Rhetoric · Book I

Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language

1| [1.1.1] Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic. For both are concerned with matters that are in some way common knowledge to everyone and belong to no separately marked-off science; hence everyone in some way has a share in both, since everyone, to some extent, attempts both to test and uphold an argument, and to defend himself and to accuse. [1.1.2] Now among the many, some do these things at random, others through a habit acquired by practice; and since both ways are possible, clearly it would be possible to do them also by a method. For it is possible to observe the cause on account of which those who succeed by habit and those who succeed by chance both hit the mark, and such an observation everyone would at once agree is the work of a craft. [1.1.3] As things stand, then, those who have composed treatises on the art of speeches have worked out virtually none of this, its proper part (for the proofs are the only part that belongs to the craft, the rest being additions), and they say nothing about enthymemes, which are the very body of persuasion, while they spend most of their effort on matters outside the case at hand. [1.1.4] For slander and pity and anger and such affections of the soul have nothing to do with the fact of the matter, but are directed at the judge; so that if all trials were conducted as they now are in some cities, and especially in the well-governed ones, these writers would have nothing to say. [1.1.5] For everyone agrees that the laws ought to speak this way, and some actually enforce it and forbid speaking outside the case, as in the Areopagus, and rightly so in their view; for the judge ought not to be warped by being led into anger or envy or pity. That would be just as if someone were to make crooked the very ruler he intends to use.

2| [1.1.6] Further, it is plain that the disputant has nothing to do beyond showing that the fact is or is not so, that it has happened or has not happened; but as to whether it is a great matter or a small one, or just or unjust, in all cases where the lawgiver has not defined it, the judge himself surely must decide, and not learn it from the disputants. [1.1.7] It is most fitting, then, that rightly established laws should themselves define everything possible, and leave as little as possible to those who judge, first because it is easier to find one man, or a few, of sound judgment and capable of making laws and of judging, than to find many; next, because legislation comes about after long consideration, while judgments are given on the spur of the moment, so that it is hard for those who judge to render properly what is just and what is advantageous. And the greatest point of all is that the lawgiver's judgment is not about a particular case, but concerns the future and is universal, whereas the member of the assembly and the juror already judge about present and specific matters, toward which affection and hatred and private advantage are often already attached, so that they are no longer able to see the truth adequately, but their own pleasure or pain darkens their judgment. [1.1.8] Concerning everything else, then, as we say, one should make the judge sovereign over as little as possible; but concerning whether a thing has happened or not, will be or will not be, is or is not, this must of necessity be left to the judges, for it is not possible for the lawgiver to foresee these things.

3| [1.1.9] Given that matters stand this way, whoever goes on to define the remaining parts is really treating as belonging to the art what actually falls outside the case — for example, what the introduction or the narrative should contain, and so with each of the other parts; in handling these they pursue nothing beyond shaping the judge into a certain state of mind, while about the proofs proper to the craft they demonstrate nothing, and yet this is precisely the source from which a person might become skilled at enthymemes. [1.1.10] For this reason, though the method is the same for deliberative and forensic speeches, and though the business of deliberation is finer and more properly political than the business of private transactions, they say nothing about the former, but all try to reduce to an art the business of the courts, because it is less useful to speak outside the case in deliberative speeches, and deliberative oratory is less liable to foul play than forensic pleading, because it is more general in its concern. For there the judge decides about his own affairs, so that nothing further is needed except to demonstrate that the matter is as the adviser says; but in forensic cases this is not enough, and it is useful besides to win over the hearer, since the judgment concerns matters belonging to others, so that the judges, looking to their own interest and listening with a view to their own favor, give way to the disputants instead of judging.

4| Hence, as I said before, in many places the law forbids speaking outside the case; and there the judges themselves keep to this adequately. [1.1.11] Since it is plain that the method that belongs to the craft is concerned with the proofs, and proof is a kind of demonstration (for we are most persuaded when we suppose a thing to have been demonstrated), and since rhetorical demonstration is the enthymeme, and this is, so to speak, simply the most sovereign of the proofs, and the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism, and it belongs to dialectic likewise to examine every syllogism, either the whole of it or some part, it is clear that the one most able to observe this — from what elements and how a syllogism comes about — would also be most skilled at enthymemes, once he has grasped in addition what sorts of things the enthymeme concerns and what differences it has from logical syllogisms. For the true and what resembles the true belong to the same faculty to discern, and at the same time human beings are sufficiently disposed by nature toward the truth and for the most part do hit upon the truth; hence to be skilled at conjecturing about accepted opinions belongs to one who is likewise disposed toward the truth. That the other writers, then, treat as art what lies outside the case, and why they have inclined more toward pleading in the courts, is plain.

5| [1.1.12] Rhetoric is useful because the true and the just are by nature stronger than their opposites, so that if judgments are not given as they ought to be, the true and the just must be defeated through their own fault — which deserves blame. Further, even if we possessed the most exact knowledge, it would not be easy, in speaking from that knowledge alone, to persuade some audiences; for a speech based on scientific knowledge is instruction, and this is impossible with such hearers, but it is necessary to base one's proofs and arguments on things generally accepted, as we said also in the Topics concerning discourse with the many. Further, one must be able to persuade of contrary things, just as also in syllogisms — not in order that we may do both (for one ought not to persuade people of base things), but so that it may not escape our notice how the matter stands, and so that, when another person uses arguments unjustly, we ourselves may be able to refute them. Now none of the other crafts draws syllogistic conclusions of contraries; dialectic and rhetoric alone do this, for both apply equally to contraries. Yet the underlying facts are not equally balanced, but the true and the better are always by nature easier to draw into syllogisms and more persuasive, to put it simply. Besides this, it is absurd that a man should be ashamed of not being able to defend himself with his body, but not ashamed of failing to do so with speech, which is more distinctive of a human being than the use of the body. [1.1.13] And if it be objected that one who uses such a power of speech unjustly could do great harm, this objection applies in common to all good things except virtue, and most of all to the most useful things, such as strength, health, wealth, and generalship; for with these a man might do the greatest benefit if he uses them justly, and the greatest harm if he uses them unjustly.

6| [1.1.14] It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not concerned with some one definite genus, but is like dialectic; and that it is useful; and that its function is not to persuade but to discern the persuasive elements available in each case, just as in all the other crafts as well (for it is not medicine's function to make someone healthy, but to advance him as far toward health as is possible — for even those unable to recover health can nonetheless be treated well). Besides this, it is clear that the same craft discerns both the persuasive and the apparently persuasive, just as in dialectic it discerns both the syllogism and the apparent syllogism — for sophistic lies not in the capacity but in the moral purpose; except that here the orator will be an orator either by knowledge or by moral purpose, while there the sophist is a sophist by moral purpose, and the dialectician is a dialectician not by moral purpose but by capacity. Let us now try to speak about the method itself — how and from what materials we shall be able to hit upon what lies before us. So then, defining it again as it were from the start, as to what it is, let us go on to the rest. [1.2.1] Let rhetoric, then, be a capacity for discerning the possible means of persuasion concerning any subject whatever. For this is the function of no other craft: each of the others is instructive and persuasive about its own subject matter — medicine, for instance, about what is healthy and diseased, geometry about the properties that attach to magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and likewise the rest of the crafts and sciences. But rhetoric appears able to discern the persuasive, so to speak, concerning any subject given to it; that is why we say it does not have its expertise confined to some one genus of its own.

7| [1.2.2] Of the means of persuasion, some are non-technical and some are technical. By non-technical I mean those not furnished by us but pre-existing — witnesses, evidence extracted under torture, contracts, and the like; by technical I mean those that can be constructed by method and by us, so that of these we must use the one kind and discover the other. [1.2.3] Of the means of persuasion furnished through speech, there are three species: some reside in the character of the speaker, some in disposing the hearer in a certain way, and some in the speech itself, through demonstrating or seeming to demonstrate. [1.2.4] They reside in the character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we trust decent people more, and more readily — on all matters generally, but completely so on matters where exactness is not possible and opinion is divided. This too, however, must come about through the speech, not through any prior opinion about what sort of person the speaker is; for it is not the case, as some who write on the art claim, that decency on the speaker's part contributes nothing to persuasiveness and so has no place in the art — on the contrary, character is, one might almost say, the most authoritative means of persuasion. [1.2.5] They reside in the hearers whenever the hearers are brought by the speech into some emotion; for we do not give the same judgment when grieving and when rejoicing, or when feeling friendly and when feeling hostile. And it is to this alone, we say, that present-day writers on the art try to devote their effort. [1.2.6] These matters will be set out one by one when we speak about the emotions. As for persuasion through the speech itself, it occurs whenever we demonstrate the true, or what appears true, from whatever is persuasive in each particular case.

8| [1.2.7] Since the means of persuasion come about through these, it is clear that grasping them belongs to one who is able to reason logically and to study character and the virtues, and, thirdly, to study the emotions — what each of the emotions is, what quality it has, and from what causes and how it arises. It follows, then, that rhetoric is, as it were, an offshoot of dialectic and of the study of character, which it is right to call political science. That is also why rhetoric assumes the guise of political science, and why those who lay claim to it do so partly through lack of education, partly through pretension, and partly for other, ordinary human causes; for it is a part of dialectic and resembles it, just as we said at the outset — neither of the two is a science of any definite subject matter, of how things stand, but both are certain capacities for furnishing arguments. [1.2.8] Concerning their capacity, then, and how they stand toward each other, more or less enough has been said. As for persuasion through demonstrating or seeming to demonstrate — just as in dialectic one thing is induction, another syllogism, another apparent syllogism — so too here it is the same way: the example is induction, the enthymeme is syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme is apparent syllogism. I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example a rhetorical induction. Everyone produces persuasion through demonstration either by citing examples or by enthymemes, and by nothing besides these; so that, since it is in general necessary to demonstrate anything whatever, about anyone whatever, either by reasoning syllogistically or by induction — and this is clear to us from the Analytics — each of these two must be identical, respectively, with each of those.

9| [1.2.9] What the difference is between example and enthymeme is clear from the Topics (for there the treatment of syllogism and induction came earlier): where it is shown, on the basis of many similar cases, that something holds, there it is called induction in that context and example in this one; and where, certain things being so, something else results because of them, alongside them, by their being so, either universally or for the most part, there it is called syllogism in that context and enthymeme in this one. [1.2.10] It is also clear that each species of oratory has its own advantage; for just as has been said in the methodical treatises, the same holds here too: some styles of oratory are given to examples, others to enthymemes, and likewise some orators are given to examples and others to enthymemes. Speeches made through examples are no less persuasive, but those made through enthymemes stir more applause. [1.2.11] The cause of this, and how each is to be used, we shall discuss later; for now let us define these very matters more precisely. Since the persuasive is persuasive to someone, and one thing is immediately persuasive and credible in its own right, while another is persuasive because it appears to be demonstrated by means of such things — and since no craft studies the particular case (medicine, for instance, does not consider what is healthy for Socrates or for Callias, but what is healthy for such-and-such a kind of person, or for people of such-and-such a kind, since this is what falls within the craft, while the particular case is unlimited and not an object of knowledge) — so too rhetoric will not study the particular reputable opinion, as held by Socrates or Hippias, but what holds for people of such-and-such a kind, just as dialectic does as well. For dialectic, too, does not reason from just any premises whatever (for some things appear so even to people who are raving), but reasons from premises that call for argument, while rhetoric reasons from premises that people are already accustomed to deliberate about.

10| [1.2.12] Rhetoric's function has to do with the sort of matters we deliberate about but for which we possess no systematic crafts, and with such hearers as are unable to take in many steps at once or to reason from a distance. And we deliberate about things that appear capable of being otherwise; for concerning things that cannot possibly be, or come to be, or be otherwise than they are, no one deliberates who supposes them to be so — there would be nothing gained by it. [1.2.13] It is possible to reason syllogistically and draw conclusions, in some cases from things already proved by syllogism, in others from things not themselves syllogized but requiring a syllogism because they are not generally accepted opinions. Of these, the former kind is necessarily hard to follow because of its length (for the judge is assumed to be an ordinary person), and the latter kind is unpersuasive because it does not proceed from things agreed upon or from generally accepted opinions. It follows that both the enthymeme and the example must be about things that admit of being otherwise for the most part — the example being induction, the enthymeme being syllogism — and drawn from few premises, and often from fewer premises than the primary syllogism requires; for if any of these premises is already known, there is no need even to state it, since the hearer himself supplies it. For instance, to show that Dorieus has won a contest in which the prize is a crown, it is enough to say that he has won at Olympia; there is no need to add that the Olympic games award a crown, for that is known to everyone.

