Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language
1| [1155a] After this it would follow to go through friendship: for it is a virtue, or involves virtue, and moreover it is most necessary for life. For even a man in possession of every other good would refuse a friendless life: indeed even to those who are wealthy and hold positions of rule and power, friends seem to be the greatest necessity; for what use is such prosperity if the opportunity for beneficence is taken away, which comes about, and is most praised, above all toward friends? Or how could such prosperity be guarded and preserved without friends? For the greater it is, the more exposed it is to danger. And in poverty and in the other misfortunes people think friends are the only refuge. Friends help the young keep from error, and help the old with attention and with what their action lacks because of weakness, and help those in their prime toward fine actions: 'two going together' -- for they are more capable both of understanding and of acting. And by nature there seems to be present, in the parent toward the offspring and in the offspring toward the parent, a natural affection, not only among human beings but also among birds and most animals, and among members of the same race toward one another, and most of all among human beings, which is why we praise those who love humanity. And one might see, even in the course of travels, how every human being is akin and dear to every other human being. And friendship also seems to hold cities together, and lawgivers seem to be more concerned about it than about justice: for concord seems to be something like friendship, and this is what they aim at above all, and they drive out faction, which is enmity, above all: and when people are friends, they have no need of justice, but when they are just, they still need friendship in addition, and the most just of just things is thought to be what is friendly. And it is not only necessary but also fine: for we praise those who love their friends,
2| and having many friends is thought to be one of the fine things: and further, people think that the same men are good men and are friends. But there is no little dispute about it. For some hold that it is a kind of likeness, and that like people are friends, which is why they say 'like to like,' and 'jackdaw to jackdaw,' and such sayings: but others say, on the contrary, that all such people are like potters to one another. [1155b] And about these very questions they inquire further, and in a more properly natural way, Euripides saying that the parched earth loves the rain, and that the majestic sky, when filled with rain, loves to fall to earth, and Heraclitus saying that what opposes is helpful, and that the finest harmony comes from things that differ, and that all things come to be in accordance with strife: but opposed to these, others, and especially Empedocles, say that like desires like. Let us, then, dismiss the natural questions among these problems (for they are not proper to the present inquiry): but let us examine those that are human and belong to character and feeling, such as whether friendship comes about among all people or it is not possible for wicked people to be friends, and whether there is one form of friendship or several. For those who think there is one, on the ground that it admits of more and less, have trusted an insufficient sign: for things that differ in form also admit of more and less. This has been discussed before. But perhaps it would become clear about these matters once what is lovable has been recognized. For it is thought that not everything is loved, but what is lovable, and this is the good or the pleasant or the useful: but it would seem that useful
3| is what something good or pleasure comes about through, so that the good and the pleasant would be lovable as ends. Do people, then, love the good, or what is good for themselves? For these sometimes conflict. And likewise concerning the pleasant. Now it seems that each person loves what is good for himself, and that the good without qualification is lovable, but for each person it is what is good for him: and each person loves not what is good for him but what appears good to him. This will make no difference: for what is lovable will simply be what appears so. There being three things on account of which people love, in the case of love for inanimate things it is not called friendship: for there is no love in return, nor any wishing of good for that thing (for it would be ridiculous, presumably, to wish good things for wine; if anything, one wishes it to be preserved, so that one may have it oneself): but for a friend they say one must wish good things for that person's own sake. Those who wish good things in this way, without the same coming about from the other side too, they call well-disposed: for they say that goodwill in people who return the feeling is friendship. Or must we add 'without escaping notice'? For many are well-disposed toward people they have not seen, but suppose to be decent or useful: [1156a] and one of those people might feel the very same thing toward this person. These, then, appear well-disposed toward one another: but how could one call them friends when they do not notice how they stand toward each other? So people must be well-disposed toward one another and wish good things for one another without this escaping their notice, and for one of the reasons mentioned. And these reasons differ from one another in kind: and so too, therefore, do the lovings and the friendships. There are, then, three forms of friendship, equal in number to the things that are lovable: for in accordance with each there is a mutual loving that does not escape notice, and those who love one another wish good things to one another
