Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language
1| [book A] [section 1_col1] Goods. He also divided things up in this way, Aristotle says:: of goods, some are in the soul, some in the body, some external. For example, justice and practical wisdom and courage and temperance and things of this kind are in the soul; beauty and good condition and health and strength are in the body; friends and the happiness of one's country and wealth are among the external goods. Goods, therefore, are of three kinds: some are in the soul, some in the body, some external. [section 5_col2] Goods. Goods are divided into three. For of them, some are in the soul, some in the body, some external. Those in the soul are practical wisdom, justice, courage, temperance, and the other things of this kind; those in the body are strength, beauty, health, good condition, and the other things of this kind; those external are friends, wealth, good repute, and the happiness of one's country. Of goods, therefore, some are in the soul, some in the body, some external.
2| [section 2_col1] Friendship. Of friendship there are three kinds: one of it is natural, one is comradely, one is hospitable. We call natural, then, that which parents have toward their offspring and kin toward one another; and the other animals too have been allotted a share of this. We call comradely the friendship that arises from familiarity and belongs to no kinship at all, but is, for example, the friendship of Pylades toward Orestes. Hospitable friendship is that which arises toward strangers from a formal introduction and through letters. Of friendship, therefore, one kind is natural, one comradely, one hospitable; but some add a fourth, the erotic kind. [section 58_col2] Friendship. Friendship is divided into four. For one of it is kinship-friendship, one comradely, one hospitable, one erotic. Kinship-friendship is, for example, that of a father toward his sons and of brothers toward brothers and of the other members of a household; comradely friendship is that in which people who have become friends through familiarity share; hospitable friendship is that which makes people friends through letters and formal introduction; erotic friendship is that which, through desire, provides a sharing in friendship for the fine. [section 3_col1] The Constitution.
3| Of the constitution there are five kinds: one of it is democratic, another aristocratic, a third oligarchic, a fourth kingly, a fifth tyrannical. It is democratic, then, in those cities where the multitude holds power and chooses the offices and the laws through itself; it is aristocracy where neither the rich nor the poor nor the notable rule, but the best men of the city preside over it. It is oligarchy whenever the offices are chosen on the basis of property assessments; for the rich are fewer than the poor. Of kingship, one kind is according to law, the other according to lineage. The kingship at Carthage, then, is according to law; for it is up for purchase. But the kingship in Lacedaemon and Macedonia is according to lineage; for they establish the kingship from a certain family. Tyranny is that in which people are ruled after being deceived or coerced by someone. Of the constitution, therefore, one kind is democracy, one aristocracy, one oligarchy, one kingship, one tyranny. [section 7_col2] The Constitution.
4| The constitution is divided into five. For one part of it is democracy, one aristocracy, one oligarchy, one tyranny, one kingship. Democracy is that in which the multitude of the city holds sway; aristocracy is that in which the strongest lead, not through lineage or wealth but through virtue; oligarchy is that in which certain people, having made the property assessments high, govern on that basis, or, having forced the multitude through a political faction, administer the city; tyranny is that in which someone, having deceived or forced the multitude, administers the city; kingship is when a king, either according to law or according to lineage, administers the affairs of the city. Of the constitution, therefore, one part is democracy, one aristocracy, one oligarchy, one tyranny, one kingship. [section 4_col1] Justice. Of justice there are three kinds: one of it concerns the gods, one concerns human beings, one concerns those who have departed. For those who sacrifice according to the laws and take care of the sacred things clearly show piety toward the gods; those who repay loans and deposits act justly toward human beings; those who take care of tombs clearly show justice toward those who have departed. Of justice, therefore, one kind is toward the gods, one concerns human beings, one concerns those who have departed.
5| [section 4_col2] Justice. Justice is divided into three: one of it is toward god, one toward human beings, one toward those who have departed. Justice toward god is thanksgiving accompanied by piety and the fulfilling of his commandments; justice toward human beings is lawfulness in contracts and in the other matters reckoned as just; justice toward those who have departed is to bury them and to perform the other customary rites for them. Of justice, therefore, one part is toward god, one toward human beings, one toward those who have departed. [section 5_col1] Knowledge. Of knowledge there are three kinds: one is practical, one productive, one theoretical. House-building and shipbuilding are productive; for it is possible to see a finished work of them. Politics and flute-playing and lyre-playing and the like are practical; for it is not possible to see a finished work of them, but rather the people are doing something — the one plays the flute or the lyre, the other engages in politics. Geometry and harmonics and astronomy are theoretical; for their practitioners neither do anything nor produce anything, but the geometer studies how lines stand in relation to one another, the student of harmonics studies pitches, and the astronomer studies the stars and the universe. Of the branches of knowledge, therefore, some are theoretical, some practical, some productive.
6| [section 8_col2] Knowledge. Knowledge is divided into three: one part of it is theoretical, one productive, one practical. Theoretical knowledge is that whose chief business [and] is contemplation, such as geometry and arithmetic and harmonics and the like; productive knowledge is that whose chief business is the completion of a work, such as house-building and statue-making and other things of this kind; practical knowledge is that whose chief business is action, such as medicine and generalship and politics and other things of this kind. Of knowledge, therefore, one part is theoretical, one productive, one practical. [section 6_col1] Medicine. Of medicine there are five kinds: one is pharmaceutical, one surgical, one dietetic, one diagnostic, one first-aid. Pharmaceutical medicine heals illnesses by means of drugs; surgical medicine restores health by cutting and cauterizing; dietetic medicine relieves illness through regulating diet; diagnostic medicine works through recognizing the illness; first-aid medicine relieves pain through giving immediate help. Of medicine, therefore, one kind is pharmaceutical, one surgical, one dietetic, one diagnostic, one first-aid.
7| [section 61_col2] Medicine. Medicine is divided into five: one part of it is pharmaceutical, another surgical, another dietetic, another diagnostic, another therapeutic. Pharmaceutical medicine cures illnesses by means of drugs; surgical medicine 〈heals by cutting and cauterizing; dietetic medicine〉 relieves illness by means of regimen; diagnostic medicine, by knowing the disease, cures the patient in that way; therapeutic medicine heals the sick by means of remedies. [section 7_col1] Law. There are two divisions of law: one part of it is written, the other unwritten. That by which we conduct our public life in cities is written; that which arises from custom is called unwritten — for example, not walking naked in the marketplace, or not putting on a woman's cloak. For no law forbids these things, but nevertheless we do not do them, because we are restrained by unwritten law. Of law, then, one part is written, the other unwritten. [section 20_col2] Law. Law is divided into two: one part of it is written, one unwritten. The written is that in accordance with which we transact contracts and settle our other dealings with one another and manage all such matters; the unwritten is that in accordance with which customs grow up and persist in cities.