11| For everyone knows this. [1.2.14] But since few of the things from which rhetorical syllogisms are drawn are necessary (for most of the things about which judgments and deliberations are made admit of being otherwise — for the things people deliberate and inquire about are the things they act on, and everything that is done is of this kind, and, so to speak, none of these things happens of necessity, while things that happen for the most part and admit of being otherwise must be inferred by syllogism from premises of the same kind, and necessary conclusions from necessary premises; this too is clear to us from the Analytics), it is evident that, of the things from which enthymemes are stated, some will be necessary but most will be things that hold for the most part, and enthymemes are drawn from probabilities and from signs, so that each of these two kinds of premise must correspond to each of those two kinds of conclusion.

12| [1.2.15] For a probability is what happens for the most part — not simply, as some define it, but rather what is about things that admit of being otherwise, standing to that in relation to which it is probable as the universal stands to the particular. [1.2.16] Of signs, one kind stands as a particular thing stands to the universal, the other as a universal thing stands to the particular. Of these, the necessary one is called a proof, and the one that is not necessary has no name to mark the difference. [1.2.17] By necessary I mean those signs from which a syllogism can be formed; that is why a sign of this kind is called a proof — for whenever people think it is not possible to refute what has been said, they then think they are bringing forward a proof, as something demonstrated and settled: for tekmar and peras (limit) are the same word in the old language. [1.2.18] Of signs, one kind stands as the particular to the universal, in this way: for example, if someone said it was a sign that wise people are just, since Socrates was wise and just. This, then, is a sign, but it can be refuted, even if what is said is true (for it forms no valid syllogism). The other kind is necessary — for example, if someone said it is a sign that a person is ill, since he has a fever, or that a woman has given birth, since she has milk. This alone, among signs, is a proof; for this alone, if true, cannot be refuted. The kind that stands as the universal to the particular is, for example, if someone said it is a sign that a man has a fever, since he breathes rapidly. This too can be refuted, even if true, since it is possible to pant hard without having a fever. What a probability is, then, and what a sign and a proof are, and how they differ, has been stated now in outline, and is set out more clearly, along with the reason why some of these are not valid syllogisms while others are valid syllogisms, in the Analytics.

13| [1.2.19] It has been stated that a paradigm is a kind of induction, and what kind of matters induction concerns. It stands neither as part to whole, nor as whole to part, nor as whole to whole, but as part to part, like to like — whenever both fall under the same genus, but one is better known than the other, that is a paradigm: for example, that Dionysius, in asking for a bodyguard, was plotting tyranny; for Pisistratus too, earlier, when plotting, asked for a bodyguard, and once he got it, made himself tyrant, and so did Theagenes at Megara; and all the other cases people know of become, all of them, a paradigm for the case of Dionysius, whom they do not yet know for certain to be asking for this reason. All these fall under the same universal, that whoever plots tyranny asks for a bodyguard. It has now been stated, then, from what sources come the proofs that are held to be demonstrative. [1.2.20] The greatest difference among enthymemes, and the one that goes almost entirely unnoticed by everyone, is the very one found also with regard to the dialectical method of syllogisms: for some of them belong to rhetoric in the same way that some belong to the dialectical method of syllogisms, while others belong to other arts and capacities, some already established and some not yet grasped; that is why they escape the notice of listeners, and the more one takes proper hold of them, the further one moves away from rhetoric and dialectic themselves.

14| What is being said will be clearer if stated at greater length. [1.2.21] I mean that dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are concerned with the things about which we speak of 'topics.' These are the common topics, about matters of justice, about natural science, about politics, and about many things that differ in kind — for example, the topic of the more and the less: from this it is no more possible to construct a syllogism or state an enthymeme about matters of justice than about natural science or about anything whatever, even though these differ in kind. But the special topics are those drawn from the premises particular to each kind and genus — for example, there are premises about natural science from which there is neither an enthymeme nor a syllogism about matters of character, and about matters of character there are other premises from which nothing will follow about natural science; and the same holds alike in every case. Those common topics will not make anyone knowledgeable about any particular subject matter, since they are about no underlying subject; but with these special premises, the better one selects them, the more one will, without noticing it, produce a science different from dialectic and rhetoric — for if one hits upon first principles, it will no longer be dialectic or rhetoric but that science whose principles one has hold of.

15| [1.2.22] Most enthymemes are stated from these special kinds, the particular and proper ones, and fewer from the common topics. Just as in the Topics, then, here too the species of enthymemes must be distinguished, along with the topics from which they are to be drawn. By species I mean the premises proper to each particular genus, and by topics the common ones that apply alike to all. Let us speak first about the species; but first let us take up the genera of rhetoric, so that, having distinguished how many there are, we may take up the elements and premises for each separately. [1.3.1] The species of rhetoric are three in number, for that is also how many kinds of listeners there are for speeches. For a speech is composed of three things: the speaker, the subject he speaks about, and the person he addresses, and the end of the speech is directed at this last — I mean the listener. [1.3.2] The listener must be either a spectator or a judge, and a judge either of things that have happened or of things that are going to happen. The one who judges about future things is the member of the assembly, the one who judges about things that have happened is, for example, the juror, and the one who judges the speaker's ability is the spectator. [1.3.3] So there must necessarily be three genera of rhetorical speeches: deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. Of deliberation, one part is exhortation, the other dissuasion; for those who advise privately and those who address the public always do one or the other of these. Of a lawsuit, one part is accusation, the other defense; for disputants must necessarily do one or the other of these. Of epideictic, one part is praise, the other blame.

16| [1.3.4] The time appropriate to each of these is, for the deliberative speaker, the future (for he advises about things to come, either urging or dissuading); for the litigant, the past (for it is always about things already done that one accuses and the other defends); while for the ceremonial speaker the most proper time is the present (for it is on the basis of existing qualities that everyone praises or blames), though they often also make use of recalling the past and projecting the future. [1.3.5] The end is different for each of these, and since there are three kinds, there are three ends: for the deliberative speaker it is the advantageous and the harmful (for the one who urges advises as toward the better course, and the one who dissuades dissuades from the worse, and takes in the other considerations, whether just or unjust, fine or shameful, as subordinate to this); for litigants it is the just and the unjust, though they too take in the other considerations as subordinate to these; for those who praise and blame it is the fine and the shameful, and they too refer the other considerations to these. [1.3.6] A sign that the end is what has been stated for each is this: on the other points speakers sometimes would not dispute — for example the litigant, that the act did not occur or did no harm — but that he is doing wrong he would never admit, since then there would be no need of a trial. Likewise deliberative speakers often concede the other points, but would not admit that they are advising what is disadvantageous or dissuading from what is beneficial; whereas that it is not unjust to enslave neighboring peoples, even ones doing no wrong, often does not trouble them at all. Similarly those who praise and those who blame do not look to whether a man's actions were advantageous or harmful, but often even count it a mark of praise that, disregarding his own advantage, he did what was fine — for example they praise Achilles because he came to the aid of his comrade Patroclus, knowing that he himself must die when he might have lived. For him such a death was finer, even though living was the more advantageous.

17| [1.3.7] It is clear from what has been said that one must first have premises concerning these matters; for evidences, probabilities, and signs are rhetorical premises. For in general a syllogism is composed of premises, and the enthymeme is a syllogism composed of the premises just mentioned. [1.3.8] Since it is not possible either for impossible things to be done or to have been done, but only possible ones, and since things that have not occurred or will not occur cannot be said to have been done in the one case or to be going to be done in the other, it is necessary for the deliberative speaker, the litigant, and the ceremonial speaker alike to have premises about the possible and the impossible, and about whether a thing has occurred or not, and whether it will occur or not. [1.3.9] Further, since all speakers — those who praise and blame, those who urge and dissuade, those who accuse and those who defend — try to show not only what has been stated but also that the good or the evil, the fine or the shameful, the just or the unjust, is great or small, whether speaking of these in their own right or comparing them to one another, it is clear that they would also need premises about greatness and smallness and about the greater and the less, both in general and with respect to particulars — for example, which is the greater good or the lesser, which the greater wrongdoing or the greater just act; and likewise concerning the others. On what matters, then, it is necessary to take up premises has been stated; after this we must divide the subject and treat each of these separately — the subjects of deliberation, the subjects of ceremonial speeches, and third, the subjects of trials.

18| [1.4.1] First, then, we must grasp on what sorts of goods or evils the deliberative speaker advises, since it is not about everything but only about such things as admit of both happening and not happening. [1.4.2] For whatever necessarily either is or will be, or is necessarily incapable of being or coming to be, about these there is no deliberation. [1.4.3] Nor indeed is there deliberation about everything that is contingent; for among contingent goods there are some that come about by nature and some by chance, capable both of happening and not happening, about which deliberating serves no purpose; but clearly deliberation concerns only those matters that are open to deliberation. Such are the things whose nature it is to be traced back to us, and whose origin of coming-to-be is up to us; for we consider a matter only up to the point where we discover whether it is possible or impossible for us to do it. [1.4.4] To enumerate these precisely one by one and divide them into the kinds about which people are accustomed to transact business, and further to define them as exactly as the truth allows, is not a task to pursue at the present time, because this belongs not to the craft of rhetoric but to one more intelligent and more concerned with truth, and because rhetoric has already been assigned far more subject matter of its own than is proper to it. [1.4.5] For what we have in fact already said is true: that rhetoric is composed out of the science of analytics and the political science that concerns character, and is similar partly to dialectic and partly to sophistical arguments. [1.4.6] But the more anyone tries to construct either dialectic or rhetoric not as capacities but as sciences, the more he will unwittingly destroy their very nature by this transformation, remaking them into sciences of certain underlying subject matters and not merely of arguments.

19| [1.4.7] Nonetheless, so far as it is worthwhile to make distinctions, while still leaving further inquiry to political science, let us set them out even now. For, roughly speaking, the matters about which everyone deliberates and about which deliberative speakers make their speeches turn out to be five in number, the greatest being these: revenues, war and peace, further the defense of the territory, imports and exports, and legislation. [1.4.8] So concerning revenues, the future adviser needs to know what the city's sources of income are and how large they are, so that if any is being overlooked it may be added, and if any is too small it may be increased; and further all the city's expenditures, so that if any is superfluous it may be removed, and if any is too great it may be reduced. For people become richer not only by adding to what they already have but also by cutting expenditures. These matters can be surveyed not only from experience in one's own affairs, but it is also necessary to be well-informed about what has been discovered among other peoples, for the sake of advising on these matters. [1.4.9] Concerning war and peace, he must know the power of the city — how great it already is and how great it may become — and of what kind that existing power is and what kind might be added to it, and further what wars it has fought and how. And it is necessary to know these things not only about one's own city but also about neighboring ones, and about those with whom war is likely, so that peace may be kept with those who are stronger and war may be within one's own control against those who are weaker, and to know the respective forces, whether similar or dissimilar; for it is possible to have the advantage or the disadvantage in this respect too. And in view of this it is necessary to have observed not only one's own wars but those of others as well, and how they have turned out; for like causes naturally produce like results.

20| [1.4.10] Further, concerning the defense of the territory, one must not be ignorant of how it is guarded, but must know both the size and the kind of the garrison and the locations of the guard-posts (which is impossible without experience of the territory), so that if the guard is too small it may be increased, and if any post is superfluous it may be removed, and so that the suitable places may be watched more closely. [1.4.11] Further, concerning food supply, one must know how much expenditure is sufficient for the city and of what kind, both what is produced at home and what must be imported, and what goods they need to export and what to import and from whom, so that treaties and agreements may be made with these peoples; for citizens must be kept free of reproach on two counts — toward those who are stronger and toward those who are useful for these purposes. [1.4.12] For the sake of security it is necessary to be able to survey all these matters, and not least to have some understanding of legislation; for the safety of the city lies in its laws, so that it is necessary to know how many kinds of constitution there are, which kind is advantageous for each city, and by what causes a constitution is naturally corrupted, both causes proper to it and causes opposed to it. By corruption through causes proper to it I mean this: that apart from the best constitution, all the others are corrupted both by being relaxed and by being intensified — for example a democracy not only becomes weaker when relaxed, so that it will end in oligarchy, but also when it is intensified too much;

21| Just as with hookedness and snubness in a nose: they arrive at the mean not only when relaxed toward it, but also when they become extremely hooked or snub, they get into such a state that the nose no longer even seems to be a nose. [1.4.13] For lawmaking it is useful not only to grasp which constitution is advantageous by studying constitutions of the past, but also to know the ones in use among other peoples, which sorts suit which sorts of people. So it is clear that for lawmaking, surveys of the world's peoples are useful (for from these one can take the laws of the various nations), while for political deliberation the histories of those who write about actions are useful. But all of this is the work of political science, not of rhetoric. As for the subjects on which the future counselor must have propositions ready, these are the most important; but from what materials we must speak, both about these and about other things, to urge or dissuade, let us go on to say.

