Plutarch · a new plain-English translation from the original language
Such, then, is the recorded history of these men's lives. Since both have left behind many fine examples of political and military virtue, let us first take this point about their military careers: Pericles, dealing with a people who were doing splendidly and were at their greatest in his own time and most flourishing in power, might seem to have come through unscathed and unstumbling on the strength of the common good fortune and might of affairs,
whereas Fabius's actions, undertaken when he took charge of the city in the most disgraceful and most ill-fated of times, did not preserve it safe amid good fortunes, but transformed it from evils into something better. And to Pericles the victories won by Cimon, the war-trophies set up by Myronides and Leocrates, together with the numerous major triumphs that Tolmides achieved, handed over a city in which he, as general, could join the celebration and share in the public rejoicing, rather than one he had to win and guard by war;
but Fabius, seeing many routs and defeats, many deaths and slaughters of supreme commanders and captains — lakes, plains, and woodlands strewn with the bodies of destroyed armies, rivers running with blood and slaughter all the way to the sea, laid hold of the city as it was rushing and plunging headlong in his own time, and by bracing himself against it did not allow it, swept along by their disasters, to be utterly poured out and destroyed.
And yet it would seem not so difficult a thing to manage a city humbled by misfortunes and, under compulsion, obedient to the man of sound judgment, as to throw a bridle of insolence and boldness upon a people puffed up and swelling with good fortune — and it is in this way above all that Pericles appears to have gotten the better of the Athenians. But the magnitude and multitude of the evils that then befell the Romans revealed a man of strong judgment and greatness, one who was neither thrown into confusion nor abandoned his own calculations.
And to Samos, captured by Pericles, one may set the capture of Tarentum, and, by Zeus, to Euboea the cities around Campania — since Capua itself was taken by the consuls Fulvius and Appius. But from a pitched battle Fabius does not appear to have won a victory, except the one from which he drove in his earlier triumph, whereas Pericles set up nine trophies over his enemies by land and by sea,
yet Pericles has no exploit set down to match what Fabius accomplished in snatching Minucius from Hannibal and saving an entire Roman army whole — a fine deed, and one that combines courage together with prudence and goodness alike; just as, again, no blunder is recorded of Pericles such as that which Fabius suffered, outgeneraled by Hannibal through the trick of the oxen, when he caught the enemy by chance and good fortune as it had entered the narrow passes, but let it slip away by night undetected, and by day was forced to yield, being forestalled by one who was about to be mastered and captured—
and mastered instead the one who thought to seize him. But if the good general must not only make use of present circumstances but also correctly divine the future, then for the Athenians the war ended just as Pericles had foreseen and foretold: for by meddling further they destroyed their power. The Romans, on the other hand, contrary to the calculations of Fabius, sent out Scipio against the Carthaginians and mastered all — not by luck, but by the wisdom and courage of a general who conquered the enemy outright by force.
So that in the one case the misfortunes of his country bore witness that he had judged rightly, while in the other his successes convicted him of having been altogether wrong. Yet it is an equal fault in a general to fall into misfortune through failure to anticipate it, and to let slip an opportunity for success through distrust. For it seems that the same inexperience both breeds rashness and takes away courage. So much for their conduct of war.
As for statesmanship, the great charge against Pericles is the war: for it is said that it was brought on by him, since he contended not to yield to the Lacedaemonians. Yet I think that not even Fabius Maximus would have yielded anything to the Carthaginians, but would nobly have stood his ground for the danger risked for supremacy. Still, the fair-mindedness and gentleness of Fabius toward Minucius convicts the factional strife of Pericles against Cimon and Thucydides, good men and of aristocratic sympathies, whom he drove into exile and ostracism.
But the power and dominance of Pericles were greater, and hence he never permitted another commander to inflict disaster on the city through poor judgment, except that Tolmides alone escaped him and, forcing his own way, came to grief against the Boeotians; all the others attached themselves to his judgment and arranged themselves entirely according to it, owing to the greatness of his power.
Fabius, on the other hand, though safe from error in what concerned himself, appears to fall short in his inability to restrain others. For the Romans would not have met with so many disasters if Fabius had had as much power among them as Pericles had at Athens. And indeed, as for greatness of soul with regard to money, the one showed it by taking nothing from those who offered it, the other by giving away much to those in need, ransoming the captives with his own funds.
Yet of these there was no great number, only about six talents; whereas of Pericles one could perhaps not even say how much he might have profited and been courted by allies and kings, since his power allowed it, and yet he kept himself the most incorruptible and the purest of men.
As for the greatness of his works, the temples and the construction of buildings with which Pericles adorned Athens, it is not worth comparing all together the ambitious monuments of Rome before the Caesars, but the grandeur and magnificence of these works held a preeminence surpassing and beyond comparison with those others.