4| in the respect in which they love. Now those who love each other for utility do not love each other in their own right, but insofar as some good comes to them from one another. And likewise those who love for pleasure: for they do not cherish witty people because of what sort of people they are, but because they are pleasant to them. Those who love for utility, then, feel affection because of the good that accrues to themselves, and those who love for pleasure because of the pleasure that accrues to themselves, and not insofar as the person loved is what he is, but insofar as he is useful or pleasant. These friendships, then, are accidental: for it is not insofar as the person loved is what he is that he is loved, but insofar as one party furnishes some good and the other pleasure. Such friendships, then, are easily dissolved, when the parties do not remain alike: for if they are no longer pleasant or useful, they stop loving. And what is useful does not remain the same, but becomes different at different times. So when the reason they were friends is removed, the friendship is dissolved too, since the friendship existed in relation to those things. Such friendship seems to arise mostly among the elderly (for people of that age pursue not the pleasant but the beneficial), and among those in their prime and the young who pursue their own advantage. Nor do such people particularly live together with one another either: for sometimes they are not even pleasant to each other, and they do not need this sort of companionship unless they are useful; for they are pleasant to each other only to the extent that they have hopes of some good. Guest-friendship too is classed among these. The friendship of the young, on the other hand, seems to be for pleasure: for they live by feeling, and pursue above all what is pleasant to themselves and what is present; and as their age changes, what is pleasant to them becomes different too. This is why they become
5| friends and stop being friends quickly: for the friendship shifts along with the pleasant, [1156b] and the change in this sort of pleasure is quick. The young are also erotic: for erotic love is for the most part a matter of feeling and pleasure; that is why they fall in love and quickly stop, often changing within the same day. But such people do wish to spend their days together and live together, since it is in this way that what belongs to their friendship comes about for them. Complete friendship is that between people who are good and alike in virtue: for these people alike wish good things for each other insofar as they are good, and they are good in their own right. Those who wish good things to their friends for the friends' own sake are friends most of all: for they are disposed this way because of themselves, and not accidentally. So the friendship of these people lasts as long as they are good, and virtue is a lasting thing. And each of them is good both without qualification and to his friend: for good people are both good without qualification and useful to one another. And likewise they are pleasant too: for good people are pleasant both without qualification and to one another, since to each person his own actions and actions of that kind are pleasurable, and the actions of good people are the same or alike. And such friendship is reasonably lasting: for it joins together in itself everything that ought to belong to friends. For every friendship is for the sake of the good or for the sake of the pleasant, either without qualification or for the one who loves, and in accordance with some likeness; and to this kind of friendship all the things mentioned belong in their own right: (the text is corrupt at this point in the Greek) and the rest follow likewise, since what is good without qualification is also pleasant without qualification, and these things are lovable above all; so loving and friendship are found in these people above all, and are best. It is likely that such friendships are
6| rare, since few people are of this sort. Further, it also requires time and familiarity: for as the proverb says, people cannot know one another until they have shared the proverbial salt together; nor can they accept each other, nor be friends, until each has appeared lovable to the other and been trusted. Those who quickly perform the acts of friendship toward one another wish to be friends, but are not, unless they are also lovable, and they know this: for a wish for friendship arises quickly, but friendship does not. This friendship, then, is complete both in point of time and in every other respect, and in every case each party gets from the other things that are the same and alike, which is what ought to hold between friends. [1157a] Friendship for the sake of pleasure has a resemblance to this: for good people are pleasant to one another too. And likewise friendship for the sake of utility: for good people are useful to one another in that way too. In these cases as well, friendships last most of all when the same thing comes about from each to the other, for example pleasure, and not only in that way but also from the same source, as with witty people, and not as with a lover and beloved. For these do not take pleasure in the same things: the one in seeing the other, the other in being courted by the lover; and when the bloom of youth fades, sometimes the friendship fades too (for the one no longer finds the sight of the other pleasant, and for the other the courtship no longer happens). But many, on the other hand, remain friends, if from their familiarity they have come to love each other's characters, being alike in character. Those who exchange not pleasure but utility in their erotic relationships are both less truly friends and less lasting. Those who are friends for the sake of utility are dissolved as friends together with