22| [1.5.1] Nearly every individual, privately, and all people, in common, have some target at which they aim in choosing and avoiding things; and this target, to put it in a single phrase, is happiness and its parts. [1.5.2] So for the sake of an example let us take up what happiness is, stated simply, and out of what elements its parts consist. For it is about happiness and the things that contribute toward it, and the things opposed to it, that all urging and dissuading turn: for one must do the things that produce happiness or one of its parts, or that make a greater good replace a lesser one, and one must not do the things that destroy it or impede it or produce its opposites. [1.5.3] Let happiness, then, be doing well combined with virtue, or self-sufficiency of life, or the life that is most pleasant together with security, or a flourishing condition of possessions and of body together with the power to guard and make use of these: for pretty much everyone agrees that happiness is one or more of these things. [1.5.4] If, then, happiness is something of this sort, its parts must necessarily be good birth, abundance of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, many children, a good old age; further, the virtues of the body (for example health, beauty, strength, size, athletic power), reputation, honor, good luck, virtue, or also its parts, practical wisdom, courage, justice, temperance. For in this way a person would be most self-sufficient, if he possessed both the goods within himself and the external goods; for there are no other goods besides these. Now what is within a person consists of the things concerning the soul and the things in the body, while what is external consists of good birth, friends, wealth, and honor; and further we think power and good fortune ought to belong to him as well, for in this way life is most secure. Let us, then, take up in the same manner what each of these is.

23| [1.5.5] Good birth, then, for a nation or a city is being indigenous or ancient, and having as first leaders men of distinction, and having many distinguished descendants of them in the things that are emulated. For an individual, good birth is either from the male line or from the female line, and legitimacy from both, and, as in the case of a city, that the first known ancestors be distinguished either for virtue or for wealth or for some other thing that is honored, and that many distinguished persons have come from the family, both men and women, both young and old. [1.5.6] Good children and many children are not obscure notions. For a community, good children means abundant and good youth, good with respect to virtue of body, for example size, beauty, strength, athletic power; and of soul, temperance and courage are the virtues of the young. For an individual, good children and many children means that one's own children are many and of this quality, both female and male; the virtue of females is, in body, beauty and size, and in soul, temperance and industriousness without meanness of spirit. Similarly, both privately and in common, and for men and for women, one must seek that each of these qualities be present; for wherever the condition of the women is poor, as among the Spartans, people are roughly half as happy as they might be.

24| [1.5.7] The parts of wealth are: abundance of currency and of land, possession of estates outstanding in number and size and beauty, and further possession of furnishings, slaves, and livestock outstanding in number and beauty—all of these being one's own, secure, gentlemanly, and useful. Useful goods are more the fruit-bearing ones, gentlemanly goods those meant for enjoyment (I call fruit-bearing those from which income comes, and enjoyable those from which nothing worthwhile results beyond the use itself). The definition of security is possessing a thing in such a place and in such a manner that the use of it is in one's own power; and the definition of a thing's being one's own or not is whether the power to alienate it is in one's own power—by alienation I mean giving and selling. In general, being wealthy consists more in using than in possessing; for the actuality and the use of such things is wealth.

25| [1.5.8] Good repute is being supposed by everyone to be a person of worth, or having something of the sort that everyone, or the majority, or the good, or the wise desire. [1.5.9] Honor is a sign of a reputation for doing good; and those who have done good are honored justly and most of all, though the one who has the power to do good is also honored. Doing good extends either to safety and whatever causes existence, or to wealth, or to some other of the goods whose acquisition is not easy, either in general or in that place or at that time; for many people gain honor through things that seem small, but the place and the occasion are responsible. Parts of honor are sacrifices, memorials in verse and without verse, privileges, precincts of land, front seats, tombs, statues, public maintenance, the barbarian honors such as prostrations and giving way, and gifts that are prized in each community. For a gift is both a giving of property and a sign of honor; hence both those fond of money and those fond of honor desire them, for gifts hold what both parties need: a gift is a possession, which is what the money-lovers desire, and it carries honor, which is what the honor-lovers want. [1.5.10] The virtue of the body is health, of such a kind that people are free of disease while making use of their bodies; for many are healthy in the way Herodicus is said to have been, whom no one would congratulate on his health, because he abstains from all, or nearly all, human activities. [1.5.11] Beauty differs at each stage of life. In a young man, beauty consists in having a body useful for the exertions of running and of force, while being pleasant to look at for enjoyment; that is why pentathletes are the most beautiful, because they are naturally suited both for force and for speed at once. In a man in his prime, beauty consists in being suited for the exertions of war, while seeming pleasant along with an air of formidableness. In an old man, it consists in being sufficient for the necessary exertions, and free of pain because he has none of the things that old age mars.

26| [1.5.12] Strength is the power to move another as one wishes, and moving another necessarily means either pulling or pushing or lifting or squeezing or crushing, so that the strong person is strong in all of these or in some of them. [1.5.13] The virtue of size is to be so much greater than most people in length and depth and breadth that the excess does not make one's movements slower. [1.5.14] Athletic virtue of the body is composed of size, strength, and speed (for the swift person is also strong); for the one able to hurl his legs in a certain way and move them swiftly and over a great distance is suited for running, the one able to press down and hold his opponent is suited for wrestling, the one able to drive his opponent back with a blow is suited for boxing, the one who has both of the latter abilities is suited for the pancratium, and the one who has all of them is suited for the pentathlon. [1.5.15] A good old age is slowness of aging combined with freedom from pain; for a person is not well-aged if he ages quickly, nor if he ages slowly but painfully. It comes both from the virtues of the body and from good fortune; for someone who is neither free of disease nor strong will not be free of suffering or free of pain, and living a long time would not persist without good fortune either. There is also a certain other capacity for longevity apart from strength and health; for many people live long without the virtues of the body. But precision about these matters is of no use for our present purposes. [1.5.16] Abundance of friends and good friends are not obscure notions, once the friend has been defined: such a friend is one who acts to bring about what he believes to be good for that other person, for that other person's sake. Whoever has many such friends has abundance of friends, and whoever has decent men as such friends has good friends.

27| [1.5.17] Good luck is when the good things of which fortune is the cause come about and are present, either all of them, or most of them, or the greatest of them. Fortune is the cause of some of the things that the crafts are also causes of, and of many things that involve no craft — for example, whatever comes from nature (though it is also possible for these to happen contrary to nature): for craft is the cause of health, but nature is the cause of beauty and stature. In general, goods of this kind that come from fortune are the ones on which envy is directed. Fortune is also the cause of goods that come about contrary to reasonable expectation — for example, if the other brothers are ugly but this one is handsome, or if the others did not see the treasure but he found it, or if the arrow struck the man standing next to him and not him, or if he was the only one who did not come, since he always used to come, while those who came just this once were destroyed: for all things of this kind are thought to be strokes of good luck. [1.5.18] As for virtue, since the topic proper to it is the topic of praise, it must be marked out when we are giving an account of praise. [1.6.1] What the person urging a course, then, must aim at, treating it as something that will be or already is, and what the person dissuading must aim at, is clear: for the things aimed at in dissuading are the opposites of these. And since the aim set before the deliberative speaker is the advantageous (for people do not deliberate about the end, but about the things that lead to the end, and these are the things advantageous with a view to actions, and the advantageous is a good), we would need to grasp the elements concerning the good and the advantageous taken simply.

28| [1.6.2] Let the good, then, be whatever is choiceworthy for its own sake, and that for the sake of which we choose something else, and that which all things aim at, or which all things that have perception or intellect aim at, or would aim at if they acquired intellect, and whatever intellect would assign to each thing, and whatever the intellect that is concerned with each particular thing assigns to it: for this is good for each thing, and that whose presence puts a thing in a good condition and makes it self-sufficient, and self-sufficiency itself, and whatever produces or preserves such things, and that which such things follow upon, and whatever prevents or destroys the opposites of these.

29| [1.6.3] Something follows in two ways — either at the same time or later (for example, understanding follows upon learning later, while living follows upon being healthy at the same time) — and productive things in three ways: some, as being in a healthy condition is productive of health, others, as food is productive of health, and others, as exercise is productive of it, because it generally produces health. [1.6.4] Given these points, it is necessary that acquisitions of good things be good, and losses of bad things be good: for not having the bad follows at once upon the one, while having the good follows later upon the other. [1.6.5] And taking a greater good in exchange for a lesser one, and a lesser evil in exchange for a greater one, are goods: for by the amount that the greater exceeds the lesser, by that same amount there occurs an acquisition in the one case and a loss in the other. [1.6.6] And the virtues must be goods (for those who possess them are put in a good condition by them, and the virtues are productive of goods and are also practical; [1.6.7] but about each virtue, what it is and of what sort, must be discussed separately), and pleasure must be a good: for all animals by nature aim at it; hence pleasant things and fine things must also be goods: for pleasant things are productive of pleasure, while of fine things some are pleasant and others are choiceworthy in their own right. [1.6.8] To state them one by one, the following must be goods. Happiness: for it is choiceworthy in its own right and self-sufficient, and it is for its sake that we choose everything else. [1.6.9] Justice, courage, temperance, greatness of soul, magnificence, and the other states of that kind: for they are virtues of the soul.

30| [1.6.10] And health, beauty, and things of that kind: for they are virtues of the body and productive of many things — health, for example, is productive both of pleasure and of life, which is why it seems to be the best thing, because it is the cause of two of the things most valued by most people, pleasure and life. [1.6.11] Wealth: for it is the virtue of possession and productive of many things. [1.6.12] A friend and friendship: for a friend is choiceworthy in his own right and productive of many things. [1.6.13] Honor and reputation: for they are pleasant and productive of many things, and for the most part it follows upon them that one actually has the qualities for which one is honored. [1.6.14] The power of speaking and of acting: for all things of this kind are productive of goods. [1.6.15] Further, good natural endowment, memory, aptness for learning, quickness of mind, and everything of that kind: for these capacities are productive of goods. And likewise all the sciences and all the crafts. And life: for even if no other good were to follow from it, [1.6.16] it is choiceworthy in its own right. And what is just: for it is something advantageous held in common. [1.6.17] These, then, are pretty much the goods that are agreed upon. [1.6.18] In disputed cases, the syllogisms proceed from the following. That whose opposite is bad is good. [1.6.19] And that whose opposite is advantageous to our enemies is good: for example, if being cowardly is especially advantageous to our enemies, it is clear that courage is especially beneficial to the citizens. [1.6.20] And in general, whatever our enemies wish for, or whatever they take pleasure in, the opposite of this appears beneficial; hence it has been said, "then would Priam rejoice" (Homer, Iliad 1.255). But this is not always so, only for the most part: for nothing prevents the same thing from sometimes being advantageous to opposed parties; hence it is said that misfortunes bring people together, whenever the same thing is harmful to both.

31| [1.6.21] And that of which there is no excess is good, while whatever is greater than it ought to be is bad. [1.6.22] And that for the sake of which much toil or expense has been incurred is good: for it already appears to be a good, and a thing of this kind is taken to be an end, and an end of many things, and the end is a good. Hence these things have been said: "so as to leave a boast for Priam" (Homer, Iliad 2.160), and "it is shameful to remain long" (Homer, Iliad 2.298), and the proverb about the jar breaking at the door. [1.6.23] And that which most people aim at, and what appears to be fought over, is good: for what all aim at was a good, and the many appear as though they were all. [1.6.24] And what is praiseworthy is good: for no one praises what is not good. And what enemies and base people praise is good: for it is as if everyone already agrees, if even those who have suffered badly at its hands agree — for they would agree on account of what is evident, just as those are base whom their friends censure, and those are good whom their enemies do not censure (which is why the Corinthians supposed themselves insulted by Simonides when he wrote that "Ilium does not blame the Corinthians"). [1.6.25] And what some man of practical wisdom, or some good man or woman, preferred — for example, Odysseus as preferred by Athena, and Helen as preferred by Theseus, and Alexander as preferred by the goddesses, and Achilles as preferred by Homer. [1.6.26] And in general, whatever is deliberately chosen: people choose to do the things already mentioned, and things bad for their enemies, and things good for their friends, and things that are possible. [1.6.27] And these are possible in two senses: things that could come about, and things that come about easily; things are easy if they come about either without pain or in a short time, for difficulty is defined by either pain or length of time. And things are possible if they turn out as people wish; and they wish either for nothing bad, or for less bad than good — and this will happen if the bad goes unnoticed, or if the penalty for it is small.

