Politics · Book II

Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language

1| Since we intend to study the political community — which is the best of all for those able to live as far as possible according to their wish — we must also examine the other constitutions: both those which some of the cities said to be well governed actually use, and any others that happen to have been proposed by certain thinkers and are thought to be good, so that what is correct and useful in them may be seen, and further so that our seeking something different beyond them may not seem to be altogether the wish of people wanting to display cleverness, but that we may seem to have undertaken this inquiry because these constitutions now in existence are not good. We must first make the beginning that is naturally the beginning of this inquiry. For necessarily either all the citizens must share in everything, or in nothing, or in some things but not in others. Now that they should share in nothing is clearly impossible (for the constitution is a kind of community, and in the first place the citizens must necessarily share in a place: for the place of a single city is one, and the citizens are sharers in that one city): [1261a] but is it better for the city that is going to be well managed to share in everything it is possible to share in, or better to share in some things but not others?

2| For it is possible for the citizens to share with one another children and wives and property, as in Plato's Republic: for there Socrates says that the children and the wives and the possessions must be common. Is it then better for things to be as they are now, or according to the law written in the Republic? Now the community of wives for all involves many other difficulties as well, and in particular the reason Socrates gives for why it must be legislated in this way does not appear to follow from his arguments. Further, with a view to the end which he says must belong to the city, as it is now stated it is impossible, and yet nowhere has it been determined how it must be distinguished. I mean the claim that the city should be as much as possible entirely one, this being taken as the best thing — for this is the hypothesis Socrates adopts. And yet it is evident that as it proceeds and becomes more and more one, it will not even be a city any longer: for a city is by nature a kind of multitude, and as it becomes more one it will become a household instead of a city, and a human being instead of a household; for we would say the household is more one than the city, and the individual more one than the household. So that even if someone were able to bring this about, it must not be done:

3| for it will destroy the city. And the city is made up not only of a number of human beings, but of human beings differing in kind. For a city does not arise from people who are alike. An alliance and a city are different things: an alliance is useful by its quantity, even if it is the same in kind (for an alliance exists by nature for the sake of assistance), just as a weight would pull down more if there were more of it; but the elements from which a unity is to arise must differ in kind (and it is by this too that a city will differ from a tribe, when the multitude is not scattered in villages but is like the Arcadians). Hence it is reciprocal equality that preserves cities, as has been said before in the Ethics: since even among the free and equal this must hold, for it is not possible for all to rule at the same time, but only for a year, or according to some other arrangement or period of time. And it comes about in this way that all do rule, just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange places, and the same people were not always shoemakers and the same always carpenters. Since it is better this way even in regard to the political community, it is clear that it is better for the same people always to rule, if this is possible; but where it is not possible, because all are equal by nature,

4| [1261b] And at the same time it is also just, whether ruling is a good thing or a bad one, that all should share in it; this at least imitates the practice of equals yielding their turn, since to rule and be ruled are things unequal in themselves — for some rule and others are ruled in turn, as though they had become different people. In the same way, once in office, different people hold different offices. It is clear, then, from this that the city is not by nature meant to be one in the way some people say, and that what is said to be the greatest good in cities is in fact what destroys cities — and yet the good peculiar to each thing is what preserves each thing. There is also another way in which it is clear that seeking to make the city too much a unity is not better. For a household is more self-sufficient than an individual, and a city more self-sufficient than a household, and a city only comes to exist, properly speaking, once the community formed by its multitude becomes self-sufficient. If, then, the more self-sufficient thing is more choiceworthy, then what is less unified is more choiceworthy than what is more unified. But further, even granting that it is best for the community to be as much a unity as possible, this does not appear to be demonstrated by the argument that all should say 'mine' and 'not mine' at the same time — for this is what Socrates thinks is a sign that the city is completely one.

5| For 'all' is a double term. If it means each individually, then perhaps what Socrates wants to bring about would more nearly result (for each person will say the same boy is his own son, and the same woman his own wife, and likewise about property and about each of the various concerns) — but as things actually stand, those who hold wives and children in common will not speak this way; rather, all will speak of them collectively but not each one individually — and property likewise: all will speak of it collectively, but not each individually. That there is some fallacy, then, in saying 'all' is clear (for the words 'all' and 'both,' and 'odd' and 'even,' produce contentious syllogisms in arguments precisely because of this double sense; that is why for all to say the same thing is in one sense fine but not possible, and in another sense implies no unanimity at all). Beyond this, the proposal has yet another harm. What is common to the greatest number of people gets the least care: people attend to their own things above all, and to communal things less, or only to the extent that it falls to each individually — since with regard to everything else, on the assumption that someone else is looking after it, they are more inclined to neglect it, just as in domestic service a large number of servants sometimes gives worse attendance than a smaller number does.

6| Each of the citizens comes to have a thousand sons, and these are not each individual man's sons, but any given child belongs equally to any given father; and so all alike will neglect them. [1262a] Further, in this scheme each man calls 'mine' whichever citizen happens to be doing well or badly, whatever his number happens to be — say, 'mine' or 'so-and-so's' — speaking this way of each one out of the thousand, or however many the city numbers, and even then in doubt, since it is unclear to whom a child happened to be born and, once born, happened to survive. And yet which is really better — for each person to say 'mine' in this way, applying the same word 'mine' to two thousand or ten thousand people, or rather to say 'mine' the way people actually do in cities now? As things now stand, one man calls the same person his son, another calls him his brother, another his cousin, or kin by some other relation, either by blood or by connection through marriage — his own first, or belonging to his own family — and besides these, another calls him clansman or tribesman. It is better to have a cousin who is truly one's own than a son of this communal sort. And yet it is not even possible to escape the fact that some people will suppose certain others to be their own brothers, children, fathers, and mothers; for on the basis of the resemblances that occur between children and their parents, they will necessarily form beliefs about one another. This is indeed said to happen, according to some writers on geographical circuits of the earth: among certain of the upper Libyans, wives are held in common, yet the children born are divided up according to their resemblances.

7| There are also some women, and likewise females of other animals — horses and cattle, for instance — who are strongly disposed by nature to produce offspring resembling the parent, as with the mare called 'the Just One' at Pharsalus. Moreover, it is not easy for those who set up this kind of community to guard against such unpleasant difficulties as assaults, involuntary and even voluntary killings, fights, and abuse — none of which it is pious to have occur toward fathers and mothers and those not distantly related, as it might be toward strangers. Such episodes are bound to occur with greater frequency where kinship goes unrecognized than where it is known; and once they have taken place, when the parties involved are known kin the customary rites of atonement can be performed, whereas for the unknown, no such remedy exists. It is also strange that, having made the sons common, one removes only the sexual intercourse of lovers, without forbidding the being-in-love itself, nor the other intimacies which it is most unseemly of all for a father to have with a son, or a brother with a brother, given that mere being-in-love already is such an intimacy. And it is strange, too, to remove the sexual union for no other reason than that the pleasure is too intense, on the assumption that it makes no difference that the one party is father or son, and the others are brothers to one another.