7| their advantage: for they were not friends of one another, but of what was profitable. For pleasure, then, and for utility, it is possible even for base people to be friends with one another, and for decent people to be friends with base people, and for a person who is neither to be friends with one of any sort whatever; but it is clear that people are friends for their own sake only if they are good: for bad people take no pleasure in one another unless some benefit comes of it. And the friendship of good people alone is beyond slander: for it is not easy for anyone to trust a person about someone who has been tested by that very person over a long time; and it is among such people that trust exists, and the conviction that the other would never do wrong, and all the other things that are required in friendship that is true in the fullest sense. In the other kinds of friendship, on the other hand, nothing prevents such things from occurring as well. For since people call friends even those who are friends for utility, as cities are (for alliances between cities are thought to arise for the sake of advantage), and also those who are fond of one another for pleasure, as children are, perhaps we too should call such people friends, but say that there are several species of friendship, and that the friendship of good people, insofar as they are good, is friendship in the primary and proper sense, while the others are friendships by likeness: for insofar as there is something good, and something alike, in that respect they are friends; since the pleasant too is good for those who are fond of pleasure. These kinds do not entirely coincide, however, nor do the same people become friends both for utility and for pleasure: for accidental attributes are not often paired together. [1157b] Since friendship has been divided into these species, base people will be friends for the sake of pleasure or utility, being alike in that respect, while good people will be friends for their own sakes: for they are friends insofar as they are good. These, then, are friends without qualification, while the others are friends accidentally, and by
8| being made like these. Just as with the virtues, some people are called good in respect of a state, others in respect of an activity, so too with friendship: for those who live together take joy in one another and provide each other with good things, while those who are asleep or separated by distance are not actively engaged, but are so disposed that they would engage in friendly activity; for distance does not dissolve friendship without qualification, but only the activity of it. But if the absence is prolonged, it seems to produce forgetfulness of the friendship too; hence the saying, 'lack of conversation has dissolved many a friendship.' Neither the elderly nor the sour-tempered appear to be inclined to friendship: for there is little of the pleasant in them, and no one can spend his days with someone who is painful or not pleasant; for nature seems above all to shun what is painful and to reach for what is pleasant. Those who accept one another but do not live together seem to resemble people of goodwill rather than friends. For nothing so belongs to friends as living together (for it is those in need who desire benefit, but even the blessed desire to spend their days together, since it least befits them to be solitary); but it is not possible for people to spend their time together if they are not pleasant to each other and do not enjoy the same things, which is thought to be characteristic of comradeship. Friendship, then, is above all the friendship of good people, as has often been said: for what is good or pleasant without qualification seems to be lovable and choiceworthy, and what is such for each particular person is lovable and choiceworthy for him; and a good person is lovable and choiceworthy to a good person for both these reasons. Loving seems to be like a feeling, but friendship like a state; for loving belongs no less
9| toward inanimate things, but they love back in return with choice, and choice comes from a state of character; and they wish good things to the beloved for the beloved's own sake, not as a matter of feeling but as a matter of a state of character. And in loving their friend they love what is good for themselves: for the good man, in becoming a friend, becomes a good for the one whose friend he is. Each of them, then, loves what is good for himself, and repays in equal measure both the wishing and the pleasure: for friendship is said to be equality, [1158a] and this belongs most of all to the friendship of good people. But among the sour and the elderly friendship arises less, in proportion as they are harder to get along with and take less pleasure in company: for these traits seem most of all to be marks of friendliness and productive of friendship. That is why the young become friends quickly, but the old do not: for people do not become friends with those in whom they take no pleasure, and the same holds of the sour. Yet people of this sort are kindly disposed toward each other: they want good things for one another and come through when help is needed; but calling them friends outright goes too far, since they do not pass their days in each other's company or delight in one another—precisely the things that most seem to mark out friendliness. One cannot, however, hold many people as friends under the complete form of friendship, any more than one can be in love with several at once (that looks like an excess, and love of this kind by nature attaches itself to a single person); nor is it easy to strongly please a great many people simultaneously, and perhaps there are not that many good people to please. And one must also gain experience of the person and come to be in close familiarity with him, which is a very hard thing. But because of usefulness and pleasure it is possible to please many people: for there are many such people, and the services rendered take little time. Of these, the pleasure-based friendship comes closest to genuine friendship, since it occurs when both sides feel the same way and delight in each other or in shared
