Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language
1| BOOK 29. PROBLEMS CONCERNING JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE Why is it that, although the wrongdoing is greater when someone damages a greater good, and honor is a greater good than money, injustice in matters of money nevertheless seems worse, and unjust people are thought to be unjust especially with regard to money? Is it because people choose money over honor, and money is the most common thing of all, while honor belongs to few, and the use of it occurs only rarely?
2| Why is it more terrible to withhold a deposit than a loan? Is it because it is shameful to wrong a friend? Now the person who withholds a deposit wrongs a friend, for no one entrusts a deposit to someone he does not trust. But the person to whom the loan belongs is not a friend, for one does not lend to a friend, if he is a friend, but gives outright. Or is it because the wrongdoing is greater? For in addition to the loss, he also violates the trust for the sake of which, if for no other reason, one ought to abstain from wrongdoing. Further, it is base not to requite like with like: the one party gave as to a friend, but the other took the deposit away as from an enemy, whereas the lender did not give as a friend. Further, in the one case the giving is for the sake of safekeeping and return, in the other for the sake of profit as well; and we are less indignant at a loss if we were angling for gain, as fishermen are over their bait, for there the risk is evident beforehand. Further, it is generally people who are being plotted against and who are unfortunate who make deposits, while it is people who are well off who lend; and it is more terrible to wrong the unfortunate person than the fortunate one. Why do some courts vote more by the evidence of family relation than by wills? Is it because it is not possible to lie falsely about one's family, but only to declare what actually is the case, whereas many wills have already been proven false?
3| Why is poverty found among decent people rather than among base ones? Is it because, hated and driven out by everyone, it takes refuge with the reasonable, thinking that it will find safety and endurance especially among them? For if it went to wicked men, they would not remain in the same condition but would turn to stealing or plundering, and once this happened poverty would no longer be present among them. Or is it because poverty thinks that decent people would make the best use of it, and would be least likely to treat it with outrage? So just as people place deposits of money with decent men, in the same way poverty arranges things on its own behalf. Or is it because, being female, it is more helpless, and so needs decent men? Or is it because, being itself an evil, it would not go to what is evil — for if it chose what is evil, it would be altogether incurable? Why are acts of injustice not proportionately greater in the case of words as in other cases — for instance, a man who reveals a small secret would not necessarily reveal one that must not be told at all, whereas a man who betrays one person will also betray a city, just as the man who steals an obol will also steal a talent? Is it because in some cases a lesser injustice results from a greater one only because of an inability to do more?
4| Why is it more shameful to defraud someone of a small deposit than to default after borrowing a large sum? Is it because the man who withholds a deposit deceives the person who took him to be decent? Or is it because the man who would do the one would also do the other? Why is man, who has the largest share of education of all animals, the most unjust of all? Is it because he has the largest share of reasoning? So he has examined pleasures and happiness most of all, and these do not exist without injustice. Why is wealth generally found more among base people than among decent ones? Is it because, being blind in its judgment, it cannot discern or choose the best? Why has it been thought more just to come to the aid of the dead than of the living? Is it because the living would be able to help themselves, but the dead man can no longer do so? Why is it that a man who spends time with a healthy person becomes no healthier himself, nor does he gain anything toward the states of being strong or beautiful, but a man who spends time with a just, moderate, and good person does gain something toward these states? Is it because the former qualities cannot be imitated by the soul, while the latter can? For a person is good in respect of his soul, but healthy in respect of his body; so he becomes accustomed to feeling pleasure and pain correctly. But the person who spends time with a healthy man does not gain this, for being healthy does not consist in feeling pleasure or not feeling it about certain things; none of these things produces health.
5| Why is it more terrible to kill a woman than a man, even though the male is by nature better than the female? Is it because the woman is weaker, so that she does less wrong? Or is it because it is not manly to press one's advantage against something much weaker? Why do they give the defendant the position on the right in court? Is it because they wish to equalize the sides? Since the prosecutor has the advantage, they give the position to the defendant. Then again, defendants generally keep watch for themselves, and watchfulness is exercised toward the right, if the defendant occupies the position on the right.
