Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language
1| Being is said in many ways, just as we distinguished earlier in the discussion of how many ways each thing is said. For it signifies, on the one hand, what a thing is and a this-something, and on the other, being-such or being-so-much or each of the other things predicated in this way. Since being is said in this many ways, it is clear that of these the primary being is what a thing is, which signifies substance (for when we say what sort of thing this is, we say it is good or bad, but not three cubits long or a man; but when we say what it is, we say not white nor hot nor three cubits long, but a man or a god), while the other things are called beings because they belong to what is primarily in this way — some being quantities, others qualities, others affections, others something else. Hence one might raise the question whether walking and being healthy and sitting each signify a being, and likewise with any of the other things of this sort; for none of them is either naturally in its own right or capable of being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is the walking thing, the sitting thing, and the healthy thing that are among beings. These appear to be beings to a greater degree because there is something definite underlying them (and this is the substance and the particular thing), which is manifest in a predication of this kind:
2| For the good, or the sitting thing, is not said apart from this. It is clear, then, that it is on account of this that each of those other things exists, so that what is primarily being, and not a being-something but being without qualification, would be substance. Now "primary" is said in many ways; but nevertheless substance is primary in every way — in account, in knowledge, and in time. For of the other predicates none is separable, but this alone is; and it is primary also in account (for the account of substance must be present in the account of each thing); and we think we know each thing most fully when we know what a man is, or what fire is,
3| [1028b] rather than when we know its being-such or its being-so-much or its being-somewhere, since we know each of these latter, too, only when we know what the quantity or the quality is. And indeed the question asked long ago and now and always, and always a puzzle — what being is — is just this: what substance is (for on this point some say it is one, others more than one, and some say a finite number, others an infinite number). Hence for us too, above all and first and, one might almost say, alone, we must investigate what it is that is in this way. Substance seems to belong most evidently to bodies (which is why we say animals and plants and their parts are substances, and natural bodies such as fire and water and earth and each such thing, and whatever are parts of these or composed of these, whether of parts or of all of them, such as the heaven and its parts, the stars and the moon and the sun) — but whether these are the only substances, or there are others too, or some of these and others besides, or none of these but certain others, must be examined. Some think that the limits of a body, such as surface and line and point and unit, are substances, and more so than body and solid.
4| Further, beyond the perceptible things, some think there is nothing of this sort, while others think there are more such things, and more truly beings, and eternal ones — as Plato posits the forms and the mathematical objects as two substances, and as a third the substance of perceptible bodies; while Speusippus posits even more substances, starting from the one, and principles for each substance, one for numbers, another for magnitudes, and then for soul; and in this way he extends the substances further. And some say that the forms and the numbers have the same nature, and that the other things — lines and planes — are dependent on these, down to the substance of the heaven and the perceptible things. Concerning these matters, then, what is said rightly or not rightly, and which things are substances, and whether there are certain substances besides the perceptible ones or not, and how these exist if they do, and whether there is some separable substance, and why and how, or none, besides the perceptible ones, must be examined, after first sketching out what substance is. Substance is spoken of, if not in more ways, then in four especially: for the essence and the universal and the genus are each thought to be the substance of a thing, and a fourth of these is the substrate.
5| The substrate is that of which the other things are said, while it itself is no longer said of anything else. Hence we must first determine the matter concerning this; [1029a] for the primary substrate seems most of all to be substance. Now in one way matter is spoken of as being of this sort, in another way the form, and in a third way the composite of these (I mean by matter, for instance, the bronze; by form, the shape of the figure; and by the composite of these, the statue taken as a whole) — so that if the form is prior to the matter and is being to a greater degree, then by the same reasoning it will also be prior to the composite of both. Now then, we have said in outline what substance is, namely that which is not said of a substrate but of which the other things are said; but it must not be defined only in this way, for this is not sufficient — the point itself is unclear, and further, matter comes out as substance. For if this is not substance, no other candidate is left standing; for when the other things are stripped away, nothing appears to remain. For the other attributes of bodies are affections and products and capacities, while length and breadth and depth are certain quantities but not substances (for the quantity is not substance), but rather that to which these primarily belong is substance. But then again, when length and breadth and depth are taken away, we see nothing remaining, except, if there is anything, that which is bounded by these — so that to those who look at it this way, matter necessarily appears to be the only substance.
6| By matter I mean that which in its own right is called neither a something nor a so-much nor anything else by which being is marked off. For there is something of which each of these is predicated, whose being is different from each of the categories (for the others are predicated of substance, while this one is predicated of matter), so that the ultimate substrate in its own right is neither a something nor a so-much nor anything else; nor indeed are the negations, for these too will belong to it only accidentally. From this line of reasoning, then, it results that matter is substance; but this is impossible. For being separable and being a this-something are thought to belong to substance most of all, which is why the form and the composite of both would seem to be substance to a greater degree than matter. The substance composed of both, then — I mean the substance from matter and form — must be set aside, for it is posterior and evident; and matter too is in a way evident. It is about the third that we must inquire, for this is the most puzzling. Substances among the perceptible things are agreed to exist, so we must look among these first.
7| [1029b] For it is worthwhile to move to what is more knowable. For learning always comes about in this way for everyone: proceeding through things less knowable by nature to things more knowable. And this is the work to be done, just as in the sphere of action the work is to produce, out of the things good for each person, the things that are good absolutely, so, out of the things more knowable to a given person, the work is to produce as knowable to him the things knowable by nature. Now the things knowable and primary to particular people are often only slightly knowable, and have little or nothing of being in them; but nevertheless one must try to know the things that are knowable absolutely by starting from the things poorly known but known to oneself, passing, as has been said, by means of these very things. And since at the start we distinguished the number of ways in which we mark off substance, and one of these seemed to be the essence, we must examine it. And let us first say something about it in a dialectical way: that the essence of each thing is what it is said to be in its own right. For your being is not the same as being-musical; for you are not musical in your own right. What you are in your own right, then, is your essence. But not this whole either: for it is not in its own right in the way that a surface is white, because being-a-surface is not the same as being-white. But then neither is it the compound of both, being-a-white-surface, because the word 'white' is added on to it.
