Clement of Alexandria · a new plain-English translation from the original language
It is far indeed from the case that the man who is put to the test in such piety should be quick either to lie or to swear an oath. For an oath is a determining affirmation with the additional assumption of the divine. But how could the man who is once for all faithful render himself unfaithful, so as to have need even of an oath, rather than have his very life stand, firmly and determinately, as an oath for him? He lives and conducts himself as a citizen, and shows the fidelity of his affirmation in a life and a word that never shift and stand fast. And if the doing of wrong lies in the judgment of the one acting and speaking, and not in the experience of the one wronged, he will neither lie nor swear falsely as one wronging the divine, knowing this to be by nature harmless; but neither will he lie or transgress anything for the sake of his neighbor, whom indeed he has learned to love, even if that person happens not to be an intimate; and for his own sake he will still less lie or swear falsely, since of his own will he could never be found unjust even toward himself. But he will not even swear, choosing to set, over assent, only the word "yes," and over denial, the word "no." For to swear an oath is either this, or else it is to bring forward, in effect, from one's very mind, something equivalent to an oath.
It suffices for him, then, either to his assent or to his denial, to add "I speak truly," as a demonstration for those who do not clearly perceive the firmness of his answer. For, I think, one must have, toward outsiders, a life so trustworthy that not even an oath is asked of him, and toward himself and those who understand, a good conscience, which is a justice chosen freely. Accordingly the Gnostic is one who keeps his oath, yet is not prone to swearing — one who rarely arrives at swearing, and even then only in the manner we have described. And yet speaking truly in accordance with an oath comes about together with an agreement in respect of the true; keeping one's oath, then, results from rightness in matters of duty. Where, then, is there still any need of an oath for the one who lives at the very summit of truth? The man who does not even swear is very far indeed from perjuring himself, while the man who transgresses none of the terms of his agreements would never even have sworn at all, seeing that the ratification both of transgression and of fulfillment lies in deeds — just as, of course, lying and false swearing lie in speaking and swearing contrary to duty. But the man who lives justly, transgressing none of his duties, keeps his oath in his deeds, at the very point where the judgment concerning truth is put to the test; the testimony of the tongue is therefore superfluous for him. Persuaded, then, in every way that God exists always, and reverencing the truth, and knowing that lying is unworthy of himself, he is content with the divine conscience and his own alone; and in this way he does not lie, nor does he act contrary to his agreements, and in this way too he does not swear an oath when one is demanded of him, nor does he ever deny anything, so as not to lie, even should he die under torture.
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