Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language
1| ON XENOPHANES, ON ZENO, ON GORGIAS. [part Xenoph] ON XENOPHANES [section 1] He says that if anything is, it is eternal, since it is not possible for anything to come to be out of nothing. For whether all things have come to be or not all of them, either way they are eternal. For they would come to be out of none of them. For if all things come to be, nothing pre-exists; and if certain things always exist, and other things are always being added to them, then the one would have become more and greater. [section 2] But that by which it is more and greater would have come to be out of nothing; for the greater does not belong to the lesser, nor does the greater exist in the smaller. And being eternal, it is unlimited, because it has no beginning from which it came to be, nor an end at which what has come to be would at some point have ended; and whatever is a whole and unlimited, is. For if there were more than two, these would be limits with respect to one another. [section 3] And the one is alike in all its parts; for if things were unlike, being more than one, one could no longer posit a single thing but many. And being eternal and measured and alike in every way, the one is unmoved. For it could not be moved unless it withdrew into something. And it would be necessary for it to withdraw either into what is full or into what is empty. Of these, the one, the full, would not receive it, and the other, the void, is nothing at all.
2| [section 4] Being of this sort, the one is free from pain and free from suffering, sound and free from disease, neither rearranged in position, nor altered in form, nor mixed with anything else. For according to all these, the one would become many, and what is not would be generated, and what is would be forced to perish. [section 5] But these things are impossible. For even if one were to say that some one thing is a mixture out of several things, and that there are many things in motion into one another, then the mixing, taken as a composition of several things into one, would either be, by their separation, something like a screening-off of the things mixed — in which case, when the things mixed are separated out from one another, then, given that there is a screening-off in the rubbing-together, each thing would become apparent as the first things are removed, the things placed under one another among the things mixed — and neither of these turns out to happen. [section 6] But in this way many things would exist even for us, only in the sense of appearing so. So since it cannot be this way, the things that are cannot be many either, but it is not correct that they seem to be so. For many other things too appear so in every act of perception. [section 7] But an account does away neither with the same things coming to be, nor with what is being many, but shows it to be eternal and unlimited and in every way like itself. Should one, then, first not begin by taking up every opinion, but always take as starting point what is most secure?
3| [section 8] So if all the things that seem to be so are not correctly grasped, presumably it is not fitting to make use even of this doctrine — that nothing could ever come to be out of nothing. For this too is one of the not-correct opinions, one that we have taken up, on the strength of a certain kind of perception, in the case of many things. [section 9] But if not all the things that appear to us are false, but there are, among these too, some correct beliefs — or if it is possible to show which of such qualities seem most correct — these must be taken up, and they must always be more secure than the conclusions that are going to be shown from those arguments. For even if there were two opinions opposed to one another, as he thinks — if he says that many things have not come to be, it is necessary that they come from things that are not. [section 10] But if this is not possible, then the things that are, are not many. For what is would come to be, because it is possible for it to be unlimited. And if so, it is also one. Now for us, the argument on both sides equally shows nothing more that it is one than that it is many. [section 11] But if one of the two opinions is more secure, then the conclusions drawn from it are shown more surely. But as things actually stand — since we hold both these beliefs — the things that are, are also in motion. And of the two, this latter belief is the more credible, and everyone would more readily give up the former opinion than this one.
4| [section 12] So even if it turns out that the statements are contrary, and it is impossible both for things to come to be out of what is not and for things not to be many, these would refute one another — but why should it be more this way than the other? Indeed someone might even assert the contraries of these. For he has neither shown that the opinion from which he starts is correct, nor has he taken it as more secure than the very thing he is trying to prove by it. [section 13] For it is taken to be more plausible that things come to be out of what is not than that things are not many. And indeed it is said, and quite emphatically, on this subject, both that things which are not come to be, and that many things have not come to be out of things that are not — and this is said not only by ordinary people, but some of those who are reputed to be wise have said it too. [section 14] Hesiod, for instance, says: first of all, chaos came to be, and then earth of the broad breast, the ever-secure seat of all, and Eros, who is preeminent among all the immortals. [section 15] And he says the other things came to be, and these out of nothing. And many others too say that nothing is, but everything comes to be, saying that the things that come to be, come to be out of things that are not. So this much is clear, that it seems to some, at least, that things could come to be even out of things that are not.
