust acts, yet they are not on this account already unjust or wicked people, for the harm is not due to depravity. But whenever it is done from choice, the person is unjust and wicked. Hence acts done from spirit are rightly judged not to come from premeditation, for it is not the one who acts in anger who starts the matter, but the one who provoked the anger. Further, in such cases the dispute is not even about whether the thing happened or not, but about what is just, since anger is directed at an apparent injustice. For it is not as in business dealings, where people dispute about whether the thing happened, and in which case one of the two parties must necessarily be wicked, unless they act as they do through forgetfulness; rather, agreeing about the fact itself, they dispute about which way is just (whereas the one who has plotted against another is not ignorant of this), so that one party thinks he has been wronged, and the other does not.
21| [1136a] But if he causes harm from choice, he acts unjustly; and it is in respect of these unjust acts that the one who acts unjustly is unjust, when the act goes against proportion or against equality. Similarly too a man is just when he acts justly by choice; and he acts justly if he merely acts voluntarily. Of involuntary acts, some are pardonable and some are not pardonable. For as many errors as men commit not only in ignorance but also because of their ignorance are pardonable, but as many as they commit not because of ignorance, but while in ignorance on account of a feeling that is neither natural nor human, are not pardonable. One might raise the difficulty whether the subject of being treated unjustly and of acting unjustly has been sufficiently defined - first, whether the case is as Euripides has strangely put it, saying: 'I killed my mother - the story is short' - willingly her willing, or she unwilling and I unwilling? For is it really possible to be treated unjustly voluntarily, or is it not, but is every case of it involuntary, just as every case of acting unjustly is voluntary? And is it entirely one way or entirely the other, just as acting unjustly is entirely voluntary, or is part of it voluntary and part involuntary? Similarly too in the case of being treated justly: for acting justly is entirely voluntary; so it is reasonable that the opposition should run the same way in each case, and that being treated unjustly and being treated justly should each be either voluntary or involuntary. But it would seem odd also in the case of being treated justly, if it were entirely voluntary; for some people are treated justly without being willing. Next one might also raise this further puzzle: whether everyone who has suffered what is unjust is thereby being treated unjustly, or whether, just as with doing, so too the same holds with suffering. For it is possible, accidentally, to have a share of just acts in both ways; and it is clear that the same holds likewise for unjust acts. For doing unjust things is not the same as acting unjustly, nor is suffering unjust things the same as being treated unjustly; and likewise too in the case of acting justly and being treated justly: for it is impossible
22| for anyone to be treated unjustly if no one is acting unjustly, or to be treated justly if no one is acting justly. But if acting unjustly is, without qualification, harming someone voluntarily, and acting voluntarily is knowing whom one harms, with what, and how, while the person who lacks self-control voluntarily harms himself, then he would be treated unjustly voluntarily, and a man could act unjustly toward himself. And this too is among the puzzles still open, [1136b] namely, can a person be unjust toward his own self? Further, because of lack of self-control a man might voluntarily be harmed by another who harms him voluntarily, so that it would be possible to be treated unjustly voluntarily. Or is the definition not correct, but must one add to 'harming someone knowingly, and whom, and with what, and how' the phrase 'against that person's own wish'? A man, then, is harmed voluntarily and suffers unjust things voluntarily, but no one is treated unjustly voluntarily; for no one wishes it, not even the person who lacks self-control, but he acts against his own wish. For no one wishes for what he does not think is good, and the person who lacks self-control fails to do the very thing his own judgment tells him is required. A man who gives away what is his own, as Homer says Glaucus gave Diomedes 'gold armor for bronze, the worth of a hundred oxen for the worth of nine,' is not treated unjustly; for giving is within his own power, but being treated unjustly is not within his own power - there must be someone acting unjustly toward him. So it is clear, regarding being treated unjustly, that it is not voluntary. Of the two questions we set out to answer, there remain two things to say: whether it is the person who assigns more than what is deserved who acts unjustly, or the person who has it; and second, can a person be unjust toward himself. If the first of these holds true, and it is the one who distributes who acts unjustly, and not the one who has the greater share, then if someone knowingly and voluntarily assigns to another a greater share than his own, this person himself