8| It seems that holding wives and children in common would be more useful for the farmers than for the guardians; [1262b] for there will be less friendship where children and wives are held in common, and it is precisely this disposition — being little inclined to friendship — that those who are ruled need, so as to be obedient and not prone to revolution. But taken as a whole, the necessary result of such a law is the opposite of what the correctly established laws ought to produce, and of the very reason Socrates thinks matters concerning children and wives should be arranged in this way. For we think friendship is the greatest of goods for cities (since this is what would make them least prone to civil strife), and it is precisely the city's being one that Socrates praises above all, which he also holds — and it does seem — to be the work of friendship; just as we know Aristophanes says, in his speeches about love, that lovers, because of their intense affection, desire to grow together and become one out of two. In that case, necessarily, either both parties would be destroyed, or one of them; but in the city, friendship is bound to become watered down by this sort of community, and least of all will a father say 'mine' of a son, or a son of a father. For just as a little sweetness mixed into a great deal of water makes the mixture imperceptible, so too it happens with the mutual sense of belonging that derives from these names — it becomes least necessary of all, in a constitution of this kind, for a father to feel concern as toward sons, or a son as toward a father, or brothers toward one another.

9| For there are two things above all that make human beings care for one another and feel affection: what is one's own, and what is precious to one — and neither of these can belong to people governed under such a scheme. Moreover, as to the practice of transferring the children who are born, some from the farmers and craftsmen to the guardians, and others from the guardians to those groups, this involves a great deal of confusion as to how it is to be managed — and those who hand over and transfer the children must necessarily know which children they are giving to which people. Further, the difficulties mentioned earlier — assaults, illicit desires, killings — are bound to occur even more among these transferred children; for those who are given from the other citizens to the guardians, and in turn those among the guardians given to the other citizens, will no longer address one another as brothers, children, fathers, and mothers, and so will not be guarded by the caution that kinship inspires against doing such things to one another. Let this, then, be our determination concerning the community of children and wives. Next after this it is fitting to examine the question of property — in what manner it ought to be arranged for those who are to live under the best constitution: whether property should be held in common or not held in common. This question might indeed be considered separately from what has been legislated concerning children and wives,

10| [1263a] What I mean about property is this: whether — even if those other things remain separate, in the way things now stand for everyone — it would be better for possessions and their use to be held in common, so that, for example, the plots of land are separate but the produce is brought together for common consumption (which is what some peoples do); or the opposite, that the land itself be held in common and worked in common, while the produce is divided up for private use (some of the barbarians too are said to share property in this way); or that both the plots of land and the produce be held in common. Now if it is other people who work the land, one arrangement — an easier one — would apply; but if the owners labor for themselves, questions of property would create more difficulties. For if the enjoyments and the labors are not made equal but unequal, complaints are bound to arise against those who enjoy or take much while laboring little, on the part of those who take less but labor more. And in general, living together and sharing in anything human is difficult, and especially in things of this sort. This is shown by partnerships of fellow-travelers: nearly all of them fall out over the everyday matters at hand, taking offense at each other over small things.

11| Again, among servants too, it is those we make the most use of for our daily errands that we most often clash with. So the holding of these and other such possessions in common carries difficulties of this kind; but the way things now stand, if it is adorned with good habits and an arrangement of correct laws, would make no small difference. For it will have the good of both: I mean the good that comes from possessions being common and the good that comes from their being private. For they must be common in a certain way, but private taken as a whole. When the tasks of care are divided up, this will not produce complaints against one another; rather, people will make more progress, each attending to his own as to something private; and through virtue, in the matter of use, the things of friends will be common, as the proverb says. Indeed even now this arrangement is sketched out in this way in some cities, showing it is not impossible, and especially in well-governed ones — some parts of it exist already, other parts could come to be: for each person, while holding his own property privately, makes some things useful to his friends, while using other things as common — as, for example, at Sparta they use one another's slaves as, so to speak, their own, and likewise horses and dogs, and if they need provisions on a journey, they use whatever is out in the fields throughout the countryside.

12| It is clear, then, that it is better for possessions to be private, but for their use to be made common; and it is the lawgiver's own particular task to see that people become of this character. Further, as regards pleasure too, it makes an untold difference to regard something as one's own. For it is not for nothing, presumably, that each person has affection for himself; this is natural. [1263b] Self-love is rightly blamed, but this blame does not fall on loving oneself, but on loving oneself more than one ought — just as with the love of money, since everyone, so to speak, loves things of that kind. But further, to give freely and to help friends or guests or companions is a very great pleasure, and this comes about only when possessions are private. None of this happens for those who make the city excessively one; and besides this, they plainly do away with the functions of two virtues — moderation with respect to women (for it is a fine act, on account of moderation, to hold back from a woman who belongs to another), and generosity with respect to possessions: for a man will not be visibly generous, nor will he perform any generous act, since the function of generosity lies in the use of possessions. So such legislation might seem attractive on the surface and appear humane, for the listener gladly accepts it, supposing there will be some wonderful friendship of all with all — especially when someone denounces the evils that now exist in constitutions as arising because property is not held in common, meaning lawsuits with one another over contracts, judgments concerning false witness, and flattery of the rich —

13| but none of these things comes about because of the absence of common holding, but because of wickedness, since we see that those who hold and share property in common quarrel far more than those who own their property separately; but we observe only a few who quarrel as a result of partnerships, comparing them against the many who hold their possessions privately. Further, it is only fair to speak not only of the evils they will be deprived of by holding things in common, but also of the goods; and the life appears to be altogether impossible. The cause of Socrates' error must be thought to be that his premise is not correct. For the household and the city must indeed be one in some sense, but not in every sense. There is a point beyond which the city, advancing further, will cease to be a city at all, and there is a point at which it will still be a city but, coming close to not being one, will be a worse city — just as if someone were to turn harmony into unison, or rhythm into a single beat. Rather, being a multitude, it must be made one and common through education, as has been said before; and it is strange that someone who intends to introduce education, and thinks that through it the city will become excellent, should suppose he can set it right by measures of that kind rather than by habits, philosophy, and laws — just as the lawgiver, in the matter of property at Sparta and Crete, made it common by means of the common messes.

