Clement of Alexandria · a new plain-English translation from the original language
What method, then, could be better or clearer as a starting point for this kind of teaching than to go through in speech the name that has been put forward, so plainly that all who share the same language may follow along? Is the name "demonstration," then, like the word "blituri" — a mere sound signifying nothing at all? How could that be, when neither the philosopher nor the orator treats it so? Nay, not even the judge brings forward "demonstration" as a meaningless name, nor does any of the litigants fail to know what it signifies, even if it does not yet exist in the case at hand. At any rate, the philosophers provide for demonstration as something that has real subsistence, each in his own way. If, then, one were to divide correctly concerning anything under inquiry, one could not lead the argument back to any more agreed-upon starting point than to what is acknowledged, from the common name, by all who share a nation and a language alike. Then, setting out from there, one must necessarily inquire whether the thing signified — the thing the argument concerns — actually exists or not; and next, if it should be shown to exist, one must inquire carefully into its nature, what sort of thing it is, and whether perhaps it oversteps the order that has been assigned to it.
But since it is not enough simply to state one's opinion about the matter under inquiry — for the one taking the opposite side is equally free to declare in turn whatever he wishes — one must instead confirm what has been said. If the judgment concerning it is referred back to something equally disputed, and that in turn, likewise, to yet another disputed thing, the process will go on to infinity and remain undemonstrated; but if the confirmation of what is not agreed upon is referred back to something agreed upon by all, that must be made the starting point of the teaching. Every name, then, that is put forward must be translated into an account that is agreed upon and clear to those sharing in the inquiry — an account that will serve as the starting point of the teaching, and that will guide the discovery of what is being sought. Come, then, let the name "sun" be put forward. The Stoics, for their part, say that this is "a form of intelligent fire kindled out of the sea's moisture." Is not their account of it more obscure than the name itself, needing yet another demonstration to show whether it is true? It is better, then, to say, in a common and clear account, that the sun is named "the brightest of the bodies moving through the heaven"; for this account, I think, is more trustworthy and clearer, and agreed upon alike by all.
← All of Clement of Alexandria: Exhortation, Instructor & Miscellanies