Tertullian · a new plain-English translation from the original language
To take up the actual question of the military crown itself: I think we must first inquire whether military service suits Christians at all. What use is it, after all, to quibble over the incidentals, when the fault lies already in the antecedents? Do we believe it lawful to lay a human oath of allegiance on top of a divine one, and to pledge answer to another master after Christ, and to renounce father and mother and every kinsman — whom the law commanded to be honored, and to be loved next after God, and whom the gospel too, prizing Christ alone above all, likewise honored? Will it be lawful to busy oneself with the sword, when the Lord declares that whoever uses the sword will perish by the sword? And will the son of peace, for whom it is not even fitting to go to law, take part in battle? Will he administer chains and prison and torture and executions, he who is not even to avenge his own wrongs? Then again, will he stand guard duty for others more than for Christ, or even on the Lord's Day, when he would not do so even for Christ? And will he keep watch over temples he has renounced? And will he dine there, where the apostle disapproves? And will he, by night, defend those he drove off by day with exorcisms — leaning and resting upon the very spear that pierced the side of Christ? Will he carry a standard, too, as rival to the standard of Christ? Will he ask a watchword from his commander, when he has already received one from God? Will even his dead body be disturbed by the trumpeter's blast, he who expects to be roused by the trumpet of an angel? And will the Christian be cremated by the custom of the camp — he to whom burning was not even permitted, since Christ has spared him the merits of the fire? How many other things, besides, could be found among the duties of camp life to count as transgression! The very name itself — carrying it over from the camp of light into the camp of darkness — is a transgression. Of course, if faith comes later to find some already caught up in military service, that is a different case — like those whom John used to admit to baptism, or like that most faithful centurion whom Christ approves and whom Peter catechizes — provided that, once faith has been received and sealed, either the man withdraws at once, as many have done, or else he must be endlessly on his guard in every way, lest he commit against God what is not permitted even outside the army, or, last of all, that he suffer for God what a pagan's own loyalty would equally have exacted of him. For military service promises neither impunity for sins nor exemption from martyrdom. The Christian is never anything other than a Christian, anywhere: one gospel, and the same one everywhere — Jesus about to deny every denier and to confess every confessor, about to save the soul lost for his name's sake, and about to destroy, on the other hand, whatever gain was won against his name. To him, the faithful soldier is no more and no less than the faithful pagan is a soldier. The state of faith does not admit of pleas of necessity. There is no necessity to sin for those whose one and only necessity is not to sin. For someone may indeed be pressed by the necessity of torture or of penalties, to sacrifice or flatly deny; but even so discipline does not connive at that necessity, because the necessity of fearing denial and of undergoing martyrdom outweighs the necessity of escaping suffering and fulfilling one's duty. Besides, an argument of this sort undermines the whole substance of the sacrament, loosening even the clasp on voluntary sins — for the will too could then be made out to be a necessity, having, that is to say, its own compulsion. I have set this out in advance for the other cases of official crowns as well, to which the plea of necessity is most familiar — since either the offices are to be fled so we do not fall into sin, or martyrdoms are to be endured so we may break with the offices. On the first point of the question — the unlawfulness of military service itself — I will say no more, so that the second point may have room to be answered; otherwise, if I drove out military service altogether by every possible argument, it would be pointless to have raised the question of the military crown at all. Suppose, then, for the sake of argument, that military service is permitted, right up to the question of the crown.