10| things, the kind of friendship typical among the young: for in these there is more of the free and generous spirit. But the friendship based on usefulness is a marketplace kind. And the blessedly happy have no need at all of useful people, but they do need pleasant ones: for they want to share their lives with particular people, and although something painful can be tolerated briefly, no one would put up with it going on and on—not even the good, were it distressing to him; hence they look for friends who bring pleasure. But presumably these must also be good, and moreover good for them: for so they will have everything that friends need to have. But those in positions of power appear to use their friends in a divided way: some are useful to them and others pleasant, but the same people are not very often both; for they do not seek people who are pleasant along with virtue, nor people who are useful for fine ends, but rather, aiming at pleasure, they seek witty people, and for what is ordered to be carried out, people clever at doing it, and these traits are not very often found in the same person. It has been said that the pleasant and the useful come together in the excellent man; but such a person does not become the friend of one who surpasses him, unless that person is also surpassed in virtue; otherwise he does not achieve equality in proportion, being surpassed. But such people do not very often turn out to exist. [1158b] The friendships mentioned so far, then, are based on equality: for the same things come from both sides and they wish them to one another, or they exchange one thing for another, for instance pleasure for benefit; but it has been said that these are friendships to a lesser degree and less lasting. And they seem, both because of resemblance and because of difference, to be the same as the friendship in accordance with virtue and not to be the same: for in respect of resemblance to the friendship in accordance with virtue they appear to be friendships (for the one has pleasure and the other usefulness, and these belong to that friendship as well), while in respect of the fact that the one is safe from slander and lasting, and these change quickly and differ from it in many other respects besides, they do not appear to be friendships, because of their unlikeness to that one.
11| There is also another kind of friendship, the one based on superiority, such as that of father to son and in general of elder to younger, of husband to wife, and of every ruler to the one ruled. And these differ also from one another: for the friendship of parents to children is not the same as that of rulers to those ruled, nor indeed is that of father to son the same as that of son to father, nor that of husband to wife the same as that of wife to husband. For the virtue and the function of each of these is different, and the reasons for which they love are different as well; so the acts of loving and the friendships are different too. Neither party, then, receives the identical thing from the other, nor ought one to expect that; but once children give their parents what is owed to those who brought them into being, and parents give their sons what children are owed, the friendship between such people will hold firm and be a fitting one. And in all friendships based on superiority the loving too must be proportional, for instance the better person should be loved more than he loves, and likewise the more beneficial one, and each of the others correspondingly; for when the loving comes about according to worth, then a kind of equality comes about, which indeed seems to belong to friendship. But the equal does not appear to hold in the same way in matters of justice and in friendship: for in matters of justice what is equal is primarily what accords with worth, and what accords with quantity is secondary, while in friendship what accords with quantity is primary, and what accords with worth is secondary. This is clear if a great gap arises in virtue or vice or wealth or anything else: for people are no longer
12| friends, nor indeed do they think they deserve to be. This is most evident in the case of the gods: for they surpass all people most of all in every good thing. [1159a] It is clear too in the case of kings: for those who are far inferior do not think they deserve to be their friends, nor do those worth nothing think they deserve to be friends of the best or the wisest. Now there is no precise definition in such cases, up to what point people remain friends: for even when much is taken away friendship still remains, but when the gap becomes very wide, as with god, it no longer does. Hence the puzzle also arises, whether friends really wish for their friends the greatest of goods, for instance that they become gods: for then their friends will no longer be friends to them, nor indeed goods at all, since friends are goods. Assuming, then, that it is correctly stated that a friend wants good things for his friend for that friend's own sake, the friend would need to stay the kind of being he currently is: it is as a human being that he will be wished the greatest goods. But perhaps not all goods: for each person wishes goods most of all for himself. Most people seem to wish to be loved rather than to love, on account of love of honor: that is why most people are fond of flatterers; for the flatterer is a friend who is inferior, or pretends to be such and to love more than he is loved; and to be loved seems close to being honored, which indeed most people aim at. But they do not seem to choose honor for its own sake, but incidentally: for most people rejoice at being honored by those in positions of power because of hope (for they think they will get something from them if they need it, and so they rejoice in the honor as a sign of good treatment to come); while those who desire honor from decent people who know them aim at confirming their own opinion about themselves: so they rejoice because, trusting the judgment of those who speak, they are good.