5| [section 1] But whether the things he says are possible or impossible, this must be set aside. But whether the conclusion actually follows from what he takes as premises, or whether nothing prevents it from being otherwise as well, must be adequately examined; for this might perhaps be a different matter from that one. [section 2] And first, once it is posited — what he first takes — that nothing could come to be out of what is not, is it necessary that all things be ungenerated, or does nothing prevent some things from having come to be out of others, and this proceeding to infinity? Or does it even bend back in a circle, so that the one thing has come to be out of the other, with something always existing in this way, and each thing having come to be an infinite number of times out of the others? [section 3] So, given the premise that nothing could come to be out of what is not, nothing would prevent all things from having come to be, and nothing prevents one from applying to that unlimited totality any of the names that go along with the one. For that man too attaches 'all things exist and are said' to the unlimited. And nothing prevents their coming-to-be from being in a circle, even if they are not unlimited. [section 4] Further, if all things come to be, and nothing is, as some say, how could the one be eternal? But indeed he argues for the being of some one thing as something that is and is posited. For if, he says, it did not come to be, then let it be eternal — as though it were necessary for being to belong to things.
6| [section 5] Further, even granting as much as possible that what is not cannot come to be, nor can what is not perish, still, what prevents some of these things from having come to be, and others being eternal, as Empedocles too says? [section 6] For he too, granting all the same points — that it is impossible for anything to come to be out of what is not, and that it is unaccomplishable and impracticable for what is to be destroyed (for it will always be set down wherever one keeps pressing it) — nonetheless says that of the things that are, some are eternal — fire and water and earth and air — while the others come to be and have come to be out of these. [section 7] For there is, as he thinks, no other coming-to-be for the things that are, but only a mixing and interchange of things mixed; and it is on these grounds that 'nature' is the name men use. But he says that coming-to-be applies to the eternal things also in the sense that they come to be, since he thought this simply impossible. [section 8] For how, he will say, could there be increase, and whence would it have come? But he says that by the mingling and combining of fire and the things that go with fire, many things come to be, and by their being interchanged and separated out they perish again, and that in respect of mixture there are many, and in respect of separation likewise, but in respect of nature there are four, without the causes, or one; or even if these should straightway be unlimited, out of which, by their being combined, things come to be, and by their being separated, perish — as indeed some say Anaxagoras too states, that the things that come to be, come to be out of things that always are and are unlimited.
7| [section 9] Even if this were so, not all things would be eternal, but some would be coming to be, and would have come to be out of things that are, and would be perishing into certain other substances. Again, nothing prevents the universe from being a single substance in form, as both Anaximander and Anaximenes say — the one asserting that the universe is water, the other, Anaximenes, that it is air — and as many others have claimed the universe to be one in this way. [section 10] This one thing, then, by shapes and by greater and lesser number, and by becoming rarefied or dense, produces the whole as many things, both existing and coming to be, and unlimited in number. And Democritus too says that water and air, and each of the many things — this being what it is — differ by configuration. [section 11] What, then, prevents the many things from coming to be and perishing in this way too, with what is always changing from what is into what is, by the differences of the one just mentioned, while the whole becomes neither more nor less? Again, what prevents bodies from at one time coming to be out of other things, and again perishing back into them? [section 12] But even if one were to grant this too, and there were something ungenerated as well, on what ground is it any more shown to be unlimited? For he says it is unlimited if, while it is, it has not come to be. For he holds that the beginning and end of coming-to-be are limits.