8| [section 8_col1] Speech. Speech is divided into five, of which one is the kind that those engaged in public affairs use in the assemblies, which is called political; a second division of speech is that which orators write and deliver for display and 〈for the lawcourt, such as〉 encomia and denunciations and accusations 〈and defenses〉... this sort is rhetorical in kind. A third division of speech is that which private individuals converse in with one another; this manner is called private. A further division of speech is that which people who question and answer each other briefly converse in; this speech is called dialectical. A fifth division of speech is that which craftsmen converse in about their own craft; this is called technical. Of speech, then, one part is political, another rhetorical, another private, another dialectical, another technical. [section 16_col2] Speech. Speech is divided into five: one part of it is rhetorical, another political, another dialectical, another technical, another private. The rhetorical is both epideictic and accusatory and defensive; the political is deliberative and hortatory; dialectical is that which briefly makes clear, by questioning, what one intends; technical is that which craftsmen speak concerning each [of the] matters proper to their own craft; private is that which private people speak to one another, conversing day by day.
9| [section 9_col1] Music. Music is divided into three: one part is by the mouth alone, such as song; a second is by the mouth and the hands, such as singing to the lyre; a third is by the hands alone, such as playing the lyre. Of music, then, one part is by the mouth alone, another by the mouth and the hands, another by the hands. [section 60_col2] Music. Music is divided into three: one part of it is the work of the mouth alone, one of the hands and the mouth, one of 〈the hands alone. Now the〉 work of the mouth alone is such as songs and warblings and the like; that of the hands and the mouth is such as choral flute-accompaniment and [flute-playing] and similar things; that of the hands is lyre-playing and the like. [section 10_col1] Good birth.
10| Good birth is divided into four kinds. One: if the ancestors were fine and good and just, those born of them are said to be well-born. Another: if the ancestors held power and had been rulers, those born of them are said to be well-born. Another: if the ancestors were famous — for example from generalship, from crowned contests — for we call those born of them well-born too. A further kind: if a person is himself noble in soul and great-souled, he too is said to be well-born; and this is the best kind of good birth. Of good birth, then, one part is from decent ancestors, another from powerful ones, another from renowned ones, another from the person's own nobility of character. [section 10_col2] Good birth. Good birth is divided into three: one part of it is to be born from renowned and famous parents, such as from kings and rulers [to have been born], or people holding some other reputation; another is from serious and just people, such as from Xenophon and Neilos and the like; another is from the excellence of the person himself, as when he is noble and magnificent and just and the like. Of good birth, then, one part is to be born from renowned and famous ancestors, one from serious and just ones, one from the excellence of the person himself.
11| [section 11_col1] Beauty. Beauty is divided into three: one part of it is praiseworthy, such as fine form seen by sight; another is useful, as an instrument and a house and the like are beautiful for use; and things relating to laws and pursuits and the like are beautiful for benefit. Of beauty, then, one part is for praise, another for use, another for benefit. [section 62_col2] Beauty. Beauty is divided into three: one part of it is praiseworthy, such as fine form seen by sight; another is useful, as an instrument and a house and the like are beautiful for use; and others are for benefit, as a good law and pursuits and the like are beautiful for benefit. [section 12_col1] The soul. The soul is divided into three: one part of it is the rational, another the appetitive, another the spirited. Of these, the rational is the cause of deliberating and reasoning and thinking and all such things; the appetitive part of the soul is the cause of desiring to eat and to have intercourse and all such things; the spirited part is the cause of being confident and feeling pleasure and pain and anger. Of the soul, then, one part is rational, another appetitive, another spirited.
12| [section 1_col2] The soul. The soul is divided into three: one part of it is rational, one spirited, one appetitive. The rational is that by which we reason; the appetitive is that by which we take up our desires; the spirited is that by which we feel spirit and anger and confidence and defend ourselves and the like. Of the soul, then, one part is rational, another spirited, another appetitive. [section 13_col1] Virtue. Of complete virtue there are four kinds: one practical wisdom, another justice, another courage, a fourth temperance. Of these, practical wisdom is the cause of doing things correctly; justice is the cause of acting justly in associations and dealings; courage is the cause of not [fleeing] in dangers and frightening things, but standing firm; temperance is the cause of mastering the appetites and being enslaved by no pleasure, but living in an orderly way. Of virtue, then, one part is practical wisdom, another justice, a third courage, a fourth temperance. [section 2_col2] Virtue. Virtue is divided into four: one part of it is practical wisdom, one justice, one courage, one temperance. Practical wisdom is in the rational part; justice arises in all these parts together; courage is in the spirited part; temperance is in the appetitive part. Of virtue, then, one part is practical wisdom, one justice, one courage, one temperance.
13| [section 14_col1] Rule. Rule is divided into five parts: one is rule by law, one by nature, one by custom, a fourth by lineage, and a fifth by force. Now those who rule in cities, once they have been chosen by the citizens, rule by law; those who rule by nature are, for example, males — not only among human beings but also among the other animals, for in most cases everywhere the males rule the females; rule by custom is of the sort that tutors exercise over children and teachers over their pupils. Rule by lineage is said to be of the sort the Spartan kings exercise, for their kingship comes from a certain lineage. And in Macedonia they rule in the same way, for there too kingship is established from lineage. Those who rule by having used force or deceived people, against the will of the citizens, this sort of rule is said to be by force. Of rule, then, one kind is by law, one by nature, one by custom, one by lineage, one by force.
14| [section 63_51_col2] Rule.
15| Rule is divided into five parts: one is rule by law, one by nature, one by custom, one by lineage, and a fifth by force. Now those who rule in cities, whenever they are chosen by the citizens, these rule by law. Rule by nature exists not only among human beings but also among the other animals, for in most cases everywhere the males of animals rule the females. Rule by custom is of the sort in which tutors rule children and teachers rule their students. Rule by lineage is said to be of the sort in which, when a father who is king dies, a son succeeds him, and again this son's son after him, and so on in succession. And all who rule by having used force, against the will of the citizens, this sort of rule is said to be by force. Rule is divided into three: one part of it is by nature, one by force, one by order and position. By nature, then, the male rules the female, and the stronger rules the weaker, as for example among cattle the bull, among sheep the ram, and all such cases; by force, as for example masters rule slaves and tyrants rule cities, and all such cases; by order and position, as for example whatever is placed first — from this comes the opening of the tragedy, "O ancient Argos," and among the letters alpha, and among numbers the unit.