8| So that in which, in stating the thing itself, the thing itself will not be present in the account — that account is the account of the essence for each thing, so that if being-a-white-surface is the same as being-a-smooth-surface, then being-white and being-smooth are the same and one. But since there are also compounds according to the other categories as well (for there is some underlying subject for each, for instance for quality and quantity and time and place and motion), we must examine whether there is an account of the essence for each of these, and whether the essence belongs to these too — for instance, whether there is an essence-of-a-white-man. Let its name be 'cloak.' What is being-a-cloak? But surely this too is not among the things said in their own right. Now 'not in its own right' is said in two ways, and of this one kind is by addition and the other is not. For a thing is said to be by addition when what is being defined is attached to something else — for instance, if in defining being-white one were to state the account of a white man; and it is said the other way when something else is attached to it — for instance, if 'cloak' signified white man, and one were to define cloak as white. Now 'white man' is indeed white,
9| [1030a] but its essence is not the same as being-white. But is being-a-cloak an essence of something at all, or not at all? For essence is precisely what a thing is; but when one thing is said of another, it is not precisely a this — for instance, the white man is not precisely a this, if indeed the 'this' belongs only to substances. So essence belongs to those things whose account is a definition. But it is not a definition merely because a name signifies the same as an account (for then every account would be a definition — for there will be a name for any account whatever, so that even the Iliad will be a definition), but only if it is the account of some primary thing; and things of this sort are those that are said without being said of something else as of another. There will therefore be no essence belonging to any of the things that are not species of a genus, but only to these (for these seem to be spoken of not by participation, nor as an affection, nor as an accident); but for each of the other things too there will be an account of what it signifies, if it has a name — that a certain this belongs to a certain that — or, instead of a simple account, a more precise one; but there will be no definition of it, nor any essence. Or is it that 'definition,' like 'what a thing is,' is said in several ways?
10| For indeed 'what a thing is' signifies in one way substance and a this, and in another way each of the things predicated — quantity, quality, and all the others of this sort. For just as 'is' belongs to all things, though not in the same way, but to some primarily and to others derivatively, so too 'what a thing is' belongs simply to substance, but in a qualified way to the other things: for we would ask even of quality what it is, so that quality too is among the things of which one asks 'what is it,' but not simply — rather, just as some say of not-being, speaking logically, that it is, not simply, but is not-being, so too with quality. Now we must consider both how one ought to speak about each thing, and, no less, how the matter actually stands: hence, since what is meant is now clear, essence too will belong in the same way, primarily and simply to substance, and then to the other things as well, just as 'what a thing is' does — not essence simply, but the essence of a quality or of a quantity. For we must say that these are beings either homonymously, or by adding and subtracting qualifications — as we call even the unknowable knowable — since the correct thing is to say neither homonymously nor in the same sense, but as 'medical' is said in relation to one and the same thing, though it is not itself one and the same thing, yet not homonymously either;
11| [1030b] for a body, a procedure, and an instrument are called medical neither homonymously nor in virtue of one thing, but in relation to one thing. But it makes no difference which way one chooses to put this; what is clear is that definition, and essence, in the primary and simple sense, belong to substances. Not but what they belong to the other things as well, in a like way, only not primarily. For it is not necessary, if we grant this, that there be a definition of anything whose account signifies the same as some name, but only of an account of a certain kind — and this holds if it is an account of one thing, not one thing by continuity, as the Iliad is, or as things are one by being tied together with a connective, but in however many ways 'one' is said to be one; and 'one' is said in the same ways as 'being.' Now 'being' signifies in one sense a this, in another a quantity, in another a quality. Hence there will be an account and a definition even of white man, but in another way than there is of white, and of substance. There is a puzzle, if one denies that the account by addition is a definition, as to what will then be the definition of the things that are not simple but coupled together; for it is necessary to make them clear by addition. I mean, for instance, there is nose, and concavity, and snubness, which is said of the two together, this in that — and neither concavity nor snubness is an accidental affection of the nose, but belongs to it in its own right;
12| not as whiteness belongs to Callias, or to man, because Callias, who is white, happens to be a man, but as the male belongs to animal, and the equal to quantity, and everything else that is said to belong to a thing in its own right. And these are the cases in which either the account or the name of that of which this is an affection is present, and it is not possible to make it clear apart from it — as it is possible to speak of white apart from man, but not of female apart from animal. So that of these, essence and definition either belong to none of them, or, if they do belong, belong in another way, as we have said. And there is another puzzle about them as well. For if a snub nose and a concave nose are the same thing, then snub and concave will be the same; but if not — because it is impossible to speak of snub apart from the thing of which it is an affection in its own right (for snub is concavity in a nose) — then either it is impossible to say 'snub nose,' or the same thing will have been said twice: nose-nose-concave (for the snub nose will be a nose-nose-that-is-concave). Hence it is absurd for essence to belong to things of this kind; if not, we go on to infinity:
13| For in "nose," there will again be another "snub nose" present in it. [1031a] It is clear, then, that definition belongs to substance alone. For if it belonged to the other categories as well, it would have to be by addition, as in the case of the quality and the odd — for the odd cannot be defined apart from number, nor the female apart from animal (I call it "by addition" in cases where it turns out that the same thing is said twice, as in these). But if this is true, then not even the combined terms will have definitions, e.g. "odd number" — but it escapes notice that the accounts here are not stated with precision. And if these too have definitions, then either they are definitions in some other way, or else, as was said, "definition" and "essence" must be said to be spoken of in several senses, so that in one sense there will be no definition of anything, and essence will belong to nothing but substances, while in another sense there will be. It is clear, then, that definition is the account of the essence, and that essence belongs either to substances alone, or above all, primarily, and without qualification, to substances. But whether the essence and the thing itself are the same or different must be examined. For this is not without use for the inquiry concerning substance — each thing seems not to be other than its own substance, and the essence is said to be the substance of each thing.
