Magna Moralia · Book II

Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language

1| [section 29] If, then, the case is similar with the virtues too — which is likely and reasonable — practical wisdom would also be practical. For all the virtues are practical, and practical wisdom is, as it were, a kind of master-craftsman over them; for whatever this directs, the virtues and those who act in accordance with them do accordingly. Since, then, the virtues are practical, practical wisdom too would be practical. [section 30] But does practical wisdom rule over everything in the soul, as it seems to and as is disputed, or not? For it would not seem to rule over the better things — for instance, it does not rule over wisdom. But, it is said, practical wisdom takes care of everything, and has authority in directing. [section 31] But perhaps the case is like that of the steward in a household. For he has authority over everything and manages everything, but he does not yet rule over everything; rather he provides leisure for the master, so that the master, not being hindered by necessary matters, may not be shut out from doing some fine and fitting action. [section 32] In just this way and similarly to this, practical wisdom is, as it were, a steward of wisdom, and provides it with leisure and the doing of its own work, by holding in check the passions and bringing these to moderation. Book B

2| [section 1] After this it would be necessary to make an examination concerning fairness — what it is, and among what people, and about what matters. Fairness, and the fair-minded man, is that which falls short of what is just according to law. For in cases where the lawgiver is unable to define precisely each particular but speaks in general terms, the man who yields in these cases, and who chooses what the lawgiver wished to define particularly but was not able to, is the fair-minded man. But he does not fall short of the just simply speaking; for he does not fall short of what is just by nature and truly so, but of what is just according to law, which the lawgiver, being unable, left undetermined. [section 1] Reasonableness and the reasonable man are concerned with the same things as fairness — with the just [and] the things that have been left deficient by the lawgiver through his not having defined them precisely — being one who judges correctly the things left deficient by the lawgiver, and who recognizes that although they have been left deficient by the lawgiver, they are nevertheless just; such a man is reasonable. Reasonableness, then, does not exist apart from fairness; for judging belongs to the reasonable man, but acting [and] in accordance with the judgment belongs to the fair-minded man.

3| [section 1] Good deliberation is concerned with the same things as practical wisdom (for it concerns the practicable things, those that involve choice and avoidance), but it does not exist apart from practical wisdom. For practical wisdom is the practical capacity concerning these things, while good deliberation is a state, or disposition, or something of this kind, that is capable of hitting upon what is best and most advantageous among practicable things. [section 2] Hence things that turn out well by chance would not seem to belong to good deliberation; for in cases where there is no reasoning that looks to what is best, you would not call someone in whom something turned out well by chance well-deliberating, but fortunate; for successes that come about without the reasoning that judges are strokes of good fortune. [section 3] Does it ever belong to justice to give each person equal treatment in one's dealings — I mean, for example, meeting each person as he happens to be, whatever sort he is? Or not? For this would seem to belong rather to the flatterer and the toady; but to render one's dealings with each person according to worth — this would seem to belong to the just and the serious man simply speaking. But one might raise a difficulty about this too. [section 4] If indeed to act unjustly is to harm someone willingly and knowingly — both whom, and how, and for the sake of what — and harm and injustice have to do with goods, and concern goods, then the man who acts unjustly, and the unjust man, would know what sorts of things are good and what sorts are bad; and knowledge about such matters is the special property of the practically wise man and of practical wisdom. So it turns out to be strange that the greatest good, practical wisdom, should accompany the unjust man.

4| [section 5] Or would practical wisdom not seem to accompany the unjust man after all? For the unjust man does not look to, nor is he able to judge, what is good simply speaking as against what is good for himself; rather he goes wrong. [section 6] This is precisely what belongs to practical wisdom — to be able to view these matters correctly — just as, in the case of medicine, we all know what is healthy simply speaking and productive of health, that hellebore and the purgative and cutting and cauterizing are healthy and productive of health, but nevertheless we do not possess medical knowledge; for we do not further know what is good for a particular person, as the doctor knows for whom this is good, and when, and in what condition he must be. For it is precisely in this that medical knowledge consists. So then, though we know what is healthy simply speaking, we nevertheless do not possess medical knowledge, nor does it accompany us. [section 7] And the unjust man is the same way. He knows that, simply speaking, 1159b tyranny and rule and power are good things; but whether they are good for him, or not, or when, or in what condition he must be, this he no longer knows. And this belongs above all to practical wisdom, so that practical wisdom does not accompany the unjust man. For he chooses, on account of which he acts unjustly, the things that are good simply speaking, not the things that are good for himself. For wealth and rule are, simply speaking, a good thing, yet perhaps not a good thing for him; for having become prosperous and having come to rule, he will do many bad things to himself and to his friends, since he will not be able to make right use of his rule.

5| [section 8] This too raises a puzzle worth considering: whether there is injustice toward the base man, or not. For if injustice consists in harm, and harm consists in deprivation of goods, it would seem that he is not harmed; for he thinks the things that are goods are goods for him, but they are not goods — for office and wealth will harm the base man who is unable to use them rightly. If, then, their presence will harm him, the one who deprives him of them would not seem to be doing him injustice. [section 9] Such an argument would seem paradoxical to most people; for everyone thinks himself capable of using office, power, and wealth well, judging incorrectly. [section 10] This is clear too from the lawgiver: for the lawgiver does not entrust ruling to everyone, but has fixed both the age and the means that the man who is to rule must have, on the ground that it is not possible for everyone to rule. If, then, someone should be indignant that he does not rule, or that no one allows him to steer the ship, one might say to him, "You have nothing of the sort in your soul — you will not be able either to rule or to steer." [section 11]

6| Or rather: in the case of the body, we see that those who take in things that are unqualifiedly good are not thereby able to be healthy; rather, if a body in bad condition is to become healthy, water and scanty food must first be given it. Must not the man whose soul is in bad condition abstain from wealth, office, power, and such things generally, in order to work no evil — inasmuch as the soul is more easily moved and more easily changed than the body? For just as the man whose body is in bad condition is fit to live on such a regimen, so too the man whose soul is in bad condition is fit to live in this way, possessing none of these things. [section 12] This too raises a puzzle: whenever it is not possible to do the courageous act and the just act at the same time, which should one do? Now in the case of the natural virtues we said that only the impulse toward the fine [must] be present, without reason; but choice lies in reason, and in what possesses reason. So that at the very moment the choosing [also] occurs, complete virtue too will be present — the virtue we said goes together with practical wisdom, and not without the natural impulse toward the fine. [section 13] Nor will virtue be opposed to virtue. For it is natural for it to yield to reason, [or] as reason commands, so that it inclines toward whatever reason leads it to; for reason is what chooses the better. For the other virtues do not arise without practical wisdom, nor is practical wisdom complete without the other virtues, but they work together with one another, accompanying practical wisdom.

7| [section 14] No less will the following raise a puzzle: whether the case is the same with the virtues as with the other goods, both external goods and goods of the body. For these, when they occur in excess, make people worse — for instance, great wealth, once it has come about, has made people contemptuous and disagreeable; and likewise with the other goods — office, honor, beauty, stature. [section 15] Is it the case with virtue too, then, that if justice or courage comes to someone in excess, he will be worse, or not? "No," he says. But honor comes about from virtue, and honor, when it becomes great, makes people worse; so that it is clear, he says, that virtue, as it advances toward greatness, will make people worse; for virtue is the cause of honor, so that virtue too, becoming greater, would make people worse. [section 16] Or is this not true? For if virtue has many other functions, as indeed it does, this too is among its chief ones: the ability to use rightly these goods and others of the kind, once they are present. If, then, the excellent man, when honor or great office comes to be present to him, does not use them rightly, he would no longer be excellent; so neither honor nor office will make the excellent man worse, and therefore neither will virtue.

8| [section 17] But on the whole, since it has been determined by us at the start that the virtues are means, and the more something is a virtue the more it is a mean, it is therefore not the case that virtue, advancing toward greatness, will make one worse, but rather better; for the mean was a mean between the deficiency and excess of the affections. [section 1] So much for this. After this it is necessary, making a fresh start, to speak about self-control and lack of self-control. Just as virtue and vice themselves [also] are strange cases, so too the accounts that are to be given of these matters must turn out strange. [section 2] For this virtue is not like the others. In the other virtues, reason and the affections move toward the same thing and are not opposed to one another; but in this one, reason and the affections are opposed to one another. [section 3] There are three things that occur in the soul in respect of which we are called base: vice, lack of self-control, and brutishness. Now what vice and virtue are, and in what they consist, has been stated by us above; now we must speak of lack of self-control and brutishness.

