Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language
1| [1025b] The principles and the causes of beings are sought, but clearly as beings. For there is a cause of health and of good condition, and there are principles and elements and causes of mathematical things, and in general every discursive science, or one that partakes to some degree in thought, is concerned with causes and principles, either more precise or simpler. But all these sciences, marking off for themselves some being and some genus, occupy themselves with this, but not with being without qualification, nor qua being, nor do they give any account of the what-it-is; rather, starting from this — some making it clear by perception, others taking the what-it-is as a hypothesis — they thus demonstrate, more necessarily or more loosely, the things that belong in their own right to the genus with which they are concerned. Hence it is plain that there is no demonstration of substance, nor of the what-it-is, from induction of this kind, but some other manner of making it clear. Likewise they say nothing as to whether the genus with which they deal exists or does not exist, because it belongs to the same act of thought to make the what-it-is clear and to make clear whether it is. And since natural science too happens to be concerned with a certain genus of being (for it is concerned with that substance in which the principle of motion and rest is present in itself), it is clear that it is neither practical nor productive (for of things produced the principle is in the producer — either intellect, or craft, or some power — while of things done the principle is in the one who does them, namely choice —
2| for what is done and what is chosen are the same thing). So that if all thought is either practical, or productive, or theoretical, natural science would be a kind of theoretical science — but theoretical about that sort of being which is capable of motion, and about substance as defined in its account, for the most part, as not separable only. And one must not fail to notice how the essence and the account stand, since without this, to inquire is to accomplish nothing. Now among things defined, and among things that state what a thing is, some are like the snub, others like the concave. These differ in that the snub is taken together with matter (for the snub is a concave nose), while concavity is without perceptible matter.
3| [1026a] If, then, all natural things are spoken of in the same way as the snub — for example, nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and in general animal; leaf, root, bark, and in general plant (for the account of none of these is without motion, but it always has matter) — it is clear how one must seek and define the what-it-is in the case of natural things, and why it belongs to the natural scientist to study even some part of the soul, namely as much of it as is not without matter. That natural science, then, is theoretical, is clear from this; but mathematics too is theoretical. But whether it is concerned with things immovable and separable is not clear at present — though it is clear that some branches of mathematics study their objects as immovable and as separable. But if there is something eternal and immovable and separable, it is clear that knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science — not, however, to natural science (for natural science is concerned with certain movable things), nor to mathematics, but to a science prior to both. For natural science is concerned with things that are separable but not immovable; and some parts of mathematics are concerned with things immovable but perhaps not separable, but as existing in matter; while the first science is concerned with things both separable and immovable. Now all causes must be eternal, but these most of all: for these are the causes of the visible things among the divine.
4| So there would be three theoretical philosophies: mathematics, natural science, and theology (for it is not unclear that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in a nature of this kind), and the most honorable science must concern the most honorable genus. Now the theoretical sciences are more worth choosing than the other sciences, and this one more than the other theoretical sciences. For one might raise the question whether first philosophy is universal, or concerned with some one genus and a single nature (for the case is not the same even among the mathematical sciences: geometry and astronomy are concerned with some particular nature, while the universal mathematical science is common to all of them). Now if there is no substance other than those constituted by nature, natural science would be the first science; but if there is some substance that is unmoved, this would be prior, and would be first philosophy, and would be universal in this way, because it is first. And it would belong to this science to study being qua being — both what it is, and the things that belong to it qua being. But since being spoken of without qualification is spoken of in many ways, one of which was the accidental, another the true (and non-being as the false), and besides these there are the figures of predication (for instance, the what, the of-what-kind, the how-much, the where, the when, and whatever else signifies in this way),
5| [1026b] and besides all these, the potential and the actual — since, then, being is spoken of in many ways, first something must be said about the accidental, namely that there is no theoretical study of it. Here is a sign of this: no science concerns itself with it, whether practical, productive, or theoretical. For the person who builds a house does not make everything that happens to occur along with the house as it comes to be (for these are unlimited: nothing prevents the house that has been made from being pleasant to some, harmful to others, beneficial to others, and different, so to speak, from every other thing that is — and house-building is the making of none of these). In the same way the geometer does not study the attributes that so happen to belong to figures, nor whether a triangle is different from a triangle having its angles equal to two right angles. And this happens reasonably: for the accidental is, in a way, a mere name. That is why Plato, in a way, was not wrong to assign sophistic to the sphere of non-being. For the arguments of the sophists are concerned with the accidental about as much as with anything, such as whether musical and literate are different or the same, and whether musical Coriscus and Coriscus are the same, and whether everything that is, but is not always, has come to be, so that if someone who is musical has become literate, then someone who is literate has thereby become musical, and all the other arguments of this kind are of the same sort;
6| for the accidental appears to be something close to non-being. This is clear also from arguments of the following kind: of things that are in another way, there is coming-to-be and passing-away, but of things that are accidentally there is not. Nevertheless we must still say, so far as is possible, what the nature of the accidental is and through what cause it exists; for perhaps at the same time it will also become clear why there is no science of it. Since, then, among the things that are, some are always in the same state and of necessity — not the necessity spoken of as the forced, but the one we mean by not admitting of being otherwise — while others are neither of necessity nor always, but for the most part, this latter is the starting point and this is the cause of the being of the accidental. For whatever is neither always nor for the most part, this we say is accidental. For example, if in a heat wave there should be a storm and cold, we say this is accidental, but not if there is stifling heat and warmth, because the latter occurs always or for the most part, but not the former. And it is accidental that a man is pale (for this is neither always nor for the most part), but that he is an animal is not accidental.