13| People take pleasure in being loved simply in its own right; so it would seem that being loved is better than being honored, and that friendship is choiceworthy in its own right. But friendship seems to lie more in loving than in being loved. A sign of this is the pleasure mothers take in loving: some give their children away to be raised by others, and though they love them, knowing them, they do not seek to be loved in return, if both cannot be had; it seems enough for them to see their children doing well, and they go on loving them even if the children, through ignorance, render them none of what is owed to a mother. Since friendship consists more in loving, and since people who love their friends are praised, the virtue proper to friends seems to be loving; so that those in whom this happens in proportion to worth, [1159b] these are lasting friends, and their friendship lasts. In this way even unequal people could most be friends, for they would be equalized. Equality and likeness are friendship, and most of all the likeness of people who are alike in virtue: for being stable in themselves, they remain stable also toward each other, and they neither need base services nor render them, but rather, one might say, prevent them; for it is proper to good people neither to go wrong themselves nor to allow their friends to. But base people have nothing stable about them, since they do not even remain like themselves; they become friends for a short time only, delighting in each other's badness. Useful and pleasant friends last longer, for as long as they supply each other with pleasures or benefits. Friendship arising from usefulness seems to occur most of all between opposites, for instance a poor man and a rich one, an ignorant man and a knowledgeable one; for whatever a person happens to lack, this he desires, and in return gives something
14| else. Here too one might drag in both lover and beloved, the beautiful and the ugly. That is why lovers sometimes appear ridiculous, claiming to be loved as they love; presumably they should make this claim only if they are equally lovable, and where they have nothing of the sort it is ridiculous. Perhaps, too, the opposite does not desire the opposite in its own right, but only incidentally, and what is really desired is the mean; for that is the good — for instance, what is dry does not desire to become wet, but to arrive at the mean, and likewise the hot and the rest. Let these questions be set aside, then, for indeed they lie rather outside our subject. But it appears, as was said at the start, that friendship and justice have to do with the same things and exist among the same people. For in every community there seems to be some form of justice, and friendship too; at any rate people address as friends their fellow sailors and fellow soldiers, and likewise those in other communities as well. And to the extent that people share a community, to that extent friendship exists; for so does justice. And the proverb 'friends' goods are common property' is correct, since friendship consists in community. Brothers and comrades have everything in common, while others have it marked off, more for some, less for others; for friendships too differ, some more, some less. And what is just differs as well: [1160a] the same claims do not hold between parents and children as between brothers with each other, nor between comrades and fellow citizens, and likewise with the other kinds of friendship as well. What is unjust, then, differs with respect to each of these, and grows greater the closer it is to friends — for instance
15| to defraud a comrade of money is a worse thing than to defraud a fellow citizen, and to fail to help a brother is worse than to fail to help a stranger, and to strike a father is worse than to strike anyone else at all. And justice naturally grows along with friendship, since they exist among the same people and extend equally far. Now all communities seem to be parts of the political community; for people come together for the sake of some advantage, procuring something needed for life, and the political community too seems to have come together in the first place, and to persist, for the sake of advantage; for this is what lawgivers aim at, and they say that what is to the common advantage is just. The other communities aim at advantage in some particular respect — sailors, for instance, aim at what belongs to the voyage with a view to making money or something of the sort, fellow soldiers at what belongs to the war, whether they are after money or victory or a city, and likewise members of a tribe or a deme. Some communities seem to come about for the sake of pleasure, such as religious societies and dining clubs, for these exist for the sake of sacrifice and of fellowship. But all these seem to fall under the political community; for the political community aims not at present advantage but at advantage for the whole of life, performing sacrifices and holding gatherings in connection with them, and rendering honors to the gods, and providing rest for themselves along with pleasure. For the ancient sacrifices and gatherings appear to have taken place after the harvesting of crops, as a kind of first-offering; for it was especially at these seasons that people had leisure. So all communities appear to be parts of the political community, and such friendships will correspond to such communities. There are three kinds of constitution, and an equal number of deviations, which are, so to speak, corruptions of them. The constitutions themselves are kingship and aristocracy, and a third based on property assessments, which it seems fitting to call timocracy, though most people