9| [section 1] Brutishness is a kind of excessive vice. For whenever we see someone who is thoroughly base, we call him not a man but a beast, on the ground that brutishness is a certain kind of vice. [section 2] The virtue opposed to this is nameless; it is such as to be above man — a kind of heroic and divine virtue. This virtue is nameless because it is not the virtue of a god; for a god is better than virtue and is good not by virtue of virtue — for in that case virtue would be better than the god. [section 3] Hence the virtue opposed to the vice of brutishness is nameless. What is opposed to a vice of this kind must be divine and above man; for just as the vice of brutishness is above man, so too is the virtue opposed to it. [section 1] Concerning lack of self-control and self-control, we should first state the puzzles and the arguments that run counter to the apparent facts, so that, by examining together the puzzles and the opposing arguments, and testing them, we may see the truth about these matters as far as is possible; for in this way it will be easier to see the truth. [section 2] Now Socrates the elder did away with the notion altogether, and denied that

10| lack of self-control exists, saying that no one who knows that bad things are bad would choose them; yet the person who lacks self-control seems, though knowing that things are base, nevertheless to choose them, led on by his affection. Because of this argument he did not think lack of self-control existed. [section 3] This is not correct. For it is absurd, persuaded by this argument, to do away with what plainly occurs; for there are people who lack self-control, and they themselves, knowing that things are base, nevertheless do them. [section 4] Since, then, lack of self-control exists, does the person who lacks self-control have some knowledge which he contemplates and examines as he does the base things? But again this would not seem so. For it is absurd that the first and most secure of the things within us should be overcome by anything; for knowledge is the most steadfast and most compelling of all the things within us; so that again this argument runs counter (with a gap in the text at this point) to the claim that it is not knowledge. [section 5] But is it perhaps not knowledge but opinion? Yet if the person who lacks self-control has opinion, he would not be blameworthy. For if he does something base without knowing it precisely but merely holding an opinion, one might grant him pardon for giving in to pleasure and doing base things, since he does not know precisely that they are [not] base, but only holds an opinion; and those to whom we grant pardon, we do not blame; so that the person who lacks self-control, if indeed he has opinion, will not be blameworthy.

11| [section 6] but he is blameworthy. Arguments of this sort produce puzzlement. For some denied that there is knowledge in such a case, since they made something absurd result; and others again denied even that there is opinion, for these too again [made] something absurd result. [section 7] — But one might also raise a puzzle about the following. Since the temperate person is held to be also self-controlled, will strong appetites arise in the temperate person? If he is to be self-controlled, he must have strong appetites (for you would not call someone self-controlled who masters moderate appetites); but if he will [not] have strong appetites, he will no longer be temperate (for the temperate person is the one who feels no appetite and is affected by nothing). [section 8] — These points too raise a further puzzle in turn, for it follows from the arguments that the person lacking self-control is sometimes praiseworthy and the self-controlled person blameworthy. Suppose, he says, someone has gone wrong in his reasoning, and it seems to him, when he reasons it out, that fine things are base, while his appetite draws him toward the fine things; then his reasoning will not allow him to act, but led by his appetite he acts (for this is what the person lacking self-control was); he will therefore do the fine things, since his appetite leads him to them (while his reasoning will hinder him, for by his reasoning he goes wrong about the fine things); this person, then, will be lacking in self-control, yet praiseworthy, for he does the fine things, and so is praiseworthy. What follows here, then, is absurd.

12| [section 9] Again, suppose he goes wrong in his reasoning the other way, and fine things do not seem to him to be fine, while his appetite draws him toward the fine things; and the self-controlled person is the one who feels the appetite but does not act on it, because of his reasoning; then the person who has gone wrong in his reasoning about the fine things will prevent himself from doing the things he desires to do, and so will prevent himself from doing the fine things (for appetite led him toward these); but the person who does not do the fine things when he ought to is blameworthy; the self-controlled person, then, will sometimes be blameworthy. What follows here too, then, is absurd. [section 10] — One might also raise the puzzle whether lack of self-control, and the person who lacks it, occur in all things and about everything alike, such as money, honor, anger, and reputation (for people are held to lack self-control about all of these), or whether this is not so, but lack of self-control concerns some one delimited thing. These, then, are the points that give rise to the puzzle; and the puzzles must be resolved. [section 11] First, then, the puzzle about knowledge; for it seemed absurd that someone who has knowledge should either throw it away or have it change. [section 12] The same argument applies to opinion as well; for it makes no difference whether it is opinion or knowledge — if the opinion is strong through being firm and unshakeable, it will differ in no way from knowledge, since opinion carries the conviction that things are as one believes them to be, just as Heraclitus of Ephesus holds such an opinion about the things that seemed so to him.

13| [section 13] There is nothing absurd, however, in the person lacking self-control doing something base, whether he has the knowledge or the sort of opinion we are speaking of. For 'to know' is used in two ways: one is to have the knowledge (for we say someone knows whenever he has the knowledge), the other is to be actually exercising the knowledge already. The person lacking self-control, then, is one who has the knowledge of fine things but is not exercising it; [section 14] so when he is not exercising this knowledge, there is nothing absurd in his doing base things while having the knowledge. It is like the case of people asleep. For these, though they have the knowledge, nonetheless both do and undergo many distressing things in their sleep. For the knowledge is not being exercised in them. It is the same with the person lacking self-control. For he is like someone asleep, and is not exercising his knowledge. [section 15] The puzzle, then, is resolved in this way. For the puzzle was whether the person lacking self-control throws away his knowledge at that moment, or has it change. For both seem to be absurd. — But again this can be made clear from the following, just as we said in the Analytics, that a syllogism arises out of two premises, and of these the first is universal, and the second falls under it and is particular. For example: I know that every feverish person should be made healthy; and this man is feverish; therefore I know that this man too should be made healthy. There is, then, a case where I know by the universal knowledge but not by the particular one.

14| [section 16] An error, then, arises for the person who has the knowledge here too: for example, I know that every feverish person should be made healthy, yet if this man is feverish, I do not know it. In the same way, then, in the case of the person lacking self-control who has the knowledge, the same error will occur. For it is possible for the person lacking self-control to have the universal knowledge, that things of this sort are base and harmful, and yet not know, in the particular case, that this thing here is base; so that, having the knowledge in this way, he will go wrong; for he has the universal knowledge, but not the particular. [section 17] There is, then, nothing absurd in this happening in the case of the person lacking self-control either — that one who has the knowledge does something base. For the case is like that of people who are drunk. For the drunk, when their drunkenness leaves them, are again the same as they were; their reasoning and their knowledge did not fall out of them, but were overpowered by the drunkenness, and once freed from the drunkenness they are again the same as they were. It is the same, then, with the person lacking self-control. For once the affection has gained the upper hand, it made his reasoning lie still; and when the affection departs, like the drunkenness, he is again the same as he was. [section 18] There was also another argument about lack of self-control that raised

15| a puzzle, to the effect that the person lacking self-control would sometimes be praiseworthy and the self-controlled person blameworthy. But this does not follow. For the one who is deceived in his reasoning is neither self-controlled nor lacking self-control, but rather it is the one who has correct reasoning, and by this judges what things are base and what fine; and the person lacking self-control is the one who deserts such reasoning, while the self-controlled person is the one who obeys it and is not led by his appetites. For not even in the case of someone to whom it does not seem base to strike his father, while he desires to strike him, is the one who abstains from this self-controlled; [section 19] so that if there is neither self-control nor lack of self-control in such cases, then lack of self-control would not be praiseworthy, nor self-control blameworthy, as it seemed to be. [section 20] Among cases of lack of self-control, some are pathological and some are natural. Pathological, for instance, are cases like these: there are people who pull out their hair and gnaw at it. If, then, someone masters this pleasure, he is not praiseworthy, nor, if he fails to master it, is he especially blameworthy. Natural cases are of this sort: they say a son once, being tried in court for striking his father, defended himself by saying, 'for this man too struck his own father,' and was on this ground acquitted; for the fault seemed to the jurors to be natural — as though, if someone were to master the urge to strike his father, he would not be especially praiseworthy.