7| And it is accidental that the builder heals, [1027a] because it does not belong to the builder by nature to do this but to the doctor — but it turned out by accident that the builder was also a doctor. And a cook aiming at pleasure might produce something healthy, but not in virtue of the art of cooking; hence we say it happened by accident, and it does so in a sense but not without qualification. For of other things there are sometimes productive capacities, but of accidental things there is no art nor any determinate capacity; for of things that are or come to be accidentally, the cause too is accidental. So since not all things are or come to be of necessity and always, but most things are for the most part, it is necessary that the accidental exist: for instance, the pale man is neither always nor for the most part musical, but since this sometimes happens, it will be accidental (otherwise everything would be of necessity); so the matter will be the cause that admits of variation, alongside what happens for the most part, of the accidental. But this must be taken as a starting point: whether nothing is either always or for the most part. Or is this impossible? There is, then, something besides these, namely the fortuitous and the accidental. But is it the case that the for-the-most-part belongs to some things while always belongs to none, or are there some eternal things?
8| These questions must be examined later; but that there is no science of the accidental is evident: for every science is of what is always or of what is for the most part — for how else will one learn from another, or teach another? For it must be marked out either by always or by for the most part, as, for example, that honey-water is beneficial to one with a fever, for the most part — but the science will not be able to state the exception, when it is not so, for instance at the new moon; for what happens at the new moon too occurs either always or for the most part, and the accidental lies beside these. What the accidental is, then, and through what cause, and that there is no science of it, has been stated. But that there are starting points and causes that are subject to coming-to-be and passing-away without themselves ever coming to be or passing away, is evident. For if this were not so, everything would be of necessity, if it is necessary that of what comes to be and passes away there be some cause that is not accidental. For will this thing be or not? It will, if this other thing comes to be; but if not, it will not. And this will happen if some other thing does. And thus it is clear that, time always being subtracted from a limited time, we shall arrive at the present moment,
9| [1027b] so that this man will die by disease or by violence, if he goes out; and this, if he becomes thirsty; and this, if something else happens: and thus we shall arrive at what is now present, or at something that has already happened. For example, if he becomes thirsty: this, if he eats pungent food; and this either is the case or is not; so that of necessity he will die or will not die. And likewise, even if one jumps ahead to things that have already happened, the argument is the same; for this already belongs to something, I mean to what has happened: so of necessity all future things will come to be, for instance that the living man will die; for something has already happened, for instance the presence of contraries in the same thing. But if it is by disease or by violence, this is not yet necessary, but only if this other thing occurs. It is clear, then, that the regress goes back to some starting point, but this no longer goes back to anything else. This, then, will be the starting point of what happens by chance, and nothing else will be the cause of its coming-to-be. But into what kind of starting point and what kind of cause this reduction leads — whether as into matter, or as into that for the sake of which, or as into what set the motion going — must especially be considered. Concerning being in the sense of the accidental, then, let it be dismissed (for it has been sufficiently determined); but being as the true, and not-being as the false, since these depend on combination and division, and as a whole concern the division between the two sides of a contradiction (for the true has affirmation in the case of what is combined and negation in the case of what is divided, while the false has the contradictory of this division):
10| But how it comes about that thinking occurs together or separately is another discussion — I mean the "together" and the "separate" such that it is not a succession but becomes some one thing. For falsity and truth are not in the things themselves — as if the good were true and the bad were straightaway false — but in thought; and concerning simple things and what-a-thing-is, not even in thought. What must be examined about being and non-being in this sense must be considered later. But since combination and division are in thought and not in the things, and being in this sense is different from being in the strict sense (for thought either joins or removes what-a-thing-is, or its being-such, or its being-so-much, or something else), we must set aside being as accident and being as true — for the cause of the one is indeterminate, and of the other some affection of thought, [1028a] and both concern the remaining genus of being, and do not show that being has some nature outside them — so these must be set aside, and we must examine the causes and principles of being itself, qua being. It is clear from what we distinguished about how many ways each thing is said, that being is said in many ways.