32| [1.6.28] And things that are one's own, and things no one else has, and things out of the ordinary: for in this way there is more honor. And things fitting to them: such are what belongs to them by birth and by power, and things in which they think they are lacking, even if the lack is small — for they are no less inclined to do these things. [1.6.29] And things easily accomplished: for these are both possible and easy; and things are easily accomplished which everyone, or most, or people like them, or people inferior to them, have succeeded in. And things that will please their friends, or that will be hateful to their enemies. And whatever those they admire choose to do. And things for which they are naturally gifted and experienced: for they think they will succeed more easily at these. And things no worthless person would do: for these are more praiseworthy. And things they happen to desire: for these appear not only pleasant but better. [1.6.30] And each person is most inclined toward whatever fits his own love of a thing — for example, the lover of victory, if there will be victory; the lover of honor, if there will be honor; the lover of money, if there will be money; and the others likewise. So on the good and the advantageous, the proofs must be drawn from these considerations. [1.7.1] But since people often agree that both things are advantageous and dispute about which is more so, we should next speak about the greater good and the more advantageous. [1.7.2] Let the exceeding be this much and more, and the exceeded be what is contained within it; and let the greater and the more always be relative to the less, and the great and the small and the much and the little be relative to the magnitude of most things; and let the exceeding be the great, the falling short be the small, and likewise for the much and the little.

33| [1.7.3] Since, then, we call good that which is choiceworthy for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, and that which all things aim at, and that which intellect and practical wisdom would choose, and what is productive or preservative of these, or what such things follow upon — whereas that toward which something aims is its end, and an end is the goal on account of which everything else exists, and a thing counts as good for something when it stands in that relation to it — it follows of necessity that a larger quantity, once the one item or the smaller items are counted in together with it, is a greater good than the one item or the smaller items alone: for it surpasses them, while what is contained within is surpassed.

34| [1.7.4] And if the greatest of one class exceeds the greatest of another, then the classes themselves exceed each other; and whatever classes exceed each other, their greatest members also exceed each other: for example, if the greatest man is greater than the greatest woman, then men in general are greater than women, and if men in general are greater than women, then the greatest man is greater than the greatest woman — for the excesses of the classes correspond proportionally to the excesses of the greatest members within them. [1.7.5] And when this follows from that, but that does not follow from this — whether following at once, in succession, or potentially, for the use of what follows is contained in the use of the other — this is the greater good. Living follows at once upon being healthy, but the reverse does not hold; knowing follows later upon learning; and depriving follows potentially upon temple-robbery, for one who robs a temple would also commit theft. [1.7.6] And things that exceed the same thing by a greater amount are greater: for they must also exceed it by the lesser amount. [1.7.7] And things productive of a greater good are themselves greater: for this was what it was to be productive of the greater. And likewise for that whose productive cause is greater: for if the healthy is more choiceworthy than the pleasant and a greater good, then health too is greater than pleasure. [1.7.8] And what is choiceworthy in its own right is more choiceworthy than what is not choiceworthy in its own right — for example, strength compared with the healthy: for the one is not for the sake of itself, but the other is for the sake of itself, which was just what the good was. [1.7.9] And likewise if one thing is an end and the other is not an end: for the one exists for the sake of something else, the other for its own sake — for example, exercising, compared with being in good bodily condition.

35| [1.7.10] And what needs the other, or others, less is greater: for it is more self-sufficient; and what needs fewer things, or things more easily gotten, needs less. [1.7.11] And whenever this thing cannot exist without that, or cannot come to be without it, while that thing can exist without this — then what does not need the other is more self-sufficient, so that it appears the greater good. [1.7.12] And likewise if one is a principle and the other is not a principle, or if one is a cause and the other is not a cause, for the same reason: for without a cause and a principle it is impossible for a thing to exist or to come to be. And of two principles, what comes from the greater principle is greater, and of two causes, what comes from the greater cause is greater. And conversely, of two principles, the principle of the greater thing is the greater principle, and of two causes, the cause of the greater thing is the greater cause. [1.7.13] It is clear, then, from what has been said, that a thing can appear greater in both ways: for if one thing is a principle and the other is not, it will seem greater, and if one is not a principle and the other is, it will also seem greater — since the end is greater, not the principle, just as Leodamas, prosecuting Callistratus, said that the one who planned a wrong does it more than the one who carried it out, for it would not have been done if he had not planned it; but again, against Chabrias, that the one who carried it out wrongs more than the one who planned it, for it would not have happened if there had not been someone to carry it out — since it is for this very purpose, that they may carry it out, that people plot. [1.7.14] And the rarer is greater than the abundant — for example, gold is greater than iron, even though it is less useful, because possessing it is a greater thing, on account of its being harder to get. (In another way, the abundant is greater than the rare, because its use is greater: for the frequent exceeds the infrequent — which is why it is said, 'water is best.') Pindar, Olympian 1.1

36| [1.7.15] And in general the more difficult is greater than the easier: for it is rarer. But in another way, the easier is greater than the more difficult: for it turns out as we wish. [1.7.16] And that whose contrary is greater is itself greater, and that whose privation is greater. And virtue is greater than the absence of vice, and vice is greater than the absence of virtue: for the one class consists of ends, the other does not. [1.7.17] And things whose works are finer or more shameful are themselves greater, and things whose vices and virtues are greater have greater works as well, since as the causes and principles are, so are the results, and as the results are, so are the causes and principles. [1.7.18] And things whose superiority is more choiceworthy or finer are themselves greater — for example, seeing accurately is more choiceworthy than smelling (for sight is superior to smell), and being more devoted to one's comrades than to money is a finer thing, so that comradeship is finer than love of money as well. And correspondingly, the excesses of better things are better, and of finer things, finer. [1.7.19] And things whose desires are finer or better are themselves greater: for the greater longings are longings for greater things. And for the same reason, the desires for finer or better things are themselves finer and better. [1.7.20] And things whose sciences are finer or more serious have subject matters that are finer and more serious as well:

37| for as the science stands, so does the truth — each science lays down the law about its own subject matter. And for the same reason, the sciences of more serious and finer things are correspondingly more serious and finer. [1.7.21] And whatever the wise judge, or have judged, to be a greater good — whether all of them, or most, or the majority, or the strongest among them — must in fact be so, either absolutely, or to the extent that they judged it in accordance with practical wisdom. This holds in common for the other categories too: for a this, a how-much, and a what-sort-of-thing are as scientific knowledge and practical wisdom would say. But we have spoken of it with respect to goods: for the good has been defined as that which each thing, if it possessed practical wisdom, would choose; so it is clear that the greater good is what practical wisdom declares to be greater.

38| [1.7.22] And what belongs to the better people, either without qualification or insofar as they are better, is a greater good — for example, courage is greater than strength. And what the better person would choose, either without qualification or insofar as he is better, is greater — for example, being wronged rather than doing wrong; for the more just person would choose this. [1.7.23] And the more pleasant thing is greater than the less pleasant; for all things pursue pleasure, and things desire pleasure for its own sake, and it is by reference to these that the good and the end have been marked out; and more pleasant is what is freer from pain and what is pleasant for a longer time. [1.7.24] And the finer thing is greater than the less fine; for the fine is either what is pleasant or what is choiceworthy in its own right. [1.7.25] And whatever things people wish to be responsible for themselves or for their friends rather than not, these are greater goods, and whatever things they wish less to be responsible for, these are greater evils. [1.7.26] And things that last longer are greater than things that last a shorter time, and more secure things than less secure things; for the use of the one class exceeds in time, of the other in what one wishes: for whenever people wish it, the use of the secure thing is more available to them. [1.7.27] And as one item stands in a coordinate series and in similar grammatical cases, so the rest follow along — for example, if acting courageously is finer and more choiceworthy than acting temperately, then courage is more choiceworthy than temperance, and being courageous than being temperate. [1.7.28] And what everyone chooses is greater than what not everyone chooses; and what the majority choose is greater than what the minority choose; for the good was what all things aim at, so that the greater good is what more things aim at. And what one's rivals or enemies choose, or what judges choose, or what those whom the judges themselves judge would choose, is greater; for the one case is as if all were to say so, the other is the case of those with authority and those who know.

39| [1.7.29] And sometimes what everyone shares in is greater, since not sharing in it is a dishonor; but sometimes what no one, or few, share in is greater, since it is rarer. [1.7.30] And things more praiseworthy are greater, for they are finer. And things carrying greater honors are likewise greater, for honor is a kind of worth. And things carrying greater penalties are greater. [1.7.31] And things greater than things admitted or apparent to be great are greater still. And things, when divided into their parts, appear greater than the same things undivided; for the excess appears greater — which is why the poet says that persuading Meleager to rise up spoke of all the evils that come upon men whose city has been taken: the people perish, fire reduces the city to ashes, and strangers carry off the children (Hom. Il. 9.592-594). And likewise the technique of piling things up and building upon them, as Epicharmus does — for the same reason as division works (since composition displays a great excess), and because a beginning appears to be a cause of great things. [1.7.32] And since what is more difficult and rarer is greater, then occasions, ages, places, times, and capacities make things great; for if something is achieved beyond one's power, beyond one's age, beyond what people like oneself can do, or if it is done in such a manner, or in such a place, or at such a time, it will have greatness whether in fine things, in good things, in just things, or in their opposites — which is why the epigram for the Olympic victor runs: 'Before, carrying a rough yoke-pole about my shoulders, I bore fish from Argos to Tegea' (Simonides fr. 163). And Iphicrates used to praise himself by pointing out what he had risen from. [1.7.33] And what is by nature is greater than what is acquired, for it is more difficult — which is why the poet says, 'I am self-taught' (Hom. Od. 22.347).

40| [1.7.34] And the greatest part of a great thing is greater — for example, Pericles, in his funeral oration, said that the youth had been taken away from the city just as if the spring were taken out of the year. [1.7.35] And things useful in a greater need are greater — for example, things useful in old age and in sickness. And of two things, the one nearer the end is greater. And what is good for a particular person is greater than what is good without qualification. And the possible is greater than the impossible, for the one is good for him, the other is not. And things at the end of life are greater, for things nearer the end are ends more truly. [1.7.36] And things that aim at truth are greater than things that aim at reputation; and the mark of what aims at reputation is what a person would not choose if he were going to escape notice — which is why receiving benefit would seem more choiceworthy than doing benefit; for a person will choose to receive benefit even if it escapes notice, but he would not seem willing to choose to do benefit while escaping notice. [1.7.37] And things people wish to be rather than to seem to be are greater, for they aim more at truth — which is why people say justice amounts to little, because seeming just is more choiceworthy than being just, but this is not so with being healthy. [1.7.38] And what is more useful for many purposes is greater — for example, what is useful for living, for living well, for pleasure, and for doing fine actions — which is why wealth and health seem to be the greatest goods, for they include all of these. [1.7.39] And what is freer from pain and accompanied by pleasure is greater, for it is more than one good, since both pleasure and freedom from pain are each a good. And of two things, whichever, added to the same thing, makes the whole greater, is itself the greater. [1.7.40] And things that do not escape notice when present are greater than things that do escape notice, for the former tend more toward truth — which is why being wealthy would appear a greater good than seeming wealthy.

41| [1.7.41] And the object one is fond of is greater, both in cases where it is the only one a person has and in cases where it is one among others — which is why the penalty is not equal if someone blinds a man who has one eye and a man who has two; for the one-eyed man has been deprived of the thing he was fond of. As to the sources from which one ought to draw one's proofs in urging and in dissuading, this has been more or less stated. [1.8.1] But the greatest and most authoritative thing of all, for being able to persuade and to give good counsel, is to have grasped all the constitutions and to have distinguished the character, the laws, and the interests of each. [1.8.2] For everyone is persuaded by what is advantageous, and what is advantageous is what preserves the constitution. Further, the authoritative pronouncement is that of the authority, and the authorities are distinguished according to the constitutions; for as many as the constitutions are, so many are the authorities. [1.8.3] There are four constitutions: democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy; so that the authoritative and judging element would be some part of these, or the whole of one of them. [1.8.4] Democracy is a constitution in which the offices are distributed by lot; oligarchy is one in which they are distributed according to property assessments; aristocracy is one in which they are distributed according to education — and by education I mean the education laid down by the law. For those who have remained faithful to the laws rule in an aristocracy; and it is necessary that these appear to be the best, which is why this constitution has taken its name from that fact. Monarchy is, as its name indicates, a constitution in which one person has authority over everyone; of monarchies, the one that follows some fixed order is kingship, the one that is unbounded is tyranny. [1.8.5] Now the end of each constitution must not go unnoticed, for people choose what tends toward the end. The end of democracy is freedom; of oligarchy, wealth; of aristocracy, the things concerned with education and the laws; of tyranny, self-protection. It is clear, then, that we must distinguish the characters, laws, and interests that tend toward the end of each constitution, since it is by referring to this end that people make their choices.