14| [1264a] Nor must this itself be overlooked, that attention should be paid to the long span of time and the many years, in which such an arrangement would not have gone unnoticed if it were good: for pretty much everything has been discovered already, though some of it has not been collected together, and some of it people know of but do not put to use. It would become clearest of all if one could see such a constitution actually being set up in practice: for one will not be able to form the city without dividing and separating it — some parts into common messes, others into brotherhoods and tribes. So nothing else will be legislated except that the guardians not farm the land — which is exactly what the Spartans now attempt to do. Indeed, not even what the character of the whole constitution will be for those who share it in common has Socrates stated, nor is it easy to say. And yet the mass of the city consists almost entirely of the other citizens, about whom nothing has been determined — whether property should be common for the farmers too, or private for each, and further whether wives and children should be private or common as well. For if in the same way everything is common to everyone, how will these differ from those guardians? Or what greater benefit will they gain by submitting to their rule, or what will they have learned that makes them submit to that rule, unless the rulers contrive something clever, as the Cretans do?

15| For the Cretans, having allowed their subjects everything else the same as their slaves, have forbidden them only gymnastic exercises and the possession of weapons. But if, as in other cities, such things will exist among them too, what will be the manner of their partnership? For within a single city there must necessarily be two cities, and these opposed to one another. For he makes the guardians into something like a garrison, while the farmers, craftsmen, and other citizens are something else; and complaints, lawsuits, and all the other evils he says exist in cities will exist among these people too. And yet Socrates says they will need few laws because of their education — laws about city-management, market-management, and other such matters — since he assigns education only to the guardians. Further, he makes the farmers, who pay a rent, owners of their own property; but it is far more likely that they will be difficult and full of pride than the helots, penestae, or slaves that exist among some peoples. But then, whether these arrangements are equally necessary or not, nothing at all has been determined even now. Nor has it been determined what constitution, education, and laws will apply to those who are closely connected with these people — and this is neither easy to find, nor a small matter, since it makes a great difference what sort of people these must be for the partnership of the guardians to be preserved.

16| [1264b] But further, if he is going to make the women common but the property private, who will manage the household as the men manage what is on the farms? And it is absurd, if both the property and the farmers' wives are to be common, to draw the analogy from animals, as if women must pursue the same occupations as men, when animals have no share in household management. It is also risky the way Socrates establishes the rulers. For he always makes the same people rulers, and this becomes a cause of civil strife even among people who possess no worth at all, let alone, presumably, among spirited and warlike men. That it is necessary for him to make the same people rulers is plain: for the gold from the god is not mixed into different souls at different times, but always into the same ones. He says that at their very birth some have gold mixed in, others silver, and bronze and iron into those who are going to be craftsmen and farmers. Moreover, in taking happiness away from the guardians, he says the lawgiver ought to make the whole city happy. But it is impossible for the whole to be happy unless most or all or some of its parts possess happiness.

17| For being happy is not the kind of thing being even is: that can belong to the whole while belonging to neither of its two parts, but being happy cannot. But if the guardians are not happy, who else is? Certainly not the craftsmen and the mass of vulgar workers. So the constitution Socrates has described has these difficulties, and others no fewer than these. And the discussion in the Laws, written later, stands in much the same case, which is why it is better to examine the constitution set out there as well, briefly. For in fact in the Republic Socrates has determined only quite a few points: about the community of women and children, how it should be arranged; about property; and about the ordering of the constitution (for the multitude of inhabitants is divided into two parts, the farmers and the part that does the fighting, and a third arising from these, the part that deliberates and has authority over the city) — but about the farmers and the craftsmen, whether they will have a share in any office or none, and whether these too must possess arms and fight alongside the rest or not, Socrates has determined nothing. Rather, he thinks the women must fight alongside the men and share the same education as the guardians, while for the rest he has filled out the discussion with material brought in from outside, including about the education, of what sort it should be, for the guardians.

18| [1265a] As for the Laws, the greatest part of it consists of laws properly so called, and he has said little about the constitution; and though he wishes to make this constitution more generally applicable to cities, he gradually brings it back around again toward the other constitution. For apart from the community of women and of property, he assigns everything else the same to both constitutions: the same education, a life spent free from the necessary tasks, and likewise concerning common meals — except that in this one he says there must be common meals for the women too, and while the one constitution has a thousand men possessing arms, this one has five thousand. Now all of Socrates' discussions have their share of refinement, cleverness, novelty, and the spirit of inquiry, but perhaps it is hard for all of them to be right as well; since even the number just mentioned must not be overlooked — that so many will need a territory the size of Babylonia or some other boundless expanse, to support five thousand men living in idleness, and around them another crowd many times larger still, of women and attendants. One should indeed lay down premises according to one's wish, but nothing impossible. And it is said that the lawgiver ought to frame his laws looking to two things, the territory and the human beings.

19| It would also be well to add a further point, concerning the neighboring places: first, whether the city must live a political life directed outward (for it is not only necessary for it to use in war such weapons as are useful within its own territory, but also with a view to places beyond it); and if someone does not accept such a life, neither for the individual nor for the city in common, all the same the city must be no less formidable to its enemies, not only when they come into its territory but also when they leave it. And one must also look at the amount of property, whether it might not be better to mark it out in some other, clearer way. For he says it must be so much as to allow living temperately, as if one had said, so as to live well. But this is really too general a formula, since it is possible to live temperately and yet wretchedly; a better boundary is temperately and liberally, for the two will come apart, since to the one will follow luxury, to the other hardship — since these alone are the choiceworthy states with regard to the use of property: one cannot use property gently or courageously, but one can use it temperately and liberally, so that the states concerning it must necessarily be these.

20| It is also absurd, in equalizing the properties, not to regulate the number of citizens as well, but to leave the production of children unbounded, on the assumption that it will be leveled off sufficiently to the same number by the childlessness of some, however many are born, [1265b] because this is thought to happen even now among cities. But this need not hold with the same exactness for cities then as for cities now: now no one is at a loss, because estates are divided among however large a number, but then, since estates are undivided, those left over from the division must necessarily have nothing, whether the number of such men be fewer or more. One would suppose it more necessary that the production of children be bounded by reference to the property, so that no more than a certain number be born, this number being fixed with an eye to chance events, in case some of those born happen to die, and to the childlessness of others. To leave it unregulated, as happens in most cities, must necessarily be a cause of poverty for the citizens, and poverty produces civil strife and wrongdoing. Now Phidon the Corinthian, one of the most ancient lawgivers, thought that the households and the number of citizens ought to remain equal, even though at first everyone had allotments unequal in size; but in these Laws the opposite holds. But how we think it would be better arranged concerning these matters must be said later; and it is also left out in these Laws how the rulers will differ from the ruled.