16| [section 21] It is not, then, cases of this sort that we are now inquiring into, whether of lack of self-control or of self-control, but those in respect of which we are called blameworthy or praiseworthy without qualification. Among goods, some are external, such as wealth, office, honor, friends, reputation, while others are necessary and concern the body, such as touch and taste [the person, then, who lacks self-control about these would seem, strictly speaking, [also] to be a person lacking self-control,] and the bodily pleasures; and the lack of self-control we are inquiring into would seem already to concern these. [section 22] The puzzle was about what, exactly, lack of self-control concerns. Now concerning honor, a person is not said, without qualification, to lack self-control; for the person who lacks self-control about honor is in a way even praised, for he [is] in some sense a lover of honor. But as a whole, in cases of this sort too, we speak of the person lacking self-control by adding what it concerns — lacking self-control about honor, or reputation, or anger. But to the person who lacks self-control without qualification we do not add what it concerns, as though it were plain and evident without the addition what it concerns; for the person who lacks self-control without qualification concerns bodily pleasures and pains. [section 23] — This is clear too from the following: since the person who lacks self-control is blameworthy, the things underlying it must themselves be blameworthy. Now honor and reputation and office and money, and whatever else the term 'lacking self-control' is applied to, are not blameworthy, but the bodily pleasures are blameworthy; hence it is reasonable that the person who indulges in these more than he ought is called, in the full sense, a person lacking self-control.

17| [section 24] Since, among the various lacks of self-control spoken of with regard to other things, the lack of self-control concerned with anger is the most blameworthy, is the lack of self-control concerned with anger more blameworthy than that concerned with pleasures? The lack of self-control concerned with anger is like children who are eager to be of service: for these too, when the master says "give me," carried away by their eagerness, give something before hearing what they are supposed to give, and so go wrong in the giving; for often, when they ought to give a book, they give a pen instead. [section 25] The person who lacks self-control with respect to anger is affected in a similar way: for when he first hears it said that he has been wronged, his spirit rushes toward retaliation, without waiting any longer to hear whether he ought to retaliate or not, or that it is not deserved so severely. [section 26] Now this sort of impulse toward anger, which seems to be lack of self-control with respect to anger, is not much to be blamed, whereas the impulse toward [the] pleasure is blameworthy. For it differs from the other because of reason, which turns one away from acting, and yet one acts against reason all the same; hence it is more blameworthy than the lack of self-control due to anger. For the lack of self-control due to anger is accompanied by pain (for no one who is angry fails to feel pain), while that due to appetite is accompanied by pleasure; hence it is more blameworthy, for the lack of self-control due to pleasure seems to involve insolence.

18| [section 27] Are self-control and endurance the same thing, or not? Self-control is concerned with pleasures, and the self-controlled person is the one who masters pleasures, while endurance is concerned with pains: the one who endures and holds out under pains has endurance. [section 28] Again, lack of self-control and softness are not the same. Softness, and the soft person, is the one who does not hold out under exertions—not all exertions, but those which anyone else would necessarily hold out under—whereas the person who lacks self-control is the one who cannot hold out against pleasures, but is softened and led by them. [section 29] There is again someone called licentious: is the licentious person the same as the person who lacks self-control, or not? The licentious person is of such a sort as to think that what he does is both best and most advantageous for him, and to have no reasoning opposed to what appears pleasant to him; the person who lacks self-control has reasoning that opposes him, in the direction his appetite leads him. [section 30] Which is easier to cure, the licentious person or the person who lacks self-control? On this showing it would perhaps seem not to be the person who lacks self-control—the licentious person is easier to cure, for if reasoning came to be in him teaching him that these things are base, he would no longer do them; but in the person who lacks self-control the reasoning is already present, and still he acts against it, so such a person would seem incurable.

19| [section 31] But which is in the worse condition—the one in whom nothing good at all is present, or the one in whom something good is present alongside these bad things? Clearly the former, and the more honorable the thing badly disposed in him is, the worse off he is. Now the person who lacks self-control has, as a good, reasoning that is correct; the licentious person does not have this. [section 32] Further, reasoning is the ruling principle in each person: in the person who lacks self-control the principle—being the most honorable thing—is well disposed, while in the licentious person it is badly disposed; so the licentious person would be worse than the person who lacks self-control. [section 33] Further, just as with the bestiality we spoke of, the vice in question cannot be seen existing in a beast, only in a human being (for "bestiality" is the name given to excessive vice)—why is that? For no other reason than that a base ruling principle does not exist in a beast, and the ruling principle is reasoning. Given this, which would do more harm—a lion, or a Dionysius or a Phalaris or a Clearchus or one of these depraved men? Clearly these men; for a base ruling principle, once present, contributes to great evils, whereas in a beast there is no ruling principle at all. [section 34] In the licentious person, then, a base ruling principle is present. For he does base things, and his reasoning agrees with this and holds that he ought to do these things, so the ruling principle present in him is unsound. Hence the person who lacks self-control would seem to be better than the licentious person.

20| [section 35] There are also two kinds of lack of self-control. One is a sort of impetuous, unpremeditated kind that arises suddenly (as when we see a beautiful woman, we are immediately affected in some way, and from that affection an impulse arises to do something one perhaps ought not to do); the other is a sort of weak kind, present along with the reasoning that would turn one away. The former would not seem to be very blameworthy—it occurs even in serious, excellent people, in those of a hot and well-formed nature; the latter occurs in those who are cold-natured and melancholic, and such people are blameworthy. [section 36] Further, it is possible, by anticipating with reasoning, to be affected not at all: reasoning that a good-looking woman will come, and that one must therefore hold himself in check. The person who lacks self-control from a fresh impression, having forestalled it with such reasoning, will be affected by nothing and will do nothing shameful. But the one who knows through reasoning that he ought not, yet gives way to pleasure and is softened by it, is more blameworthy. For the excellent person would never become self-lacking in this way, and reasoning, once it has forestalled the impression, does not fail to cure him. For this reasoning is present in him as a ruler, whom the other person does not obey at all, but instead gives way to pleasure, and is softened and in a way weakened.

21| [section 37] Whether the temperate person is self-controlled was raised as a difficulty earlier; let us discuss it now. The temperate person is also self-controlled: for the self-controlled person is not only the one who, when appetites are present, holds them back through reasoning, but also the one who is of such a character that, even if appetites were not present, he would be the sort to hold them back should they arise. [section 38] The temperate person is the one who has no base appetites, together with reasoning about these matters that is correct; the self-controlled person is the one who has base appetites, together with reasoning about these matters that is correct. So the self-controlled will follow along with the temperate, and the temperate person will be self-controlled, but the self-controlled person will not be temperate. For the temperate person is the one not affected by base appetites, while the self-controlled person is the one who is affected and masters them, or is capable of being affected; neither of these belongs to the temperate person; hence the self-controlled person is not temperate. [section 39] Is the licentious person self-lacking, or the self-lacking person licentious? Or does neither follow from the other? The person who lacks self-control is one whose reasoning fights against his affections, whereas the licentious person is not of this sort, but is one who, in doing base things, has his reasoning voting along with him at the same time; so the licentious person is not of the sort the self-lacking person is, nor is the self-lacking person of the sort the licentious person is.

22| [section 40] Further, the licentious person is also more depraved than the person who lacks self-control. For things that are natural are harder to cure than things that have come about from habit (habit is indeed thought to be strong for this very reason, that it settles into nature). [section 41] Now the licentious person is himself of such a sort as to be base by nature, and it is because of this that the reasoning in him is base as well; but the person who lacks self-control is not so—it is not because he himself is of that sort that his reasoning is not excellent, for he would have had to be base if he were by nature the sort the base person is. [section 42] The person who lacks self-control, [then], seems to be base by habit, while the licentious person is base by nature; the licentious person is therefore harder to cure. For habit is driven out by another habit, but nature is driven out by nothing. [section 43] Since the person who lacks self-control is of such [a] sort as to know and not be deceived in his reasoning, and the practically wise person is also of such a sort as to view each particular thing by correct reasoning, [but] can the practically wise person lack self-control, or not? One might raise a difficulty from what has been said; but if we follow what was said earlier, the practically wise person will not lack self-control. For we said that the practically wise person is not one in whom correct reasoning is merely present, but one for whom the doing of what appears best in accordance with the reasoning also belongs; and if the practically wise person does what is best, the practically wise person could not lack self-control—rather, such a person is clever.

