Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language
1| Book 18: Problems Concerning Argument Why is it that sleep overtakes some people as soon as they begin to read, even against their will, while others, though wanting to stay awake beforehand, find that picking up the book keeps them awake...? Is it because those who have breath-like movements on account of a coldness of nature, or of melancholic humors — through which an undigested breath-like residue is produced on account of the coldness — in these people, when the thinking is in motion and does not settle on anything by fixing on it, it is knocked out by the other motion, which is a cooling one, and this is why they fall asleep the more. But when they fix their thinking on something, which is what reading does, they are moved by the heating motion, which is not knocked out by anything, so that they cannot sleep. But in those whose condition is natural, when the thinking comes to rest on one thing and does not shift about in many directions, being at its strongest, the other things too that are in that region come to a halt, and sleep is the settling-down of these. But when the intellect comes to rest and grows as it were weary, it weighs down the head, being located in it, and produces sleep. But when the soul is in motion according to nature, it does not sleep; for then it is most alive. And being awake is a cause of life more than sleeping is. Why are contentious arguments good exercise? Is it because they frequently involve winning or losing? So they immediately make people fond of victory; for those who are winning are drawn on to dispute further because they enjoy it, and those who are losing do so as intending to get their own back. And it is the same with people in other contests too; this is why, even when fighting and getting the worse of it, they are often unwilling to break off.
2| Why do people enjoy examples in speeches and arguments more than enthymemes? Is it because they enjoy both learning and learning quickly? And they learn more easily by means of examples and stories; for the things they already know are these particular cases, whereas enthymemes are demonstrations from universals, which we know less well than particulars. Further, the more witnesses there are to something, the more we believe it, and examples and stories are like testimonies; and convictions produced through witnesses are easy ones. Further, people learn what is similar with pleasure, and the example and fables show what is similar. Why do we call an orator, a general, and a moneymaker "clever," but not a flute-player or an actor? Is it because the capacity of the latter is without a view to gain (for it aims at pleasure), while that of the former is directed at gain? For a good orator, general, or moneymaker is one able to have more, and cleverness lies especially in getting the advantage. Why do people think the philosopher differs from the orator? Is it because the one deals with what injustice is, the other with how so-and-so is unjust; and the one, that so-and-so is a tyrant, the other with what tyranny is.
3| Why is it that people spend their time on the things they have chosen, even when these are trivial, more than on the more serious ones? For instance, someone who has chosen these pursuits would rather be a conjuror or a mime-actor or a pipe-player than an astronomer or an orator. Is it because some people want to engage with the most serious things, but because they do not trust themselves to be capable of it, they do not act on this for that reason? Or is it because each person chooses the things in which he thinks himself to excel? And whatever a person chooses, toward this too he will press on, devoting the greatest part of his day to it, so that he himself may turn out to be best at it. And whatever people choose from the start, and whatever they become habituated to, they are no longer even able to judge what is better; for their thinking has been corrupted by base choices.
4| Why is it that sleep overtakes some people as soon as they begin to read, even against their will, while for those who do [not] wish it, it makes them able to stay awake, when they pick up a book? Is it because those who have breath-like movements on account of a coldness of nature, or of melancholic humors — through which an undigested breath-like residue is produced on account of the coldness — in these people, when the thinking is in motion and does not settle on anything by fixing on it, the other motion is knocked out, and this is why, shifting their thinking about a great deal, they fall asleep the more; for the breath-like motion is overcome. But when they fix their thinking on something, which is what reading does, they are moved by the breath-like motion, which is not knocked out by anything, so that they cannot sleep. But in those whose condition is natural, when the thinking comes to rest on one thing and does not shift about in many directions, the other things too that are in that region come to a halt, and sleep is the settling-down of these. For when one governing thing comes to a halt, just as in a rout, the other parts too are naturally disposed to come to a halt. For by nature the light is carried upward, and the heavy downward. So when the soul is in motion according to nature, it does not sleep; for that is its condition. But when it comes to a halt and grows as it were weary, the intellect changes, and the bodily elements, going upward toward the head, produce sleep. Reading might seem to prevent sleep. But this is not on account of thinking — for the soul is at that point more determinate — but the wakefulness is on account of the shifting about, since there are also acts of thinking of the following kind that are sleep-preventing: those in which the soul searches and is at a loss, but not those in which it continuously contemplates; for the former make it indeterminate, but the latter do not.
5| Why is there no idle rambling in contentious arguments? Is it because a contentious argument is an apparent syllogism, and a syllogism proceeds in few steps; and if it is drawn out, as time passes the fallacy becomes evident, and it is possible to take back what one has conceded. Why is it that we listen with more pleasure to accounts organized around one thing than to those elaborated about many things? Is it because we attend more to, and take more pleasure in hearing, the things that are more knowable; and what is determinate is more knowable than what is indeterminate. Now the one is determinate, but the many partake of the unlimited. Why do we take pleasure in hearing things that are neither too old nor entirely new? Is it because we distrust the things far removed from us, and we take no pleasure in the things we distrust; while as for the things we still as it were perceive, we take no pleasure in hearing about these either.