6| Why is it that when the votes appear equal for both the defendant and the prosecutor, the defendant wins? Is it because the defendant, in the contest, has heard only what he must defend himself against, and must produce his witnesses to counter the charges laid against him, if they are going to be of any help? But it is not easy for someone to divine in advance everything for which he must prepare witnesses or some other proof that he is doing no wrong. The prosecutor, on the other hand, can do as he wishes: even before summoning the case to trial he can set the matter in motion, and once he has already summoned it, he can fabricate whatever plausible charge he wishes and accuse the defendant with it. Seeing the defendant at a disadvantage in all these respects, then, the lawgiver added to the defendant's side whatever the jurors are divided about. But one may also see it this way. People who are in a state of fear leave out many things they ought to have said or done, and defendants, as it happens, are generally in greater danger than prosecutors; so if they leave out things they ought to have said, and yet still come out equal with what is just, it is clear that if they had not left anything out, they would have won outright. Further, each of us would rather vote to acquit a wrongdoer, holding that he is not guilty, than vote to convict an innocent man, holding that he is guilty — for instance, if someone is on trial for enslavement or for homicide.
7| For when the charges brought against a person actually hold, we would rather acquit than convict when they do not hold. For whenever a matter is in doubt, the lesser of the wrongs must be chosen. For it is a terrible thing to condemn a slave as though he were free; but it is far more terrible when someone condemns a free man as though he were a slave. Further, if one person happens to be bringing a charge and another is disputing it over some possession, we do not think it right straightaway to hand the thing over to the accuser, but rather that the possessor should keep enjoying it until judgment is given. In the same way, too, in the case of larger numbers: whenever the number of those asserting that a wrong has been done is equal to the number of those not agreeing, just as when at the start one party made the accusation and the other denied it, we do not think the lawgiver ought to add weight to the accuser's side, but rather that the defendant should have authority, until the wrongdoer has some superiority. Likewise too in the case of jurors: since when the votes are made equal there is no superiority on either side, the lawgiver let things remain as they stood. Further, for the more serious wrongs the penalties too are severe, so that for those who convict unjustly and do not recognize it, there is no opportunity to correct the matter once it is taken;
8| but for those who acquit contrary to what is fitting, if they do so cautiously enough that the man will never again do wrong at all, what great error would the jurors have committed in acquitting such a man of a capital charge? But if he should do wrong afterward, one might think he deserves to be punished now for both offenses. Or is it because it belongs to a more unjust man to commit those wrongs which are less likely to be falsely charged against him? For doing wrong comes about through anger, through fear, through desire, and through many other causes, and not only from premeditation; but bringing a false charge is, for the most part, a matter of premeditation. So then, since the votes have come out equal, and since bringing a false charge is itself an act of wrongdoing on the part of the accuser and the defendant a wrong done to him, once the unjust accuser has been judged base, the lawgiver has assigned the victory to the defendant. We ourselves are disposed in just this way toward our household slaves: whenever we suspect that they have done something wrong and have nothing precise to go on, but nevertheless suppose that they have done it, we do not go straight to punishing them; and if we are no more able to investigate further, we drop the charge. Further, the one who does wrong from premeditation does a greater wrong than the one who does not act from premeditation. Now the man who brings malicious accusations always does wrong from premeditation, while the man who does some other wrong finds himself doing wrong sometimes out of necessity, sometimes out of ignorance, and sometimes as it happens to fall out.