23| [section 44] For we distinguished above the clever man and the practically wise man, as being different. For they are concerned with the same things, but the one is capable of acting on the things he ought, while the other is not capable of acting. It is possible, then, for the clever man to be lacking in self-control (for he is not capable of acting on the things he ought), but it is not possible for the practically wise man to be lacking in self-control. [section 1] After this it would be right to speak about pleasure, since our account concerns happiness, and everyone supposes happiness to be either pleasure and living pleasantly, or at any rate not without pleasure. And those who are uneasy about pleasure and do not think it right to count pleasure among the goods nevertheless add freedom from pain. [section 2] Freedom from pain, then, is close to pleasure. For this reason we must speak about pleasure, not only because others too think we must, but because it is actually necessary for us to speak about pleasure. For since our account concerns happiness, and we have distinguished happiness and say it is the activity of virtue in a complete life, and virtue is concerned with pleasure and pain, it would be necessary to speak about pleasure, since happiness does not exist without pleasure.

24| [section 3] Let us first state, then, what some say in claiming that pleasure ought not to be taken as part of the good. First, they say pleasure is a coming-into-being, and a coming-into-being is something incomplete, and the good could never occupy the place of the incomplete. Second, that there are some base pleasures, and the good could never consist in baseness. Again, that pleasure arises in all things alike: for it arises in the base person and in the excellent one, and in a beast and in a grazing animal, whereas the good is unmixed with base things and not something held in common by many. (Here the text breaks off.) And they say that pleasure is not the most dominant thing, whereas the good is most dominant. And that pleasure is an impediment to doing fine actions, whereas what hinders fine actions could not be good. [section 4] First, then, we should speak to the first point, about coming-into-being, and try to refute this argument on the ground that it is not true. For, first, not every pleasure is a coming-into-being. The pleasure that arises from contemplating is not a coming-into-being, nor is that from hearing and seeing and smelling. For it does not arise out of a deficiency, as the others do, such as the pleasure from eating or drinking. For these arise out of deficiency and excess, in that either the deficiency is filled up or the excess is removed.

25| [section 5] For this reason it seems to be a coming-into-being. And deficiency and excess are pain. Pain, then, is present wherever there is a coming-into-being of pleasure. But in the case of seeing and hearing and smelling, it is not possible to have felt pain beforehand; for no one who takes pleasure in seeing or in smelling has felt pain beforehand. [section 6] Likewise too in the case of thought, it is possible to take pleasure in contemplating something without having felt pain beforehand. So there would be some pleasure that is not a coming-into-being. If, then, pleasure, as their argument said, is for this reason not a good — because it is a coming-into-being — and yet there is some pleasure that is not a coming-into-being, this pleasure would be a good. [section 7] But in fact, taken as a whole, no pleasure at all is a coming-into-being. For even those pleasures from eating and drinking are not comings-into-being; rather, those who say these pleasures are comings-into-being are mistaken. For they suppose that, since pleasure comes about when the intake of food occurs, it is for this reason a coming-into-being; but it is not. [section 8] For since there is some part of the soul by which we feel pleasure at the same time as the intake of what we are in need of, this part of the soul is active and is in motion, and its motion and activity is pleasure. So because that part of the soul is active at the same time as the intake, or on account of its own activity, they suppose pleasure to be a coming-into-being, because the intake is evident while the part of the soul is not evident.

26| [section 9] It is like someone supposing a human being to be a body, because the body is perceptible while the soul is not; yet [the] soul certainly exists too. It is the same in this case as well: for there is some part of the soul by which we feel pleasure, which is active at the same time as the intake. For this reason no pleasure at all is a coming-into-being. [section 10] And, they say, restoration to one's nature is perceptible. But indeed there is pleasure even for those who are not being restored to their nature: for being restored is the filling-up, for what is deficient by nature, of that deficiency, whereas, as we say, it is possible to feel pleasure without being in a state of deficiency. For deficiency is pain, and we say we feel pleasure without pain and prior to pain; so pleasure would not be the restoration of what is deficient, for in the case of such pleasures nothing at all is deficient. So if pleasure seemed not to be a good because it was a coming-into-being, and yet no pleasure at all is a coming-into-being, pleasure would be a good. [section 11] But after this, they say, not every pleasure is a good. One might grasp this point as well in the following way. Since we say the good is spoken of in all the categories (for it is found in substance, and in relation, and in quantity, and in time, and in general in all of them), that other point becomes clear at once. For upon every activity of a good thing some pleasure follows, so that since the

27| good is found in all the categories, pleasure too would be a good. So since in these categories there are both goods and pleasure, and pleasure that comes from good things is pleasure, every pleasure would be a good. [section 12] At the same time it is clear from this that pleasures also differ in species. For the categories in which pleasure occurs also differ. For it is not as it is with the sciences, for example grammar or any other science whatsoever. For if Lamprus possesses grammar, the grammarian will [and] be affected by this grammar in the same way as any other person whatsoever who possesses grammar, and there are not two different grammars, one in Lamprus and one in Ileus; but with pleasure it is not so. For the pleasure from drunkenness and the pleasure from sexual intercourse do not affect a person in the same way. For this reason pleasures would seem to differ in species. [section 13] But indeed, they say, because some pleasures are base, pleasure did not seem to them to be a good. But this sort of thing, and this sort of judgment, is not peculiar to pleasure, but applies to nature and to knowledge as well. For there is also a base nature, such as that of worms and beetles and, in general, of dishonored animals, but nature is not for this reason a base thing.

28| [section 14] Likewise there are also base sciences, such as the menial crafts, but nevertheless knowledge is not for this reason base; rather, both knowledge and nature are, in their genus, good. For just as one ought not judge a sculptor by the sort of works from which he failed and worked badly, but by those in which he worked well, so too one ought not judge knowledge, or nature, or anything else, by what sort of thing it is on the basis of its base instances, but on the basis of its excellent ones. [section 15] Likewise pleasure too is, in its genus, a good, since indeed that there are base pleasures does not escape us either. For since the natures of animals are also different, some base and some excellent — for example the nature of a human being is excellent, while that of a wolf or some other beast is base, and likewise the nature of a horse and of a human being and of a donkey and of a dog are different from one another — [section 16] pleasure is a settling, out of what is contrary to nature, into each thing's own nature. So this would be a distinguishing feature: to a base nature belongs a base pleasure. For it is not the same thing for a horse and for a human being, and likewise not for the others either; but since natures differ, pleasures too differ. For pleasure was a restoration, and restoration, they say, settles a thing into its nature, so that the restoration belonging to a base nature is base, and that belonging to an excellent nature is excellent.

29| [section 17] But those who claim that pleasure is not something serious are affected the way people are who, not knowing nectar, think the gods drink wine and that there is nothing more pleasant than this. This is what they undergo through ignorance. Similar to this is what happens to those who say all pleasures are processes of becoming and not a good; for because they do not know pleasures other than the bodily ones, and see that these are processes of becoming and not serious, they think, without qualification, that pleasure is not a good. [section 18] Since, then, pleasure occurs both while nature is being restored and while it is in its settled state — for instance, the fillings-up from a state of deficiency occur while it is being restored, while the pleasures from sight, hearing, and the like occur while it is in its settled state — the activities of nature in its settled state would be better; for the pleasures spoken of in both these ways are activities. So it is clear that the pleasures from sight, hearing, and thinking would be the best, since the bodily pleasures at least come from a filling-up. [section 19] Further, this too was said, that pleasure is not a good: for what is present in all things and common to all is not a good. Such a thing belongs rather to the ambitious person and to ambition. For the ambitious person is the one who wants to be the only one to have something, and by this to surpass others; and so pleasure, if it is going to be a good, would need to be of this sort.

30| [section 20] Or is this not so, but rather the opposite — would it not seem to be a good for this very reason, that all things desire it? For it is the nature of all things to desire the good, so that if all things desire pleasure, pleasure would be a good in kind. [section 21] Again, they said pleasure was not a good because it is an obstacle. But their claiming it to be an obstacle appears to come from not examining the matter correctly. For the pleasure that comes from the very thing being done is not an obstacle; but if it is a different pleasure, it is an obstacle — for instance, the pleasure from drunkenness is an obstacle to acting. [section 22] But in that case knowledge too will be an obstacle to knowledge; for it is not possible to be active in respect of both at the same time. But why is knowledge not a good, if it produces the pleasure that comes from knowledge? And will it be an obstacle? Or not, but will it rather promote action? [section 23] For pleasure, arising from the action itself, spurs one on to act more; since if you make the serious person act in accordance with virtue, and act with pleasure in doing these things — will he not be far more active in the action? And if a person acts while feeling pleasure, he will be serious; but if he does fine actions while feeling pain, he is not serious. For pain belongs to things done under compulsion, so that if someone feels pain in doing fine actions, he acts under compulsion; and one who acts from compulsion is not serious.