16| are accustomed to call it a constitution. Of these the best is kingship, the worst timocracy. The deviation from kingship is tyranny: [1160b] both are forms of one-man rule, yet they are worlds apart: the tyrant keeps his own advantage in view, while the king keeps in view the advantage of those he rules. Nobody counts as a true king unless he is self-sufficient and outstanding in every good thing; a man of that sort lacks nothing further, and so he would not attend to his own benefit but to the benefit of his subjects — since a so-called king who fails this test would be king only by the luck of the draw. Tyranny is the very opposite of this, for the tyrant pursues what is good for himself. And it is clearer in this case that tyranny is the worst, since the worst thing is what is opposite to the best. The change is from kingship to tyranny, for tyranny is the debased form of monarchy, and a bad king becomes a tyrant. From aristocracy the change is to oligarchy, through the badness of the rulers, who distribute what belongs to the city contrary to worth, keeping all or most of the good things for themselves, and always assigning the offices to the same people, valuing wealth above everything; so a few rule, and bad men instead of the most respectable ones. From timocracy the change is to democracy, since these are neighboring constitutions; for timocracy too wishes to be rule of the majority, and all who meet the property assessment are equal. Democracy is the least bad of these, for it deviates only slightly from the form of a constitution proper. These, then, are the changes by which constitutions most commonly shift, since in this way the change is smallest and easiest. One can find likenesses of these, and as it were models of them, in households as well. For the community of father with sons has the shape of kingship,
17| since the father cares for his children; and this is why Homer addresses Zeus as 'father,' for kingship wants to be a father's kind of rule. Yet with the Persians the paternal relation turns tyrannical, since they deal with their sons as if they were slaves. And the rule of a master over slaves is likewise tyrannical, for in it the master's advantage is what is being served. This form appears correct, while the Persian form is mistaken; for the modes of rule proper to different sorts of people differ. The rule of husband over wife appears aristocratic, for the husband rules in proportion to worth, and in matters that belong to a man, while whatever befits a wife he hands over to her. But when the husband has authority over everything, he shifts the relation into oligarchy, for he does this contrary to worth, and not insofar as he is better. [1161a] Sometimes it is the women who rule, being heiresses; in such cases the rule does not come about according to virtue, but on account of wealth and power, as in oligarchies. The relation of brothers resembles timocracy, for they are equals, except to the extent that they differ in age; hence, if they differ greatly in age, their friendship no longer remains a brotherly one. Democracy is found chiefly in households without a master (for there everyone is on an equal footing), and in those where the ruler is weak and each person has license. In each of the constitutions, friendship appears to the same extent as justice does: between a king and those he rules, it consists in a superiority of benefaction, for he does good to those he rules, given that, being good, he cares for them so that they may fare well, as a shepherd cares for his sheep — which is why Homer calls Agamemnon
18| called "shepherd of the peoples." Such too is the friendship of a father, though it differs in the scale of its benefits, for a father is the cause of his children's existing, which is thought the greatest thing, and of their nourishment and education. These same things are also attributed to ancestors: for by nature a father has rule over sons, ancestors over descendants, a king over subjects. These friendships involve superiority, which is also why parents are honored. And what is just in these relations is not the same in each case but is proportioned to worth, for that is how the friendship is too. And the friendship of husband toward wife is the same as in an aristocracy, for it is according to virtue, and the better party gets the greater good, and each gets what befits him; and that is how the just is measured too. The friendship of brothers resembles that of comrades, for they are equals and of an age, and such people are for the most part alike in feeling and character. Similar to this too is the friendship found in a timocracy, for the citizens wish to be equal and decent; ruling is by turns, and on equal terms, and so the friendship is of this kind too. But in the deviant constitutions, just as the just is present only to a small degree, so too is friendship, and least of all in the worst of them; for in a tyranny there is little or no friendship. Wherever there is nothing shared between the one ruling and the one ruled, friendship is absent as well, and so is justice — take the case of a craftsman and his instrument, or a soul and a body, or a master and a slave: [1161b] each of these instruments does profit the person making use of it, yet no friendship exists toward lifeless things, and no justice either. Nor indeed is there friendship toward a horse or an ox, nor toward a slave qua slave. For there is nothing in common: the slave is an ensouled tool, and the tool is an unsouled slave.