14| Now in the case of things spoken of accidentally, there would seem to be a difference — for instance, "pale man" is different from "being a pale man" (for if they were the same, then "being a man" and "being a pale man" would be the same too; for man and pale man are the same, as people say, so that "being a pale man" and "being a man" would also be the same — or is it not necessary that things accidentally the same be the same, since the extreme terms do not become the same in the same way? But perhaps it would seem to follow that the extreme terms become accidentally the same, e.g. "being pale" and "being musical" — yet this does not seem to be so). But in the case of things spoken of in their own right, must they be the same — for instance, if there are certain substances than which there are no other, prior substances or natures, of the kind some say the Forms are? For if the good itself will be different from being good, and animal from being an animal, and being from being,
15| [1031b] then there will be other substances and natures and Forms besides the ones spoken of, and those will be prior substances, if essence is substance. And if they are severed from one another, then of some of them there will be no knowledge, and the others will not be beings (I call them "severed" when neither does being good belong to the good itself, nor does being good belong to this thing here); for there is knowledge of each thing when we know its essence, and the case holds alike for the good and for the rest, so that if being good is not good, then neither is being a being a being, nor is being one one; and in the same way essence holds of all things alike or of none, so that if being a being is not a being, none of the others is either. Further, that to which being good does not belong is not good. It is necessary, then, that the good and being good be one, and the fine and being fine be one, and likewise whatever is not spoken of in virtue of something else but in its own right and primarily — for this is enough even if there are no Forms, and perhaps even more so if there are Forms (and at the same time it is clear also that, if the Forms are of the kind some say, the substrate will not be substance;
16| for these must be substances, but not said of a substrate — for they will exist by participation). From these arguments, then, it is one and the same thing, and not accidentally so — each thing itself and its essence — and also that to know each thing is just this, to know its essence, so that even by the method of setting out an example, the two must be one thing (but what is spoken of accidentally, e.g. "the musical" or "the pale," because it signifies two things, is not truly said to be the same as its essence and itself; for that to which the pale belongs and the accident are both there, so that it is in one way the same, and in another way not the same, that the essence and the thing itself are the same — for "man" and "pale man" are not the same, but the affection is the same). It would also appear absurd if one were to give a name to the essence of each thing; for then there would be yet another thing besides that one — for instance, besides "the essence of horse" there would be another "essence of horse." Yet what prevents some things from being, straightaway, their own essence even now, if indeed essence is substance? But moreover, not only are they one, but their account is also the same, as is clear from what has been said as well;
17| [1032a] for "being one" and "one" are not accidentally one. Further, if there is to be something else, it will go on to infinity — for the one thing will be the essence of the one, and the other will be the one, so that the same account will apply to those as well. It is clear, then, that in the case of primary things spoken of in their own right, "being for each thing" and "each thing" are the same and one. And it is clear that the sophistical refutations directed against this position are resolved by the same solution, and likewise the question whether Socrates and being Socrates are the same — for it makes no difference either from what premises one might raise the question, or from what premises one might succeed in resolving it. In what way, then, essence is the same as each thing, and in what way it is not the same, has been stated. Of the things that come to be, some come to be by nature, some by craft, and some spontaneously, and everything that comes to be comes to be by something, and from something, and comes to be something. By "something" I mean in accordance with each category — for it becomes either a this, or a quantity, or a quality, or a somewhere. The natural comings-to-be are those whose generation is from nature; and that from which a thing comes to be we call matter, that by which it comes to be is one of the things that exist by nature, and the "something" is a man or a plant or something else of this kind, which we say are substances above all — and all things that come to be, whether by nature or by craft, have matter;
18| for each of them is capable both of being and of not being, and this capacity is the matter present in each. And, generally speaking, both that from which nature comes and that in accordance with which it is nature (for the thing that comes to be has a nature, for instance a plant or an animal), and that by which the so-called specific nature — the nature that is the same in form — comes to be (this being present in something else): for man begets man. In this way, then, the things that come to be come to be through nature, while the other comings-to-be are called productions. All productions proceed either from craft, or from a capacity, or from thought. Some of these also come about spontaneously and by chance, in a way much like the things that come to be from nature — for there too some of the same things come to be both from seed and without seed. About these matters we must inquire later,
19| [1032b] but from craft come to be those things whose form is in the soul (by "form" I mean the essence of each thing and its primary substance); for in a way even contraries have the same form — for the substance of a privation is the opposite substance, as health is the substance opposite to disease, since disease is the absence of that, while health is the account in the soul and the knowledge. The healthy comes to be when one has thought in this way: since this is health, then if the thing is to be healthy, this must be present, for instance uniformity, and if this, then heat — and one keeps thinking in this way until one is brought to that which one is oneself finally able to produce. Then the motion from this point on is called production, namely the motion toward being healthy. So it turns out that, in a way, health comes to be from health, and a house from a house — the one that has matter from the one without matter; for the medical art and the building art are the form of health and of the house, and by substance without matter I mean the essence. Of comings-to-be and motions, one is called thinking and the other production — the one proceeding from the starting point and the form is thinking, and the one proceeding from the final stage of the thinking is production.
20| Similarly, each of the other intermediate steps also comes to be. I mean, for example: if a person is to become healthy, he would need to be brought into balance. What, then, is being brought into balance? This — and this will happen if he is heated. And what is that? This. And this is present potentially, and this at last is up to him. Now the thing that acts, and the point from which the motion toward health begins, if it comes from craft, is the form in the soul; but if it comes from chance, it comes from that starting point from which the doing begins for the one who acts from craft — just as in the practice of medicine the starting point is perhaps from heating (and the physician produces this by rubbing). The heat, then, that is in the body is either a part of health, or something of that sort follows on it which is a part of health, or it produces health through several further steps. This is the last thing, the thing that produces the part of health — and likewise of the house (for example, the stones) and of the other cases: so that, as it is said, it is impossible for something to come to be if nothing pre-exists. That some part will of necessity be present beforehand is clear, then, for the matter is such a part — for this is present in the thing and it is this that comes to be.
21| [1033a] But is this true also of the elements in the definition? We do in fact speak of what bronze circles are in both ways: naming the matter, saying it is bronze, and naming the form, saying it is a shape of such-and-such a kind, and this is the genus into which it is first placed. The bronze circle, then, has its matter within its definition. But some things, when they come to be out of something as their matter, are named, once they have come to be, not by the name of that thing but by a name derived from it: for example, the statue is not called stone but 'of stone,' while the man who is becoming healthy is not called by the name of that from which he comes. The reason is that a thing comes to be both from the privation and from the substrate, which we call the matter (for both the man and the sick man become healthy), yet it is more properly said to come to be from the privation — for example, the healthy man comes from the sick man rather than from the man — hence the healthy man is not called 'the sick man' but 'the man,' and 'the man is healthy.' But in cases where the privation is unclear and has no name — for example, whatever shape there was in the bronze before, or the house that was in the bricks and timbers — these are thought to come to be out of these materials in the same way that the healthy man comes from the sick man. Hence, just as in that case the thing is not called by the name of that from which it comes, so here too the statue is not called wood, but is said to be produced as 'wooden,' not 'wood'; and 'of bronze,' not 'bronze'; and 'of stone,' not 'stone'; and the house is 'of brick,' not 'bricks' — since, if one looks closely, one would not say without qualification that a statue comes to be out of wood, or a house out of bricks, because what a thing comes to be out of must undergo change, and not persist unchanged.