42| [1.8.6] Since proofs come about not only through demonstrative speech but also through character (for we trust a speaker because of what sort of person he appears to be, and this happens when he appears good, or well-disposed toward us, or both), we ought to be in possession of the characters proper to each constitution; for the character of each constitution is necessarily the most persuasive one to use in addressing it. And these will be grasped by the same means as before: for characters are made evident through choice, and choice is referred to the end. [1.8.7] So then, what things one must, in exhorting people, hold out as being about to be or as already being, and from what sources one must take the proofs concerning what is advantageous, and further, through what means and how we shall have a good supply of the characters and customs proper to the several constitutions, has been stated, so far as suited the present occasion; for these matters have been worked out with precision in the Politics. [1.9.1] After this let us speak about virtue and vice, and the fine and the shameful; for these are the targets aimed at by the one who praises and the one who blames. And it will turn out that, in speaking about these things, we shall at the same time be showing the means by which we ourselves will be taken to be persons of a certain character — which was the second kind of proof; for from the same materials we shall be able to make both ourselves and another person trustworthy with respect to virtue. [1.9.2] Since it happens that people often praise, both in earnest and not in earnest, not only a human being or a god but also inanimate things and any chance one of the other animals, we must take up the premises concerning these too in the same way, so let us say something about them as well, for the sake of illustration. [1.9.3] The fine, then, is whatever is choiceworthy in its own right and is also praiseworthy, or whatever, being good, is pleasant because it is good. And if this is what the fine is, then virtue must be fine, since being good it is praiseworthy.

43| [1.9.4] Virtue, as is generally held, is a capacity for providing and preserving good things, and a capacity for doing good in many and great ways — indeed for doing every sort of good in every sphere. [1.9.5] The parts of virtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, greatness of soul, liberality, practical wisdom, wisdom. [1.9.6] The greatest virtues must be those most useful to others, if indeed virtue is a capacity for doing good, and this is why people honor the just and the courageous most of all: courage is useful to others in war, justice both in war and in peace. Then comes liberality; for liberal people give freely and do not compete for money, which other people desire more than anything. [1.9.7] Justice is the virtue through which people have what belongs to them, each as the law assigns; injustice is that through which they have what belongs to others, not as the law assigns. [1.9.8] Courage is that through which people are capable of doing fine deeds amid dangers, as the law commands, and are in service to the law; cowardice is the opposite. [1.9.9] Temperance is the virtue through which people are disposed toward the pleasures of the body as the law commands; licentiousness is the opposite. [1.9.10] Liberality does good with respect to money; illiberality is the opposite. [1.9.11] Greatness of soul is the virtue productive of great acts of benefaction; smallness of soul is the opposite, [1.9.12] and magnificence is the virtue productive of greatness in expenditures; smallness of soul and stinginess are its opposites. [1.9.13] Practical wisdom is a virtue of thought by which people are able to deliberate well about the goods and evils, of the kind already mentioned, that bear on happiness. [1.9.14] So then, about virtue and vice in general, and about their parts, enough has been said for the present occasion; as for the rest, it is not hard to see: for it is clear that the things productive of virtue must be fine, since they tend toward virtue, and so must the things that come from virtue, and such are both the signs of virtue and its works.

44| [1.9.15] Since the signs of virtue, and such things as are the works or affections of a good person, are fine, it follows that whatever are works of courage, or signs of courage, or things done courageously, must be fine, and likewise just acts and things done justly (though not the affections that accompany justice: for in this virtue alone, being treated justly is not always fine — in the case of being penalized, it is more shameful to be penalized justly than unjustly), and the same holds for the other virtues in the same way. [1.9.16] And whatever things have honor as their prize are fine; and whatever things are done for the sake of honor rather than money; and whatever choiceworthy things a person does not do for his own sake, [1.9.17] and things good without qualification — whatever a person has done on behalf of his country while disregarding his own interest — and things good by nature, and things not good for the agent himself: for things of that kind, when they are good for oneself, are done for one's own sake. [1.9.18] And whatever can belong to a person more after death than while living: for what benefits a living person has more the character of being for his own sake. [1.9.19] And whatever deeds are done for the sake of others: for these are less for one's own sake. And whatever good deeds are done toward others rather than toward oneself, and those done toward one's benefactors, for this is just; and acts of benefaction generally, for they are not directed toward oneself. [1.9.20] And the opposites of whatever people are ashamed of: for people are ashamed of shameful things whether they are saying them, doing them, or intending them, just as Sappho showed when, after Alcaeus said, "I want to say something, but shame holds me back" (Alcaeus, fr. 55), she answered: "If you had desire for what is noble or good, and your tongue were not stirring up something base to say, shame would not hold your eyes, but you would speak about what is right" (Sappho, fr. 28).

45| [1.9.21] And whatever things people feel anxious about without fear: for this is what they experience concerning goods that bear on reputation. [1.9.22] And the virtues of those who are by nature more excellent are finer, and so are their works — for example, those of a man rather than those of a woman. [1.9.23] And virtues whose enjoyment falls to others rather than to their possessor are finer: this is why the just, and justice, are fine. [1.9.24] And punishing one's enemies rather than being reconciled with them is fine: for to repay is just, and the just is fine, and not to be defeated is the mark of a courageous man. [1.9.25] And victory and honor are among the fine things: for they are choiceworthy even though they yield no fruit, and they show a superiority of virtue. So are things worth remembering, and the more so the more memorable they are. And things that attend a person after death, and things that honor accompanies, and things that are exceptional, and things that belong to one person alone, are finer: for these are more memorable. [1.9.26] And possessions that bear no fruit are fine: for these are more becoming of a free man. And whatever is peculiar to a given people is fine among them, and whatever is a sign of the things praised among that people — for example, in Sparta it is fine to wear one's hair long, since this is a sign of being free: for it is not easy for a man with long hair to perform any menial task. [1.9.27] And practicing no vulgar craft is fine: for it is the mark of a free man not to live for another's benefit. [1.9.28] One must also take the qualities that lie close to a person's actual qualities as though they were the same, both for praise and for blame — for example, calling the cautious man cold and calculating, or the foolish man good-natured, or the insensitive man gentle, [1.9.29] and each person should always be described in terms of the accompanying qualities taken in their best sense — for example, calling the irritable and hot-tempered man straightforward, and the stubborn man dignified and impressive, and treating those who are in excess as though they possessed the corresponding virtues, for example calling the rash man courageous, and the prodigal man liberal:

46| for this will seem right to most people, and at the same time it involves a fallacy drawn from the cause: for if a man takes risks where there is no necessity, much more would he seem likely to do so where it is fine to do so; and if he is free in giving to people who happen along, he will be so to his friends as well: for it is the excess of virtue to treat everyone well.

47| [1.9.30] One should also consider the audience before whom the praise is given: for as Socrates used to say, it is not hard to praise Athenians among Athenians. One should state what is honored among each people as actually belonging to the subject — for example, among Scythians, or Spartans, or philosophers. And in general one should bring what is honored around to the fine, since it does seem to be closely related to it. [1.9.31] Also whatever accords with what is fitting — for instance, whether the deeds are worthy of the person's ancestors and of what he has previously achieved; for it is a mark of happiness and is fine to add further honor to what one already has. And whether things go beyond what is fitting and toward the better and finer — for example, if in good fortune he is moderate, but in misfortune great-souled, or if as he becomes greater he becomes better and more reasonable. Of this sort is the saying of Iphicrates, "from what to what," and the saying about the Olympic victor, "before, with a rough cloak about his shoulders," and the saying of Simonides, "she who was the daughter and wife and sister of tyrants." [1.9.32] Since praise arises from actions, and it is proper to the serious person to act by choice, one must try to show him acting by choice, and it is useful for him to appear to have done so often; hence one should take even coincidences and strokes of luck as though done by choice, for if many similar instances are brought forward, they will seem a sign of virtue and of choice. [1.9.33] Praise is speech that makes evident the greatness of virtue. So one must display the actions as being of that sort. The encomium concerns the deeds themselves (the surrounding matters serve as proof, for example good birth and upbringing — for it is likely that good people come from good people, and that one so raised will be of that sort); that is why we praise people for what they have done. Deeds are signs of a person's state of character, since we would praise even someone who had not acted, if we believed him to be of that sort.

48| [1.9.34] Calling someone blessed and calling someone happy are the same thing in themselves, but they are not the same as these other things — rather, just as happiness contains virtue, so calling someone happy encompasses these. [1.9.35] Praise and advice have a common form: for the things one would propose in giving advice become encomia when transposed in wording. [1.9.36] Since, then, we possess what one ought to do and what sort of person one ought to be, we must state these as recommendations and transpose and turn them around in wording — for example, that one ought not to be proud of goods that come by luck but of those that come through oneself. Stated this way it functions as a recommendation, but stated this way it becomes praise: "being proud not of goods that belong to him through luck but of those through himself." So whenever you wish to praise, look at what you would recommend, and whenever you wish to recommend, look at what you would praise. [1.9.37] The wording will necessarily be opposite in character when what restrains is transposed into what does not restrain. [1.9.38] One should also make use of many of the devices of amplification — for example, whether he alone, or first, or with few others, or whether he has done what is most notable; for all these things are fine. Also amplification from times and occasions: whether the action was beyond what was fitting for the time. And whether he has succeeded at the same thing often; for that will seem a great thing, and not due to luck but to himself. And if it was because of him that things exhorting and honoring him were invented and established, and if the first encomium ever composed was for him — as for Hippolochus, and for Harmodius and Aristogeiton the statue set up in the marketplace. Likewise too on the opposite side. And if you are not resourceful in praising him on his own merits, compare him with others — which is what Isocrates used to do, because of his lack of practice in forensic pleading. One should compare him with people of reputation, for it is a means of amplification and it is fine if he proves better than serious men.

49| [1.9.39] Amplification naturally falls under praise, for it consists in superiority, and superiority belongs to fine things; hence even if the comparison is not with people of reputation, one should still compare with others, since superiority is thought to indicate virtue. [1.9.40] In general, of the common forms available to all speeches, amplification is most suited to the epideictic (for these speeches take the actions as agreed upon, so what remains is to invest them with greatness and beauty); examples are suited to the deliberative (for we judge future events by divining from things that have already happened); and enthymemes are suited to the forensic (for what has happened, because it is unclear, most admits of a cause and a demonstration). [1.9.41] These, then, are more or less all the sources from which praise and blame are drawn, and the points one must look to in praising and blaming, and the sources from which encomia and reproaches arise. Once one has these, their opposites are evident; for blame is derived from the opposites. [1.10.1] Concerning accusation and defense, it would be next in order to say from how many and what sort of premises one must construct the syllogisms. [1.10.2] One must grasp three things: first, for the sake of what things and how many things people do wrong; second, in what state of mind they themselves are; third, what sort of people they wrong and in what state those people are. [1.10.3] Having defined wrongdoing, then, let us speak next in order. Let wrongdoing be defined as doing harm voluntarily contrary to the law. Law is either particular or common: by particular I mean that written law by which a community is governed; by common I mean all those unwritten laws that seem to be agreed upon among everyone. People act voluntarily in whatever they do knowingly and without being compelled. Now not everything done knowingly is done by choice, but everything done by choice is done knowingly; for no one is ignorant of what he chooses.

50| [1.10.4] The things because of which people choose to do harm and act badly contrary to the law are vice and lack of self-control; for if people have some depravity, one or several, it is in respect to that in which they happen to be depraved that they are also unjust — for example, the ungenerous person in matters of money, the self-indulgent person in bodily pleasures, the soft person in matters of ease, the coward in dangers (for through fear such people abandon those who share the danger with them), the honor-loving person because of honor, the quick-tempered person because of anger, the contentious person because of victory, the bitter person because of revenge, the foolish person because he is deceived about what is just and unjust, the shameless person through contempt for reputation; and likewise each of the others in respect to each of the underlying matters. [1.10.5] But concerning these matters the point is clear, partly from what has been said about the virtues, partly from what will be said about the emotions; what remains is to say for the sake of what, and in what state of mind, people do wrong, and against whom. [1.10.6] First, then, let us distinguish what things people desire and what things they avoid when they set about doing wrong; for clearly the accuser must examine how many and what sort of these belong to his opponent — the things which everyone, in reaching for them, wrongs their neighbors to get — while the defender must examine which and how many of these do not belong to him. [1.10.7] Now everyone does everything either not because of themselves or because of themselves. Of the things not because of themselves, some they do because of luck and some from necessity, and of things from necessity, some by force and some by nature; so that everything people do not because of themselves, they do either from luck or by nature or by force. As for what they do because of themselves, and of which they themselves are the cause, some they do through habit, some through desire — some through rational desire and some through irrational desire.