19| So then, qua slave there is no friendship toward him, but qua human being there is; for some measure of justice is held to exist between any human being and anyone else able to share in law and covenant, and friendship follows along with it, in proportion as he is human. So in tyrannies friendship and justice hold only to a small degree, but in democracies they hold to a greater degree, since where people are equals they have much in common. Now every friendship exists within a community, as has been said. But one might mark off friendship of kinship and friendship of comradeship as separate. Political friendship, and friendship among members of a tribe, and among fellow-voyagers, and all such friendships, more closely resemble the friendships of community, for they seem to exist by virtue of some kind of agreement. Into this class one might also place the friendship of hospitality toward strangers. And kinship friendship appears to have many forms, but all of them depend on the friendship of a father: for parents love their children as being something of themselves, while children love their parents as having come from them, something belonging to those parents. Parents, however, recognize their own offspring more readily than the children recognize that they have sprung from these parents, and what originates a thing is knit to what it produces more tightly than the produced thing is knit to its producer; for whatever comes forth from someone belongs to that person — as a tooth, a hair, or anything else belongs to whoever has it — while for the originator, what came from him belongs to him little, or not at all. And this holds also by length of time: parents love their children as soon as they are born, but children come to love their parents only as time goes on, once they have acquired understanding or perception. From these considerations it is also clear why mothers love more. Parents, then, love their children as themselves (for what comes from them is, in a sense, another self, by virtue of having been separated), while children love their parents as having their nature from them,
20| and brothers love one another because they have their nature from the same source; for their sameness in relation to that source produces sameness with each other, which is why people speak of "same blood" and "same root" and the like. They are, then, in a way the same thing, even though they exist as separate individuals. Great too for friendship is having been brought up together and being of the same age, for "like takes to like," and those who are used to one another become comrades; which is also why the friendship of brothers resembles that of comrades. [1162a] Cousins and the rest of one's kin are bound to one another through these same ties, since they too come from the same source. Some turn out closer, some more distant, according to whether the common ancestor is near or far removed. The friendship of children toward parents, and of human beings toward the gods, is a friendship toward something good and superior, for these have conferred the greatest benefits, being the cause of existence and nourishment, and, once the children have come into being, of their education. Such a friendship also has more of the pleasant and the useful in it than friendship among strangers does, to the extent that the life shared between them is more common. What holds in the friendship of brothers holds also in that of comrades, and more so among decent people, and in general among those who are alike, insofar as they are more closely bound to each other and have loved one another from birth, and insofar as those born of the same parents and brought up together and educated alike are more alike in character; and the test that comes from length of time is here the fullest and surest. And proportionately the same holds for the rest of one's kin. Between man and woman friendship is held to exist by nature; for a human being is by nature more a pairing creature than a political one, inasmuch as the household is prior to and more necessary than the city, and the begetting of offspring is more common to animals generally. In other
21| animals the community goes only this far, but human beings live together not only for the sake of begetting children but also for the needs of life; for from the start the functions are divided, and those of husband and wife are different. So they supply each other's needs, putting their own particular contributions into the common stock. For this reason this friendship is thought to have both the useful and the pleasant in it. And it might also come about through virtue, if the two are decent, for each has his or her own virtue, and they could take pleasure in that. Children appear to serve as the tie that holds them together, and that is why couples without children separate sooner, since offspring are a shared good belonging to both partners, and a shared good is what keeps people bound to each other. As for how one ought to live with a wife, and in general how one friend ought to live with another, this is evidently no different a question from how one ought to live justly; for it plainly is not the same for a friend in relation to a friend as for a stranger, a comrade, or a fellow-student. There are, as was said at the start, three kinds of friendship, and in each of them some friends are on a footing of equality, others on one of superiority (for good people become friends with one another equally, and a better person with a worse; and likewise pleasant friends, [1162b] and those who are friends for utility, being equal in the benefits or differing in them). Equals ought to render equality in loving and in everything else, while those who are unequal ought to render what is proportionate to their superiorities. Complaints and reproaches arise in the friendship of utility either exclusively or most of all, and reasonably so. For those who are friends through virtue are eager to do well by one another, since this belongs to virtue and to friendship, and when people are rivaling one another toward this end there are no complaints or quarrels; for no one