16| [section 15_col1] Rhetoric. There are six forms of rhetoric. For whenever people urge going to war or forming an alliance with someone, this form is called exhortation; whenever they urge not going to war nor forming an alliance, but keeping the peace, this form is dissuasion. A third form of rhetoric is whenever someone claims to be wronged by another and shows him responsible for many evils; this form is named accusation. A fourth form of rhetoric [is called defense], whenever someone shows that he himself is doing no wrong nor committing any other outrage; this they call defense. A fifth form of rhetoric is whenever someone speaks well of another and shows him to be admirable and good; this form is called encomium. A sixth form is whenever someone shows someone to be base; this form is called blame. Of rhetoric, then, one part is encomium, one blame, one exhortation, one dissuasion, one accusation, one defense. [section 17_col2] Rhetoric. Rhetoric is divided into five: one part of it is accusation, one defense, one deliberation, one encomium, one blame. [section 16_col1] Speaking correctly.
17| Speaking correctly is divided into four: one is what one must say, one is how much one must say, a third is to whom one must speak, and a fourth is when one must speak. Now what one must say is whatever is going to be advantageous to the speaker and to the hearer; how much one must say is neither more nor less than what is sufficient. As to whom one must speak: if you are conversing with older people who are at fault, you must address them in words fitting for older people; and if with younger people, you must speak to them in words fitting for younger people. When one must speak is neither too soon nor too late; otherwise one will miss the mark and speak badly. [section 52_col2] Speaking correctly.
18| Speaking correctly is divided into five: one part of it is how much one must say, one is where one must say, one is to whom one must say, one is when one must say, one is what one must say. Now how much one must say is neither more nor less than what is sufficient; where one must say is in a place, such as in the marketplace, in the gymnasium, in a place of leisurely discussion, and in other proper places; to whom one must speak means what is fitting for each [and what is fitting to whomever it is fitting], for example to older people [or to younger people], and to base or to agreeable people, and to enemies or friends; when one must speak, for example neither too soon nor too late nor in between, without regard for the right moment, but at the opportune time; what one must say, for example what is advantageous and beneficial both to oneself and to one's friend. [section 17_col1] Beneficence.
19| Beneficence is divided into four: it is done either by money, or by bodily aid, or by knowledge, or by speech. By money, whenever someone comes to the aid of a person in need so as to supply him with money; by bodily aid, people benefit others whenever, being present, they come to the aid of those being struck; those who educate and heal and teach some good thing benefit by knowledge; and whenever one person goes into court as an advocate for another and speaks some fair word on his behalf, this person benefits by speech. Of beneficence, then, one kind is through money, one through bodily aid, one through knowledge, and a fourth through speech. [section 44_col2] Beneficence. Beneficence is divided into four: one part of it is to benefit by speech, one by knowledge and skills, one in respect of money, and one through bodily aid. By speech, then, those benefit who act as advocates and join in pleading cases and offer praise, and such people; by knowledge and skill, those who educate and heal and those who produce things useful for life; in respect of money, those who take charge of the [for] use of money; and by bodily aid those benefit who ward off harm and come to the aid of those being struck, and in such mishaps.
20| [section 18_col1] The outcome of things — the causes. The outcome of things is divided into four kinds: things reach their outcome by law, whenever a decree is made and the law brings it to completion; things reach their outcome by nature, such as the day, the year, and the seasons. Things reach their outcome by craft, such as the builder's craft — for one completes a house — and shipbuilding — for one completes ships. Things reach an outcome by chance whenever the result turns out otherwise than one supposes. Of the outcome of things, then, one kind is by law, one by nature, one by craft, one by chance. [section 48_col2] The outcome of things — the causes. Each of the things that are is brought to completion through four causes: either through chance [as being unpredictable though bearing on what is useful], or through knowledge, or through nature, or through force and necessity. Things that come about through chance are what is completed of itself and without forethought; things that come about through knowledge are houses and ships and all such things; things that come about through nature are, for example, human beings and trees and all animals; and through force and necessity, for example, the taming of irrational animals, and their subjugation, and mastery over slaves, and tyrannies, and such things.
21| [section 19_col1] Power. Power is divided into four kinds: one is what we can do by thought, [for example] to reason and to suppose; another is what we can do by the body, such as to walk and to give and to take, and things of that sort; a third is what we can do by a multitude of soldiers and money, from which a king is said to have great power; and the fourth division of power is being acted on and acting well or badly, such as being ill and being educated and becoming healthy and all such things. Power, then, is partly in thought, partly in the body, partly in an army and in money, and partly in acting and being acted on. [section 33_col2] Power. Power is divided into five: for one part of it is in the soul, one in the body, one in actions, one in some things that are not, and one in being acted on or acting. In the soul are the things we learn and think; in the body are, for example, motions and the other powers by which we are able to do something with the body; in actions are, for example, military powers — for a person is said to have great power when money and many soldiers have been gathered together. Among things that are not, power belongs to some of them, namely as many as are capable of coming to be or being made; and in being acted on or acting, as many as are capable of being destroyed or of destroying.
22| [section 20_col1] Kindness to people. There are three kinds of kindness to people: one that comes about through addressing others, as when some people greet everyone they meet and, taking their right hand, hail them; another kind, when someone is ready to help everyone who has met with misfortune; and there is another kind of kindness to people, in which some are fond of giving dinners. Kindness to people, then, is partly through addressing others, partly through doing good, and partly through entertaining and enjoying company. [section 21_col1] Happiness.
23| Happiness is divided into five parts: one part of it is good deliberation, another is good perception and health of body, a third is good fortune in actions, a fourth is good reputation among people, and a fifth is abundance of money and of what is useful for life. Good deliberation comes from education and from becoming experienced in many things. Good perception comes from the parts of the body — for example, if someone sees with the eyes and hears with the ears and perceives with the nose and mouth what needs to be perceived; that sort of thing is good perception. Good fortune is when a person acts on what he has in view, succeeding in doing what the serious person ought to do; good reputation is when someone is well spoken of. Abundance is when someone is so disposed toward the uses of life that he can both do good to friends and discharge public duties generously and abundantly. Whoever has all these is completely happy. Happiness, then, consists partly in good deliberation, partly in good perception and health of body, partly in good fortune, partly in good reputation, and partly in abundance. [section 22_col1] Crafts — Sciences.