51| [1.10.8] Wish is desire for the good (for no one wishes for anything except when he thinks it good); the irrational desires are anger and appetite. So that everything people do, they necessarily do through seven causes: through luck, through nature, through force, through habit, through reasoning, through spirited anger, through appetite. [1.10.9] It is superfluous to further divide actions by age, or states of character, or anything else of that kind; for if it happens that the young are prone to anger or to appetite, it is not because of their youth that they do such things, but because of anger and appetite. Nor is it because of wealth and poverty — rather, it happens that the poor desire money because of their need, while the rich desire unnecessary pleasures because of their means; but even these people will act not because of wealth and poverty but because of appetite. Likewise the just and the unjust, and all the others said to act according to their states of character, will act for these same reasons — either through reasoning or through emotion; but some through good characters and emotions, others through the opposite. [1.10.10] It happens, however, that such consequences follow such states of character, and other such consequences follow other such states of character.

52| For it is likely that, immediately, good opinions and appetites concerning pleasant things follow for the temperate person because he is temperate, while the opposite ones concerning these same things follow for the licentious person. [1.10.11] So we should let such distinctions go, and consider instead what kinds of things tend to follow what kinds of people: for if someone is fair or dark, tall or short, none of these traits is fixed to make anything follow from it; but if he is young or old, just or unjust, then it already makes a difference. And in general, whatever among the attending circumstances makes people's characters differ makes a difference — for instance, thinking oneself rich or poor will make some difference, and so will being fortunate or unfortunate. We will discuss these later; for now let us first speak of what remains.

53| [1.10.12] Things come about by chance when their cause is indeterminate, when they do not occur for the sake of anything, and when they happen neither always nor for the most part nor in an orderly way (this is clear from the definition of chance regarding these matters). [1.10.13] Things come about by nature when their cause is in the things themselves and orderly: for they turn out either always or for the most part in the same way. As for what happens contrary to nature, there is no need to be precise about whether it comes about by nature or by some other cause. [1.10.14] Chance too might seem to be a cause of such things. Things come about by force when they occur, through the very agents doing them, contrary to appetite or reasoning. [1.10.15] Things come about by habit when people do them because they have often done them before. [1.10.16] Things come about through reasoning when, out of the goods mentioned, they appear advantageous either as an end or as a means to the end, whenever the act is done because it is advantageous — for even the licentious do some advantageous things, but not because they are advantageous, rather for pleasure. Acts of retribution come about through spirit and anger. [1.10.17] Retribution and punishment differ: punishment is for the sake of the one who suffers it, but retribution is for the sake of the one who inflicts it, so that he may be satisfied.

54| [1.10.18] What anger is will become clear in the discussion of the emotions. Through appetite people do whatever appears pleasant. What is habitual and customary also counts among pleasant things: for many things that are not pleasant by nature come to be done with pleasure once people have grown accustomed to them. So, to put it concisely, everything people do for their own sake is either good or apparently good, or pleasant or apparently pleasant. And since whatever they do for their own sake they do willingly, while whatever is not for their own sake they do unwillingly, everything they do willingly would be either good or apparently good, or pleasant or apparently pleasant. For I count also the removal of evils, or apparent evils, or or the taking of a lesser evil in place of a greater, among goods (for these are in some way choiceworthy), and likewise the removal of painful things, or apparent painful things, or or the taking of lesser pains in place of greater ones, among pleasant things. We must therefore grasp the advantageous and the pleasant — how many kinds there are, and what sort.

55| [1.10.19] Concerning the advantageous, then, we spoke earlier in the discussion of deliberative rhetoric; let us now speak of the pleasant. We should hold that definitions are adequate if they are, for each thing, neither unclear nor overprecise. [1.11.1] Let it be laid down, then, that pleasure is a certain motion of the soul, a sudden and perceptible settling into its underlying nature, and that pain is the opposite. [1.11.2] If pleasure is something of this sort, then clearly whatever produces this disposition is pleasant, and whatever destroys it, or produces the opposite state, is painful. [1.11.3] It is necessary, then, that it be pleasant for the most part to move toward what accords with nature, and especially when things that come about in accordance with a given nature have recovered that nature; and likewise habits are pleasant (for what has become habitual comes to be as if it were already natural: habit is in fact something like nature, since what happens often is close to what happens always, and nature belongs to the always, while habit belongs to the often); [1.11.4] and what is not forced is pleasant (for force is contrary to nature, which is why what is compelled is painful, and it has rightly been said that every compelled thing is by nature distressing) (Euenus, fr. 8) — whereas cares, exertions, and strenuous efforts are painful, since these are compelled and forced unless people have grown accustomed to them; habit, in this way, makes them pleasant. The opposite things are pleasant: which is why idleness, freedom from toil, neglect, play, rest, and sleep are among pleasant things — for none of these involves any compulsion.

56| [1.11.5] And whatever the appetite is set on is entirely pleasant: for appetite is a desire for the pleasant. Of appetites, some are irrational, some accompanied by reason. I call irrational those that people feel without any supposition (these are the ones said to exist by nature, such as those that arise through the body — for instance, the thirst and hunger for nourishment, and for each kind of nourishment a corresponding kind of appetite, and the appetites concerned with tastes, with sexual pleasures, and in general with things touched, and with smell, hearing, and sight). Appetites accompanied by reason are those that people feel as a result of being persuaded: for people desire to see and to acquire many things because they have heard about them and been persuaded. [1.11.6] Since being pleased consists in perceiving some affection, and imagination is a kind of weak perception, some imagination of what he remembers or hopes for will always accompany the person who remembers and the person who hopes; and if this is so, it is clear that pleasures too accompany those who remember and those who hope, inasmuch as perception is also involved. [1.11.7] So it is necessary that all pleasant things be either present, in perception, or past, in memory, or future, in hope: for people perceive present things, remember past things, and hope for future things. [1.11.8] Things remembered are pleasant not only if they were pleasant at the time they were present, but some are pleasant even though they were not pleasant then, if what followed afterward turned out fine and good; hence the saying, "but it is sweet, once safe, to remember hardships" (Euripides, fr. 133), and "a man who has suffered much and accomplished much takes delight even in pains when he remembers them" (Homer, Odyssey 15.400-401).

57| [1.11.9] The reason for this is that it is also pleasant not to have anything bad; and among things hoped for are whatever, if present, would appear to bring great delight or benefit, and to benefit without pain. And in general, whatever things delight when present also, for the most part, delight when hoped for and when remembered. That is why even feeling anger is pleasant, as Homer too composed concerning wrath, that it is "far sweeter than trickling honey" (Homer, Iliad 18.109) — for no one grows angry at someone who appears unable to be made to pay a penalty, and toward those who are far beyond them in power, people either do not grow angry, or grow angry less. [1.11.10] And in most appetites some pleasure follows: for either in remembering how they got something or in hoping that they will get it, people take some pleasure — for instance, those gripped by thirst during fevers take pleasure both in remembering that they drank and in hoping that they will drink. [1.11.11] And those who are in love take pleasure always in talking, writing, and doing something concerning the beloved: for in all such things, by remembering, they think they perceive the beloved, as it were. And this becomes, for everyone, the beginning of love: when they take pleasure not only in the beloved's presence but, remembering, come to love even in the beloved's absence, so that pain is added by the absence; and likewise in mourning and lamentation some pleasure comes over as well: [1.11.12] for the pain lies in the person's not being there, but the pleasure lies in remembering and, in a way, seeing him, and what he did, and what sort of person he was; which is why this too has fittingly been said: "so he spoke, and in all of them he stirred a longing for lamentation" (Homer, Iliad 23.108, Odyssey 4.183).

58| [1.11.13] Also, taking revenge is pleasant. For where failing to get something is painful, getting it is pleasant; and people who are angry are pained beyond measure when they do not get revenge, but they take pleasure when they expect to get it. [1.11.14] Also winning is pleasant, not only for those who love to win but for everyone; for an impression of superiority arises, which everyone desires, whether mildly or intensely. [1.11.15] Since winning is pleasant, it follows that competitive and contentious games must be pleasant too (for winning often occurs in them), and so must dice-games, ball-games, games of chance, and board games. And the same holds for serious contests as well: some become pleasant when one is practiced in them, while others are pleasant right away, such as hunting and every kind of chase; for wherever there is a contest, there is also victory; that is why forensic pleading and disputation are pleasant to those who are accustomed to them and capable at them. [1.11.16] Also honor and good reputation are among the most pleasant things, because each person gets the impression that he is the sort of man the good man is — and all the more when those who say so are people he thinks tell the truth. And such are those near at hand rather than those far off, and one's intimates and fellow-citizens rather than strangers, and people alive now rather than those to come, and the sensible rather than the senseless, and the many rather than the few; for it is more likely that the people just named will tell the truth than their opposites. Since, in the case of people one thoroughly despises, such as children or animals, one cares nothing for their honor or their opinion, for the sake of the opinion itself, but if at all, for some other reason. [1.11.17] Also a friend is among the pleasant things; for loving is pleasant (no one is fond of wine without taking pleasure in wine), and being loved is pleasant too; for here too there arises an impression that one possesses the good, something everyone who perceives it desires; and being loved is being cherished for one's own sake.

59| [1.11.18] Also being admired is pleasant, for the same reason as being honored. And being flattered, and the flatterer, are pleasant; for the flatterer appears to be an admirer and appears to be a friend. [1.11.19] Also doing the same things often is pleasant; for what is habitual was found to be pleasant. [1.11.20] Also change is pleasant; for changing accords with nature: doing the same thing continuously produces an excess of the established state, which is why it has been said, "change in all things is sweet" (Euripides, Orestes 234). That is why things that come only after an interval are pleasant, both people and affairs; for there is change from the present state, and at the same time what comes only after an interval is also rare. [1.11.21] Also learning and admiring are, for the most part, pleasant; for in admiring there is a desire to learn, so that the admirable is an object of desire, while in learning there is a settling into one's natural state. [1.11.22] Also doing well by others and having good done to one are among the pleasant things; for having good done to one is getting what one desires, and doing well by others is possessing and being superior, both of which people aim at. And because doing good is pleasant, it is also pleasant for people to set their neighbors right and to complete what is deficient in them. [1.11.23] Since learning and admiring are pleasant, things of the following kind must also be pleasant: whatever is imitative, such as painting, sculpture, and poetry, and everything that has been well imitated, even if the thing imitated is not itself pleasant; for one does not take pleasure in the object itself, but there is an inference that this is that, so that learning something occurs.

60| [1.11.24] Also reversals of fortune, and narrow escapes from danger, are pleasant; for all these things are admirable. [1.11.25] And since what accords with nature is pleasant, and things of the same kind are naturally akin to one another, all things akin and alike are, for the most part, pleasant — man to man, horse to horse, young to young; that is why the proverbs have been said, such as "age delights age," and "like always to like," and "beast knew beast," and "jackdaw beside jackdaw," and all the other such sayings. [1.11.26] And since what is like and akin is in every case pleasant to itself, and each person is affected this way most of all toward himself, it necessarily follows that everyone is self-loving, either more or less; for all such things belong most of all in relation to oneself. And since everyone is self-loving, one's own things must also be pleasant to everyone, such as one's works and words; that is why people are, for the most part, fond of flatterers, fond of lovers, fond of honor, and fond of their children; for children are their own work. And completing what is deficient is pleasant, [1.11.27] for it is already becoming one's own work. And since ruling is most pleasant, seeming to be wise is also pleasant; for practical intelligence is a capacity to rule, and wisdom is knowledge of many admirable things. Further, since people are, for the most part, fond of honor, it follows that finding fault with those nearby is pleasant, and so is ruling, [1.11.28] and spending time in that activity in which one seems to be best at himself, just as the poet says: "and he presses on toward this, allotting the greatest part of each day to that in which he happens to be best at himself" (Euripides, fr. 183).