31| [section 24] But surely it is not possible to do the actions in accordance with virtue without either feeling pain or pleasure; and there is no intermediate state. Why? Because virtue lies in affection, and affection lies in pain and pleasure, and there is nothing in between; it is clear, then, that virtue too comes with pain or pleasure. If, then, someone does fine actions while feeling pain, he is not serious. So virtue would not come with pain; therefore it comes with pleasure. [section 25] So pleasure is not only not an obstacle, but is also an incentive to action, and in general it is not possible to act without the pleasure that arises from the action itself. [section 26] There was another argument, that no knowledge produces pleasure. But this too is not true. For caterers, garland-makers, and [the] perfumers are producers of pleasure. [But in the case of the other kinds of knowledge, pleasure is not present as an end, but rather they come with pleasure and not without pleasure.] So there is also knowledge that is productive of pleasure (here the text breaks off). [section 27] Further, there was still another argument, that pleasure is not the best thing. But by this same argument you would also do away with the virtues spoken of individually. For courage is not the best thing — is it, then, not a good for this reason? Or is this absurd? Likewise in the case of the others. So pleasure too is not, for this reason, not a good, because it is not the best thing.

32| [section 28] One might raise this same difficulty by turning to the virtues as well. For instance, since reason sometimes masters the affections (for this is what we say of the self-controlled person), and the affections, conversely, sometimes master reason (as happens with the uncontrolled), then, since the irrational part of the soul, when it has vice, masters reason when reason is well disposed (for this is what the uncontrolled person is like), reason, being likewise badly disposed, will in the same way master the affections when they are well disposed and possess their proper virtue; and if this is so, it will follow that virtue is used badly — for reason, being badly disposed and using virtue, will use it badly. Now this sort of consequence would seem to be absurd. [section 29] Against such a difficulty it is easy to argue back and to resolve it from what we have said before about virtue. For we say virtue exists when reason, being well disposed, is in due proportion with the affections that have their proper virtue, and the affections with reason; for when they are disposed this way they will be in harmony with each other, so that reason always prescribes what is best, and the affections, being easily well disposed, do what reason prescribes.

33| [section 30] If, then, reason is badly disposed but the affections well disposed, there will be no virtue, since reason is deficient (for virtue comes from both together); so it is not possible to use virtue badly either. — And, without qualification, it is not, as others think, that reason is the principle and guide of virtue, but rather the affections. For an irrational impulse toward the fine must first come into being (and this does happen), and then afterward reason comes to ratify and judge it. One could see this from children and from creatures that live without reason; for in these, impulses of the affections toward the fine arise first without reason, and reason, coming later and concurring with them, brings about the doing of fine actions. But if the starting point toward fine actions is taken from reason, the affections do not follow along in agreement, but often oppose it; hence the affection, when well disposed, resembles a starting point toward virtue more than reason does. [section 1] It would follow next to speak of this, since the discussion concerns happiness — namely, about good fortune. For most people think that the happy life is the fortunate life, or at least not without good fortune, and perhaps rightly; for without external goods, of which fortune is in control, it is not possible to be happy. Hence one must speak about good fortune, and, without qualification, who the fortunate person is, and in what respects and about what.

34| [section 2] First, then, one who came to these questions and looked closely at them might raise a difficulty. For one could not say that luck is a nature. For nature [always] is, of that of which it is a cause, productive for the most part in the same way, but luck never is, but acts disorderly and as it chances; hence luck is spoken of in cases like these. Nor again could one say it is some intellect or right reason; for here too there is no less the ordered and the always-the-same, but luck is not like that. Hence also where there is most intellect and reason, there [and] luck is least, and where there is most luck, there intellect is least. [section 3] But then is good luck a kind of care exercised by the gods? Or would this not seem so? For we think it right that god, being in control of such things, apportions both goods and evils to those who deserve them, but luck, and the things that come from luck, truly happen as chance has it. But if we attribute this sort of thing to god, we will make him a poor judge, or an unjust one; and that is not fitting for [the] god. [section 4] But indeed, apart from these, one could assign luck to nothing else, so it is clear it must be one of these. Now intellect and reason and knowledge seem entirely foreign to it. But then neither would care and goodwill on god's part seem to be good luck, because good luck occurs among base people too;

35| [section 5] and it is not likely that god cares for the base. What remains, then, and is most proper to good luck, is nature. Good luck and luck occur in things that are not up to us, nor among things of which we ourselves are in control and have the power to do. Hence no one calls the just man fortunate, as just, nor the courageous man, nor in general anyone in respect of virtue; for these things are up to us, both to have and not to have. But already in cases like the following we will call good luck more properly by that name: for we call the well-born man fortunate, and in general anyone to whom such goods belong of which he himself is not in control. [section 6] But even here good luck would not be spoken of in the strict sense. The fortunate man is spoken of in many ways: for one to whom it happened, contrary to his own reckoning, to do something good, we call fortunate, and one who, though by reason he should have incurred a loss, gained instead, we call fortunate. [section 7] Good luck, then, consists in some good coming to be present contrary to reason, and in not incurring an evil that was reasonably expected. But good luck would seem, more properly and more its own, to consist in obtaining a good: for obtaining a good would seem in its own right to be good luck, while not incurring an evil is good luck only accidentally.

36| [section 8] Good luck, then, is an irrational nature: for the fortunate man is one who has, without reason, an impulse toward goods, and attains them, and this belongs to nature; for there is present in the soul, by nature, something of the sort by which we are moved without reason toward what is good for us, [section 9] and if one were to ask a man so disposed, "why does it please you to act in this way?" — "I do not know," he says, "but it pleases me" — undergoing something like what those who are inspired undergo; for the inspired too have, without reason, an impulse to do something. [section 10] We have no proper and distinct name by which to call good luck, but we often say it is a cause; but "cause" is foreign to the name. For the cause and that of which it is the cause are different things, and it is called a cause even apart from the impulse that attains goods — for example, the cause of not incurring an evil, or again, of a man who did not expect to get a good, nonetheless getting one. [section 11] Good luck of this sort, then, is different from that other kind, and this one seems to come about from a reversal in circumstances, and is good luck accidentally. So that even if this too is good luck, still, in relation to happiness, that other kind of good luck would be the more proper one — the kind in which the origin of the impulse toward attaining goods lies within the person himself.

37| [section 12] Since, then, happiness does not exist without external goods, and these come about from good luck, as we said before, good luck would be a contributing factor to happiness. [section 1] Concerning good luck, then, so much. Since we have spoken about each of the virtues taken separately, it remains to speak of them as a whole, putting the particulars together and summing them up. [section 2] Now the name applied to the person of complete excellence is not badly chosen — the fine-and-good. For they say someone is fine and good when he is completely excellent. For they use "fine and good" in respect of virtue: they call the just man fine and good, the courageous man, the temperate man, and so on in general in respect of the virtues. [section 3] Since, then, we divide things into two, and say that some are fine and others [also] good, and of the goods some are good without qualification and others not, and things fine are, for instance, the virtues and the actions that proceed from virtue, while goods are, [for example], rule, wealth, reputation, honor, and things of that kind — the fine-and-good man, then, is one for whom the things good without qualification are good, and the things fine without qualification are fine. [section 4] For such a man is fine and good. But one for whom the things good without qualification are not good is not fine and good, just as things healthy without qualification would not seem to keep healthy a man who is not healthy. For if wealth and rule, once present, do him harm, they would not be choiceworthy for him; rather, he will wish to have only such things as will not harm him.