23| acts unjustly toward himself - which is exactly what moderate people seem to do, for the decent person is inclined to take less than his share. Or is this too not so simple? For perhaps he is gaining more of some other good, such as reputation or what is fine without qualification. Further, the difficulty is resolved by the definition of acting unjustly: for he suffers nothing against his own wish, so that on this account at least he is not treated unjustly; if anything, he is merely harmed. It is likewise plain that the one who divides the shares is the wrongdoer, and the one who merely holds the larger portion is not always so; for it is not the person in whom the unjust act resides who acts unjustly, but the one who does this voluntarily, and this belongs to whoever is the source of the action, which lies in the distributor, not in the recipient. Further, since 'doing' is said in many ways, and there is a sense in which inanimate things kill, as does the hand, and as does a slave acting on someone's orders, such an agent does not act unjustly, though it does the unjust deed. Further, if a judge gave judgment in ignorance, he does not act unjustly by the standard of legal justice, nor is his judgment unjust, though it is in a sense unjust; for legal justice and justice in the primary sense are different things. But if he gave judgment unjustly knowingly, [1137a] then he himself too is gaining more, whether of favor or of revenge. So just as if he had taken a share of the wrongdoing itself, the judge who for these reasons gives an unjust judgment likewise has more; for in that case, in awarding the field, he received not a field but money. People think that acting unjustly is within their own power; that is why they also think being just is easy. But it is not so: to have relations with one's neighbor's wife, to strike the man next door, or to hand over the money with one's own hand is easy and within one's own power, but to do these things while in the corresponding state of character is neither easy nor within one's own power. And likewise too
24| knowing what is just and what is unjust - people think this requires no wisdom, because it is not difficult to understand what the laws say (though these are not the just things themselves, except accidentally). But knowing how actions must be done and how things must be distributed for them to be just - this is a far greater task than knowing what is healthy. For there too it is easy to know honey, wine, hellebore, cautery, and surgery, but knowing how one must administer them for health, and to whom, and when, is as great a task as being a doctor. And for this very reason people think that acting unjustly belongs no less to the just man, because the just man is no less able, indeed even more able, to do each of these things: for indeed he could have relations with a woman and strike a blow; and the courageous man could throw away his shield and turn and run in whichever direction he liked. But acting the coward or acting unjustly does not consist in doing these things, except accidentally, but in doing them while in the corresponding state of character, just as practicing medicine and healing do not consist in cutting or not cutting, or administering drugs or not administering them, but in doing so in the corresponding way. Just things exist among those who share in goods that are unconditionally good, and who are capable of possessing an excess or a deficiency of them. For some beings there is no excess of these goods - the gods, perhaps; for others, those incurably bad, no portion of them is beneficial at all, but everything harms them; while for others they are beneficial up to a point - and this is why justice is a human thing. As for equity and the equitable, and how equity relates to justice, and the equitable to what is just, it remains next to speak of these. For on examination they appear neither as simply the same nor as different in kind; and sometimes the equitable
25| We also praise a man of this sort, so that in praising other things too [1137b] we apply the term in place of 'good,' making clear that the more decent is better; but sometimes, following the argument, it seems strange that the decent, being something apart from the just, should be praiseworthy: for either the just is not good, or the decent is not just, if it is something different; or, if both are good, they are the same. Now the puzzle about the decent arises more or less for these reasons, but all the claims are in a way correct and none is opposed to the others: for the decent, being a certain kind of just thing, is better than just—not as being a different genus that is better than the just. The just and the decent are therefore the same, and though both are good, the decent is superior. The puzzle arises because the decent is just, but not what is just by law—rather a correction of what is legally just. The reason is that law is always universal, but about some things it is not possible to speak correctly in universal terms. So in cases where it is necessary to speak universally but not possible to do so correctly, the law takes what holds for the most part, not unaware of the error this involves. And it is none the less correct: for the error lies not in the law nor in the lawgiver, but in the nature of the matter, since the material of practical affairs is of just this sort from the start. So whenever the law speaks universally, but what happens in a given case falls outside the universal rule, then it is correct—insofar as the lawgiver's statement was deficient and erred by speaking without qualification—to correct the omission, saying what the lawgiver himself would have said had he been present there, and would have legislated had he known. Hence the decent is just, and better than a certain sort of just,