61| [1.11.29] Likewise, since play is among the pleasant things, and so is all relaxation, and laughter is among the pleasant things, laughable things must also be pleasant — people, speeches, and deeds alike; the subject of the laughable has been distinguished separately in the works on poetics. Let this much be said, then, about pleasant things; painful things are evident from their opposites. [1.12.1] These, then, are the things for the sake of which people commit injustice; let us now say in what state of mind, and against whom, they do so. People themselves commit injustice whenever they think it possible for the act to be done, and possible for themselves to do it — and then, if it is done, either that it will escape notice, or that if it does not escape notice they will not pay the penalty, or that if they do pay it, the penalty will be less than the gain to themselves or to those they care about. [1.12.2] What sort of things appear possible and what impossible will be stated later (for this is common to all speeches); but people think they are most able to commit injustice without penalty if they are capable speakers, practical men, experienced in many contests, and if they have many friends or are wealthy. [1.12.3] And they think they are most able if they themselves possess the qualities just mentioned; and if not, if they have friends, servants, or associates of that sort; for through these they are able both to act, to escape notice, and to avoid paying the penalty. [1.12.4] Also if they are friends with those they wrong, or with the judges; for friends are unguarded against being wronged and are reconciled beforehand rather than pursuing the matter, while judges favor those who are their friends, and either acquit them altogether or impose small penalties.

62| [1.12.5] Likely to escape notice are those whose character is opposite to the charge — for example, weak men in a charge of assault, and a poor man or an ugly man in a charge of adultery — and acts done too much out in the open and before everyone's eyes; for these go unguarded against because no one at all would think them likely. [1.12.6] Also acts so great, and of such a kind, as no single person would commit; for these too go unguarded against: for everyone guards against the usual kinds of wrongdoing, just as against the usual kinds of illness, but no one takes precautions against an illness no one has ever yet had. [1.12.7] Also those who have no enemies, or many; the former think they will escape notice because no one is on guard, the latter escape notice because no one would think they would attempt it against people who are on guard, and because they can offer the defense that they would not have attempted it. [1.12.8] Also those who have means of concealment, whether in manner or in place, or resourceful circumstances. And those who, even if they do not escape notice, have a way to deflect the suit, or to delay it in time, or to corrupt the judges. And those who, if a penalty is imposed, have a way to deflect the payment, or a long delay, or who, through poverty, have nothing to lose. [1.12.9] Also those for whom the gains are evident, or great, or near at hand, while the penalties are small, or unclear, or far off. And a person for whom the punishment is not equal to the advantage, as seems to be the case with tyranny. [1.12.10] Also those for whom the wrongdoings are gains, while the penalties are mere reproaches. And, conversely, those for whom the wrongdoings lead to a kind of praise — as happened, for example, when someone at the same time avenged his father or mother, as with Zeno — while the penalties are fines, exile, or something of the sort; for people commit injustice on account of both these motives and while in both these states of mind, though not the same people in each case, but people of opposite characters.

63| [1.12.11] And those who have often escaped detection or gone unpunished, and those who have often failed (for there are some who, even in such matters, are like men in war, capable of fighting back again). [1.12.12] And those for whom the pleasure is immediate and the pain later, or the gain immediate and the loss later; for the lacking-in-self-control are of this sort, and lack of self-control extends to everything people desire. [1.12.13] And those for whom, conversely, the pain or the loss is already present, but the pleasure and the benefit come later and last longer; for the self-controlled and the more prudent pursue such things. [1.12.14] And those for whom it is possible to seem to have acted through chance, or through necessity, or through nature, or through habit, and in general to have made a mistake rather than committed injustice. [1.12.15] And those for whom it is possible to meet with fairness. And all who are in need; and people are in need in two ways: either of what is necessary, as the poor are, or of what is in excess, as the rich are. [1.12.16] And those held in very high repute, and those in very low repute — the former because they will not be suspected, the latter because their reputation will be no worse for it. [1.12.17] Those, then, who are in such a condition attempt to commit injustice, and they wrong such people and in such ways: those who have what they themselves lack, whether for necessities, for superiority, or for enjoyment, [1.12.18] and both those who are far away and those who are near; for with the former the seizing is quick, and with the latter the retaliation is slow — as with those who plunder the Carthaginians. [1.12.19] And those who are not cautious or watchful but trusting; for it is easy to escape the notice of all such people. And the easygoing; for pursuing a wrong to the end takes diligence. And the bashful; for they are not combative over gain.

64| [1.12.20] And those who have been wronged by many and have not pursued redress, being, as the proverb says, 'spoil of the Mysians.' [1.12.21] And those who have never yet been wronged and those who have been wronged often; for both are unguarded, the former because they think it will never happen, the latter because they think it will not happen again. [1.12.22] And those who have been slandered or are easy to slander; for such people neither choose to pursue redress, fearing the judges, nor are able to persuade them, since they are hated and envied. [1.12.23] And those against whom they have a pretext, whether of ancestors, or themselves, or friends, having done wrong or being about to do wrong, either to themselves, or to their ancestors, or to those they care for; for as the proverb says, wickedness needs only a pretext. [1.12.24] And both enemies and friends; for wronging the former is easy, and wronging the latter is pleasant. And those without friends. And those who are not skilled in speaking or in acting; for either they do not attempt to pursue the matter to the end, or they come to a settlement, or they accomplish nothing. [1.12.25] And those for whom it is not profitable to spend time waiting on a trial or on compensation, such as foreigners and men who work with their own hands; for they settle for a small amount and are easily brought to drop the matter. [1.12.26] And those who have themselves committed many wrongs, or wrongs of the same kind as they are now suffering; for it seems close to not being unjust at all when someone suffers a wrong of just the sort he himself was accustomed to commit — I mean, for example, if someone should assault a man who was in the habit of committing outrage against others. [1.12.27] And those who have done harm, or wished to, or wish to, or will do so; for this carries both pleasure and nobility, and appears close to not being unjust. [1.12.28] And those by wronging whom they will do a favor — to friends, or to people they admire, or to their beloved, or to their masters, or in general to those on whom their own lives depend.

65| [1.12.29] And those from whom it is possible to obtain fair treatment afterward. And those against whom they have already brought a charge and already come to a settlement, as Callippus did in the affair concerning Dion; for such actions too appear close to not being unjust. [1.12.30] And those who are about to be wronged by others anyway, if not by themselves, on the ground that there is no longer any chance to deliberate about it — as Aenesidemus is said to have sent cottabus-prizes to Gelon after he had enslaved a city, because Gelon had gotten there first, when Aenesidemus himself had also been about to do it. [1.12.31] And those whom, by wronging, they will be able to do many just things, on the ground that they will easily make it right — as Jason the Thessalian said that one must commit some injustices in order to be able to do many just things as well. [1.12.32] And the wrongs that everyone, or many people, are in the habit of committing; for they think they will meet with pardon. [1.12.33] And wrongs that are easy to hide; such are things that are quickly used up, like foodstuffs, or things easily altered in shape, color, or blend, or things that there are many ways to make disappear; [1.12.34] such are things that are easy to carry off and that can be made to vanish in small spaces. [1.12.35] And things of which the wrongdoer already had many indistinguishable and similar ones beforehand. And wrongs that those who suffer them are ashamed to speak of, such as outrages against the women of their own household, or against themselves, or against their sons. And wrongs of a kind that pursuing them at law would make the one pursuing them seem litigious; such are petty matters, and ones for which pardon is customary.

66| In what condition, then, people are when they commit injustice, and what kinds of wrongs, and against what kinds of people, and for what reasons — these are, roughly speaking, the answers. [1.13.1] Let us now divide up all acts of injustice and all just acts, beginning first from this point. Just and unjust acts are defined, then, in relation to two kinds of law, and in relation to the persons concerned, in two ways. [1.13.2] By law I mean, on the one hand, the particular law, and on the other, the common law. The particular law is the one each community has defined for itself, and this in turn is partly unwritten, partly written; the common law is the law that accords with nature. For there is something that everyone divines, a naturally common sense of justice and injustice, even where there is no association or agreement between people — as Sophocles' Antigone appears to say, that it is just to bury Polyneices though it has been forbidden, on the ground that this is just by nature: 'for it is not a thing of today or yesterday, but lives forever, and no one knows from where it appeared' (Sophocles, Antigone 456-457). And as Empedocles speaks about not killing what has life: for this is not just for some and not just for others, but 'the law for all extends, through the wide-ruling air continuously, and through the boundless light.' And as Alcidamas says in his Messeniacus: 'God has left all men free; nature has made no one a slave.'

67| [1.13.3] As for the persons concerned, the division is twofold: for what must be done and not done has been defined either in relation to the community as a whole or in relation to one member of the community; hence it is possible to commit injustice and to act justly in two ways — either toward one definite individual or toward the community. For the adulterer and the man who strikes another wrongs some definite individual, while the man who fails to do military service wrongs the community. [1.13.4] Now that all acts of injustice have been divided, some being against the community and others against another individual or individuals, let us go back and say what being wronged is. [1.13.5] Being wronged, then, is suffering unjust treatment at the hands of someone acting voluntarily; for committing injustice has already been defined as being voluntary. [1.13.6] And since the one wronged must necessarily be harmed, and harmed by an act done voluntarily, the kinds of harm are clear from what was said before; for the things good and bad in themselves have already been discussed, and likewise voluntary acts, namely that they are whatever is done knowingly, [1.13.7] so that all accusations must necessarily be either against the community or against an individual, and must involve either someone ignorant and unwilling, or someone acting willingly and knowingly, and of these latter, some done by deliberate choice, others because of emotion.

68| [1.13.8] Spirit, then, will be discussed in the section on the emotions; but what kinds of things people choose, and in what state of mind, has already been discussed earlier. [1.13.9] But since people often admit to having done the act itself, yet do not admit to the charge as formally stated, or to what the charge is really about — for example, admitting to taking something but not to theft, to having struck first but not to committing outrage, to having had intercourse but not to adultery, to theft but not to temple-robbery (since it was not something belonging to a god), to farming another's land but not to encroaching on public land, to having conferred with the enemy but not to treason — because of this it would be necessary to have defined these terms as well: what theft is, what outrage is, what adultery is, so that, whether we wish to show that the charge applies or that it does not apply, we may be able to make the just state of the case clear.

69| [1.13.10] All disputes of this kind concern whether an act is unjust and base, or not unjust; for the wickedness and the injustice lie in the choice, and words of this sort signify the choice in addition — for example, "insolence" and "theft." For striking someone is not in every case insolence, but only if it is done for some purpose, such as to dishonor the man struck or to gratify oneself. Nor is taking something secretly in every case theft, but only if it is done to harm the person from whom it was taken and to appropriate the thing for oneself. The same holds for the other cases as for these. [1.13.11] Now since there are two kinds of just and unjust acts (some are written, others unwritten), what the laws speak of has been discussed; of the unwritten kind there are two kinds. [1.13.12] These are: the one kind concerns excess of virtue and vice, for which there is reproach and praise, dishonor and honor, and gifts of gratitude (for example, being grateful to a benefactor and repaying a benefactor's kindness, being ready to help one's friends, and other things of that sort); the other kind is what is lacking in the particular written law. [1.13.13] For what is equitable seems to be just, and the equitable is what is just apart from the written law. This comes about sometimes with the lawgivers' consent and sometimes without it: without it when it escapes their notice, with it when they are unable to draw the distinction but it is necessary to speak universally, though the case is not in fact universal but holds for the most part; and also in cases not easy to distinguish because of their indefinite variety — for example, how large and what kind of iron weapon must be used to wound someone: a lifetime would not suffice to enumerate them all.