21| For he says it is necessary that, just as the warp of wool comes from a different stock than the woof, so too the rulers must stand to the ruled. But since he allows the whole property to grow larger, up to five times its original amount, why should this not hold for land as well, up to some limit? One must also examine the division of house-plots, whether it is not in fact inexpedient for household management: for he assigned each person two house-plots, divided and set apart, and it is hard to manage two households. The whole arrangement wishes to be neither democracy nor oligarchy, but a mean between these, which they call a polity, since it is made up of those who bear heavy arms. If then he is constructing this as the most widely applicable constitution for cities among the others, he has perhaps spoken well; but if as the best after the first constitution, he has not spoken well. For one might rather praise the constitution of the Spartans, or perhaps some other constitution more aristocratic still. Now some say that the best constitution must be a blend made up of all the constitutions, and this is why they praise that of the Spartans (for some say it is made up of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, calling the kingship a monarchy, the rule of the elders an oligarchy, and saying it is governed democratically by reason of the office of the ephors, because the ephors are drawn from the people)

22| Others say that the ephorate is a tyranny, but that the common messes and the rest of daily life are run democratically. [1266a] Now in the Laws it is said that the best constitution ought to be composed out of democracy and tyranny — regimes that one would either not count as constitutions at all, or would call the worst of all. Those who mix in more elements therefore speak better, for a constitution composed of more elements is better. Further, the constitution described there plainly has nothing monarchical in it, but only oligarchic and democratic elements, and it inclines rather toward oligarchy. This is clear from the arrangement of the offices: filling them by election from among elected candidates is common to both democracy and oligarchy, but requiring the wealthier to attend the assembly and elect officials or perform some other political function, while releasing the rest from this requirement, is oligarchic, and so is the attempt to have most of the officials drawn from the wealthy, and the highest offices from those of the highest property assessments. The election of the council too he makes oligarchic. For all are required to vote, but from the first property class, and then again an equal number from the second; then from the third — except that not all were required to vote from the third or fourth classes, but from the fourth only those of the first and second classes were required to vote. Then from these he says an equal number must be returned from each property class.

23| The result will be that those from the highest property classes will be more numerous and better qualified, since some of the common people will not vote at all, because it is not required of them. That such a constitution ought not to be composed out of democracy and monarchy is clear from this, and from what will be said later, when the inquiry comes round to this constitution. There is also danger in the method of electing officials by having elected men elect further electors. For if some number of people, even a moderate number, are willing to combine, the elections will always go according to their wishes. This, then, is the state of affairs concerning the constitution described in the Laws. There are also some other constitutions, some proposed by private individuals, others by philosophers and statesmen, and all of them stand closer to the constitutions now actually established, and by which cities are actually governed, than either of the two just discussed. No one else has proposed anything so novel as the community of children and wives, or of common messes for the women; instead, they start from more necessary matters. For some think that the arrangement concerning property is the most important thing to get right, since they say that it is over property that all factional conflicts arise. This is why Phaleas of Chalcedon was the first to introduce this proposal: he says that citizens' properties ought to be equal.

24| [1266b] He thought this would not be hard to arrange at once in newly founded cities, but that in cities already settled it would be more laborious — though it could still be leveled most quickly if the rich were to give dowries but not receive them, while the poor were to receive them but not give them. Plato, in writing the Laws, thought it necessary to allow accumulation up to a point, but that no citizen should be permitted to acquire more than five times the minimum holding, as has also been said before. But those who legislate in this way must also not overlook a point that is now being overlooked: that in fixing the amount of property one ought also to fix the number of children, for if the number of children exceeds what the amount of property can support, the law is bound to be broken, and quite apart from this breach, it is a bad thing for many who were rich to become poor, since it is hard for such people not to become agitators for revolution. That equality of property has some power for political community even some of the ancients evidently recognized — Solon, for instance, legislated on it, and among other peoples there is a law forbidding the acquisition of as much land as one wishes; similarly the laws forbid selling one's property, as at Locri there is a law against selling unless one can show that manifest misfortune has befallen one, and further there is a law for preserving the old allotments — this last, once abolished at Leucas too, made their constitution excessively democratic

25| (for it no longer followed that men proceeded to office from the fixed property assessments). But it is possible for equality of property to exist, and yet for this equal amount to be either so great that people live in luxury, or so small that they live in penury. It is clear, then, that it is not enough for the legislator to make properties equal; he must aim at the mean. Further, even if one were to fix a moderate property for everyone, it would be of no use, since it is the desires that need to be leveled rather than the properties, and this cannot be done unless people are adequately educated by the laws. But perhaps Phaleas would say that this is exactly what he himself is proposing, for he thinks that these two things ought to be equal for cities: property and education. But he must say what this education will be, and to say that it should be one and the same for all is of no use, for it is possible for it to be one and the same, yet be of such a kind that people are trained to be grasping, whether for money or honor or both together. Further, factions arise not only because of inequality of property, but also because of inequality of honors, though in the opposite way for each: the many because of inequality in property,

26| [1267a] the refined because of equality in honors — hence the line, "in equal honor is held both the coward and the brave." (Homer, Iliad 9.319) Men do wrong not only on account of necessities, for which he supposes equality of property to be the remedy, so that they will not turn to theft out of cold or hunger, but also so that they may enjoy themselves and not merely desire; for if their desire exceeds what is necessary, they will do wrong in order to cure that desire — and not for this reason alone, but also if they should desire simply to enjoy pleasures unaccompanied by pain. What, then, is the remedy for these three causes? For some, a small property and work; for others, self-control; and as for the third, if some wished to enjoy themselves through their own resources, they would seek no remedy except one drawn from philosophy. For the other pleasures require other people; since it is in fact for excess that people do the greatest wrongs, not for necessities (for example, men do not become tyrants in order to avoid the cold — which is why the greatest honors go to one who kills not a thief but a tyrant). So the remedy proposed by Phaleas's constitution is of use only against petty wrongdoing. Further, he wants to establish most of his arrangements with a view to how citizens will conduct themselves well toward one another, but a city must also look to its neighbors and to all outsiders.