22| This, then, is why things are spoken of in this way. Now since what comes to be comes to be both by the agency of something (I mean by this: that from which the starting point of the coming-to-be is) and out of something (and let this not be the privation but the matter — for we have already distinguished the sense in which we mean this), and becomes some particular thing (this being either a sphere or a circle or whatever else it may turn out to be), then, just as the maker does not make the substrate — the bronze — so too he does not make the sphere, except accidentally, in that the bronze sphere happens to be a sphere, and it is that he makes. For to make a particular this out of the substrate taken generally is to make a particular this (I mean that to make the bronze round is not to make the round itself, or the sphere itself, but something else — namely, this form in something else; for if he were making the round or the sphere itself, he would have to be making it out of something else again, since that would then have to be presupposed as substrate):
23| [1033b] for example, he makes a bronze sphere, and does so in this way: out of this — which is bronze — he makes this — which is a sphere. If, then, he had also to make the bronze itself, clearly he would make it in the same way, and the comings-to-be would proceed to infinity. It is clear, then, that the form — or whatever we ought to call the shape present in the perceptible thing — does not come to be; there is no coming-to-be of it, nor of the essence either (for this is what comes to be present in something else, whether by craft or by nature or by a power). What one makes is the bronze sphere's being: for one makes it out of bronze and sphere; one produces this form in this matter, and the result is a bronze sphere. But of a sphere's being taken simply, if there is to be a coming-to-be of it, something must come to be out of something. For what comes to be must always be divisible, and there must be one part that is this and another that is this — I mean, one part matter and the other form. If, then, a sphere is a shape all of whose points on the surface are equidistant from the center, then of this, one part is that in which what makes it produces the shape, another part is the shape itself in that matter, and the whole is the thing that has come to be — for example, the bronze sphere. It is clear, then, from what has been said, that what is spoken of as form, or as substance, does not come to be, but the composite spoken of in accordance with it does come to be, and that in everything generated matter is present, and one part is this and another is this.
24| Is there, then, some sphere over and above these particular spheres, or a house over and above these bricks? Or would nothing ever have come to be a particular this at all, if that were so — rather, the form signifies a such, and is not a this and a determinate thing, but the maker produces and generates a such out of this, and once it has been generated, it is a this such? The whole particular thing, Callias or Socrates, is like this particular bronze sphere, while man and animal in general are like bronze sphere in general. It is clear, then, that the causal role assigned to the forms — as some are accustomed to speak of the Forms, if there are indeed certain things over and above particulars — is of no use whatsoever with respect to comings-to-be and to substances; nor, for this reason at least, would they be substances in their own right. In some cases, indeed, it is even evident that what generates is of the same kind as what is generated, though not the same individual, nor one in number but one in form — for example, among natural things, since man begets man, unless something occurs contrary to nature, as when a horse begets a mule (and this case is similar too: for whatever would be common to horse and donkey, the nearest genus, has no name, though it would presumably be both — that is, 'mule'):
25| [1034a] so it is clear that there is no need at all to posit a form as a pattern (for it is above all in these cases that one would look for it, since these are substances most of all), but it is enough that the begetter produce it and be the cause of the form's being present in the matter. The whole thing, now — this such-and-such form in this flesh and these bones — is Callias and Socrates: and they are different because of their matter (for their matter is different), but the same in form (for the form is indivisible). One might raise the difficulty why some things come to be both by craft and by chance, for example health, while others do not, for example a house. The reason is that, in the case of things belonging to the products of craft, the matter which governs the coming-to-be, in the producing and coming-to-be of something — the matter in which some part of the product is already present — is in some cases of such a kind as to be moved by itself, and in others not; and of the former kind, some can be moved in this particular way and some cannot: for many things are capable of being moved by themselves, but not in this particular way — for example, to dance. So whatever has matter of this sort, such as stones, cannot be moved in this particular way except by something else, though it can be moved in that other way — and fire is the same. For this reason, some things will not come to be without someone possessing the craft, while others will:
26| For it will be moved by these things which do not possess the craft, though they are capable of being moved by other things which do not possess the craft, or possess it only in part. It is also clear from what has been said that in a way everything comes to be from something with the same name, as is the case with things that come to be by nature, or from something that has the name in part (for example, a house comes from a house, insofar as it comes to be by intellect — for the craft is the form) or from a part, or from something that has some part, provided that it does not come to be accidentally: for the cause of the making is, primarily, in its own right, a part. For the heat that is in the motion produced heat in the body; and this heat either is health, or a part of it, or some part of health follows upon it, or it is health itself: that is why it is said to produce health — because it is that thing to which heat is attached, and to which heat belongs accidentally, that produces health. So, just as in syllogisms, the substance is the starting point of everything: for syllogisms proceed from what a thing is, and here too, comings-to-be proceed from this. Things that are constituted by nature stand in the same relation as these. For the seed produces just as things that come from craft do (for it has the form potentially,
27| [1034b] and that from which the seed comes has, in a way, the same name — for one should not look for this in all cases in the way that a human comes from a human: for a woman too comes from a man — unless there is some deformity; that is why a mule does not come from a mule): as for things that come to be spontaneously, just as in that case, this happens with those things whose matter is capable of being moved by itself with the very motion that the seed imparts; but for those whose matter is not capable of this, it is impossible for them to come to be in any other way than from the parents themselves. But the argument shows not only concerning substance that the form does not come to be, but the argument applies commonly and alike to all the primary things — for example, to quantity, quality, and the other categories. For what comes to be is the bronze sphere, but not sphere, nor bronze as such — and the same holds for bronze, if it comes to be (for the matter and the form must always pre-exist) — and it is the same way with what a thing is, and with quality and quantity, and likewise with the other categories: for it is not the qualified that comes to be, but the qualified wood, nor the quantified, but the quantified piece of wood or animal. But what one can grasp as peculiar to substance, from these cases, is that it is necessary for another substance to pre-exist in actuality, which produces it — for example, an animal, if an animal comes to be:
28| whereas for a quality or a quantity, it is not necessary — only potentially. Since a definition is an account, and every account has parts, and as the account stands to the thing, so the part of the account stands, in like manner, to the part of the thing, the question now arises whether the account of the parts must be present within the account of the whole, or not. For in some cases they evidently are present, in others not. For the account of the circle does not contain the account of its segments, whereas the account of the syllable does contain the account of its letters; and yet the circle too is divided into its segments, just as the syllable is divided into its letters. Further, if the parts are prior to the whole, and the acute angle is a part of the right angle, and the finger a part of the animal, then the acute angle would be prior to the right angle, and the finger prior to the man. But those are thought to be prior: for the parts are described in terms of them, and they are also prior in being, since they can exist without one another. Or rather, 'part' is said in many ways, one of which is that which measures according to quantity — but let this be set aside; what we must examine is that from which substance is composed as from parts.