24| Crafts are divided into three: one is first, one second, one third. First, then, is mining and woodcutting, for these are preparatory. Bronze-working and carpentry are transformative: bronze-working makes weapons out of iron, and carpentry makes pipes and lyres out of wood. The using craft, such as horsemanship, uses bridles; the military craft uses weapons; music uses pipes and the lyre. Of craft, then, there are three kinds: one first, one second, one third. [section 53_col2] Crafts — Sciences. The sciences [of the first and of the second] are divided into three: for some of them are first, some second, some third. First, then, are the preparatory ones — mining, woodcutting, and stone-cutting; second are the productive and transformative ones, such as bronze-working, which takes iron and reshapes and makes it into bridles and weapons and things of that sort, and carpentry, which takes wood and reshapes and makes it into pipes and ships and houses and things of that sort, and stone-working, which takes stones and reshapes and makes them into walls and houses and things of that sort. Third, again, are the using crafts: horsemanship takes the bridle and uses it well, and the military craft uses weapons, and so on for such things; and again flute-playing takes the pipes and uses them well, and piloting takes the rudder, and so on for the other such things.
25| [section 23_col1] The good. The good is divided into four kinds: one of which we say is the person who possesses virtue, good in his own right; another we say is virtue itself and justice, that these are good; a third is, for example, suitable food and exercise and medicines; and a fourth we say is good, such as flute-playing and acting and things of that sort. Of the good, then, there are four kinds: one is possessing virtue, another is virtue itself, a third is beneficial food and exercise, and a fourth we call good is flute-playing and acting and poetic craft. [section 36_col2] The good. The good is divided into four: for one part of it is virtue and justice, one is the person who possesses virtue, one is the advantageous, and one is the pleasant and what produces enjoyment — virtue and justice, because each of these is said to be good; the person who possesses virtue, such as a horse or a man or things of that sort, for each of these too is said to be good if it possesses virtue. The advantageous is, for example, exercise and medication and all the other things conducive to health and good condition, for each of these too is said to be good for whomever it benefits. And the pleasant and what produces enjoyment — for example, an actor and a flute-player — is said to be good not because it benefits but because it gives pleasure [to be good].
26| [section 24_col1] Existing things. Of existing things, some are bad, some are good, and some are neither. Of these we call bad the things capable of always harming, such as lack of self-control, folly, injustice, and things of that sort; and the things opposite to these are good; and some things sometimes benefit and sometimes harm, such as walking and sitting and eating, [or] things wholly incapable of either benefiting or harming — these, then, are neither good nor bad. Of existing things, then, some are good, some are bad, and some are neither of these. [section 55_col2] Existing things. Each of existing things is divided into three: for it is either good or bad or neither. The good, then, is whatever benefits someone and does not harm; the bad is whatever always harms; and the neither is whatever will sometimes harm and sometimes benefit, such as walks and sleep and hellebore and things of that sort, or will neither harm at all nor benefit. [section 25_col1] Good order. Good order is divided into three: one, if the laws are good, we say is good order; another, if the citizens abide by the established laws, we also say this is good order; and a third, if, there being no laws, they conduct their civic life well according to customs and practices, we also call this good order. Of good order, then, one part is that the laws be good; another is that they abide by the existing laws; and a third is that they conduct their civic life by good customs and practices.
27| [section 14_col2] Good order. Good order is divided into three: one part of it is to use good laws; one part is, if the existing laws are not base, [not] to obey them; one part is to conduct public life by good customs, if there are no written laws. [section 26_col1] Lawlessness. Lawlessness is divided into three: one is when the laws are bad, both toward foreigners and toward citizens; another is when people do not obey the laws in place; another is when there is no law at all. Of lawlessness, then, one part is that the laws are bad; another is when people do not obey the existing laws; a third is when there is no law. [section 15_col2] Lawlessness. Lawlessness is divided into three: one part of it is to make use of bad and mediocre laws; one part is not obeying the laws laid down, if they are good; one part is conducting public life by bad customs, if there are no laws at all. [section 27_col1] Opposites.
28| Opposites are divided into three. For instance, we say goods are opposite to evils, as justice to injustice and practical wisdom to folly, and the like. Evils are opposite to evils, as extravagance to stinginess, and being tortured unjustly to being tortured justly; such evils are opposite to evils. And heavy is opposite to light, fast to slow, black to white, as neutral things opposite to neutral things. Of opposites, then, some are opposite as goods to evils; some as evils to evils; some as neutral things to neutral things. [section 23_col2] Opposites. Opposites are divided into three. For one kind of them is as good to evil, as health to disease and beauty to ugliness, and the like; another is as neutral to neutral, as whiteness to blackness and lightness to heaviness, and the like; another is as a thing-to-be-avoided to a thing-to-be-avoided, as extravagance to stinginess, heat to cold, and thinness to fatness, and the like. [section 28_col1] Goods.
29| Of goods there are three kinds. Some are things that can be possessed, some are things that can be shared in, some are things that must belong. Things that can be possessed are those it is possible to have, as justice and health. Things that can be shared in are those it is not possible to have, but it is possible to share in them; for instance, the good itself is not something it is possible to have, but it is possible to share in it. Things that must belong are those it is possible neither to share in nor to have, but which must belong; for instance, being good and being just are goods. And these are neither things one can have nor things one can share in, but being good and being just must belong. Of goods, then, some are things possessed, some things shared in, some things that must belong. [section 29_col1] Deliberative advice. Deliberative advice is divided into three: one part of it is drawn from past times, one from future times, one from present times. What is drawn from the past consists of examples, as what the Spartans suffered by trusting. What is drawn from present circumstances is, for instance, pointing out that the walls are weak, the men cowardly, the grain supply small. What is drawn from the future is, for instance, urging by way of suspicion that the embassies not be wronged, so that Greece does not become disreputable. Of deliberative advice, then, some is drawn from the past, some from the present, some from the future.