27| The constitution, therefore, must necessarily be organized with a view to military strength, about which he has said nothing. Likewise concerning property: it must be sufficient not only for political uses but also against dangers from outside. This is why it should be neither so great in amount that neighboring and more powerful states will covet it while its possessors are unable to fend off attackers, nor so small that the city cannot sustain a war even against states of equal and similar strength. He, then, has defined nothing on this point, but one must not overlook what amount of property is advantageous. Perhaps the best standard is that it should not profit those stronger to go to war on account of the excess, but should be such an amount as they would go to war for even if they did not possess so much property themselves. For example, when Autophradates was about to besiege Atarneus, Eubulus told him to consider how long it would take to capture the place, and then to calculate the expense of that time, saying that he would be willing to abandon Atarneus at once for less than that; and by saying this he made Autophradates stop and think, and he gave up the siege. It is, then, one advantageous thing for citizens' properties to be equal, with a view to their not forming factions against one another, but it amounts to nothing very great, so to speak.

28| For the refined would resent it, as not being thought worthy of equality, which is why they are so often seen attacking the constitution and starting factions: [1267b] and further, the wickedness of human beings is insatiable — at first two obols is enough, but once this becomes traditional, people always want more, until they arrive at the unlimited. For the nature of appetite is unlimited, and the many live for the filling of it. The starting point for dealing with such people, then, rather than equalizing properties, is to make the decent by nature such that they are unwilling to seek more than their share, and to make the base such that they are unable to — which comes about if they are the weaker party and are not treated unjustly. Nor has he stated the equality of property well either. For he equalizes only in respect of the possession of land, but there is also wealth in slaves and livestock and money, and a large stock of what are called furnishings. So either one must seek equality in all of these, or some moderate arrangement, or leave them all alone. And it is clear from his legislation that he is constructing his city on a small scale, if all the craftsmen are to be public slaves and are not to supply some part of the citizen body. But if those who do the public work must be public slaves, this ought to be the case (as in Epidamnus, and as Diophantus once arranged at Athens) in this manner.

29| Concerning the constitution of Phaleas, then, one might more or less judge from these points whether he happens to have spoken well or not well on any point. Hippodamus, son of Euryphon, of Miletus — who also invented the division of cities into blocks and laid out the Piraeus, and who became, in the rest of his life too, somewhat eccentric out of love of distinction, so that some thought he lived rather too fussily, both in the abundance and expense of his hair and ornament, and also in his clothing, which was cheap but warm, worn not only in winter but also through the summer season, and who wished to be learned about nature as a whole as well — was the first of those who were not themselves engaged in politics to attempt to say something about the best constitution. He constructed his city with a population of ten thousand, divided into three parts: he made one part craftsmen, one farmers, and a third the part that fought in war and possessed arms. He divided the territory too into three parts, one sacred, one public, one private: from the one, they were to perform the customary rites toward the gods, this being the sacred land; from another, those who fought in war were to live, this being the common land; and the farmers' land was private. He thought there were only three kinds of laws as well:

30| for the matters about which lawsuits arise, he held, are three in number: insult, damage, death. He also legislated for one supreme court, to which all cases thought to have been judged badly were to be brought up; this he constructed out of certain elected elders. [1268a] He thought that judgments in the courts should not be reached by a straightforward vote, but that each juror should carry a tablet, on which he was to write the verdict if he condemned outright, leave it blank if he acquitted outright, and if he condemned in part and acquitted in part, mark this distinction on it. For as things now stand, he thought the law was not well made, since it forces jurors to perjure themselves either one way or the other in their verdicts. He also laid down a law concerning those who discover something advantageous to the city, that they should be honored, and that the children of those who die in war should be maintained at public expense — as though this had not yet been legislated elsewhere (though in fact this law exists both at Athens now and in other cities as well); and that all the officials should be elected by the people. He made the people consist of the three parts of the city; and those elected were to have charge of the affairs of the community, of matters concerning foreigners, and of orphans. These, then, are the most numerous and most notable features of Hippodamus's arrangement. But one might raise a difficulty first about the division of the mass of the citizens. For the craftsmen and the farmers and those who bear arms all share in the constitution, though the farmers have no arms and the craftsmen have neither land nor arms, so that they become virtually slaves of those who possess the arms.

31| Now it is impossible for them all to share in every honor (for it is necessary that generals and guardians of the citizens and, one might say, the most authoritative offices be established out of those who possess the arms); but if they do not share in the constitution, how is it possible for them to be well disposed toward it? Yet those who possess the arms ought to be superior to both of the other parts, and this is not easy unless they are numerous; but if this is to be so, what need is there for the others to share in the constitution and to have authority over the establishment of the officials? Further, of what use are the farmers to the city? Craftsmen there must necessarily be, for every city needs craftsmen, and they are able to make their living from their craft just as in other cities; but the farmers, if they were supplying food to those who possess the arms, might reasonably be some part of the city — but as it is they have private land and will farm this privately for themselves. Further, as to the common land, from which those who fight will have their food — if they themselves are to farm it, then the fighting class will not be distinct from the farming class, though this is what the lawgiver intends; but if there are to be others, distinct both from those who farm the private land and from the fighters, this will be a fourth part of the city again, sharing in nothing, but alien to the constitution.

32| But indeed, if one is to make the same people farm both the private land and the common land, then there will be difficulty about the quantity of produce that each man will have to farm for two households, [1268b] and for what reason will they not take their food directly from the same land and the same allotments, both for themselves and to supply the fighters? All this involves a great deal of confusion. Nor is the law about judgment well framed either — that the juror should judge by making distinctions, when the charge is written up simply, and that the juror should become an arbitrator. This is possible in arbitration even when there are several arbitrators, for they confer with one another about the verdict; but it is not possible in the courts — indeed most lawgivers do the opposite of this, taking care that the jurors shall not confer with one another. Then again, how will the verdict fail to be confused, when the juror thinks the defendant owes something, but not as much as the plaintiff claims? One man claims twenty minas, and the juror decides on ten minas (or one juror more, another less), another five, another four, and in this way they will evidently split it up in different amounts; while others will condemn for the whole sum, and others for nothing. What, then, will be the method of counting the votes? Further, nothing forces the man who acquits or condemns outright to perjure himself, if the charge is written up simply, provided he judges justly:

33| for the man who acquits does not judge that the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not owe the twenty minas; but the other, the one who condemns, is already perjuring himself, if he condemns him while not believing he owes the twenty minas. As for the proposal that some honor should be given to those who discover something advantageous to the city, it is not safe to legislate about this, though it is pleasant to hear about only; for it opens the way to false accusations and, it may be, to attempts to change the constitution. But this runs into another problem and a different inquiry: for some are at a loss whether it is harmful or advantageous to cities to change their ancestral laws, if some other law is better. For this reason it is not easy to agree quickly with what has been said, if in fact it is not advantageous to make changes, since it is possible for some people to propose the repeal of laws or of a constitution as a common good. Since we have made mention of this, it is better to draw a few further distinctions about it. For it involves difficulty, as we said, and it might seem better to make changes. At any rate, in the other sciences this has proved beneficial — medicine, for instance, by changing from ancestral practice, and gymnastics, and in general all the crafts and capacities, so that, since one must set down political science too as one of these, it is clear that the same must necessarily hold of it as well. One might say that a sign of this has occurred in the facts themselves:

34| For the ancient laws, they say, are too simple and barbaric. The Greeks used to carry iron weapons, and used to buy their wives from one another, and whatever else survives of ancient customs is altogether simple-minded, [1269a] as for example at Cyme there is a law about homicide cases that if the prosecutor produces a certain number of witnesses from among his own relatives, the defendant is liable for the murder. But in general what everyone seeks is not what is ancestral but what is good. And it is likely that the first human beings, whether they were earthborn or survived some destruction, were like ordinary people and fools, just as is said of the earthborn, so that it would be absurd to abide by their opinions. Besides this, it is better not to leave even the written laws unmoved. For just as with the other crafts, so too with the arrangement of a constitution: it is impossible to write everything out with precision. For laws must be written in universal terms, but actions concern particulars. From these considerations, then, it is clear that some laws must sometimes be changed. But looked at in another way, this would seem to call for great caution. For when the improvement is small, and it is a bad thing to accustom people to dissolve the laws lightly, it is clear that certain errors both of the lawgivers and of the rulers should be left alone; for one will not gain as much by making the change as one will be harmed by being accustomed to disobey the rulers. And the analogy drawn from the crafts is false.

35| For changing a craft is not like changing a law: for law has no power to secure obedience apart from habit, and habit does not come about except over a long stretch of time, so that readily changing from existing laws to other, new laws makes the power of law weak. Further, even if laws should be changed, should all of them be changed, and in every constitution, or not? And should the changing be open to anyone who happens along, or only to certain people? For these questions make a great difference. Hence let us now set this inquiry aside; it belongs to other occasions. Concerning the constitution of the Lacedaemonians and that of the Cretans, and indeed concerning the other constitutions as well, there are two inquiries: one, whether anything in their legislation has been laid down well or not well with a view to the best arrangement; the other, whether anything runs contrary to the underlying assumption and character of the constitution they themselves propose. Now it is agreed that the city that is going to be governed well must have leisure from necessary business; but in what way it is to have this is not easy to grasp. For the Thessalian serf class has repeatedly risen up against the Thessalians, and likewise the helots against the Spartans (for they are constantly, as it were, lying in wait for their misfortunes).

36| But concerning the Cretans nothing of this kind has yet occurred. The reason, perhaps, is that the neighboring cities, [1269b] although they war with one another, are none of them allied with those who revolt, because it is not to their advantage, since they too possess perioikoi of their own; whereas for the Spartans all their neighbors were enemies — the Argives, the Messenians, and the Arcadians. Indeed even in the case of the Thessalians the revolts happened at the outset because they were still at war with their neighbors, the Achaeans, the Perrhaebians, and the Magnesians. It seems, moreover, that if nothing else, at least the business of overseeing such people is troublesome — in what manner one ought to deal with them. For if given license they grow insolent and claim to deserve equal treatment with their masters, while if treated harshly they plot against them and hate them. It is clear, then, that those for whom this happens in respect to their helot-system have not discovered the best way. Further, laxity concerning the women is both harmful to the deliberate purpose of the constitution and to the happiness of the city. For just as man and woman are parts of a household, it is clear that a city too must be reckoned as divided nearly in half, into the mass of men and the mass of women, so that in whatever constitutions the position of the women is badly arranged, half the city must be reckoned as without law. This is exactly what has happened there: for the lawgiver, wishing the whole city to be tough and enduring, is plainly of this mind with respect to the men, but has entirely neglected the matter as regards the women.

37| For they live licentiously, given over to every kind of license, and luxuriously. The result is that in such a constitution wealth is necessarily held in honor, especially if the people happen to be ruled by their women, as is the case with most military and warlike races, except the Celts and any others who have openly honored intercourse between males. For the one who first told the myth seems not without reason to have paired Ares with Aphrodite: for all such people appear to be in thrall either to intercourse with males or to intercourse with women. This is exactly what obtained among the Spartans, and much was managed by the women during the period of their supremacy. And yet what difference does it make whether the women rule, or the rulers are ruled by the women? The result is the same. Now boldness is useful for none of the ordinary business of life, but if for anything, for war; and yet even for this the boldness of the Spartan women was most harmful. This became clear at the time of the Theban invasion: they proved worthless for anything, exactly as in other cities, and produced more turmoil than the enemy did. From the beginning, then, this license of the women seems to have come about among the Spartans reasonably enough.

38| [1270a] For on account of their military campaigns they lived abroad away from home for long stretches of time, warring first the war against the Argives and then again the war against the Arcadians and the Messenians; and once they had leisure, they offered themselves to the lawgiver already prepared by their military life (for that life has many parts of virtue), whereas the women, they say, Lycurgus attempted to bring under the laws, but when they resisted he gave up the attempt again. These, then, are the causes of what came about, so that it is clear this too was an error of his. But we are not examining this — whom one ought to pardon or not pardon — but rather what is correct and what is not. Now the condition of things concerning the women seems, as was said before, not only to produce a certain unseemliness in the constitution taken by itself, but also to contribute something toward the love of money. For after what has just been said, one might find fault with them concerning the inequality of property. For it has come about that some of them possess far too much substance, while others possess extremely little; the result is that the land has come into the hands of a few. This too has been badly regulated through the laws: for while the lawgiver made it not honorable to buy or sell one's existing property, and rightly so, he gave people the freedom to give it away and to bequeath it,

39| and yet the same result necessarily follows either way. And indeed close to two of the five parts of the whole territory belong to the women, both because many become heiresses and because large dowries are given. And yet it would have been better to have regulated that there be no dowry, or a small one, or even a moderate one. But as it stands, one may give an heiress to whomever one wishes, and if a man dies without having made a will, whoever he leaves as his heir gives her to whomever he pleases. Consequently, although the territory is capable of supporting fifteen hundred cavalry and thirty thousand hoplites, the population was not even a thousand. And it has become clear through the facts themselves that the arrangements concerning this matter went badly for them: for the city could not sustain a single blow, but was destroyed through underpopulation. They say that under the earlier kings they used to share citizenship with outsiders, so that underpopulation did not occur then, even though they were at war for a long time, and they say that the Spartans once numbered as many as ten thousand. Nonetheless, whether this is true or not, it is better for a city to be populous through an equalized distribution of property. But the law concerning the begetting of children is also opposed to this correction.