29| [1035a] If, then, one thing is matter, another form, and another the compound of these, and substance is both the matter and the form and the compound of these, then in one sense matter too is said to be a part of something, but in another sense it is not, but rather it is that of which the account of the form is composed. For example, flesh is not a part of concavity (for this is the matter in which concavity comes to be), but it is a part of snubness: and bronze is a part of the composite statue, but not of the statue spoken of as form (for one must speak of the form, and of each thing insofar as it has form, but the material element must never be spoken of in its own right): that is why the account of the circle does not contain the account of the segments, while the account of the syllable does contain the account of the letters: for the letters are parts of the account of the form, and not matter, whereas the segments are parts in the sense of matter, in which the circle comes to be present: though they are nearer to the form than bronze is, when roundness comes to be present in bronze. But in another sense, not even all the letters of the syllable will be present in the account — for example, these particular letters in wax, or these in the air:
30| for these too are already a part of the syllable only as perceptible matter. For even though a line, when divided, perishes into its halves, or a man into bones, sinews, and flesh, it does not follow from this that they are composed of these as parts of the substance, but rather as out of matter; and they are parts of the composite, but no longer of the form and of that which the account is of — which is why they are not present in the accounts either. So in some cases the account of such parts will be present, but in others it need not be present, unless it is the account of the combined thing: and it is for this reason that some things are composed of these as principles into which they perish, while others are not. Accordingly, whatever is a combination of form and matter, such as the snub, or the bronze circle, these things perish into these components, and the matter is a part of them: but whatever is not combined with matter but is without matter, whose accounts are of the form alone, these do not perish — either not at all, or at least not in this way: so that these are principles and parts of the former, but neither parts nor principles of the form. And this is why the clay statue perishes into clay, and the sphere into bronze, and Callias into flesh and bones, and again the circle into its segments:
31| for there is a kind of circle that is combined with matter:
32| [1035b] for 'circle' is used homonymously, both of the circle spoken of simply and of the particular circle, because there is no distinct name for particular circles. The truth, then, has now been stated; but let us go over it again and state it still more clearly. For whatever are parts of the account, and that into which the account is divided, these are prior, either all of them or some: but the account of the right angle is not divided into the account of the acute angle, whereas the account of the acute angle is divided into the right angle; for one who defines the acute angle uses the right angle, since the acute angle is less than a right angle. The circle and the semicircle stand in a similar relation: for the semicircle is defined by the circle, and the finger by the whole; for a finger is such-and-such a part of a man. So whatever are parts as matter, and that into which a thing is divided as matter, are posterior; but whatever are parts as belonging to the account, and to the substance in accordance with the account, are prior, either all of them or some. Now since the soul of animals (for this is the substance of the ensouled thing) is the substance in accordance with the account, and the form, and the essence of a body of a certain kind (at any rate, if each part is to be defined well, it will not be defined without reference to its function, which will not belong to it apart from perception), it follows that the parts of the soul are prior, either all of them or some, to the composite animal — and likewise in each particular case — while the body and its parts are posterior to this substance, and it is not the substance but the composite that is divided into these as into matter. These, then, are in one sense prior to the composite, but in another sense they are not (for they cannot even exist when separated:
33| For a finger in any and every condition is not a part of an animal, but a dead finger is one only in name. Some parts exist at the same time as the whole, namely the controlling ones, those in which the account and the substance are primarily present — for example, whether this is the heart or the brain, for it makes no difference which of the two it is. But man and horse and things of this sort, taken as particulars, yet spoken of universally, are not substance but a composite made of this particular account and this particular matter, taken universally; while as a particular, Socrates is already composed of the ultimate matter, and similarly with the others. Now a part may be a part both of the form (and by form I mean the essence) and of the composite made of the form and the matter, and of the matter itself. But only the parts of the form are parts of the account, and the account is of the universal.
34| [1036a] For being-a-circle and a circle, and being-a-soul and a soul, are the same. But when we come to the composite — for example, this particular circle, and any of the particulars, whether perceptible or intelligible (I mean by intelligible ones such as the mathematical objects, and by perceptible ones such as those of bronze or of wood) — of these there is no definition, but they are known with the aid of intellect or of perception; and once they have departed from actuality it is not clear whether they still exist or not, but they are always spoken of and known by the universal account. Matter in itself is unknowable. And matter is of two kinds, perceptible and intelligible: perceptible matter, for instance bronze and wood and whatever matter is subject to motion, and intelligible matter, which is present in perceptible things but not insofar as they are perceptible, as with the objects of mathematics. How things stand, then, with regard to whole and part, and to prior and posterior, has been stated. But one must answer the question, when someone asks whether the right angle, the circle, and the animal are prior, or the parts into which they are divided and out of which they are composed, that the answer is not simple. For if the soul is the animal, or the besouled thing, or each thing is identical with its own essence, and a circle is being-a-circle, and a right angle is being-a-right-angle and the substance of the right angle, then one must say that a this and a this-of-something are posterior — for instance, posterior to the parts in the account, and to a particular right angle (for the right angle taken with matter, the bronze right angle, and the right angle in particular lines, belong here); but the right angle apart from matter is posterior to the parts in the account, and prior to the parts in a given particular instance — one must not say, without qualification, which is prior.
35| But if the soul is different from the animal and is not identical with it, even so one must say that some things are prior and others not, as has been stated. And it is reasonably a puzzle which parts belong to the form and which do not, but belong instead to the thing taken together with matter. Yet if this is not clear, it is not possible to define each thing; for definition is of the universal and of the form. So if it is not evident which of the parts are present as matter and which are not, the account of the thing will not be evident either. Now in the case of things that evidently occur, the same in form, in things of different kinds — for example, a circle occurring in bronze and in stone and in wood — it seems clear that neither the bronze nor the stone is any part of the substance of the circle, because they can be separated from it. But in the case of things not seen to be separated, nothing prevents their being in the same condition as these — just as if all circles were seen to be of bronze.
36| [1036b] For the bronze would be none the less no part of the form; but it is difficult to strip it away in thought. For example, the form of man always appears in flesh and bones and parts of that kind. Are these, then, also parts of the form and of the account? Or are they not, but rather matter, and we are simply unable to separate them out because the form does not also occur in other kinds of matter? Since this seems possible, though it is not clear when it occurs, some people already raise a puzzle even about the circle and the triangle, arguing that it is not fitting to define them by lines and by the continuous, but that these too should all be spoken of in the same way, as flesh and bones are said to belong to man and bronze and stone to the statue. And they reduce everything to numbers, and say that the account of a line is that of the number two. And among those who speak of Ideas, some say the Dyad is the Line-itself, others say it is the form of the line — for in some cases, they say, the form is the same as that of which it is the form (for example, the Dyad and the form of the Dyad), but in the case of the line this is no longer so. It follows, then, that there is one form for many things whose form appears to be different (which is what happened to the Pythagoreans too), and it becomes possible to make this single thing the form of everything, while the rest are not forms at all.