30| [section 18_col2] Deliberative advice. Deliberative advice is divided into three: one part of it is from the past, one from the present, one from the future. What is from the past is, for instance, when examples show that people before us, by disobeying, fell into irreparable evils. What is from the present is, for instance, when present circumstances show that if our walls are unrepaired and we are unarmed, while our enemies are equipped with all these things, we must consider how we will be able to fight. What is from the future is, for instance, pointing out what will result, saying: see to it that, if the enemy sails against us, your land is not destroyed and the bodies of many are not wasted in vain, and that you are not compelled, no less than now, to do these very things which it is now possible for you to do without danger. [section 30_col1] Sound. Sound is divided into two: one part of it is ensouled, one soulless. Ensouled sound is the voice of animals; soulless sound is notes and noises. Of ensouled sound, one kind is articulate, one inarticulate. The articulate is that of human beings, the inarticulate that of animals. Of sound, then, one kind is ensouled, one soulless.
31| [section 24_col2] Sound. Sound is divided into four: one part of it is ensouled, one soulless, and one articulate, one inarticulate. Ensouled sound is that of animals; soulless sound is, for instance, echoes and noises and the sound of the lyre and the pipes. Articulate is the voice of human beings and of certain animals, as nightingales, swallows, sparrows, and the like; inarticulate is the unstructured kind, as clicking sounds, echoes, noises, and the like. [section 31_col1] Beings. Of beings, some are divisible, some indivisible. Of the divisible, some are of like parts, some of unlike parts. Things without parts are those that admit no division and are not composed of anything, as the unit, the point, and a musical note. Divisible things are those composed of something, as syllables, chords, animals, water, and gold. Things of like parts are those composed of like elements, where the whole differs from the part in nothing but quantity, as water, gold, and everything molten, and the like. Things of unlike parts are those composed of unlike parts, as a house and the like. Of beings, then, some are divisible, some without parts; and of the divisible, some are of like parts, some of unlike parts.
32| [section 26_col2] Beings. Again, of beings, some are divisible, some without parts, and of the divisible, some are of like parts, some of unlike parts. Divisible things are whatever admits division, as a house, a cloak, silver, a possession, and the like; things without parts are whatever is indivisible, as the unit, the point, the mark, a musical note, and the like. And of divisible things, then, some are of like parts, whose parts too are alike, as water, fire, bronze, and the like; some are of unlike parts, whose parts are unlike, as a house and the like. [section 32_col1] Beings. Of beings, some are said in their own right, some relative to something. Things said in their own right are those that need no addition in their description; these would be, for instance, man, horse, and the other animals. For none of these requires interpretation through something else. Of things said relatively, those that need some addition in their description, as the greater than something, and the faster than something, and the finer, and the like; for the greater is greater than something less, and the faster is faster than something. Of beings, then, some are in their own right, some said relative to something. Thus also the first things were divided, according to Aristotle.
33| [section 67_col2] Beings. Among beings, some exist in their own right, while others are relative. Now those that exist in their own right are things like man, house, garment, gold, and everything that simply speaking is not necessarily what it is by being something else, while the relative ones are things like the double and knowledge — for the double is spoken of in relation to the half, and knowledge in relation to something else. [book B] [section 3] Vice. Vice is divided into four. For one part of it is folly, one is injustice, one is cowardice, one is licentiousness. Folly is in the rational part, injustice occurs in all these parts, cowardice is in the spirited part, licentiousness is in the appetitive part. Of vice, then, one part is folly, one is injustice, one is cowardice, one is licentiousness. [section 6] Evils. Evils are divided into three. For some of them are in the soul, some in the body, some external. Those in the soul are things like folly, injustice, cowardice, licentiousness, and other such things; those in the body are things like disease, weakness, ugliness, enmity, and other such things; those external are things like poverty, enemies, a city's disrepute, and other such things. Of evils, then, some are in the soul, some in the body, some external.
34| [section 9] Ignorance. Ignorance is divided into three. For one part of it concerns the theoretical, one the practical, one the productive. The ignorance concerning the theoretical is the ignorance found in theoretical studies, that concerning the productive is that found in productions, that concerning the practical is that found in actions. Of ignorance, then, one part concerns the theoretical, one the productive, one the practical. [section 11] Low birth. Low birth is divided into three. For one part of it is being born from parents who are disreputable and base, one is being born from parents who are unjust and wicked, one is from the very vice of the person who has it. Being born from disreputable and base ancestors is, for example, when the ancestors are ignoble by nature or otherwise obscure. Being born from unjust and depraved ancestors is, for example, when they are traitors or have some other injustice and depravity. Being from the very vice of the person who has it is, for example, when he himself is unjust or a wrongdoer, or people hold some other bad opinion of him. Of low birth, then, one part is being born from disreputable and base ancestors, one is being born from unjust and depraved ancestors, one is from the very vice and depravity of the person who has it.
35| [section 12] Motion. Motion is divided into three. For one part of it is motion in place, one is motion by alteration, one is motion in its own right. Motion in place is shifting from place to place, as with those who run, jump, sail, and other such motions. Motion by alteration is as with those who grow, age, waste away, and other such things. Motion in its own right is as with wheels, spinning tops, the universe, and other such things. Of motion, then, one part is in place, one is by alteration, one is in its own right. [section 13] Rest. Rest is divided into three. For one part of it is staying still, one is discord, one is the assessment of the heavy and the light. Staying still is being at rest in itself, as is the condition of the dead and of stones, and other such things. Discord is that of citizens, or enemies, or other animals, arising from enmity or fighting. The assessment of the heavy and the light is, for example, testing the heavy and the light by means of a balance.
36| [section 19] Time. Time is divided into three. For it is either past, or present, or future — which they also call 'about to be.' In the past there are memories and the act of remembering, for everyone remembers past things. In the present there are the sciences, and forms of knowledge, and calculations, and the actions being performed. In the future there are expectations and hopes and everything of that kind. [section 21] The desire to act. The desire to act is divided into three. For one part of it is for the pleasant, one for the fine, one for the advantageous. The desire for the pleasant is serving one's appetites; the desire for the fine is for the sake of honor and good repute; the desire for the advantageous arises for the sake of gain and benefit. [section 22] The naming of beings.