8| [section 13] And yet, from what has been said, what prevents a thing that is ungenerated from having a limit? For he holds that if a thing came to be, it has as its beginning that from which it would have come to be, if things do come to be. What, then, prevents it, even if it did not come to be, from having a beginning — not, indeed, one from which it came to be, but a different kind — and from being bounded relative to other things that are likewise eternal? [section 14] Again, what prevents the whole, being ungenerated, from being unlimited, while the things coming to be within it are bounded, having a beginning and an end of coming-to-be? Again, as Parmenides says, what prevents the universe, though it is one and ungenerated, from nonetheless being bounded, and being everywhere like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere, evenly balanced from the middle in every direction? For it must be neither any larger nor any smaller in one direction than another, as far as it extends. [section 15] Having a middle and extremities, it has a limit even while being ungenerated, since even if, as he himself says, it is one, and this is a body, it has parts other than itself, if these parts are all alike. For he says the universe is alike in this way, not . . . (text breaks off) . . . to anything else which you see to be bounded — he refutes whether the unlimited can be alike in any respect. [section 16] For a thing that is alike is alike to something else, so that, being two or more, it could not be one, nor could it be unlimited. But perhaps he means alike with reference to itself, and says that it is all alike because it is uniform in its parts, being entirely water, or earth, or some other such thing.
9| [section 17] This man is clearly claiming that each thing, being a body of two parts, is one, and is not unlimited. For the whole is unlimited, so that these bound one another while being ungenerated. Again, if it is both eternal and unlimited, how could it be one thing, being one body? For if it consisted of unlike, partless elements, it would be many — and he himself claims that it is so. [section 18] But if what-is is entirely water, or entirely earth, or whatever it is, it would have many parts, as Zeno too attempts to show of a thing that is one in this way. There would then be more parts of it, of lesser and smaller size, and in every such respect it would be different, with no body being added to it or taken away from it. [section 19] But if it has no body, no breadth, and no length at all, how could it be unlimited? What prevents there being many such things, countable in number? What prevents there being more than one thing, each unlimited in magnitude? As indeed Xenophanes says that the depth of the earth and of the air is unlimited. [section 20] Empedocles too makes this clear; for he rebukes certain people for saying such things are impossible, holding that, if the depths of the earth and the abundant ether are unlimited — as has vainly been poured out from the mouths of many mortals who have seen but a little of the whole — this is what results. Again, there is nothing strange in a thing being one and yet not alike in every respect.
10| [section 21] For if it is entirely water, or fire, or some other such thing, nothing prevents one from calling what-is more than one, if indeed each part is alike to itself throughout. And indeed one part may be rare, another dense, even though there is no void within the rare part. [section 22] For nothing prevents this: in the rare, the void is not separated off apart in certain parts, as though part of the whole were dense and this other part were rare, the whole being disposed in this way; rather, being equally full throughout, it is nonetheless equally less full than the dense. [section 23] And if it is, it is ungenerated, and for this reason it might be granted to be unlimited, and that it is not possible for one thing and another to each be unlimited. For this reason, too, at this point it must already be called impossible as well: for how could the unlimited, to the extent that the void is not present, fail to be a whole? He says it is unmoved if there is no void; for everything moves by changing place. [section 24] Now, first, this does not seem right to many; rather, they hold that there is something empty, though this is not itself a body — just as Hesiod too, in his account of the coming-to-be of things, says that Chaos came to be first, meaning that a space existed first, before the things that are. The void we are looking for is something of this sort, like a kind of vessel set in the midst of things.
11| [section 25] But indeed, even if there is no void, things might move none the less, since Anaxagoras too, who worked on this very question, and for whom it was not even enough to declare that it does not exist, nonetheless says that the things that are move, though there is no void. Likewise Empedocles says that things are always moving together continuously throughout all time, saying that there is nothing empty belonging to the whole. [section 26] From where, then, could anything come upon it? And when things are combined into a single form, so as to be one, he says that nothing is empty and nothing superfluous. For what prevents things from being carried into one another and shifting round together, any given thing into another, and that thing into a further one, and so back into the first, with something else always changing in turn? [section 27] Again, as for the change of form that occurs while the thing itself remains in the same place — which both other thinkers and he himself call alteration — [nothing] in what he has said prevents things from moving in this way, when what was white becomes black, or what was bitter becomes sweet. [section 28] For neither the absence of void nor the fact that the full does not admit it prevents alteration. So it is not necessary that all things be eternal, nor that what is be one, nor unlimited, but rather many unlimited things — nor that what is one be alike, nor unmoved, whether it is one or several things.