37| Yet in that way all things will be one. That the questions concerning definitions involve a certain puzzle, and for what reason, has been stated. That is why reducing everything in this way and stripping away the matter is a superfluous exercise; for perhaps in some cases a thing really is this in this, or these things standing in this condition. And the comparison with the animal that the younger Socrates used to make is not a good one. For it leads away from the truth, and makes one suppose that it is possible for man to exist without his parts, just as a circle can exist without the bronze. But the cases are not alike; for the animal is something perceptible, and it cannot be defined apart from motion, and hence not apart from its parts being in some condition either. For the hand is not a part of man under any and every condition, but only when it is capable of performing its function — that is, when it is besouled; if it is not besouled, it is not a part. But regarding mathematical objects, why are the accounts of the parts not parts of the account of the whole — for example, why are the semicircles not parts of the account of the circle? For these are not perceptible objects. Or does it make no difference? For there will be matter even of some things that are not perceptible.
38| [1037a] For indeed everything has some matter that is not itself an essence and a form in its own right, but is a this. So for the universal circle these will not be parts, but for the particular circles they will be parts, as has been said before; for matter is of two kinds, perceptible and intelligible. It is also clear that the soul is the primary substance, the body is matter, and man or the animal is what is composed of both, taken universally. As for Socrates or Coriscus, if the soul too is Socrates, then the name is used in two ways (for some mean by it the soul, others the composite); but if it simply means this particular soul together with this particular body, the relation is the same one that holds between the universal and the individual. Whether, besides the matter of substances of this kind, there is some other substance, and whether one must look for some further substance such as numbers or something of the sort, must be considered later. For it is for the sake of this that we are also trying to give a determination concerning perceptible substances, since in a certain way the study of perceptible substances is the task of natural science, that is, of the second philosophy. For the natural philosopher must have knowledge not only of the matter but also of the substance that accords with the account — indeed, more so.
39| As for definitions, how the parts within the account are parts, and why the definition is a single account (for it is clear that the thing is one — but in virtue of what is the thing one, given that it has parts?), must be considered later. What the essence is, then, and how it is itself in its own right, has been stated universally about every case, and why in some cases the account of the essence contains the parts of the thing defined and in others it does not, and that in the account of the substance the parts that are present as matter will not be included — for they are not parts of that substance but of the composite, and of this composite there is in a way an account and in a way there is not: for taken along with the matter there is no account of it (since matter is indeterminate), but in respect of the primary substance there is, for example the account of the soul is the account of man; for the substance is the form that is present within, from which, together with the matter, the composite is called substance — for example, concavity (for from this together with the nose comes the snub nose and snubness, since the nose will be present twice over in these) — but in the composite substance, for example in the snub nose or in Callias, the matter too will be present.
40| And that the essence and the thing itself are, in some cases, the same — [1037b] as with primary substances, for example curvature and being curvature, if it is primary (and I call primary that which is not spoken of by one thing being in another and in a substrate as in matter) — but whatever is spoken of as matter or as taken together with matter is not the same, nor is it the same if it is one by accident, as Socrates and the musical are; for these are the same by accident. Let us now speak first about the point that has not been discussed in the Analytics concerning definition: for the puzzle raised there is useful for the accounts concerning substance. I mean this puzzle: why on earth is that of which we say the account is a definition one thing — for example, of man, "animal, two-footed": let this be its account. Why then is this one thing and not many, "animal" and "two-footed"? For in the case of "man" and "pale," there are many when the one does not belong to the other, but one when it belongs and the substrate, the man, is affected by it (for then it becomes one and there is the pale man); but here neither shares in the other, for the genus does not seem to share in the differentiae (for then the same thing would at once share in the contraries —
41| for the differentiae by which the genus differs are contraries). And if it does share in them, the same account holds if the differentiae are more than one, as with "footed, two-footed, wingless." For why are these one and not many? Not because they are present in it — for on that basis everything would be one from all the things present in it. But it is necessary that whatever is in the definition be one; for a definition is a single account, and of substance, so that it must be the account of some one thing: for substance signifies some one thing and a particular thing, as we say. We must examine first the definitions arrived at by division. For there is nothing else in the definition except the genus that is stated first and the differentiae: the other genera consist of the first genus together with the differentiae taken along with it, for example the first term is "animal," the next is "animal, two-footed," and again "animal, two-footed, wingless"; and likewise however many terms it is stated through.
42| [1038a] And in general it makes no difference whether it is stated through many terms or through few, so that it makes no difference whether through few or through two: and of the two, the one is the differentia, the other the genus, for example, of "animal, two-footed," "animal" is the genus and the other is the differentia. If, then, the genus simply does not exist apart from the species that fall under it as genus, or if it does exist but exists as matter (for the vocal sound is a genus and matter, and the differentiae make the species and the elements out of this), it is clear that the definition is the account made out of the differentiae. But indeed the division must also proceed by the differentia of the differentia, for example the differentia of "animal" is "footed": again, the differentia of "footed animal" must be taken insofar as it is footed, so that one must not say of the footed that one part is "winged," the other "wingless," if one is to speak correctly (though one will do this out of inability), but rather that one part is "cloven-footed," the other "not cloven"; for these are differentiae of the foot, since cloven-footedness is a kind of footedness. And in this way one always wishes to proceed until one arrives at the terms that admit of no further differentiation: at that point there will be as many forms of foot as there are differentiae, and the footed animals will be equal in number to the differentiae.
43| If then this is so, it is clear that the last differentia will be the substance of the thing and its definition, provided that the same things need not be said many times over in the definitions — for that is superfluous. Yet this does in fact happen: for when one says "footed, two-footed animal," one has said nothing other than "animal having feet, having two feet" — and if one divides this by the division proper to it, one will say it more than once, as many times as there are differentiae. If, then, differentia is taken of differentia in succession, the last one will be one thing, the form and the substance; but if it is taken accidentally, as if one divided the footed into the pale and the dark, there will be as many as there are cuts. So it is clear that the definition is the account made out of the differentiae, and, properly speaking, out of the last of these. This would be plain if one rearranged such definitions, for example that of man, saying "footed, two-footed animal": for "footed" is superfluous once "two-footed" has been said. But there is no order in the substance — for how are we to conceive one part as later, another as earlier? Concerning the definitions arrived at by division, then, let so much be said as a first account of what sort they are.