37| The division of the naming of beings falls into five. For the things said of them are spoken of either as one in relation to many, or as many in relation to many and to one, or as unlike [as] in relation to like, or as like in relation to like, or as one in relation to one. Now those spoken of as one in relation to many are, for example, 'swiftest,' 'greatest,' 'finest,' and such things. Those spoken of as many in relation to many and to one are, for example, 'these are more than those,' 'these are greater than those,' 'these are finer than those,' and other such things. Those spoken of as unlike [as] in relation to like ⟨are such-and-such; and those spoken of⟩ as like in relation to like are, for example, 'brothers' in relation to brothers, and 'friends' in relation to friends, and such things. Those spoken of as one in relation to one are, for example, 'this one is finer than that one,' 'this one is faster than that one,' and such things. Beings are divided into three. For some of them are in respect of substance, some in respect of accident, some in respect of affection. Those in respect of substance are, for example, being a man and each of the beings' being what it is; those in respect of accident are, for example, running and sleeping and other such things; that in respect of affection is, for example, feeling pleasure and feeling pain and feeling confident and feeling afraid and such things.
38| [section 25] Beings. Beings are divided into three. For some of them are in respect of substance, some in respect of accident, some in respect of affection. Those in respect of substance are, for example, being a man and each of the beings' being what it is; those in respect of accident are, for example, running and sleeping and other such things; that in respect of affection is, for example, feeling pleasure and feeling pain and feeling confident and feeling afraid and such things. [section 27] The division of the better, etc. The division of the better and the worse, and the finer and the uglier, and the whiter and the blacker: each of these is spoken of in three ways — either in relation to its opposite, or to itself, or to a mean. For example, the good is said to be better than its opposite, as practical wisdom is better than cunning and folly; and the good is said to be better than the mean, as of that which is neither good nor bad; and a thing is said to be better than itself insofar as it is good compared to something good, if the other is less so. Likewise too with the fine: for it is said to be finer than the ugly, and finer than that which is neither ugly nor fine, and it is also said to be finer than a thing that is fine but less so. Likewise too the whiter is spoken of: for the white is said to be whiter than the black, and whiter than that which is neither black nor white, which is the mean. And in the case of the other things spoken of in this way, the same manner must be said to hold. So it is in three ways that a thing is called better and worse, finer and uglier, whiter and blacker.
39| [section 28] The elements that a city is administered from. The elements from which a city is administered are divided into three. For one of them consists in the fighting part of mankind, one in the part capable of deliberating, and one in the part that works. Now the fighting part is the vigorous part, the part capable of deliberating is that of the older men, and the working part is that of the craftsmen and farmers and others of that sort. If any of these is absent, the city is not easily administered. [section 29] Coming-to-be. Coming-to-be is divided into four. For one kind of it is changing from not-being into substance, as when a son who did not exist comes to be, and a statue that did not exist comes to be, and all such cases; one is changing from place to place and being placed in another, as with those who sail and those who journey and everything of that sort; one is a change of state and disposition, as when one becomes educated from being uneducated, and an old man from being young, and a friend from being an enemy; and one is a change of circumstances, as when one becomes poor from being rich, and a ruler from being a private citizen, and a private citizen from being a ruler, and other such cases.
40| [section 30] The true. The true is divided into three. For one part of it is the thing's being true, one is the account's being true, and one is both together. A thing is true when it is so and not otherwise, as that god is immortal; for the thing is so and not otherwise. And to say 'this is a true account' is true of the true; for the account is a thing that falls under this account. And to say that human beings are ensouled — both the account is true and the thing. [section 31] Falsehood. Falsehood is divided into three. For one part of it is the thing's being false, one is the account's, and one is both together. Now the thing is false when it is not as it is said to be but otherwise, as that the one sitting is standing, or the white is black. And the account will be false when someone says that a true account is false, as when one speaks the account concerning god [as when one speaks], that god is immortal, and someone claiming this to be false — that account is false; for there is no thing at all falling under this account, only the account. But whoever says that day is night will state both the thing and the account to be false.
41| [section 32] Honor. Honor is divided into three. For one part of it is in terms of monetary value, one in terms of praise, and one in terms of a certain service and care. Now the part in terms of monetary value is worth in selling and buying, as when we say things are worth their price. The part in terms of praise [is], as the honors given in cities for certain actions, and gifts bestowed. The part in terms of service and care is, for instance, that we honor god by a certain service and care, and we honor our parents likewise, and similarly the other things done through service. [section 34] The judgment of the sciences. The judgment of the sciences is divided into three. For one part of it holds if they concern better or finer things, one if they concern things more useful and more pressing, and one if they concern things more exact and more directed toward demonstration. Now the part concerning better and finer things is, for instance, the art of statue-making and the art of image-making and the art of dyeing purple and such arts. The part concerning useful and more pressing things is, for instance, the art of equipment-making [equipment-craft] and building and such arts. The part concerning more exact things and more directed toward demonstration is the mathematical sciences and philosophy.
42| [section 35] The general. The general is divided into three. For one is a general by law, or one by a certain power and mastery of affairs, or one by knowledge. Now the one by law is, for instance, those chosen in the cities; the one by knowledge is he who possesses the knowledge of generalship; the one by a certain power and mastery of affairs is, for instance, one appointed by someone, or one who has become master of money and soldiers by himself, on his own authority. [section 37] The methods directed at problems. The methods directed at problems are divided into three. For some of them are critical, some theoretical, and some contentious. Critical are those by which we distinguish the better from the worse, as whether justice or courage is better. Theoretical are those by which we examine such a question as whether disease is the same as health and good condition, or not. Contentious are those by which we demolish definitions, as that the best condition of bodies is not good condition. [section 38] Pain.
43| Pain is divided into three. For one part of it is felt over the things it is fitting for the prudent person to be pained at, one is felt over [the goods and evils belonging to others and] the other things that are of no concern to us at all. Now the part felt over the things it is fitting for the prudent person to be pained at is, for instance, over one's own misfortunes, or those of one's own relatives or friends, or of the city as a whole, and over other such things. The part felt over [the goods belonging to others is a kind of envy and malice and everything of that sort; and the part felt over all evils and goods and all] the other things that are of no concern to us at all — the part felt over the evils belonging to others is pity, and the part felt over their goods is envy [, and the part felt over the other things of no concern to us at all is envy and malice]. [section 39] Pleasure. Pleasure is divided into four. For one part of it concerns the rational element, one concerns the spirited element, one concerns the appetitive element, and one concerns the perceptions. Now the [learning] pleasure concerning the rational element is that which comes from learning and discovering, and things of that sort. The pleasure concerning the spirited element is, for instance, that of mastering and conquering and taking revenge, and pleasures of that sort. The pleasures concerning the appetitive element are those arising from food and sexual intercourse and such things. The [perceptual] pleasure concerning the perceptions is, for instance, that which comes through seeing and tasting and smelling, and pleasures of that sort.