12| [section 29] Given these points, nothing in what he himself has said prevents the things that are from being rearranged and altered — whether the universe is one and there is motion, things differing in greater and lesser number and something being added by alteration; or, if something is added, not to the body itself; or if there are many things, mixing and separating out together with one another. For it is reasonable that mixture is neither the kind of addition-on-top nor the kind of composition he speaks of. [section 30] So that either they are straightaway separate, or, once what lay in front has been turned away, one set of things is carried apart from another, separately from each other — but rather they are so composed and arranged that, whatever is mixed alongside whatever else, a part of it is mixed in, in such a way that they are not taken up as merely juxtaposed but as mixed, and it has no parts of any kind whatsoever. For since there is no smallest body, every part is mixed with every part, and likewise so is the whole. [part Zenon] ON ZENO. [section 1] He says it is impossible, if something is, for it to have come to be — saying this with reference to the god. For what has come to be must necessarily have come to be either from things like it or from things unlike it. But neither is possible. For it is no more fitting for a like thing to be begotten by a like thing than to beget it (since all the same properties belong reciprocally to things that are equal or alike to one another); nor could an unlike thing come to be from an unlike thing.
13| [section 2] For if the stronger came to be from the weaker, or the greater from the less, or the better from the worse, or conversely the worse from the better, then what is not would have come to be from what is—which is impossible. For this reason, then, god is eternal. And if god is the strongest of all things, he says it follows that he is one. [section 3] For if there were two or even more, he would no longer be the strongest and best of all. For each god among the many, being similar to the rest, would be of that same sort. But this is what it is to be god and to have the power of god—to rule and not to be ruled—while everything else is a thing ruled. So that, to the extent that something is not the stronger, to that extent it is not god. [section 4] If, then, there were several, and some were stronger than others and some weaker, they would not be gods; for it is the nature of god not to be ruled. And if they were equal, god would not have the nature that requires him to be strongest; for the equal is neither better nor worse than its equal. So that, if god exists and is of this sort, god is one alone. For neither could he do all that he might wish, if there were more than one.
14| [section 5] For if there were several, no one of them could be the only one. And being one, he is similar in every way, seeing and hearing, and having the other senses in every part. For if not, the parts of god, being parts, would rule and be ruled by one another—which is impossible. And being similar in every way, he is spherical; for he is not of this sort in one place and not in another, but in every way. And being eternal and one and spherical, he is neither unlimited nor limited. What is unlimited is what is not; for this has neither a middle nor a beginning and end nor any other part, and such is the unlimited. But what is not, being of this sort, could not be what is, and things would come to limit one another if they were several. [section 7] The one is similar neither to what is not nor to the many; for the one has nothing against which it will come to a limit. And the one, being of this sort—which he says god is—neither moves nor is movable. For what is not is unmoved; for neither could anything else come into it, nor could it go into anything else, [section 8] while what is more than one moves. For one thing must move into another. Now into what is not, nothing could move; for what is not is nowhere at all. But if things changed into one another, then what changes would be more than one. For these reasons, then, two things or more than one would move, while what is nothing is at rest and unmoved.
15| [section 9] The one neither rests nor moves; for it is similar neither to what is not nor to the many. And god is in every respect so disposed—eternal and one, similar and spherical, neither unlimited nor limited, neither at rest nor unmoved. [section 1] Now, first of all, this man too assumes, like Melissus, that what comes to be comes to be from what is. Yet what prevents what comes to be from coming to be not from something similar, but from what is not? Further, god is no more ungenerated than everything else, if indeed everything has come to be from something similar or from something dissimilar—which is impossible. [section 2] So that either nothing exists besides god, or all the other things are eternal too. Further, he assumes that god is strongest, calling this the most powerful and the best. But this is not the common belief; rather, according to custom the gods are held to be superior to one another in many ways. So he has not taken this admission about god from what is generally believed. [section 3] And in saying that god is strongest, he is not to be understood as meaning that god's nature is of this sort relative to something else, but relative to his own condition, since with respect to another there would be nothing to prevent his surpassing them not by his own excellence and strength, but through the weakness of the others.