40| [1270b] For the lawgiver, wishing the Spartiates to be as numerous as possible, urges the citizens to have as many children as possible; for they have a law that the man who has fathered three sons is exempt from military service, and the man who has fathered four is exempt from all public burdens. Yet it is obvious that when many children are born, while the land is divided in this fixed way, many must become poor. Moreover, the arrangements concerning the ephorate are also faulty. For this office has authority over the greatest matters for them, yet the ephors are drawn from the whole people, so that often very poor men fall into this office, men who because of their poverty are open to being bought. This has been shown often before, and now again in the affair of the Andrians: for certain men, corrupted by money, as far as lay in their own power destroyed the whole city. And because the office is excessively great and equal to a tyranny, even the kings were compelled to court the favor of the ephors, so that the constitution was harmed in this respect as well: for a democracy resulted out of an aristocracy. This office, then, does hold the constitution together—for the people keep quiet because they share in the greatest office—so that whether this came about through the lawgiver or through chance, it works out advantageously for the state of affairs; for a constitution that is to be preserved must have all the parts of the city wishing it to exist and to continue in the same condition.

41| Now the kings are so disposed because of the honor paid to them, the men of good birth and character because of the council of elders (for this office is a prize of virtue), and the people because of the ephorate (for it is filled from all)—but this office ought to have been elective from all, yet not in the manner it now is (for that manner is altogether childish). Further, the ephors are masters of great judgments, though they are men taken at random, and for this reason it would be better if they judged not by their own private judgment but according to written rules and the laws. The manner of life of the ephors, too, is not in agreement with the intention of the city: for it is itself too relaxed, while for the ephors' own way of life is too relaxed, while for the other citizens it goes too far toward the harsh, so that they are unable to endure it, but secretly escape the law and enjoy bodily pleasures, but secretly escape the law and enjoy bodily pleasures. The arrangements concerning the office of the elders are also not well made for them. For if the elders were reasonable men and adequately educated toward manly goodness, one might perhaps say that this is advantageous to the city; yet the fact that they hold authority over great judgments for life is disputable (for there is, just as of the body, also an old age of the mind).

42| [1271a] Educated in the manner they are, so that even the lawgiver himself distrusts them as not being good men, it is not safe. And in fact those who have shared in this office are shown to accept bribes and to make many public matters a matter of favor. For this reason it would be better if they were not unaccountable; but as it is they are. It might seem that the office of the ephors holds all the offices to account: but this is too great a privilege to give to the ephorate, and we do not say that accountability ought to be rendered in this manner. Further, the method of choosing the elders is, as regards its manner of judgment, childish; and it is not right that a man who thinks himself worthy of the office should himself canvass for it; for the man who is worthy of the office ought to rule whether he wishes it or not. But as it is, the lawgiver evidently does the same thing here as elsewhere in the rest of the constitution: for by making the citizens ambitious for honor, he has made use of this very trait for the election of the elders; for no one would canvass for office who was not ambitious for honor. And yet most of the wrongs men do voluntarily come about, one might almost say, through ambition for honor and through love of money. Concerning kingship, whether it is better for cities to have it or not better, let that be another discussion.

43| But it is certainly better that it should not be as it now is, but that each of the kings should be judged by his own manner of life. That the lawgiver himself does not think it possible to make men good and true is plain: at any rate he distrusts them as not being sufficiently good men; for this reason they used to send out their enemies as fellow-envoys along with the kings, and they considered it a safeguard for the city that the kings should be at odds with one another. Nor has good legislation been made, by the man who first established them, concerning the common messes called the phiditia. For the gathering ought rather to be maintained from common funds, as in Crete; but among the Spartans each man must contribute his own share, and since some of them are very poor and are unable to bear this expense, the result is the opposite of what the lawgiver intended. For he wishes the arrangement of the common messes to be democratic, but as legislated it turns out to be the least democratic thing possible. For it is not easy for the very poor to take part, and yet this ancestral rule is their standard for the constitution: that the man who is unable to pay this contribution should not share in it. And concerning the law about the admirals, other men too have found fault, and rightly so; for it becomes a cause of civil strife: since alongside the kings, who are permanent generals, the office of admiral has become virtually a second kingship.

44| One might also find fault with the lawgiver's underlying assumption in this way, [1271b] the very point that Plato too has found fault with in the Laws: the entire arrangement of the laws is directed toward one part of virtue, namely the virtue of war; for this is useful for gaining mastery. Accordingly they were preserved so long as they were at war, but were destroyed once they had gained empire, because they did not know how to be at leisure, and had practiced no other exercise held more authoritative than that of war. And there is a further error, no less than this one: they believe that the goods that are contested come about through virtue rather than through vice, and in this they are right; but that these goods are better than virtue itself, in this they are not right. The Spartiates are also badly off as regards their common funds. For there is nothing in the common treasury of the city, though they are compelled to wage great wars, and they are poor payers of contributions; for because most of the land belongs to the Spartiates, they do not scrutinize one another's contributions. And the outcome has turned out for the lawgiver the opposite of what is advantageous: for he has made the city poor in money and private individuals fond of money. Concerning the Spartan constitution, then, let this much be said; for these are the points on which one would most find fault. The Cretan constitution is closely akin to this one; in a few respects it is not worse, but for the greater part it is managed less elegantly. And indeed it appears, and is said, that the Laconian constitution has for the most part imitated the Cretan.

45| Most ancient things are less fully articulated than more recent ones. For they say that Lycurgus, when he gave up the guardianship of King Charilaus and went abroad, spent the greater part of his time around Crete because of their kinship; for the Lyctians were colonists of the Laconians, and those who came to the colony found the ordering of laws already existing among the people then dwelling there. For this reason even now the perioikoi make use of them in the same way, on the assumption that Minos was the first to establish the ordering of the laws. The island also seems by nature and by its position to be well suited for rule over the Greeks; for it lies athwart the whole sea, since almost all the Greeks are settled around the sea: for it is a short distance from the Peloponnese on one side, and on the other from the part of Asia around Triopium and Rhodes. For this reason Minos gained control of the sea, and of the islands he subdued some and colonized others, and finally, having made an attack on Sicily, ended his life there near Camicus. The Cretan arrangement corresponds to the Laconian. For the helots farm for the one, and for the Cretans the perioikoi farm,

46| [1272a] Common meals exist among both peoples, and in old times the Spartans called them not "phiditia" but "men's messes," as the Cretans still do, which makes it clear the institution came from there. And so does the arrangement of the constitution. For the ephors have the same power as the officials in Crete called "kosmoi," except that the ephors are five in number and the kosmoi ten. The elders correspond to the elders whom the Cretans call the council, and are equal in number. There used to be a kingship, but the Cretans abolished it, and the kosmoi hold the leadership in war. All share in the assembly, but it has authority over nothing except to ratify by vote what has already been decided by the elders and the kosmoi. Now the arrangement of the common meals is better among the Cretans than among the Spartans. For at Sparta each person contributes the fixed amount per head, and if he does not, the law bars him from sharing in the constitution, as has been said before; but in Crete the arrangement is more communal, for from all the crops and livestock produced publicly, and from the tribute the perioikoi pay, a portion is set apart for the gods and the public services, and a portion for the common meals, so that all are fed from a common fund — women and children and men alike.