44| [section 40] Good order. Good order is divided into four. For one part of it concerns the soul, one concerns the body, one concerns the multitude, and one concerns motions. Now the good order arising in the soul is called orderliness, the good order in the body is called beauty, the good order in motion is named good rhythm, and the good order in the multitude, for instance obedience toward rulers, is called good order. [section 41] Disorder. Disorder is divided into four. For one part of it is in the soul, one in the body, one in the multitude, and one in motion. Now the disorder arising in the soul is called profligacy or licentiousness, the disorder in the body is called ugliness, the disorder in the multitude is called disobedience, and the disorder in motion is named bad rhythm. [section 42] Problems in philosophy.
45| Philosophical problems are divided into five kinds. For one of them is political, one dialectical, one natural, one ethical, one rhetorical. Political is what is proposed concerning laws and certain punishments, for example whether one ought to punish offenses against foreigners or offenses against citizens, or dissimilar offenses, or other such things. Dialectical, for example whether the same knowledge applies to contraries or a different one, and other such things. Natural, for example whether there is one world-order or several, and other such things. Ethical, for example whether one ought to gratify friends in everything, or in some things but not others, and other such things. Rhetorical, for example if someone accuses or defends on behalf of poets — for example, why did Odysseus's companions, though he was the most prudent of men, put him ashore asleep on the island — and such things. [section 43] Punishment. Punishment is divided into four. For one part of it is removal, one a matter of a sum of money, one a matter of degradation, one a matter of bodily maltreatment. Removal is, for example, in the case of incurable offenses, which is called retribution. Those that are a matter of a sum of money are, for example, the fines by which the laws punish. Those that are a matter of degradation are, for example, the disenfranchisements that occur in cities — for example, that a man who has thrown away his shield, or embezzled a deposit, be disenfranchised, and the other legal disenfranchisements. Those that are a matter of bodily maltreatment are, for example, those who flog and those who revile, and such people.
46| [section 45] Error. Error is divided into three. For one part of it is committed with injustice, one with ignorance, one with misfortune. To err with injustice is, for example, to be impious toward god, and to treat friends badly, and the wrongdoings that occur in cities; to err with ignorance is, for example, in grammar and arithmetic and such branches of knowledge — for these come about not with injustice but with ignorance. To err with misfortune is, for example, the case of those who miss their target, and those who miss their way, and those who err involuntarily. [section 46] Misfortune. Misfortune is divided into three. For one part of it lies in actions, one in occasions, one in chance occurrences that happen of themselves. To be unfortunate in actions is to be harmed and to suffer loss; to be unfortunate in occasions is to come too late, and too early, and to miss [the] due moment [and] [occurring]; to be unfortunate in chance occurrences that happen of themselves is, for example, the sudden blows and the harms that befall one from the unexpected. [section 47] Private goods and goods held in common.
47| Private and common goods are divided into five. For some of them are private to god, some private to humans, some common to god and humans, some common to humans and the other animals except god, and some common to all. Private to god is being eternal, and such things; private to a human is being temperate and just, and such things; common to god and humans is being excellent — for it belongs both to god and to an excellent human being to be excellent. Private to a human is self-control, which is a turning away from some evil, whereas for god it is right to say that evil neither comes to be nor exists; and other such things. Common to humans and the other animals except god is courage — for this is a resisting of some danger and fear; and all such things. Common to all is the fine. [section 49] The telling of falsehoods. The telling of falsehoods.
48| The telling of falsehoods is divided into four. For one part of it lies in boastfulness, one in irony, one in mockery, one in a telling of falsehoods that involves harm. The boaster lies toward more and greater — for he is one who pretends, wanting to know what he does not know and to have what he does not have. The one being ironic lies toward less — for the rich man, if he is being ironic, says he is poor, and the wise man says he is not wise. The one telling falsehoods in mockery does so along with jesting — for example, one who calls defeat victory, or calls the bad fine, and the uneducated wise. The one who lies with harm is, for example, one who bears false witness, and one who denies a debt, and other such people. [section 50] The liar. The liar is divided into two. For one lies willingly, the other unwillingly. The one who lies willingly deceives some people and creates deception in others; the one who lies unwillingly, having himself been deceived, lies on account of the deception that is in him. [section 54] Purification and cleansing.
49| Purification and cleansing are divided into three. For one part of them is by law, one by nature, one by craft and by matter. By law, then, purification is . . . (text breaks off) . . . by nature, for example, that of the air, when it clears, and when the waters are clean, and foods, and all such things. By craft and by matter, for example, the washing of bronze vessels and of garments, and such things. [section 56] The similarity of goods [that exist].
50| The similarity of goods [that exist] — those concerning the soul, those concerning the body, and those that are external — is as follows: the first are similar to the first, the second to the second, the third to the third, the fourth to the fourth. Some goods are in the soul, some in the body, some external. For practical wisdom, being in the soul, is the cause of the soul's being disposed in the best way; good condition is the cause of the body's being disposed best; good reputation is the cause of external things being disposed best — for the man of good reputation does what he wishes. Each of these goods, then, plays the leading role, and it is by this that the similarity is first grasped. And again, justice is in the soul and is the cause of order among the parts of the soul, while comeliness, being in the body, is good order among the parts of the body — the cold and the hot and the dry and the wet — and good fortune, being external, is a kind of good timing in the coincidence of affairs. So by this too the similarity of these goods is grasped. And again, courage, being in the soul, is a kind of strength and vigor against fears and such things, while strength, being in the body, is strength against toils and hardships, and friends, being external, provide this same strength for help from outside — for the man who has many friends is stronger in the city. By this too the similarity of these goods is grasped. And again, temperance, being in the soul, adorns the soul and makes it live in due measure, while beauty, being in the body, adorns the body and renders it well-proportioned, and wealth, being external, is a provider and adorner of human beings. By this too the similarity of these goods is grasped.