16| [section 4] No one would want to say that god is strongest in this sense, but rather that he himself is in the best condition possible, and that nothing is lacking to him, and that he fares well and finely; for perhaps, for one so disposed, that other thing would follow at the same time. And nothing prevents there being several gods disposed in this way, all disposed as well as possible, and strongest in relation to other things, without being strongest in relation to one another. [section 5] But there are, it seems, other points too. He says god is strongest, and this must belong to someone in some respect; but it is in no way fitting that, being one, he see and hear all things; for it is not that, if he does not also see in this direction, he sees worse in this direction—rather, he simply does not see there. But perhaps what he means by ‘perceiving in every direction’ is that he would thereby be in the best condition, being similar in every way. [section 6] Further, being of this sort, why would he be spherical, rather than having some other shape, on the ground that he hears in every direction and rules in every direction? For just as when we say that white lead is entirely white, we mean nothing other than that whiteness is worked into it in all its parts—so what prevents ‘seeing, hearing, and ruling in every direction’ from being said in the same way there too, meaning that whatever part of it one takes, that part will be found to have this attribute? And just as white lead need not for this reason be spherical, neither must god be spherical for this reason,
17| [section 7] Further, how is it possible for a thing to be neither unlimited nor limited, if it is indeed a body and has magnitude—if this is what unlimited means: that which has no limit while being receptive of a limit? A limit arises in magnitude and in multitude, and in every quantity, so that if a thing having magnitude has no limit, it is unlimited. Further, being spherical, it must necessarily have a limit. [section 8] For it has extremities, if indeed it has a middle, this being the point most distant from those extremities. And it has a middle, being spherical; for this is what ‘spherical’ means—that which reaches from the middle equally to the extremities. A body has extremities or limits; this is where it differs from what is not. For even if what is not is simple, it does not follow that what is, is unlimited. [section 9] For what prevents some of the same things being said both of what is and of what is not? For no one now perceives what is as not being, and likewise someone might not now perceive what is not as being; yet both are speakable, so that they may be thought. [section 10] What is not, is not white; if, then, for this reason all existing things are white—so that we may not signify the same thing of what is and of what is not—then nothing prevents some existing thing from not being white either. Could the unlimited, in the same way, also admit some other negation? Unless, rather, as was said before, everything is unlimited by not having a limit, rather than by not having it in some other sense.
18| [section 11] So that what is, too, either is unlimited or has a limit. But perhaps it is also strange to attach unlimitedness to what is not. For we do not call everything unlimited that has no limit, just as we would not say that what is not is unequal either. Further, god would not have a limit by being one—but not a limit relative to another god. And if there is only one thing, then only god and the parts of god would exist. [section 12] Since this too is strange: that because it happens that the many are limited in relation to one another, the one should for this reason have no limit. For many of the same things belong both to the many and to the one, since being too is common to them. It would perhaps be strange, then, if for this reason we should refuse to say that god exists, on the ground that the many exist, so that he not be similar to them in this respect. [section 13] Further, what prevents god, being one, from being limited and having limits? As Parmenides too says that, being one, he is on every side like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, evenly balanced from the middle. For a limit must perhaps belong to something, yet not in relation to something else; nor is it necessary that what has a limit have its limit in relation to something, as being limited in relation to what is not adjacent to it as unlimited—rather, to be limited is to have extremities, and having extremities does not necessarily mean having them in relation to something.
19| [section 14] For some it does not follow that the whole is also limited. Again, regarding the claim that the one and being are unmoved — namely that being too is in motion — this is perhaps just as absurd as the points made before. [section 15] And further, might one not suppose that 'not being in motion' and 'being unmoved' are not the same thing, but rather that the one is a negation of being in motion — like 'not equal,' which can also be said of what does not exist, if that is true — while the other, 'unmoved,' is already said in the sense of possessing some positive character, like 'unequal,' and applies to the opposite of being in motion, namely being at rest, since, roughly speaking, negations formed with the alpha-privative are said of contraries? [section 16] So 'not moving' is true of what does not exist, but 'being at rest' does not belong to what does not exist. Likewise, 'being unmoved' does not signify the same thing either. But this man uses 'being at rest' of it, and says that what does not exist is at rest, because it has no transition. [section 17] And, as we also said above, it is perhaps absurd that, if we attach something to what does not exist, this should not be true to say of what exists too — especially when what is said is a negation, of the sort that 'not moving' and 'not changing' are. For otherwise, as was also said, he would be stripping away many of the predicates that belong to the things that exist.
