Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language
1| [1214a] The one who declared his own opinion at Delos, before the god, inscribed it on the porch of the temple of Leto, distinguishing things that do not all belong to the same thing — the good, the fine, and the pleasant — making the most just the finest, and health the best, and sweetest of all is to get what one desires. But let us not concede this to him. For happiness, being the finest and best of all things, is the pleasantest. Now there are many inquiries concerning each subject and each nature that involve difficulty and require investigation; some of these bear only on knowing, while others bear also on the acquisition and practice of the thing. As for those inquiries that have only a theoretical philosophy, they must be treated at the fitting occasion, so far as is proper to the method. But first we must inquire in what living well consists and how it is to be acquired — whether all who attain this designation become happy by nature, as some are tall and others short, and others differ in complexion, or through learning, happiness being a kind of knowledge, or through some kind of training (for many things belong to human beings neither by nature nor through learning but through habituation — bad qualities to those habituated badly, good ones to those habituated well) — or in none of these ways, but by one or the other of two things: either, like those possessed by nymphs or by a god among human beings, through the inspiration of some divinity, as if inspired, or through fortune (for many say that happiness and good fortune are the same thing).
2| Now it is not unclear that the presence of these advantages comes to human beings through all of these causes, or some of them, or one of them (for practically all comings-into-being fall under these principles; indeed one might bring together all actions arising from thought under those arising from knowledge). But faring well and living blessedly and finely would seem to lie chiefly in three things, the things that seem most choiceworthy. For some say that practical wisdom is the greatest good, others virtue, others pleasure. And some dispute about their relative magnitude with regard to happiness,
3| [1214b] claiming that one contributes more to it than another — some holding that practical wisdom is a greater good than virtue, others that virtue is greater than practical wisdom, others that pleasure is greater than both of these. And to some it seems that living happily comes from all of these together, to others from two of them, to others from one alone of these. Having fixed our attention on these matters, then, everyone able to live according to his own choice should set up some target for living well — either honor or reputation or wealth or education — looking to which he will perform all his actions (since not to have one's life arranged toward some end is a sign of great folly); above all, then, one must first determine within oneself, neither rashly nor carelessly, in which of the things belonging to us living well consists, and without which things it is not possible for human beings to have this. For that without which it is not possible to be healthy is not the same thing as being healthy; and this holds likewise in many other cases too, so that living finely and the things without which it is not possible to live finely are not the same either (of such things, some are not peculiar to health or to life but common, so to speak, to all things, both states and actions — for instance, without breathing or being awake or partaking of motion nothing at all, good or bad, could belong to us — while others are more peculiar to each particular nature;
4| and these must not be overlooked, for eating meat and taking walks after dinner are not equally proper to good bodily condition as the things just mentioned). For these are the causes of the dispute about faring happily — what it is and through what it comes to be; for the things without which it is not possible to be happy, some people take to be parts of happiness itself. Now to examine all the opinions that people hold about it is superfluous (for many things appear so even to children and to the sick and to those out of their minds, about which no one with any sense would raise difficulties; for these people need not arguments but, some of them, the age at which they will change, others medical or civic correction — for drugging is a correction no less than blows); and in the same way as these, one need not examine the opinions of the many either (for they speak at random about practically everything,
5| [1215a] and most of all about happiness; for it would be absurd to bring an argument to those who need no argument at all, but rather an affection). But since there are difficulties proper to each subject of inquiry, it is clear that there are also difficulties concerning the strongest way of living and the best life. These opinions, then, it is well to examine; for the refutations by disputants of the arguments opposed to them are demonstrations of their own arguments. Further, it is useful for our work not to overlook such things, above all with a view to that toward which every inquiry must strain — out of what things it is possible to have a share in living well and finely, or, if it is somewhat invidious to say 'blessedly,' at least with a view to the hope that would arise concerning each of these, for reasonable people. For if living well consists in things that come about through fortune or through nature, it would be beyond hope for many people (for its acquisition is not through care, nor is it up to them, nor a matter of their own effort); but if it consists in one's being a certain sort of person oneself and in the actions proceeding from oneself, the good would be both more common and more divine — more common because it would be possible for more people to share in it, more divine because happiness would then belong to those who make themselves and their actions of a certain quality. Most of the matters disputed and raised as difficulties will become clear if it is well determined what one ought to think happiness is — whether it consists only in the soul's being of a certain quality, as some of the wise and older thinkers supposed, or whether the person himself must indeed be of a certain quality, but still more the actions must be of a certain quality.