38| [section 5] But a man who is the sort to hold back some of the goods so that they not belong to him would not seem to be fine and good; but the man for whom all the goods, being goods, are actually good, and who is not corrupted by them — by wealth and rule, for instance — such a man is fine and good. [section 1] Concerning acting rightly in accordance with the virtues, we have spoken, but not adequately. For we said it was acting according to right reason; but perhaps someone, not knowing this very thing, might ask what acting according to right reason actually is, and where right reason is to be found. Acting according to right reason occurs, then, [section 2] whenever the irrational part of the soul does not prevent the rational part from exercising its own activity. For then the action will be in accordance with right reason. For since we have one part of the soul that is worse and another that is better, and the worse always exists for the sake of the better — just as, in the case of body and soul, the body exists for the sake of the soul — so too we will say the body is in good condition when it is disposed so as not to hinder, but rather to contribute and to help urge on, the soul in accomplishing its own function (for the worse exists for the sake of the better, so as to cooperate with the better) —

39| [section 3] So whenever the passions do not prevent the intellect from doing its own work, then what happens will accord with right reason. Yes, but someone might perhaps say: when are the passions in such a state that they do not prevent it, and when are they in that state? For I do not know. [section 4] This sort of thing is not easy to state. Nor is it for the doctor either; but when he tells the feverish patient to take barley-gruel — how am I to perceive that he has a fever? "When," he says, "you see that he is pallid." But how am I to recognize the pallor? Here the doctor must be understood to mean: if you do not have, on your own part, a perception of such things, then no further instruction will help. The same account holds in common for the other cases of this kind. [section 5] It is similar too in the case of recognizing the passions: for one must contribute something of one's own toward the perception. [section 6] Someone might perhaps also raise this further question: if I know these things in fact, will I therefore already be happy? For people think so. But that is not how it is. For none of the other kinds of knowledge either hands over to the learner the use and the activity of what is learned, but only the state; so here too it does not hand over the use of knowing these things — for happiness is an activity, as we say — but only the state; and happiness consists not in knowing the things out of which happiness is composed, but in making use of them.

40| [section 7] But the use and the activity of these things does not belong to what is handed over by teaching; for no science hands over its use either, but only the state. [section 1] On all these points it is necessary to speak about friendship — what it is, and toward whom, and about what; for friends seem to be useful throughout the whole of life in everything, and friendship seems to be a good, and would contribute toward happiness. [section 2] First, then, it is perhaps better to go through the points that are raised as puzzles and inquired into: whether friendship exists among like people, as is commonly held and said. For they say, "like flies to like," and speak of the like being drawn to the like. And they say that once, when a dog kept sleeping on the same tile, Empedocles, being asked why the dog always slept on the same tile, said that the dog had something like itself in the tile, meaning that the dog kept returning to it because of the likeness. [section 3] Again, on the other hand, it seems to some others that friendship arises more among opposites. For they say, "earth longs for rain when the ground is dry," and that the opposite wishes to be friend to its opposite; for among like things, they say, it is not even possible for friendship to arise. For the like, they say, has no need at all of the like, and so on with such claims.

41| [section 4] Further, there is the question whether becoming a friend is a difficult thing or an easy one; the flatterers, at any rate, who quickly attach themselves, are not friends, but appear to be friends. [section 5] Further, questions of this sort are also raised: will the good man be a friend to the bad man, or not? For friendship, they say, lies in trust and firmness, and the bad man is least of all like that; and is the bad man a friend to the bad, or not even that? [section 6] First, then, we must determine what sort of thing it is that we are inquiring about when we examine friendship. For, as some think, there is friendship also toward god and toward soulless things — not correctly. For we say that friendship, properly speaking, exists where there is the possibility of a corresponding love in return, but friendship toward god does not admit of being loved in return, nor of loving at all in the full sense; for it would be absurd if someone said that he loved Zeus. [section 7] Nor again is it possible to be loved in return by soulless things. Yet there is a kind of friendly feeling even toward soulless things, for instance toward wine or some other such thing. For this reason we do not inquire into friendship toward god, nor toward soulless things, but friendship toward ensouled things, and among these, toward those in which loving in return is possible. [section 8]

42| If, after this, one were to examine what the lovable is, it is nothing other than the good. Now the lovable and that-which-must-be-loved are different, just as the willable and that-which-must-be-willed are different. [section 9] For the willable is the good without qualification, while that-which-must-be-willed is what is good for each person; so too the lovable is the good without qualification, while that-which-must-be-loved is what is good for oneself, so that the one is both that-which-must-be-loved and lovable, while the merely lovable is not necessarily that-which-must-be-loved. [section 10] Here, then, and on account of just this point, the puzzle arises whether the good man is a friend to the bad man or not. For what is good for a given person is somehow bound up with the good, and that-which-must-be-loved is bound up with the lovable; and being pleasant and being advantageous also go along with, and follow upon, the good. [section 11] Now the friendship of good men exists when they love each other in return; and they love each other because they are lovable; and they are lovable because they are good. [section 12] Will the good man, then, someone says, not be a friend to the bad man? He will indeed be. For since the advantageous and the pleasant follow upon the good, then insofar as the bad man happens to be pleasant, in that respect he is a friend; and again insofar as he is advantageous, in that respect too he is a friend.

43| [section 13] But such friendship will not exist in accordance with the lovable. For the lovable was the good, and the bad man is not lovable; rather, such friendship exists in accordance with that-which-must-be-loved. For these friendships — the one in accordance with the pleasant and the one in accordance with the advantageous — derive from the complete friendship, the one found among good men. [section 14] So the man who loves for the sake of the pleasant does not love with the friendship that is in accordance with the good, nor does the man who loves for the sake of the advantageous. [section 15] And these are indeed the kinds of friendship — the one in accordance with the good, the one in accordance with the pleasant, and the one in accordance with the advantageous — not the same as one another, and yet not wholly unrelated to each other either, but somehow depending upon the same thing. For example, we call a scalpel "medical," we call a man "medical," and we call a science "medical"; these are not said in the same way, but the scalpel is called medical because it is useful for the medical art, the man because he is capable of producing health, and the science because it is the cause and the principle. [section 16] In the same way the kinds of friendship, too, are not spoken of in the same way — that of good men, on account of the good, and that in accordance with the pleasant, and that in accordance with the advantageous. Nor indeed are they spoken of merely as homonyms; rather, they are not the same, but they are concerned somehow with the same things and arise from the same source.

44| [section 17] If, then, someone should say, "the man who loves for the sake of the pleasant is not a friend to this person, for he is not a friend in accordance with the good," such a person is proceeding toward the friendship of good men, which arises out of all these things together — out of the good and the pleasant and the advantageous — so that it is true that he is not a friend [in accordance with] that friendship, but in accordance with the friendship based on the pleasant or on the advantageous. [section 18] Will the good man, then, be a friend to the good man, or not? For, someone says, the like has no need at all of the like. Now this argument is looking for the friendship based on the advantageous; for it is insofar as the one has need of the other that, being friends in that way, they are friends in the friendship based on the advantageous. [section 19] But the friendship based on the advantageous has been distinguished from that based on virtue and that based on pleasure. It is likely, then, that good men are friends much more than others; for everything belongs to them — the good and the pleasant and the advantageous. But the good man is also a friend to the bad man; [section 20] for insofar as the bad man is perhaps pleasant, in that respect he is also a friend. And the bad man is a friend to the bad man too; for insofar as the same thing is perhaps advantageous to them, in that respect they are friends. For we see this happening: when the same thing is advantageous to two people, they become friends on account of the advantage, so that nothing will prevent even bad men from having something advantageous in common.

45| [section 21] The most stable, most enduring, and finest friendship, then, is the friendship among good people, the friendship that rests on virtue and the good — and reasonably so. For virtue is not subject to change, and it is virtue that this friendship is grounded in, so that a friendship of this kind is likely not to change either; but what is advantageous is never the same from one time to another. That is why friendship based on advantage is not stable, but shifts along with the advantage. [section 22] The same holds of friendship based on pleasure. So the friendship of the best people is the one that comes about on the basis of virtue, the friendship of the many is the one based on advantage, and the friendship based on pleasure is found among the vulgar and among people taken at random. [section 23] Now it does happen that people feel resentment and wonder, when they fall in with worthless friends; but there is nothing strange in this. For whenever a friendship takes its start from pleasure — the very thing on account of which the parties are friends — or from advantage, then as soon as that thing is gone the friendship does not continue either. [section 24] But often the friendship remains, even though one party has treated the friend badly, and that is why people feel resentment; and this too is not unreasonable. For your friendship with this person did not exist on account of virtue in the first place, so it is not strange either that he does nothing that belongs to virtue. So people who feel resentment on these grounds are not right to do so: for having formed the friendship for the sake of pleasure, they think they are entitled to what belongs to friendship based on virtue — and that is not possible. For friendship based on pleasure and advantage does not partake of virtue.