26| not better than the just without qualification, but better than the error that arises from speaking without qualification. And this is the nature of the decent: a correction of law where it is deficient on account of its universality. This is also the reason not everything is governed by law: about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. For of what is indefinite, the rule too is indefinite, just like the leaden rule used in Lesbian building: for the rule is not rigid but shifts to fit the shape of the stone, and the decree likewise shifts to fit the facts. What the decent is, then, and that it is just, and better than a certain kind of just, is clear. It is clear from this, too, who the decent person is: the one who chooses and does such things, and [1138a] who does not stand strictly on justice to his own disadvantage even though he has the law on his side, but tends to take less—this person is decent, and this state of character is decency, being a kind of justice and not some other state distinct from it. Whether or not it is possible to be unjust to oneself is clear from what has been said. For some just acts are those in accordance with virtue as a whole that are prescribed by law—for example, the law does not command a man to kill himself, and what it does not command, it forbids. Further, when a man harms another contrary to the law, not in retaliation for harm suffered, and willingly, he acts unjustly, and 'willingly' means knowing both whom he harms and with what; a man who in a fit of anger cuts his own throat does so deliberately, in defiance of sound reasoning, in a manner the law forbids: he is therefore acting unjustly. But toward whom? Surely toward the city, not toward himself; for he suffers it willingly, and no one is treated unjustly willingly. This is also why the city imposes a penalty, and a kind of dishonor attaches to the man who destroys himself, as one who wrongs the city. Further, insofar as the wrongdoer is unjust only in this one respect
27| and not simply base without qualification, it is not possible to be unjust to oneself (for this is a different case from that one: the unjust man is base in a way, as the coward is, not as possessing the whole of vice, so that he is not unjust in respect of the whole of vice either): for it would follow that the identical thing was, at one and the same time, removed from a given person and given to that very person, which cannot happen—rather, justice and injustice must always range over more than a single party. Further, injustice is voluntary and done from choice, and prior to any retaliation: for a man who does the same thing back because he suffered it first is not thought to act unjustly; but a man acting against himself suffers and does the same things at the same time. Further, on this view it would be possible to be treated unjustly willingly. Besides these points, no one acts unjustly apart from particular unjust acts, and no one commits adultery with his own wife, or breaks into his own wall, or steals his own property. In general, the question of acting unjustly toward oneself is resolved also by the distinction drawn about being treated unjustly voluntarily. It is also clear that both are bad—being treated unjustly and acting unjustly (for the one is having less than the mean and the other having more, just as the healthy is in medicine and the fit condition is in gymnastics); but nonetheless, acting unjustly is worse: for acting unjustly involves vice and is blameworthy, and it is vice either complete and unqualified or close to it (for not everything voluntary involves injustice), while being treated unjustly involves neither vice nor injustice. In itself, then, being treated unjustly is the lesser evil, [1138b] but accidentally nothing prevents it from being the greater evil. But the craft of medicine pays no attention to this: it calls pleurisy a greater disease than a stumble, even though the latter might on occasion turn out, accidentally, to be the greater—if, say, as a result of stumbling and falling a man happened
28| to be captured by the enemy or killed. By way of metaphor and resemblance there is a kind of justice not of a man toward himself but toward certain parts of himself—not every kind of justice, but the kind that holds between master and slave, or between household manager and household. For in these accounts the part of the soul that has reason is set apart from the part that lacks reason; and it is with an eye to these parts that people think there is injustice toward oneself, because within them it is possible to suffer something contrary to one's own desires; so that, just as between ruler and ruled, there is thought to be a kind of justice between these parts as well, toward one another. Let this, then, be our determination of justice and the other ethical virtues, in this manner.