6| Now that lives are distinguished, and some do not even dispute about this sort of well-being but pursue it, as it were, for the sake of necessities — for instance those concerned with vulgar crafts and with money-making and the menial trades (I call vulgar those pursuits practiced only with a view to reputation, menial those that are sedentary and wage-earning, and money-making those concerned with buying and selling in the marketplace, that is, retail trade) — while there are three ways of life ranked as leading to happiness, corresponding to the goods spoken of earlier as the greatest for human beings — virtue, practical wisdom, and pleasure — we see that there are also three lives that all those who happen to have the power choose to live: the political, the philosophical, and the life of enjoyment.
7| [1215b] Of these, the philosopher wishes to be concerned with practical wisdom and with the contemplation of truth, the political man with fine actions (these being the actions that proceed from virtue), and the man of enjoyment with bodily pleasures. Hence one person calls one man happy, another calls another, as was said before too. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, when asked who was the happiest man, said, 'None of those you have in mind — rather, someone who would seem strange to you.' He answered in this way because he saw that the questioner supposed it impossible for someone not great and handsome or rich to attain this designation, while he himself perhaps thought that the man who lives without pain and in purity with respect to justice, or who shares in some divine contemplation, was, to speak of him as a human being, blessed. Now about many other matters too it is not easy to judge well, but most of all about that which seems to everyone the easiest thing, and which it seems every man can know — what among the things in life is choiceworthy, and which, if one got it, one would have one's desire fulfilled. For there are many such outcomes on account of which people give up life — for instance, diseases, extreme pains, storms — so that it is clear that, on account of these things at least, not to have come to be would have been choiceworthy from the start, if someone had offered the choice.
8| And besides these things, what about the life that people live while still children? For no one in his right mind would put up with going back to that either. Again, many of the things that involve neither pleasure nor pain, and many of the things that do involve pleasure but not a fine one, are such that not existing would be better than living. And in general, if one were to collect together all the things that everyone does and undergoes, none of them, however, chosen willingly, since none of them is chosen for its own sake, and were to add an unlimited stretch of time on top of that, no one would choose to live for the sake of these things any more than not to live. But surely no one would prize life for the pleasure of food alone, or of sex, either, once the other pleasures were taken away that knowing, or seeing, or any of the other senses provide for human beings—no one would, unless he were an utter slave. For it is clear that for anyone who makes this choice it would make no difference whether he became a beast or a man: at any rate the ox in Egypt,
9| [1216a] which they honor as Apis, has power over more things of this sort than many a monarch does. Nor likewise would anyone prize life for the pleasure of sleeping: for what difference is there between sleeping an unbroken sleep from the first day to the last for a thousand years, or however many, and living the life of a plant? Plants, at any rate, seem to share in some such life as this, and so do infants. For infants too, from their first coming-to-be in the mother, continue in a state of natural growth, but are asleep the whole time. So it is clear from considerations of this kind that what the good, and what the well, in living is escapes those who look into it. Anaxagoras, at any rate, is said to have answered someone who was raising such puzzles and asking for what reason one would choose to come into being rather than not, by saying, "For the sake of studying the heavens and the order of the whole universe." He, then, thought the choice to live was worth having for the sake of some kind of knowledge. But those who bless Sardanapallus, or Smindyrides the Sybarite, or others of those who live the life of enjoyment, all these evidently place happiness in enjoying oneself. Others again would choose neither practical wisdom of any kind nor bodily pleasures over the actions that come from virtue.