46| [section 25] So people who have shared pleasure with one another go looking for virtue, and they are not right to do so; for virtue does not follow upon pleasure and advantage, but rather both of these follow upon virtue. For it would be strange if one did not think that good people are pleasant to themselves and to one another; indeed even the worthless, as Euripides says, are pleasant to themselves — for "bad clings to bad." So it is not that virtue follows upon pleasure, but that pleasure follows upon virtue. [section 26] ...whether it must be so or not — for it would be strange to say it need not be. For if 1210a you take away from them their being pleasant to one another, they will procure other friends, pleasant ones, for the sake of living together; for there is nothing more essential to living together than being pleasant. [section 27] It would be strange, then, not to think that good people, above all, ought to live together; and this cannot happen without what is pleasant. So it seems that being a source of pleasure to one another must belong especially to people of this kind. [section 28] Now since friendships have been divided into three kinds, and among these a puzzle arose, whether friendship arises in equality or in inequality — it exists, in fact, on both grounds. For the friendship based on likeness is that of good people, and this is also complete friendship; while the friendship based on unlikeness is the one based on advantage. For to the wealthy man the poor man is a friend on account of his lack of the very things the rich man has in abundance, and to the good man the worthless man is a friend for the same reason: for on account of his lack of virtue, he attaches himself to the one from whom he supposes he can get it for himself — and that is why he is a friend to him.

47| [section 29] Friendship based on advantage, then, arises among unlike people; that is also why Euripides says: "the rain-soaked heaven longs for the parched earth" — since these, being opposites, come to have friendship on the basis of advantage. And indeed if you like, take the most opposite things of all, fire and water — even these are useful to one another. [section 30] For fire, they say, if it does not have moisture, is destroyed, since the moisture supplies it, as it were, with a kind of nourishment — but only so much nourishment as it can master; for if you make the moisture greater, it will get the mastery and cause the fire to be destroyed, whereas if it is proportionate, it will be of benefit. It is clear, then, that friendship arises through advantage even among the most opposite things. [section 31] All friendships, both those in equality and those in inequality, are traced back to the three kinds already distinguished. — And in all friendships a difference arises between the parties whenever they do not love, or do good, or render service, or anything of that sort, in like measure; for whenever one party does so intensely and the other falls short, the complaint and the blame follow the shortfall. [section 32] Nonetheless, in the case of those friendships where the end of the friendship is the same for both — for instance, if both are friends to one another on the basis of advantage, or both on the basis of pleasure — [and] the shortfall lies with the other party, then if you do me more good than I do you, I no longer dispute that you should not be loved more by me than I am by you —

48| [section 33] but in a friendship where we are not friends on account of the same thing, the differences are more pronounced. For the shortfall on each side is unclear. Take the case where one party is a friend for pleasure and the other for advantage — here the dispute arises; for the one who has the advantage on his side does not think that pleasure is a fair exchange for advantage, nor does the one who has the advantage in pleasure think it fair to receive gratitude for his pleasure in the form of advantage. That is why differences arise more in friendships of this kind. [section 34] Those who have the advantage in wealth or anything else of that sort do not think that they themselves ought to love, but think that they themselves ought to be loved by those who are more deficient. [section 35] But loving is better than being loved. For loving is a certain activity of pleasure, and a good, while from being loved no activity accrues to the one who is loved. [section 36] Further, knowing is better than being known; for being known and being loved belong even to inanimate things, whereas knowing and loving belong to living things. [section 37] Further, being capable of doing good is better than not being so: the one who loves, being capable of doing good, loves; the one who is loved, is loved, but does not do this.

49| [section 38] But people, out of love of honor, wish rather to be loved than to love, because there is a kind of superiority in being loved: for the one who is loved always has the advantage in pleasure or in wealth or in virtue, and the lover of honor reaches for that advantage. [section 39] And those who hold the position of superiority do not think they themselves ought to love; for they think they are giving something back, in the respects in which they are superior, to those who love them. Further, they also think of themselves as being in the lesser position; that is why they do not think they ought to love, but to be loved. But the person who is deficient in wealth or pleasures or virtue admires the one who is superior in these, and loves him because of either obtaining these things or expecting to obtain them. [section 40] There are also friendships of this kind arising from a shared disposition, from wishing something good for someone. But the friendship that arises on this basis does not have all these features together; for often we wish good things for another, yet do not wish to live together with him. [section 41] But should these be called friendship, or rather affections of the complete friendship that is based on virtue? For in that friendship all these features are present together: we would not wish to live with anyone else at all (for both the pleasant and the advantageous, and virtue too, belong to the good man), and we would wish good things most of all for this person, and living, and living well, for no one else but him.

50| [section 42] Whether there is also [friendship] for him toward himself, or not, let this be set aside for now — we shall speak of it later. But we wish everything for ourselves: for we wish to live together with ourselves (and perhaps this is even necessary), and we wish living well and living, and we wish the good, for no one else. [section 43] Further, we share the same feelings with ourselves more than with anyone: for if we stumble, or fall into any such trouble, we are pained at once. That is why it would seem that there is, in this way, a friendship of a person toward himself. [section 44] Such things, then — the shared feeling, and living well, and the rest — we say either with reference to friendship toward ourselves or with reference to complete friendship; for in both, all these features are present: for living together, and wishing to be, and to be well, and all the rest, belong to both of these. [section 45] ...that there is friendship; that is also why there are as many kinds of friendship as there are kinds of justice. Now there is a form of justice that holds between guest-friend and citizen, between slave and master, between citizen and citizen, between son and father, between wife and husband, and in all the other partnerships and friendships, simply speaking, that exist within each of these relations.

51| [section 46] The most stable of friendships would seem to be that of guest-friends; for they have no common end over which they compete, as citizens do — for citizens, competing with each other over superiority, do not remain friends. [section 47] The next thing to say would be whether there is friendship toward oneself, or not. Now we see, as we also said a little above, that friendship is recognized from its particulars, and these particulars are what we would wish for ourselves above all — for we wish ourselves goods, and existence, and well-being; and we are most sympathetically disposed toward ourselves; and we wish most of all to live together with ourselves. So if friendship is recognized from its particulars, and we would wish these particulars to belong to ourselves, it is clear that there is friendship toward oneself, just as we also said that injustice can be toward oneself. [section 48] For since the one who does injustice is one person and the one who suffers it is another, while each individual is one and the same, for this reason it did not seem that there could be injustice toward oneself; yet there will be, as we said when examining the parts of the soul — since the soul has more than one part — when these do not agree with one another, then there is injustice toward oneself.

52| [section 49] In the same way, then, friendship too would seem to hold toward oneself. For since, as we say, when we want to call someone emphatically a friend, we say 'my soul and his are one'; so since the soul has more than one part, the soul will be one when reason and the affections are in accord with each other (for that is how it will be one); so that, once it has become one, there will be friendship toward oneself. [section 50] This friendship toward oneself will occur in the excellent person; for only in him do the parts of the soul stand well toward one another, by not being at variance — since the base person is never a friend to himself, for he is always at war with himself. The person who lacks self-control, at any rate, when he does something for the sake of pleasure, soon after regrets it and reproaches himself; and the base person is in the same condition with respect to his other vices as well. For he continues fighting and opposing himself. [section 51] There is also friendship in equality — for example, that of comrades is in equality, both in the number and in the power of the good involved (for neither of them deserves to have more than the other, either in the number of goods or in power or in magnitude, but rather an equal share; for comrades wish to be, in a sense, equals)

53| [section 52] But the friendship of father toward son is in inequality, as is that of the ruled and the ruler, of the better and the worse, of wife and husband, and in general in cases where one party holds the position of the worse and the other of the better within the friendship. [section 53] For this is friendship in inequality according to proportion. For in giving a good, no one would ever give an equal share to the better person and to the worse, but always a greater share to the one who is superior. And this is equal in proportion; for the person who, being worse, has the lesser good is in a sense equal to the person who, being better, has the greater good. [section 1] Of all the friendships mentioned, loving occurs most of all, in a way, within kinship, and especially in that of father toward son. And why is it that the father loves the son more than the son loves the father? Is it, as some say — rightly enough, at least for most people — because the father has in a sense benefited the son, while the son owes gratitude for the benefit? [section 2] This reason [also] would seem to hold in the case of friendship based on advantage; but the situation here is somewhat like what we observe in the case of the sciences.