22| is vexed at a man who loves him and does him good, but if he has any refinement he defends himself by doing good in return. And the one who exceeds, getting what he is aiming at, would not complain of his friend, for each desires the good. Nor is there much complaint either among those who are friends for pleasure, for what they both desire comes about at the same time, if they enjoy spending time together; and a man who complained of one who did not delight him would look ridiculous, since he could simply not spend his days with him. But the friendship of utility is prone to complaint, for since the parties make use of each other for advantage they always want more, and think they have less than is fitting, and they complain that they are not getting as much as they deserve and need, while those doing them good are unable to supply as much as those receiving it need. And it seems that, just as the just is twofold, one part unwritten and the other according to law, so too friendship for utility is in one kind moral and in the other legal. Complaints, then, arise chiefly when people do not settle and dissolve the relation according to the same kind. The legal kind is that on stated terms, either the wholly commercial kind, hand to hand, or the more liberal kind, allowing time, but by agreement as to what is exchanged for what. In this kind the debt is clear and not disputed, but it has a friendly element in the postponement it allows; which is why in some places there are no lawsuits over such transactions, and people think that those who have dealt on trust ought to accept the outcome. The moral kind carries no fixed terms; rather, a person gives to a friend, or grants whatever it may be, the way one gives to a friend, yet expects the same amount back, or something greater, treating the gift not as a gift but as a loan; and he will voice a complaint if the ending of the arrangement does not match how it began. This happens
23| because everyone, or most people, wants fine things, but chooses what is beneficial to themselves. It is fine to do good to another not in order to be repaid in kind; [1163a] it is beneficial to have good done to oneself. So to one who is able, one should repay the worth of what one received, and do so willingly (for one should not be made a friend against one's will: one should treat the case as though one had made a mistake at the start and been well treated by someone one should not have been—for it was not by a friend, nor by one acting for that very reason—and so the account should be settled as with someone who did well by us on stated terms): and even one would agree to repay if able; if unable, not even the one who gave would have expected it. So if it is possible, one should repay. But at the start one should examine by whom one is being well treated and for what, so as to accept the terms or not on that basis. There is dispute over whether one should measure by the benefit to the one who received it and make the return in proportion to that, or by the beneficence of the one who acted. For those who received such things say that what they got from their benefactors was small for the givers and something they could have gotten from others too, belittling it; while the others say the opposite, that it was the greatest of what they had to give, and something not obtainable from others, and given amid dangers or such needs. Is it then the case that, since the friendship exists on account of usefulness, the benefit to the one who received is the measure? For it is he who is in need, and the other assists him on the expectation of getting back the equal: so the assistance has become as great as the benefit received by this man, and he ought to repay as much as he profited, or even more, for that is finer. But in friendships based on virtue there are no complaints, and the measure seems rather to be the intention of the one who acted; for the authority over virtue and character lies in the intention. People also differ over friendships based on superiority:
24| for each claims to deserve to have more, and when this happens the friendship is dissolved. For the better person thinks it belongs to him to have more, since more is assigned to the good man; and likewise the more useful person thinks so too—for they say a useless person ought not to have an equal share, since it becomes a public service and not a friendship, if what comes from the friendship is not in proportion to the worth of what each contributes. For they think that, just as in a partnership of money those who contribute more take more, so it ought to be in friendship too. But the needy person and the inferior one say the opposite: for they say it is the part of a good friend to assist those in need—what is the use, they say, of being a friend to a good man or to a man of power, if one is going to get nothing out of it? [1163b] So each seems to make a correct claim, and each should be assigned more from the friendship, but not more of the same thing—rather, to the one who is superior, more honor, and to the one in need, more gain. For honor is the prize of virtue and of beneficence, while gain is the assistance appropriate to need. This appears to hold in constitutions too: for the man who provides no good to the community is not honored, since the common good is given to the one who benefits the community, and honor is a common good. For it is not possible to make money from public funds and be honored at the same time. In everything, no one puts up with getting the lesser share: so to the one who is made lesser in respect of money they assign honor, and to the one who takes bribes, money; for what is in proportion to worth equalizes and preserves the friendship, as has been said. In this way, then, one should also deal with unequal parties, and and the one who is benefited, whether in money or in virtue, must repay honor in return, giving back what he can.
25| For friendship seeks what is possible, not what is proportionate to worth—since that is not possible in all cases, as with the honors paid to the gods and to parents: for no one could ever repay their worth, but the one who serves them to the extent of his power seems to be a decent person. Hence it might seem that a son may not renounce his father, though a father may renounce his son: for since he owes, he must repay, but having done nothing worthy of what has been done for him, he has done nothing, so that he is always in debt. But those to whom the debt is owed have the authority to release it, and so the father does too. At the same time it seems that no one would ever renounce a son, unless he were exceedingly wicked; for apart from natural affection, it is human not to reject his assistance. But for the son, if the father is wicked, assisting him is a thing to be avoided, or not something to be eager for; for most people want to have good done to them, but avoid doing it as unprofitable. On these matters, then, let this much be said.