44| [1038b] But since our inquiry concerns substance, let us return to it again. It is said that substance is the substrate, and the essence, and what is composed of these, and also the universal. Concerning two of these we have spoken already — concerning the essence and the substrate, that the substrate underlies in two ways, either as being a particular thing, as the animal underlies its affections, or as matter underlies actuality — but to some the universal too seems above all to be a cause, and the universal seems to be a principle; so let us take this up as well. For it seems impossible for any of the things called universal to be a substance. For, in the first place, the substance of each thing is that which is peculiar to it, which does not belong to another, whereas the universal is common; for that is called universal which is naturally such as to belong to more than one thing. Of which thing, then, will this be the substance? For it will be the substance either of all or of none, and it cannot be of all; but if it is to be the substance of one, then the others too will be this thing — for things whose substance is one and whose essence is one are themselves one. Further, substance is said to be that which is not said of a substrate, whereas the universal is always said of some substrate. But perhaps it cannot be a substance in that sense, as the essence is, but it can be present in the essence, as animal is present in man and in horse?
45| Well then, clearly there is some account of it. And it makes no difference even if it is not the account of everything in the substance; for none the less it will be the substance of something, as man is the substance of the man in whom it is present, so that the same consequence will result again: for it will be the substance of that thing — animal, for instance — in which it is present as its own. Further, it is both impossible and absurd that the particular thing and the substance, if it is composed of certain things, should not be composed of substances nor of a particular thing but of a quality; for then what is not a substance, namely the quality, will be prior to substance and to the particular thing. Which is impossible: for neither in account, nor in time, nor in coming-to-be can the affections be prior to the substance, since then they would also be separable. Further, in Socrates there will be a substance present in a substance, so that it will be the substance of two things. And in general it follows, if man is a substance, and whatever else is spoken of in this way, that none of the things in the account is the substance of anything, nor exists apart from them, nor in anything else — I mean, for example, that there is no animal apart from the particular animals, nor anything else among the things in the accounts. From these considerations, then, it is evident to those who examine them that nothing that belongs universally is a substance, and that none of the things predicated in common signifies a particular thing,
46| [1039a] but of such-and-such a kind. Otherwise many other things follow, and also the third man. Further, it is clear in this way too: it is impossible for a substance to be composed of substances present in it in actuality; for two things that are actual in this way are never in actuality one, but if they are two in potentiality, they will be one (for example, the double is composed of two halves — in potentiality, that is; for actuality separates them), so that if the substance is one, it will not be composed of substances present in it, on this account too — the very point Democritus makes correctly: for he says it is impossible for one to come from two or two from one; for it is the indivisible magnitudes that make the substances. So it is clear that the same will hold in the case of number too, if number is a composition of units, as some say; for either the dyad is not one, or there is no unit present in it in actuality. But what follows presents a difficulty. For if no substance can be composed out of universals, because a universal signifies a such-and-such and not a this, and no composite substance can be composed of substances in actuality, then every substance would be incomposite, so that there would be no account of any substance. But it is held by everyone, and was said long ago, that either only substance has a definition, or substance has one most of all —
47| but now it seems not even substance has one. There will then be a definition of nothing — or rather, in one way there will be, in another way there will not. What is being said will become clearer from what follows. And it is evident from these very points what happens also to those who say that the Forms are separate substances and at the same time make the species out of the genus and the differentiae. For if the Forms exist, and animal is present in man and horse, it is either one and the same in number, or different; in account it is clearly one, for whoever states it goes through the same account in each case. If, then, there is a man-himself, a this and separate in its own right, then the things it is composed of, such as animal and two-footed, must also signify a this and be separate and substances; so animal too must be. If, then, what is in the horse and in the man is the same and one, just as you are one with yourself, how will the one that is in things that exist apart be one,
48| [1039b] and why will this animal not also be separate from itself? Next, if it is to participate in two-footed and many-footed, something impossible follows, for contraries will belong at once to it, though it is one and a this; and if not, what is the way of it, when one says that animal is two-footed or footed? But perhaps the parts are put together and touch, or are mixed; but all of these are absurd. But suppose it is different in each case: then there will be, so to speak, infinitely many things whose substance is animal; for it is not accidentally that man comes from animal. Further, animal-itself will be many things; for the animal present in each case is a substance (for it is not called so in virtue of something else; otherwise man will be composed of that, and that will be his genus), and further, all the things man is composed of will be Forms; so then a Form will not be the Form of one thing and the substance of another (for that is impossible); animal-itself, then, will be each one of the animals present in the animals. Further, out of what is this, and how does it come from animal-itself? Or how can there be an animal whose substance is this very thing, existing apart from animal-itself? And further, in the case of perceptible things these same consequences follow, and even more absurd ones than these.