54| [section 3] I mean something like this: [it is] there are cases where the end and the activity are the same, and there is no end other than the activity — for example, for the flute-player the activity and the end are the same (for playing the flute is both his end and his activity) — but this is not so for the builder's craft (for there the end is something other than the activity); [section 4] Friendship, then, is a kind of activity, and there is no end for the activity of loving other than this activity itself. Now the father, in a sense, is always more engaged in activity, because the son is in a way something he has made. And we see this holding in other cases too; for everyone is, in a sense, well disposed toward whatever he himself has produced. [section 5] The father, then, is in a sense well disposed toward the son as being his product, drawn by both memory and hope; and this is why the father loves the son more than the son loves the father. [section 6] We must also examine the other things that are called and thought to be friendships, and ask whether they really are friendships. For example, goodwill is thought to be friendship. [section 7] Now goodwill would not seem, without qualification, to be friendship — for often, toward many people, either from seeing something or from hearing something good about them,

55| we become well disposed toward them; are we, then, already also friends toward them, or not? For if someone was well disposed toward Darius while he was in Persia, as perhaps someone was, it does not follow that he thereby had friendship toward Darius. [section 8] But goodwill would seem to be, at times, a starting point of friendship, and goodwill would become friendship if the person, being able to act, adds to it the wish actually to do good things for the sake of the one toward whom he is well disposed. [section 9] — Goodwill belongs to character and is directed toward character; for no one is said to be well disposed toward wine or toward any other inanimate good or pleasant thing, but goodwill is toward someone whose character is excellent. [section 10] — Goodwill does not exist apart from friendship, but within the same relation; and this is why it is thought to be friendship. [section 11] Concord is close to friendship, if you take concord in its strict sense. For if someone holds the same view as Empedocles, and it seems to him that the elements are what they also seemed to Empedocles, is this person then in concord with Empedocles, or not? For this is a matter of something else of this sort. [section 12] For, first, concord does not lie in matters of thought but in matters of action, and in these it consists not in thinking the same thing, but in having, together with thinking the same thing, the same choice regarding what they think about these matters. For if both think that someone should rule, but one thinks he himself should rule and the other thinks he himself should rule, are they already in concord, or not? But if I wish myself to rule and that other person also wishes me to rule, then we are already in concord.

56| [section 13] So to be in concord, in matters of action, is to have the same wish. Concord, in the strict sense, therefore, concord in the strict sense concerns the appointment of the same person as ruler in matters of action. [section 1] Since there is, as we say, friendship of a person toward himself, is the excellent person a self-lover, or not? A self-lover is one who does everything for his own sake, with a view to what is profitable to him. Now the base person is a self-lover (for he does everything for his own sake); but the excellent person is not. For he is excellent precisely because he does this for the sake of another; and so he is not a self-lover. [section 2] But everyone strives after goods and thinks that these ought to belong to himself above all. This is most evident in the case of wealth and rule. Now the excellent person will yield these to another, not on the ground that they do not belong to him most of all, but if he sees that another will be able to make better use of them than he himself would; the rest, however, will not do this, either through ignorance (for they do not think they would make bad use of such goods) or through love of honor in ruling. [section 3] The excellent person, however, will be affected by neither of these; and so he is not a self-lover, at least with respect to goods of this sort. But if he is a self-lover at all, it is with respect to the fine. For this alone he would not yield to another, whereas he will yield what is advantageous and pleasant.

57| [section 4] So the choice made for the sake of the fine will belong to the self-lover; but the choice said to be made for the sake of advantage and pleasure will not belong to the excellent person, but to the base person. [section 1] — Will the excellent person, then, love himself most of all, or not? In one sense he will love himself most, but in another sense not. For since we say that the excellent person will give up the goods that concern advantage to his friend, he will love his friend more than himself. [section 2] Yes, but insofar as he gives these things up to his friend, he thereby secures the fine for himself, and it is in that respect that he gives up such things. So in one sense he loves his friend more than himself, but in another sense he loves himself most: in respect of advantage he loves his friend, but in respect of the fine and the good he loves himself most; for he secures these for himself, and these are the finest things. [section 3] So he is a lover of the good, not a lover of self; for if he loves himself, it is only because he is good. But the base person is a lover of self; for he has nothing on account of which he might love himself, such as something fine, but he will love himself without any such thing, simply himself. That is why he, properly speaking, would be called a lover of self.

58| [section 1] Next it would be fitting to speak about self-sufficiency and the self-sufficient person: whether the self-sufficient person will need friendship in addition, or not, but will be self-sufficient to himself even in this respect. For the poets too say things of this sort: "when the divinity gives good fortune, what need is there of friends?" And from this the puzzle also arises: will the person who has all good things and is self-sufficient need a friend, or is it then that he needs one most of all? For whom will he benefit, or with whom will he live his life together? For he will surely not spend his life alone. [section 2] If, then, he will need these things, and these are not possible without friendship, the self-sufficient person would need friendship in addition. [section 3] Now the comparison habitually drawn in these arguments from the case of god is neither correct there nor would it be useful here; for it is not the case that, because god is self-sufficient and needs nothing, we too will therefore need nothing. [section 4] For there is also an argument of the following sort made about god. Since, he says, god has all good things and is self-sufficient, what will he do? For he will surely not sleep. He will contemplate something, then, he says; for this is the finest and most proper activity. What, then, will he contemplate? For if he contemplates something else, that thing will be better than himself. But this is absurd, that something else should be better than god. He will therefore contemplate himself. But this too is absurd; for when a man [who] examines himself, we reproach him as lacking sense. God, then, he says, will be absurd, contemplating himself.

59| [section 5] Let it be set aside, then, what god will contemplate; for it is not about the self-sufficiency of god that we are conducting our inquiry, but about human self-sufficiency: will the self-sufficient person need friendship, or not? Now if someone, looking to his friend, should see what a friend is and what sort of thing he is — (the text breaks off here) — such as to be another self, at least if you make him a friend in the fullest sense, as the saying goes: "this one is another Heracles, a friend is another self." [section 6] Since, then, knowing oneself is both the most difficult thing, as some of the wise have also said, and the most pleasant (for knowing oneself is pleasant), we are not able to observe ourselves from ourselves alone (and that we are not able to is clear from the fact that we reproach others for things while we ourselves do the same things without noticing it; [section 7] and this happens on account of goodwill, on account of feeling; and for many of us these things obscure our judgment, preventing us from judging correctly). So just as, when we want to see our own face, we look into a mirror and see it, likewise, when we want to know ourselves, we would come to know ourselves by looking at our friend; for the friend is, as we say, another self. [section 8]

60| If, then, knowing oneself is pleasant, and this is not possible to know without another, a friend, then the self-sufficient person would need friendship in order to know himself. [section 9] Further, if it is fine, as indeed it is, for someone who has the goods that come from fortune to do good to others, whom will he benefit? And with whom will he live his life together? For he will surely not spend his life alone; for living together is both pleasant and necessary. If, then, these things are fine and pleasant and necessary, and these are not possible without friendship, the self-sufficient person would need friendship in addition. [section 1] Should one acquire many friends, or few? Speaking simply, one should have neither many nor few [always]. For when there are many, it is a task to divide one's loving among each of them; for with respect to all other things too, our nature, being weak, is unable to extend itself very far. For neither do we see very far with our sight — if you set something too far beyond the proper measure, our sight falls short because of the weakness of our nature — nor with hearing, nor likewise with all the other senses. [section 2] So if one falls short in loving because of incapacity, one might justly incur complaints, and one would not be a friend, not loving in fact but only in name; and friendship does not want this.

61| [section 3] Further, if there are many, one cannot cease from grieving; for when there are many, it is likely that some misfortune is always befalling one or another of them, and when such things happen, grief is unavoidable. Nor again, on the other hand, should one have few, one or two, but a number proportioned to the occasion and to one's own impulse toward loving. [section 1] After this it would be fitting to examine how one should treat a friend. The inquiry does not apply to every kind of friendship, but to that in which friends most bring complaints against one another. In the other kinds they do not bring complaints in the same way; for instance, in the friendship of father toward son there is no complaint of the sort demanded in some friendships — as I have treated you, so you should treat me — and if not, then there is the severe complaint. [section 2] For among unequal friends there is no equality; and the friendship of father toward son is a friendship of inequality, likewise that of wife toward husband or of servant toward master, and in general of the inferior and the superior. Such friends, then, will not have complaints of this kind; but among equal friends, and in that kind of friendship, this sort of complaint does occur. So it would be fitting to examine how one should treat a friend in friendship among equals. (the text breaks off here)

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