Clement of Alexandria · a new plain-English translation from the original language
There are three things concerned with speech: names, which are symbols of thoughts primarily, and secondarily of the things underlying them; second, thoughts, which are likenesses and impressions of the things underlying them (hence thoughts are the same for all, because the same impression from the underlying things comes to be present in everyone, but names are no longer the same for all, because of the differing dialects); and third, the underlying things themselves, from which our thoughts are impressed upon us. Now names are reduced by grammar to twenty-four universal elements, the letters; for the elements must be determined and fixed, since of particulars, being infinite, there can be no science, and it is proper to science to rest upon universal and determinate theorems. Hence particulars are referred back to universals. The business of the philosophers is occupied with thoughts and with the underlying things. But since the particulars among these are infinite, certain elements have been found for these as well, under which everything sought falls. And if a thing appears to fall under one of the elements, or even several, we shall declare that it exists; but if it escapes them all, that it does not exist at all. Of things said, some are said with combination, as 'man runs,' and others are said without combination, as 'man' and 'runs' and whatever does not constitute a complete statement nor has truth or falsehood. Of the things said without combination, some signify substance, some quality, some quantity, some relation, some place, some time, some position, some possession, some action, some being-acted-upon — these we call the elements of the things that exist in matter and come after the first principles. For these are objects of contemplation by reason, whereas the immaterial things are grasped by mind alone, at the first application of thought.
Of the things ranged under the ten categories, some are said in respect of themselves, as the nine categories, and some in respect of something else. And again, of the things under these ten categories, some are synonymous, as 'ox' and 'man,' insofar as both are 'animal'; for synonymous things are those which have a name common to both — 'animal' — and the same definition, that is, the same account, namely, 'an ensouled substance.' Heteronymous things are those which, concerning the same underlying subject, are called by different names, as 'ascent' and 'descent'; for the road is the same, whether one calls it 'upward' or 'downward.' But there is another kind of heteronymous things, such as 'horse' and 'black,' which have both a different name and a different account from one another, and share nothing of the same underlying subject — these should rather be called simply 'different,' not 'heteronymous.' Polyonymous things are those having the same account but a different name, as 'aor,' 'xiphos,' 'phasganon' (all meaning 'sword'). Paronymous things are those named from something else, as 'the courageous man' from 'courage.' Homonymous things are those using the same name but not having the same account, as 'man,' which is used both of the living animal and of a painted figure. Of homonymous things, some are homonymous by chance, as Ajax the Locrian and Ajax the Salaminian; others by design, and of these, some by resemblance, as 'man' said both of the animal and of the painted figure, others by analogy, as 'the feet of Ida' and our own feet, because both are situated below; and others by function, as the 'foot' of a ship, by which the ship sails, and our own foot, by which we move. Things are also called homonymous when they derive from the same source and refer to the same thing, as a physician's book and a physician's scalpel are both called 'medical,' both because they come from the physician who uses them and because they refer to the same medical science.
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