10| At any rate, some choose these actions not only for the sake of reputation, but even when they are not going to win a good reputation. But most so-called statesmen do not truly deserve the name; for they are not statesmen in truth. For the true statesman is one who chooses fine actions for their own sake, while the majority take up living in that way for the sake of money and gain. Given what has just been said, it is evident that everyone assigns happiness to three ways of life: the political, the philosophical, and the one devoted to enjoyment. Of these, as for the pleasure concerned with the body and with enjoyments, what it is and of what kind it is and through what it arises is not unclear, so that the question to investigate is not what these pleasures are, but whether they contribute anything toward happiness or not, and how they contribute, and whether, if certain pleasures must be attached to living well, it is these that must be attached, or whether we must share in these in some other way, while there are other pleasures on account of which people reasonably think the happy person lives pleasantly and not merely without pain. But about these matters we must inquire later; let us first look into virtue and practical wisdom, both what the nature of each of them is, and whether these—either themselves, or the actions that come from them—are parts of the good life,
11| [1216b] since people attach them to happiness, even if not all people do, still at least those human beings worth taking seriously all do. Socrates the elder, then, thought that the end was to know virtue, and he inquired what justice is, and what courage is, and each of its parts. And he did this reasonably; for he thought all the virtues were forms of knowledge, so that knowing justice and being just would happen at the same time. For we have at the same time learned geometry and building, and we are builders and geometers. That is why he inquired what virtue is, but not how it comes to be and out of what. Now this is what happens in the case of the theoretical sciences (for astronomy is nothing other, nor is the science of nature, nor geometry, than coming to know and to study the nature of the things that underlie these sciences—though nothing prevents them, incidentally, from also being useful to us for many necessary purposes); but for the productive sciences, the end of the science and the knowledge is something different, as health is the end of medicine, and good order, or some other such thing, is the end of politics. Now it is a fine thing, indeed, to know each of the fine things,
12| but nonetheless, in the case of virtue, it is not knowing what it is that is most valuable, but knowing out of what it arises. For we do not wish to know what courage is, but to be courageous, nor what justice is, but to be just, just as we wish to be healthy rather than to know what being healthy is, and to be in a good state rather than to know what being in a good state is. And we must try to seek conviction about all these matters by argument, using as witnesses and examples the things that appear to be so. For it would be best if all human beings were seen to agree with what is going to be said, but failing that, at least all in some way—which they will do once they have been brought over; for each person has some affinity for the truth, from which we must in some way demonstrate the matters at hand. For starting from things that are said truly but not clearly, as we proceed we shall arrive also at what is said clearly, always exchanging the more familiar of the things habitually said in a confused way. And arguments differ from one inquiry to another, according as they are stated philosophically or not philosophically. That is why even for statesmen one must not think that this kind of inquiry is superfluous, an inquiry through which not only the what is made clear, but also the why. For that sort of thing is philosophical in every branch of inquiry.
13| This, however, calls for a great deal of caution. [1217a] For there are some who, because it seems to belong to a philosopher to say nothing at random but always with an argument, often without realizing it say things that are foreign to the subject and empty. And they do this sometimes out of ignorance, sometimes out of pretension, and by these means even experienced people, capable of acting, are taken in by those who have neither the architectonic nor the practical understanding, nor are capable of it. They suffer this because of a lack of education; for lack of education, in regard to any given matter, consists in being unable to judge which arguments belong to the matter and which are foreign to it. It is also well to judge separately the account of the cause and the thing being demonstrated, both because of what was just said, that one must not attend to everything by way of arguments, but often rather to what appears to be so (whereas as things stand, whenever people are unable to refute an argument, they are forced to believe what has been said), and also because often what seems to have been shown to be true by an argument is indeed true, yet not on account of the cause the argument alleges. For it is possible to show what is true by way of something false; this is clear from the Analytics. Now that these preliminary remarks have been made, let us begin, as has been said, from the first things, which are not stated clearly, and, seeking to arrive at clarity, ask what happiness is.
14| It is agreed, then, that this is the greatest and best of human goods. And we say "human" because there might well be a happiness belonging to something else better than man, for instance a god. For of the other animals, all those whose nature is inferior to man's, none has any share in this name: a horse is not happy, nor a bird, nor a fish, nor anything else that exists which does not, by its very designation, share in its nature in something divine, but which lives better or worse according to some other participation in goods. But that this is so must be examined later; for now we say that of goods, some are achievable in action for man and some are not achievable in action. We put it this way because some existing things have no share at all in motion, and so none in the goods that belong to it either; and these are perhaps the best in nature. Others are achievable in action, but achievable in action by beings more powerful than us. Since "achievable in action" is said in two ways (for we count as achievable both the things for the sake of which we act and the things which, for the sake of those, share in action — for instance we count both health and wealth among the things achievable in action, and also the things done for the sake of these, the healthful practices and the money-making activities), it is clear that happiness too must be posited as the best of the things achievable in action by man.
15| [1217b] We must therefore examine what the best is, and in how many senses it is spoken of. It appears to be found chiefly in three opinions. For some say that the good itself, of all things, is best, and that the good itself is that to which it belongs both to be first among goods and to be, by its presence, the cause to the other things of their being good. Both of these belong, they say, to the Form of the good. I mean by "both": being first among goods, and being the cause to the other goods, by its presence, of their being good. For the good is said most truly of that Form (since the other goods are goods by participation in and likeness to it), and it is first among goods: for when the thing participated in is done away with, the things that participate in it are also done away with — the things that are said to be goods by participating in that Form — and the first stands to the later in just this relation. So the good itself is the Form of the good; for it is separate from the things that participate in it, just as the other Forms are. Now to examine this opinion thoroughly belongs to another line of inquiry, and one that is for the most part necessarily more a matter of logical argument (for arguments that are at once destructive and general belong to no other science);
16| but if we must speak of it concisely, we say, first, that to say there is a Form not only of the good but of anything whatever at all is spoken merely logically and emptily. This has been examined in many ways by many people, both in the exoteric discourses and in the discourses proper to philosophy. Next, even granting as fully as possible that the Forms exist, and that there is a Form of the good, it is perhaps of no use for a good life or for actions. For the good is spoken of in many ways, and in as many ways as being. For being, as has been distinguished elsewhere, signifies in one sense what a thing is, in another its quality, in another its quantity, in another its time, and besides these, in one sense it lies in being moved, in another in moving; and the good is present in each of these cases: in substance it is intellect and god, in quality it is the just, in quantity it is the measured amount, in time it is the right moment, and in the case of motion it is that which teaches and that which is being taught. Just as being, then, is not some one thing over the things mentioned, so neither is the good, and there is no single knowledge either of being or of the good.