20| [section 18] For it would not even be true to say that 'many' is 'not one,' if what does not exist is also 'not one' — or rather, in some cases the contraries seem to result according to just as many negations: of these, if there is a plurality, it must be either equal or unequal, and if there is a number, it must be either even or odd. Likewise, if there is a body, it must be either at rest or in motion. [section 19] Further, if it is for this reason that god and the one do not move — namely, that the many move by passing into one another — what prevents god too from moving into something else? For no other reason, except that there is only one god. But if he too is composite, what prevents the parts of ... moving into one another ... in a circle ... god? For surely such a thing is not one, in the way Zeno says the many exist by nature. [section 20] For he himself says that god is a body, whether calling it this whole universe, or whatever else he calls it. For being bodiless, how could it be spherical and remain so, when in that case it could neither move nor be at rest, since it would be nowhere at all? But since it is a body, what would prevent it from moving, as has been said?
21| [part Georg] On Gorgias. [section 1] He says that nothing exists; and if it exists, it is unknowable; and even if it exists and is knowable, still it cannot be shown to others. And as to the claim that nothing exists, he puts together what has been said by others — all those who, in speaking about the things that exist, appear to declare, as they think, contrary conclusions: some, that being is one and not many; others, on the contrary, that it is many and not one; and some, that things are ungenerated, others demonstrating that they are generated — and from both sides he constructs his syllogism. [section 2] For he says it is necessary: if anything exists, it must be either one or many, either ungenerated or generated; if it is neither one nor many, neither ungenerated nor generated, then it would be nothing at all, for if a thing did not exist, it would have to be one or the other of these. That it is neither one nor many, neither ungenerated nor generated, he attempts to show, partly in the manner of Melissus, partly in the manner of Zeno, after his own first demonstration, in which he argues that neither being nor not-being exists. [section 3] For if not-being is not-being, then what does not exist would be no less than what exists; for what does not exist is not-being, and what exists is being, so that things are no more such as to exist than such as not to exist.
22| [section 4] But if nevertheless not-being exists, he says, then being is not its opposite. For if not-being exists, then being [or] not-being ought to belong to it as well. So it would not follow, he says, even in this way, that nothing exists — unless being and not-being are the same thing. But if they are the same, then in this way too nothing would exist; for what does not exist does not exist, and neither does what exists, since it is the same as what does not exist. This, then, is the same argument as Melissus's. [section 1] But it does not follow from anything he has said that nothing exists. For as to the points he actually demonstrates, he argues as follows: if not-being exists, or is, then, to put it simply, it would also be similar to what does not exist. But this neither appears to be so, nor is it necessary; rather, as with two things, one existing and one not existing, the one exists, and it is not true of the other, of what does not exist, that it exists. [section 2] So it is not the case, on account of its not existing, that both being and not-being fail to exist, nor that one or the other of the two fails to exist. For nothing, he says, would distinguish not-being from being, if not-being too were something. No one, he says, holds that not-being exists in any way at all. But even if what does not exist is indeed not-being, still in this way what does not exist would not be similar to what exists; for the one is not-being, while the other exists as well.
23| [section 3] But if it is also true, simply put, that not-being exists — which would indeed be astonishing — well, if this is so, which follows more, that all things exist, or that they do not exist? For, in this way at least, the opposite seems to result. For if not-being exists and being exists as being, then all things exist; for both the things that exist and the things that do not exist, exist. For it is not necessary, if not-being exists, that being should also not exist. [section 4] If, then, one grants even this — that not-being exists but being does not exist — still, things would exist no less; for the things that do not exist would exist, according to his own account. And if being and not-being are the same, then in this way too it is no more the case that something would not [be]. For as he himself also says, if not-being and being are the same, then both being does not exist, and so does not-being. [section 5] So that, turned around, one can equally say that nothing exists, as that all things exist. For not-being exists, and being exists, so that all things exist. After this argument he says: if it exists, it must be either ungenerated or generated. And if it is ungenerated, he takes it to be unlimited, on Melissus's postulates; but what is unlimited could never exist.