70| [1.13.14] If, then, the matter is indefinite but a law must be laid down, it is necessary to speak simply — so that if a man wearing a ring raises his hand or strikes someone, according to the written law he is guilty and commits injustice, but in truth he commits no injustice; and this is what the equitable is. [1.13.15] If the equitable is what has just been described, it is clear what sorts of things are equitable and what are not, and what sorts of people are not equitable. [1.13.16] Cases that call for pardon are equitable; and it is equitable not to judge errors and injustices as deserving the same penalty, nor errors and misfortunes either. Misfortunes are things that are contrary to reasonable expectation and not from wickedness; errors are things that are not contrary to reasonable expectation but also not from depravity; injustices are things that are neither contrary to reasonable expectation and are from depravity — for acts done through appetite are from depravity. [1.13.17] And it is equitable to forgive human failings. And it is equitable to look not to the law but to the lawgiver, and not to the letter but to the intention of the lawgiver, and not to the act but to the choice behind it, [1.13.18] and not to the part but to the whole, and not to what a man is now but to what he has always been, or has been for the most part. And it is equitable to remember the good one has received rather than the harm, and the good one has received rather than the good one has done. And it is equitable to bear being wronged. And it is equitable to be willing to have a matter judged by argument rather than by force. And it is equitable to be willing to go to arbitration rather than to a lawsuit —

71| [1.13.19] for the arbitrator looks to what is equitable, while the judge looks to the law; and it was for this purpose that arbitration was devised, so that what is equitable might prevail. Let this, then, be our account of what is equitable. [1.14.1] An act of injustice is greater the greater the injustice it proceeds from; hence the smallest acts can be the greatest — for example, the charge Callistratus brought against Melanopus, that he cheated the temple-builders of three half-obols of sacred money; the opposite holds with justice. These cases are judged by what is implicit in the capacity involved: a man who has stolen three sacred half-obols would commit any injustice whatever. So sometimes the greater injustice is judged in this way, and sometimes it is judged by the harm done. [1.14.2] An injustice is greater when no punishment is equal to it, but every punishment falls short of it. And greater when there is no remedy for it, for it is difficult and impossible (text corrupt here). And greater when the victim has no way to obtain redress, for then it is incurable; for judicial penalty and correction are a kind of remedy. [1.14.3] And greater if the one who suffered the wrong punished himself severely as a result; for then the one who did the wrong deserves to be punished still more severely — as when Sophocles, speaking as advocate for Euctemon, said, after Euctemon had cut his own throat because of the insult done to him, that he would not set the penalty at less than the victim had set for himself. [1.14.4] And an injustice is greater if the man committed it alone, or first, or along with only a few others. And repeating the same offense many times is a great matter. And greater is the offense on account of which preventive and punitive measures have been sought out and found — for example, at Argos a man is fined on account of whom a law was enacted, and on account of whom the prison was built. [1.14.5] And the more bestial an act of injustice is, the greater it is. And an act done more from premeditation is greater. And an act is greater when those who hear of it feel fear rather than pity. And rhetorically effective points of this kind are: that the offender has violated or overstepped many things — oaths, pledges of good faith, sworn assurances, marriage-ties; for this is an accumulation of many injustices.

72| [1.14.6] And an injustice is greater when it is committed in the very place where wrongdoers are punished — which is what perjurers do; for where would they not commit injustice, if they do it even in the courtroom itself? And greater when it concerns matters of the greatest shame. And greater if it is done against the very person from whom one has received benefit; for then he commits a double injustice — both by doing harm and by failing to repay good with good. [1.14.7] And greater is an act contrary to the unwritten principles of justice; for it is the mark of a better man to be just without compulsion — and the written laws involve compulsion, while the unwritten do not. But looked at another way, an act against the written laws is greater; for a man who commits injustice where the penalties are fearful and heavy would also commit it where there is no penalty at all. So much, then, has been said about the greater and lesser degree of injustice. [1.15.1] It follows next, after what has been said, to run briefly through the so-called non-technical means of persuasion; for these belong specifically to forensic speeches. [1.15.2] They are five in number: laws, witnesses, contracts, evidence given under torture, and oaths. [1.15.3] Let us speak first, then, about laws, and how they should be used both when urging and dissuading, and when accusing and defending. [1.15.4] For it is clear that, if the written law is opposed to one's case, one must appeal to the universal law and to what is more equitable and more just. [1.15.5] And one must argue that this is exactly what judging by one's best understanding means — not adhering entirely to the written laws. [1.15.6] And one must argue that what is equitable always remains and never changes, nor does the universal law (for it is according to nature), while written laws often do change — which is why the lines in Sophocles' Antigone have been quoted: she defends herself by saying that she buried her brother in violation of Creon's law, but not in violation of the unwritten law — "for this is not a thing of today or yesterday, but lives always, and no one knows from where it appeared. These, then, I was not about to..." (text breaks off; Antigone 456, 458).

73| [1.15.7] And one must argue that what is just is what is true and beneficial, not what merely appears so, so that the written law is not really law at all — for it does not perform the function that law is meant to perform. And that the judge is like an assayer of silver, whose task is to distinguish counterfeit justice from genuine. [1.15.8] And that it is the mark of a better man to make use of and abide by the unwritten laws rather than the written ones. [1.15.9] And if the law is somewhere opposed to another law held in good repute, or even to itself — as sometimes one law commands that whatever people agree to among themselves shall be binding, while another law forbids making agreements contrary to the law. [1.15.10] And if the law is ambiguous, one must turn it about and examine which interpretation fits justice or advantage, and then make use of that one. [1.15.11] And if the circumstances for which the law was laid down no longer exist while the law itself still stands, one must try to point this out and to combat the law on this ground. [1.15.12] But if the written law favors one's case, one must say that the "best understanding" clause does not mean judging in defiance of the law, but only so that, if one is ignorant of what the law says, one will not perjure oneself. And that no one chooses the good in an unqualified sense, but only what is good for himself. And that it makes no difference whether a law is not enacted or is not applied. And that in the other crafts there is no profit in trying to outsmart the doctor; for the doctor's mistake does not do as much harm as the habit of disobeying the person in authority does. And that seeking to be wiser than the laws is exactly what is forbidden in the laws that are held in high esteem. Let this, then, be our account of the laws.

74| [1.15.13] Concerning witnesses: there are two kinds, the old and the recent, and of these some share in the risk of the trial and some are outside it. By "old" I mean the poets and any other well-known people whose judgments are a matter of public record — for example the Athenians used Homer as a witness concerning Salamis, and the Tenedians recently used Periander of Corinth against the Sigeans, and Cleophon used Solon's elegiac verses against Critias, saying that the house had long been given to outrage: for Solon would never have written the words "tell red-haired Critias to obey his father" (Solon, fragment 22). [1.15.14] Such witnesses, then, testify about things that have happened; but concerning things that will happen, the interpreters of oracles also testify — for example Themistocles, in maintaining that they must fight at sea, on the ground that the "wooden wall" meant this. Further, proverbs, as has been said, are also testimonies — for example if someone advises against making an old man a friend, the proverb testifies for him: "never do a favor to an old man," and likewise the proverb about destroying the sons of those whose fathers one has destroyed: "foolish is he who kills the father and leaves the sons alive." [1.15.15] Recent witnesses are those well-known people who have rendered some judgment; for their judgments are useful to those disputing about the same matters — for example Eubulus, in the courts, used against Chares what Plato said to Archibius, that it had become common in the city to admit to being wicked. [1.15.16] And so too are those who share in the risk of the trial, if they seem to be lying. Such witnesses, then, testify only to this: whether something happened or not, whether it is the case or not; but they are not witnesses as to its quality — for example whether it is just or unjust, advantageous or disadvantageous.

75| [1.15.17] Those far removed in time are more trustworthy about these matters, and the oldest are the most trustworthy of all, since they cannot be corrupted. As grounds for establishing credibility about testimony: for one who has no witnesses, that one must judge from probabilities, and that this is what is meant by "the best judgment," and that probabilities cannot be bribed with money, and that probabilities are never convicted of false witness; for one who has witnesses, against one who does not, that probabilities are not liable to prosecution, and that there would be no need of testimony at all if it were sufficient to examine the matter from arguments alone. [1.15.18] Testimonies are of two kinds: those concerning oneself and those concerning one's opponent, and again those concerning the fact and those concerning character; so that it is clear one can never be at a loss for useful testimony. For if there is none bearing on the fact, either agreeing with oneself or opposed to one's opponent, still there is testimony about character, either to one's own decency or to the opponent's baseness. [1.15.19] The other points about a witness — whether he is a friend or an enemy or neither, whether he is well-regarded or discredited or neither, and all other such distinctions — must be argued from the same topics from which we derive our enthymemes. [1.15.20] Concerning contracts, the use of argument extends only this far: to amplifying or diminishing their force, or to making them credible or incredible — credible and binding if they favor one's own case, the opposite if they favor the opponent.

76| [1.15.21] For making them credible or incredible, the treatment is no different from that concerning witnesses; for contracts are credible in proportion to the character of those who put their names to them or hold them in keeping. Given that the existence of the contract is admitted, then if it is favorable to one's own case one must amplify it: for a contract is a kind of private and particular law, and it is not contracts that give the law its authority, but laws that give authority to contracts made according to law, and in general the law itself is a kind of contract, so that whoever distrusts or does away with a contract does away with the laws.

77| [1.15.22] Further, most transactions, including voluntary ones, are carried out by means of contracts, so that if contracts are rendered void, the dealings people have with one another are destroyed. And the other points that fit here can be seen readily on the surface. [1.15.23] But if the contract is against one's own case, then, together with one's opponents, first: whatever arguments one would use against an unfavorable law are appropriate here too — for it is absurd that we think we need not obey laws if they have not been rightly framed and their framers erred, while we must obey contracts regardless. [1.15.24] Next: that the judge is an arbiter of what is just, so it is not this that he must consider, but rather what is more just. [1.15.25] And what is just cannot be turned aside either by deceit or by force, since it exists by nature, whereas contracts are made even by those who have been deceived or compelled. Besides this, one must consider whether the contract is contrary to any of the written laws, either one's own or a foreign city's, or to the common laws, and further whether it conflicts with other contracts, later or earlier ones: for either the later ones are authoritative and the earlier ones void, or the earlier ones are correct and the later ones the product of deception — whichever way serves. One should also look to advantage, to see whether the contract in any way runs contrary to the judges' interest, and to any other such point.

78| for these too are equally easy to discern. [1.15.26] Testimony under torture is a kind of testimony, and it is thought to carry credibility because a certain compulsion attends it. It is not difficult, then, to say what is available about this too: if the results are favorable to one's own case, one may amplify them, saying that these alone among testimonies are true; but if they are contrary and favor the opponent, one may refute them by telling the truth about the whole class of such testimony — that people under compulsion tell falsehoods no less than truths, some holding firm and refusing to tell the truth, others readily making false accusations in the hope of being let off sooner. One should be ready to cite, as examples, actual cases of this kind known to the judges. One must say that testimony under torture is not true: for many thick-witted and tough-skinned people, being strong of soul, bear up nobly under compulsion, while cowardly and cautious people lose their nerve even before seeing the instruments of compulsion — so that nothing in testimony under torture is to be trusted.

79| [1.15.27] Concerning oaths, a fourfold division is possible: either one both offers and accepts an oath, or neither, or one but not the other — and of these, either one offers but does not accept, or accepts but does not offer. Further, apart from these, there is the question whether this man has already been put under oath by himself or by the other party. [1.15.28] One does not offer an oath: because people readily perjure themselves, and because the one who has sworn does not pay up afterward, while the one who declines thinks he will win his verdict against those who have not sworn, and because this risk — the one before the judges — is the stronger, for he trusts the judges but not the other man. [1.15.29] One does not accept an oath: because the oath is offered in place of money, and because, if he were a base man, he would already have sworn falsely — for it would have been better to be base for some gain than for nothing; so if he swears he will keep the money, but if he does not swear he will not, and thus his refusal would be due to virtue, not to fear of perjury. And Xenophanes' remark fits here, that this is not an equal challenge as between an impious man and a pious one, but is like a strong man challenging a weak one to strike or be struck. [1.15.30] If he does accept an oath: that he trusts himself but not the other man. And one should turn Xenophanes' saying around and say that it would be equal in this way instead: if the impious man offers the oath and the pious man swears it.

80| it is a terrible thing for him himself to be unwilling, when it is on the strength of an oath sworn by others that he asks the judges to render their verdict. [1.15.31] If he does offer an oath: that it is pious to be willing to entrust the matter to the gods, and that he has no need of other judges, since he gives the decision to them. [1.15.32] And that it is absurd not to be willing to swear about the very things concerning which he asks others to swear. Since it is clear from each of these how one should argue, it is also clear how one should argue when cases are combined — for example if he himself is willing to accept an oath but not to offer one, or if he offers but is unwilling to accept, or if he is willing to do both, or neither: for the combination must necessarily be built up out of what has been said, so that the arguments too must be built up out of what has been said. And if an oath has been sworn by himself and turns out contrary to his case: that this is not perjury, for wrongdoing is voluntary, and perjury is wrongdoing, but what is done under force or deceit is involuntary. [1.15.33] Here, then, one must also bring in the point that perjury lies in the intention, not in the utterance of the mouth. But if the oath is contrary to the opponent's case and he too has sworn it: that he does away with everything by not abiding by what he swore — for it is precisely on this basis that people also make use of the laws once they have sworn to observe them. And: you demand that we abide by what we have sworn when we sit in judgment, yet they themselves do not abide by it. And whatever else one might say to amplify the point. So much, then, for the non-technical means of persuasion.

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