9| Whenever the votes turn out equal, the prosecutor has been judged by half of the jurors to have done wrong from premeditation, while the defendant has been judged by the other half, in turn, to have done wrong, yet not from premeditation. So then, since the prosecutor has been judged to have done a greater wrong than the defendant, the lawgiver reasonably judged that the one doing the lesser wrong should win. Further, the man who does wrong while not supposing that the one he wrongs fails to notice it, and does wrong all the same, is always more unjust than the one who supposes he goes unnoticed. For the man who brings a false accusation against someone does not suppose that the person he is maliciously prosecuting fails to notice it, whereas those who commit some other wrong generally attempt their wrongdoing supposing that the one they wrong does not notice; so that prosecutors might be judged more unjust than defendants.
10| Why is it that if someone steals from a bathhouse, or from a wrestling school, or from the marketplace, or from some such place, he is punished with death, but if someone steals from a private house, he pays back double the value of the stolen goods? Is it because in houses it is possible to guard one's property in some fashion or other — for the wall is strong and there are locks, and all the household slaves in the house are concerned to see that the contents are kept safe? But in the bathhouse, and in places that are held in common in the way the bathhouse is, it is easy for anyone who wishes to do mischief; for those who set down their belongings have nothing sturdy to protect them but their own eye, so that the moment someone looks away, the thing is already at the mercy of the thief. That is why the lawgiver, judging that people are not adequate guardians of themselves in such places, set the law over them, threatening severely that they will not go on living if they appropriate what belongs to others. Further, in the case of a house, it is up to the owner whom he admits, and he need not bring in anyone he does not trust; but the man who has set something down in the bathhouse cannot prevent anyone at all from entering, nor, once someone has entered and stripped, prevent him from laying his own garment down anywhere but beside a thief;
11| but, though he would not wish it, the thief's clothing and the clothing of the man who is about to lose his own lie mixed together in the same place. That is why the lawgiver has not come to the aid, with excessively severe penalties, of the man who has willingly let the thief in and has thereby himself made a mistake, but is plainly imposing great penalties on thieves against those who share, out of necessity, in the entry to the bathhouse and in that intermingling. Further, those who steal in places that are open in this way to anyone who wishes to enter become conspicuous to everyone, because they are exposed; so that even after they get away with it, they no longer care to seem decent for the sake of any future gain, on the ground that it is pointless for them to pretend to those who have found them out that they are decent people — so they go on being openly wicked from then on. But those who become known to only one person try to persuade the others by paying back something, so that this person will not expose them; and so they would not be wholly wicked all the way through — for which reason the lawgiver made the penalties lighter for them. Further, among wrongs, those that occur in the most public gatherings and assemblies bring the greatest shame on the city, just as good order in public affairs brings by far the greatest honor; for through occasions of this sort people become most conspicuous, both to themselves and to others.
12| It follows, then, that the man who has lost something is not the only one harmed by such an act privately, but reproach also falls on the city. That is why the lawgiver punished the thief with heavier penalties than those who take something from a house. Further, the man who loses something from his house happens to be in such a place that it is easy for him, having suffered nothing and been mocked by no one, to bear the misfortune while remaining at home. But for the man stripped bare, not only is the departure itself an ordeal, but on top of that he is generally mocked by others as well, which is far more distressing than the loss itself. That is why the lawgiver set down heavier penalties for them. Further, they plainly have made many other laws similar to these: for instance, if someone speaks ill of a magistrate, the penalties are great, but if of a private citizen, there is none. And rightly so; for the lawgiver holds that in that case the man who speaks abusively is not only doing wrong to the magistrate, but also committing outrage against the city. In the same way, too, the man who steals in the harbor not only harms the private individual, but also brings shame on the city. And likewise in other cases as well, wherever we come together in common. Why is it that in the lawcourts, if the votes of the two litigants come out equal, the defendant wins? Is it because the defendant has suffered nothing at the hands of the prosecutor, and, being on equal terms, was already bound to win?
13| Why is the penalty for theft death, while for outrage — though it is a greater injustice — the penalty is an assessment of what one should suffer or pay? Is it because committing outrage is a human affection, and all people share in it more or less, whereas stealing is not among the necessary things? And because a man who undertakes to steal would also choose to commit outrage.