24| [section 6] For it would be neither in itself nor in another; for in that way there would be two things or more, the thing contained and that in which it is contained — but being nowhere, it would not exist either, according to Zeno's argument about place. For these reasons, then, it is not ungenerated; but neither, indeed, is it generated. For nothing could come to be, either from what exists or from what does not exist. [section 7] For if what exists changed, then what exists would no longer exist, just as, if what does not exist came to be, it would no longer be what does not exist. Nor, indeed, could it come to be from what exists. For if what does not exist does not exist, then nothing could come to be from nothing; and if what does not exist does exist, then for the same reasons it could not come to be from what exists, it could not come to be from what does not exist either. [section 8] If, then, it is necessary that, if anything exists, it must be either ungenerated or generated, and it is impossible for it to be either of these, then nothing could exist. Further, he says, if it exists, it is either one or many; but if it is neither one nor many, it would be nothing. And as for being one ... also that the one would be bodiless, or else caught up in Zeno's argument. But if it is one, it could not ... be, nor not ... nor many.
25| [section 9] For if it is neither one nor many, he says, it could not have moved either. For it could move in no respect; or it would no longer exist, or it would remain in the same condition — but the one state would not exist, and the other, not existing, would have come to be. Further, it either causes motion or is moved, and if it is transferred while not being continuous, what-is has been divided, and is nothing in that respect; so that it moves in every part, it is divided in every part. [section 10] But if this is so, all things do not exist. For, he says, at the point where it has been divided, what-is is deficient, calling the being-divided the void instead of the void, just as is written in the arguments called those of Leucippus. If, then, it is nothing, the demonstrations declare everything to be so. For what is thought must exist, and what is not, if indeed it is not, must not even be thought. [section 11] But if this is so, no one would say there is any falsehood, not even if he should say that chariots race on the sea. For all these things would then exist. For indeed the things seen and heard exist for this reason, that each of them is thought; but if not for this reason, then, just as the things we see are no more existent than not, so too the things we see are no more real than the things we think. [section 12] For just as there many might see these things, so here many of us might think these things. So then, more things are of this sort, but which are the true ones is unclear. So that even if things exist, to us at least the things are unknowable.
26| [section 13] But even if they are knowable, how, he says, could one make them clear to another? For what one has seen, how, he says, could one state this in speech? Or how could it become clear to that other person on hearing it, if he has not seen it? For just as sight does not know sounds, so too hearing does not hear colors, but sounds; and the one speaking speaks, but conveys neither color nor the thing itself. [section 14] So what someone does not conceive, how could he ask to conceive it from another by speech or by some sign of a different thing — unless, on the one hand, by having seen a color, and on the other by ⟨…⟩ ; for from the start it does not speak but perceives color, but rather an account, but rather an account, so that it is not possible to think a color, but only to see it, nor to think a sound, but only to hear it. [section 15] But even if this is granted, the speaker both knows it and recognizes it as he speaks. But how will the hearer conceive the same thing? For it is not possible for the same thing to be at once in several separate subjects; for then the one would be two. [section 16] But even if, he says, it were in several and remained the same, nothing prevents it from appearing not alike to them, since those subjects are not in every way alike, even being in the same condition — if they were in some such state, and yet were not two. And it is evident that not even a person himself perceives things alike as himself at the same time, but perceives different things by hearing and by sight, and differently now and formerly.
27| [section 17] So that it would hardly be that anyone perceives the whole same thing as another. Thus it is not the case — even if there is some one thing that is known — that anyone could make it clear to another, both because things are not expressible in speech, and because no one conceives the same thing as another. But all these puzzles, in this way too, belong to other, older thinkers, so that these must also be examined in the inquiry concerning those.