17| But not even the things said to be good in a similar way of speaking are to be studied by a single science — for instance the right moment or the measured amount — but one science studies one right moment and another studies another, and one science studies one measured amount and another studies another: for instance, concerning food, medicine and gymnastic study the right moment and the measured amount, while concerning acts of war it is generalship, and so with each science concerning its own action; so that it can hardly be that the good itself is studied by a single science.
18| [1218a] Further, in all cases where there is a prior and a posterior, there is no common element beyond these, and one that is separate. For there would then be something prior to the first: the common and separate element would be prior, because when the common element is done away with, the first is done away with too. For instance, if the double is first among the multiples, it is not possible for the multiple, which is predicated in common, to be separate; for then it would be prior to the double. If it should follow that the common element is the Form, as it would if one made the common element separate: if justice is a good, so is courage. There is, then, they say, some good itself. Now this "itself" is added on to the common account. But what could this be, except that it is eternal and separate? But a thing that is white for many days is no more white than a thing white for one day; so neither is the good more good for being eternal. Nor, then, is the common good the same as the Form; for the common element belongs to all of them alike. And the demonstration ought to run the reverse way from how they now demonstrate the good itself. As it stands, they demonstrate the things agreed to be goods from things not agreed on, proving them from numbers — that justice and health are goods —
19| on the ground that they are orderings and numbers, on the assumption that good belongs to numbers and units because the one itself is good. But one ought to argue from the things agreed on, such as health, strength, and temperance, that the fine belongs more to the things unchanging. For all these latter things are order and rest: if that is so, those other things are good in a higher degree, since order and rest belong to them more. The proof that the one itself is the good, on the ground that numbers desire it, is also a reckless one; for they do not say clearly in what way numbers desire, but assert this all too simply, and how could one suppose there is desire in things in which life is not present? One ought to labor over this point, and not lay claim to anything without argument, when even with argument it is not easy to believe. And to say that all existing things desire some one good is not true: for each thing desires its own particular good — the eye desires sight, the body health, and so one thing desires one thing and another another. That there is no good itself, then, involves difficulties of this sort, and also that it is of no use to political science, but that political science, like the other sciences, has some good of its own — as gymnastic has good condition — and further there is the point written in the argument: for the Form of the good itself is either useful to no science, or useful alike to all;
20| further, it is not achievable in action. Likewise, the common good is neither itself good
21| [1218b] (for it might belong even to a small good) nor is it something practicable. For medicine does not concern itself with how a thing might belong to whatever happens to have it, but with how health might belong. And likewise each of the other crafts too. But "good" is said in many ways, and one part of it is the fine, and one part is practicable while another is not practicable. The practicable good is of this sort: that for the sake of which. But this is not found among things unchangeable. It is clear, then, that neither the Form of the good nor the universal good is the very good being sought (for the one is unchangeable and not practicable, while the other is changeable but not practicable); but that for the sake of which, as an end, is best and is the cause of the things falling under it, and first of all. So this would be the good itself, the end of the things practicable by man. And this is what falls under the ruling science over all the others. This ruling science is political science, household management, and practical wisdom. For these states differ from the others in being of this sort; but whether they differ from one another in anything must be said later. That the end is the cause of the things falling under it, teaching makes clear. For once they have defined the end, people show the other things, namely that each of them is good; for the end, that for the sake of which, is a cause. For example, since being healthy is such-and-such, this-here must be what is beneficial toward it; and the healthy thing is the cause of health as having set it in motion, and thus the cause of its coming to be, but not the cause of health's being good. Further, no one demonstrates that health is good, unless he is a sophist and not a doctor (for such people play sophistical tricks with arguments belonging to others), just as no one demonstrates any other principle either. As for the good as an end for man, and the best of practicable things, we must consider in how many ways "the best of all" is meant, since this is agreed to be best, and after this take up another starting point.