51| [section 57] The resemblance of evils. The resemblance of the evils concerning the soul, the body, and external things is this: in the soul there is injustice, which disposes the soul in the worst way; in the body there is disease, which disposes the body in the worst way; and among external things there is misfortune, which disposes external actions in the worst way. And it is in this respect that the resemblance among these evils is taken. Again, in the soul folly is a kind of sickness and an irrationality of the soul, while in the body a bad bodily condition is a sickness, and among external things it is ill repute; for ill repute produces a kind of degradation, sickness, and neglect with regard to other things in one's external actions. And it is again in this respect that the resemblance among these evils is taken. Again, cowardice, being in the soul, makes souls panic-stricken and inferior to every fear, while weakness in the body makes bodies give way under every hardship, and among external things enemies make a man weak with regard to external actions and easy to despise; for a man with many enemies finds nothing comes easily to him. And cowardice makes people easy to despise in the face of fear, while weakness makes the body easy to despise in the face of hardships, and enmity does so in the actions of life. Again, prodigality and licentiousness make the soul shameful and disordered, while bodily ugliness, being in the body, makes the body shameful and disordered, and poverty, being external, makes life shameful. And it is in this respect that the resemblance among these evils is taken.
52| [section 59] The loss of knowledge. The loss of knowledge is divided into three. For one case is when that of which there is knowledge is destroyed, another is when forgetting occurs, and another is when the one who has the knowledge is destroyed. Now if that of which there is knowledge is destroyed — for example Socrates — there is no longer knowledge, for it has been destroyed. And if forgetting occurs, in this way too we lose the knowledge. And if the man who has the knowledge is destroyed, it is necessary that the knowledge be destroyed along with him and be lost. [section 64] Animals — genus and species.
53| We must examine what the difference among animals is with respect to one another. We say, then, that of animals some are mortal and some are immortal. Mortal are those whose nature it is to perish and to share in blood, such as man and ox and animals of that kind; immortal are, for example, angels. Of mortal animals, some are winged, some are aquatic, and some are land-dwelling. Land-dwelling are, for example, man, dog, horse, and such; aquatic are ... and such, and in general those whose way of life is in water; winged are, for example, birds and wasps and bees, and all the others [such] that are borne through the air by their own nature. All such things seem to differ from one another both in soul and in body. That "animal" is predicated of all of these in common is clear; but each of them has some differentia, as we have said, for one of them is land-dwelling, another aquatic, another winged, another immortal. And what is predicated in common of all of them we say is the genus. Each of these is an animal, but the animals as divided must be called species.
54| The same holds in the same way for shape and for number. For of the triangle and the rest we say that shape is common, since each of these is precisely something that is a shape. It is clear, then, that shape would be a genus of these, and these are species of shape; for we shall divide shape into triangle and quadrilateral and the rest. Likewise the odd and the even are species of number, for number is predicated of them in common. And since the genus seems . . . to be prior to the species, and "prior" is not said in a single sense, let us speak about it. [section 65] The prior — the posterior.
55| "Prior" is said in five ways. For a thing will be called prior either by nature, or in time, or in potentiality, or in position, or in order. In position, for example, is the sort of thing we are accustomed to say of counters set out, that this one is prior to that one. In order, for example, the commander of a battalion is prior to the captain of a company, and the captain of a company is prior to the private, and A is prior to B. In potentiality we say the general is prior to the soldier, and in general the man in power is prior to the private citizen. In time, for example, father is prior to son, and everything older is prior to what is younger. By nature prior is, for example, the unit is prior to the pair, and the part is prior to the whole, and the genus is prior to the species; and in general, whatever things do not reciprocally imply each other's destruction — of these, whichever one, when destroyed, carries the other along with it in destruction is prior, while what is by nature destroyed along with the other is posterior. For example, when the unit is destroyed, the pair is destroyed, and every number, but when the pair is destroyed, nothing prevents the unit from existing; therefore the unit is prior by nature to the pair. Likewise, when the part is destroyed the whole is destroyed, but when the whole does not exist, nothing prevents the part from existing. And it is clear that in as many ways as "prior" is said, in that many ways "posterior" too will be said; for we shall speak of the posterior either by nature, or in time, or in position, or in order, or in potentiality.
56| [section 66] The simultaneous. In as many ways as "prior" and "posterior" are said, in that many ways "simultaneous" too will be spoken of — either by nature, or in position, or in potentiality, or in time, or in order. In position, then, such things are simultaneous as are equal in place, for example we say that things running are simultaneous, and things standing still. In order such things are simultaneous as, for example, those who stand in the same rank. In potentiality we call simultaneous things that are capable of nothing more than one another. In time we say such things are simultaneous as exist at the same time. And by nature we must call simultaneous both things that reciprocally imply each other's destruction and things that cannot exist apart from one another, for example the double and the half; for these reciprocally imply each other's destruction, and it is impossible for the one to exist apart from the other, since if the double is destroyed there will be no half, and if the half is destroyed there will be no double, and it is impossible, when the double exists, for there to be no half. Now that these things have been demonstrated in this way, it is consistent next to speak about the things that are. [section 68] The contraries.
57| The contraries are divided as follows. Of things that are, some have a contrary, others do not. To gold, for example, and to man and to a garment and such things nothing is contrary, but to virtue and to the good and to the hot there is something contrary; for to the good the contrary is the bad, to virtue vice, and to the hot the cold. Now of contraries themselves, some have an intermediate, others do not. Between the good and the bad there is something intermediate, but between motion and rest there is nothing intermediate, for of necessity everything either is in motion or is at rest. And between life and death there is nothing intermediate, for of necessity whatever is capable of receiving life either lives or has died. | The contraries themselves are spoken of in three ways: either as good is contrary to bad, for example injustice to justice and licentiousness to temperance and such things; or as one thing that is neither good nor bad is contrary to another that is neither good nor bad (for example [text breaks off]) — for none of these is either bad or good; or as bad is contrary to bad, [bad] namely excess to deficiency, and the things spoken of in terms of excess and deficiency, for example being excessively chilled is contrary to being excessively heated, for these are spoken of in terms of excess; and the deficient degree of heat is contrary to the deficient degree of cold, for these too are contraries in terms of deficiency.
58| [section 69] On affirmation and negation. After this, then, we must examine how we speak of affirmation. We say, then, that every predication by which we show that something belongs is an affirmation, for example that the man is sitting, or that the garment is white, and everything said in this manner. Negation is such a thing as that the man is not sitting, and that the garment is not white, and in general that to which the addition of "not" or "no" signifies that something does not belong.