49| If, then, it is impossible for things to be so, it is clear that there are no Forms of them in the way some people say. Now since substance is of two different kinds — the compound and the account (I mean that in one sense substance is the account taken together with the matter, in another sense it is simply the account) — those substances, then, that are spoken of in the first way admit of destruction (for they also admit of coming-to-be), but the account is not such as to be destroyed in this way (for there is no coming-to-be of it either — it is not being-a-house that comes to be, but this particular house), rather, without coming-to-be or destruction, such things both are and are not; for it has been shown that no one generates or makes these. For this reason, too, there is neither definition nor demonstration of the perceptible particular substances, because they have matter whose nature is such that it admits of both being and not being; hence all their particulars are perishable. If, then, demonstration is of necessary things, and definition is a matter of scientific knowledge, and it is not possible — just as knowledge cannot at one time be knowledge and at another ignorance, but what changes in that way is opinion — so too neither demonstration nor definition can be of such things, but it is opinion that concerns what admits of being otherwise,
50| [1040a] it is clear that there could be neither definition nor demonstration of them. For things that perish become unclear to those who have knowledge of them, once they have passed out of perception, and though the accounts are preserved in the soul, there will no longer be either definition or demonstration of the same things. Hence, whenever someone offers a definition of a particular thing, among the terms relevant to defining it, he must not fail to notice that it is always possible to refute it; for it is not possible to define a particular. Nor indeed is it possible to define any Form. For the Form, as they say, is of a particular, and is separate; but the account must be composed of names, and the one defining will not coin a name (for it would be unknown), while the names already established are common to all things; so these must necessarily belong to something else as well: for example, if someone were to define you, he would say 'a lean animal' or 'a pale animal' or something else that will belong to something else too. But if someone were to say that there is nothing to prevent all the attributes taken separately from belonging to many things while together belonging only to this one, it must be said, first, that they belong to both components as well — for example, two-footed animal belongs to animal and to two-footed (and in the case of eternal things this is even necessary, since they are prior and are parts of the compound; but indeed they are also separate, if man is separate —
51| for either neither is separate or both are; if, then, neither is, the genus will not exist apart from the species, while if it is, the differentia will be too): and second, that they are prior in being; and these are not mutually eliminated with one another. Next, if Forms are composed of Forms (for the things a thing is composed of are less composite), then further, the things a Form is composed of — for example animal and two-footed — will also have to be predicated of many things. But if not, how will it be known? For there will then be some Form that it is impossible to predicate of more than one thing. But this is not the accepted view — rather, every Form is held to be participable. As has been said, then, it goes unnoticed that it is impossible to define things among the eternal, especially those that are unique, such as the sun or the moon. For people go wrong not only by adding features such that, when they are removed, there will still be a sun — as, for instance, 'traveling around the earth' or 'hidden by night' (for if it should stop, or appear by night, it would no longer be the sun; but it is absurd if it would not be — for 'sun' signifies a certain substance); but also by including such features as could apply to something else — for instance, if another thing came to be like this, it is clear that it would be a sun; the account, then, is common —
52| [1040b] but the sun was one of the particulars, like Cleon or Socrates. For why does no one produce a definition of the Form of them? For it would become clear, if they tried, that what has just been said is true. It is evident, too, that most of the things thought to be substances are potentialities — both the parts of animals (for none of them exists in separation; and when separated, they too then exist merely as matter) and earth, fire, and air; for none of them is one, but they are like a heap, until they are concocted and something one comes to be out of them. One might most readily suppose that the parts of ensouled things, and the corresponding parts of the soul, come to be as both actuality and potentiality at once, close together, since they have principles of motion from something at their joints; which is why some animals go on living when divided. Nevertheless, all of them will exist only potentially, whenever the thing is one and continuous by nature, and not by force or by mere growing-together; for a thing joined in that way is a mutilation. Since one is spoken of in as many ways as being is, and the substance of the one is one, and things whose substance is numerically one are numerically one, it is clear that neither the one nor being can be the substance of things, any more than being-an-element or being-a-principle can be.
53| But we are inquiring what the principle is, so that we may lead it back to something more knowable. Now being and the one are more truly substance than the principle and the element and the cause are, but not even these are yet substance, if indeed nothing else that is common is substance either; for substance belongs to nothing except itself and to what has it, that of which it is the substance. Further, the one could not exist in many places at once, but what is common does exist in many places at once; so it is clear that none of the universals exists apart from the particulars, separately. But those who speak of the forms are right in one respect, in separating them, if indeed they are substances, but not right in another respect, in that they call the one over many a form. The reason is that they cannot state what these imperishable substances are, apart from the particular and perceptible ones; so they make them the same in form as the perishable things (for these we know), man-itself and horse-itself, adding the word 'itself' to the perceptible things. And yet even if we had not seen the stars,
54| [1041a] there would be, I think, no less eternal substances beside the ones we knew of; so that even now, if we do not have them, still it is perhaps necessary that some exist. That, then, none of the things called universal is substance, and no substance is composed of substances, is clear. But we must say what substance is and of what sort, taking up the inquiry again as it were from another starting point; for perhaps from this it will become clear also about that substance which is separated from perceptible substances. Since, then, substance is a certain principle and cause, we must proceed from there. The 'why' is always sought in this form: why does one thing belong to another? For to inquire why the musical man is a musical man is either to inquire the very thing just stated, why the man is musical, or something else. Now to ask why a thing is itself is to ask nothing at all (for the fact and the being must be evident beforehand -- I mean, for example, that the moon is eclipsed -- but as to why a thing is itself, there is one account and one cause for all cases, why the man is a man or the musical is musical, unless someone should say that each thing is indivisible in relation to itself, and this is what it is to be one:
55| but this at least is common to all cases and stated briefly): but someone might ask why a man is an animal of such-and-such a kind. This much, then, is clear, that he is not asking why one who is a man is a man; he is asking, then, why something belongs to something (and that it does belong must be evident: for if it does not, he is asking nothing at all), for example, why does it thunder? Why does a noise occur in the clouds? For here what is sought is one thing predicated of another. And why are these things -- bricks and stones, say -- a house? It is clear, then, that he is seeking the cause; and this, speaking in terms of logical form, is the essence, which in some cases is that for the sake of which, as perhaps in the case of a house or a bed, and in other cases is what first set the thing in motion; for this too is a cause. But this latter sort of cause is sought in cases of coming-to-be and passing-away, while the former is sought also in the case of being. What is sought is most easily overlooked in cases where the terms are not predicated of one another,
56| [1041b] for example, what a man is is inquired into because the term is used simply, without distinguishing that this belongs to that. But one must inquire by articulating the question; otherwise the result is common to inquiring into nothing and inquiring into something. Since, then, being must be had and must belong, it is clear that one is seeking why the matter is some particular thing; for example, why are these things a house? Because what it is to be a house belongs to them. And why is this a man, or why does this body have this? So the cause that is sought is that of the matter (and this is the form) by which it is something; and this is the substance. It is clear, then, that in the case of simple things there is no inquiry and no teaching, but a different manner of inquiry applies to such things. Since a thing composed out of something is such that the whole is one, not as a heap is one but as a syllable is one -- and a syllable is not the same as its elements, nor is ba the same as b and a, nor is flesh the same as fire and earth (for once they are dissolved, some things no longer exist, such as the flesh and the syllable, but the elements do exist, both the fire and the earth) -- the syllable, then, is something, not only the elements, the vowel and the consonant, but also something else besides, and flesh is not only fire and earth, or the hot and the cold, but also something else besides -- if, then, that something else must be either an element or composed of elements, if it is an element, the same account will apply again (for out of this and fire and earth flesh will come to be, and out of something further still, so that the process will go on to infinity):
57| But if it is composed of an element, clearly it is composed not of one but of several, or that element itself will be the thing in question, so that again we shall give the same account regarding this as regarding the flesh or the syllable. It would seem that this is something, and not an element, and indeed the cause of this being flesh and that being a syllable; and likewise in the other cases too. Now the substance of each thing is this (for this is the primary cause of its being) -- and since some things are not substances among existing things, but those that are substances are constituted according to nature and by nature, this nature too would appear to be substance, which is not an element but a principle -- and an element is that into which a thing is divided, being present in it as matter, as alpha and beta are elements of the syllable.