47| The lawgiver has given much thought to sparing eating as beneficial, and likewise to the separation of the women, so that they should not bear too many children, for which purpose he instituted relations between the men themselves; whether this was done well or badly will be another occasion to examine. That the arrangements for common meals are better among the Cretans than the Spartans is clear; but the arrangements concerning the kosmoi are even worse than those concerning the ephors. For whatever defect belongs to the office of the ephors belongs also to this one (since the kosmoi too are chosen from whoever happens to be available), but the benefit the ephorate confers on the constitution there is absent here. For there, because the selection is made from the whole citizen body, the people, sharing in the highest office, wish the constitution to endure; but here they do not choose the kosmoi from the whole body but from certain clans, and the elders from among those who have already served as kosmoi — about whom one could say the same things as about the corresponding officials at Sparta: for being unaccountable and holding office for life is a greater privilege than they deserve, and ruling not by written law but by their own judgment is dangerous. And the fact that the people, though excluded from office, remain quiet is no sign that the arrangement is a good one.

48| For the kosmoi have no chance for profit as the ephors do, [1272b] because they dwell far off on an island, away from the men who might corrupt them. Yet the cure they devise for this fault is a peculiar one, belonging to a ruling faction rather than to constitutional rule. For often certain men band together and expel the kosmoi, whether from among their own colleagues in office or from private citizens; and it is also possible for the kosmoi to resign office before their term is up. It would surely be better for all these things to happen according to law than according to the will of individuals, for the will of individuals is not a safe rule. But worst of all is the practice of suspending the office of kosmoi altogether, which the powerful often bring about when they do not wish to submit to justice. This makes it clear that the arrangement has something of a constitution about it, but is not really a constitution — it is rather a rule of a powerful clique. And they are accustomed, by dividing the people and their own friends into factions, to create a state of anarchy, faction, and mutual fighting. Yet what does such a condition differ from a city's simply ceasing, after a certain time, to be a city at all, and the political community dissolving? A city in this condition is in danger, exposed to anyone who wishes and is able to attack it. But, as has been said, it is preserved because of its location, for its remoteness has had the effect of an exclusion of foreigners. That is also why the perioikoi remain loyal to the Cretans, while the helots at Sparta often revolt. For the Cretans have no share in any empire abroad, and it is only recently that a foreign war has crossed over into the island, which has revealed the weakness of the laws there.

49| Let this much be said about this constitution. The Carthaginians too are thought to be governed well, and in many respects better than others, and in some particulars very much like the Spartans. For these three constitutions are in a way close to one another and differ greatly from the rest — the Cretan, the Spartan, and, third among them, that of the Carthaginians. Many of their institutions are well arranged; and a sign of a well-ordered constitution is that the people remain willingly within the framework of the constitution, and that no faction worth mentioning has arisen, nor any tyrant. The Carthaginians have institutions resembling the Spartan constitution: their common meals of the political clubs correspond to the phiditia, and their board of one hundred and four corresponds to the ephors — except that theirs is not worse, for while the ephors are drawn from whoever happens to be available, this office is filled by election on merit. Their kings and council of elders correspond to the kings and elders there; and it is better that the kings should be neither drawn from one particular family nor from just any family, but rather, if there is one family of outstanding merit, that the kings be chosen from it by election rather than by seniority. For men set in authority over great matters, if they are of poor quality, do great harm,

50| [1273a] as they have already done harm to the city of the Spartans. Now most of the criticisms one might bring against the Carthaginian constitution because of its deviations turn out to be common to all the constitutions we have discussed. But of the features that depart from the underlying principle of aristocracy and of polity, some lean more toward democracy, others toward oligarchy. For instance, whether certain matters are brought before the people or not is decided by the kings together with the elders, if they are unanimous — but if not, the people decide even these matters as well. And whatever measures they do bring before the people, the people are not simply allowed to hear the decisions of the officials and confirm them, but have authority to judge the matter themselves, and anyone who wishes may speak against the proposals — a right that does not exist in the other constitutions. On the other hand, the fact that the boards of five, which have authority over many important matters, fill their own vacancies by co-optation, and that these same boards elect the board of one hundred, the highest office, and further that these men hold office for a longer time than the others (for they continue to exercise power both after leaving office and before entering it), is oligarchic; while the fact that they receive no pay and are not chosen by lot should be counted as aristocratic, along with any other similar feature — and so too the practice of having all lawsuits tried by the same boards of officials, and not different suits by different bodies, as happens at Sparta.

51| But the arrangement of the Carthaginian constitution deviates from aristocracy chiefly toward oligarchy, in line with a certain idea that finds general approval: for they think the officials ought to be chosen not only for merit but also for wealth, on the ground that a man in poverty cannot govern well or have the leisure for it. If, then, choosing officials by wealth is oligarchic and choosing them by virtue is aristocratic, this would be a third arrangement, according to which the Carthaginians have also organized the affairs of their constitution — for they elect with an eye to both these things, and especially so for the highest offices, the kings and the generals. But one must regard this deviation from aristocracy as a fault of the lawgiver. For from the very beginning it is one of the most necessary things to look to, that the best men should be able to have the leisure to do nothing unbecoming, not only while in office but also as private citizens. And if one must also have regard to wealth for the sake of leisure, it is a bad thing that the highest offices, the kingship and the generalship, should be purchasable. For this law makes wealth more honored than virtue, and makes the whole city money-loving; and whatever the ruling body supposes to be honorable, the opinion of the other citizens is bound to follow it as well.

52| But wherever virtue is not held in the highest honor, [1273b] that constitution cannot be a stable aristocracy. And it is reasonable that those who buy their offices should get used to making a profit from them, once they hold office after spending money to get it; for it would be absurd if a man who is poor but reasonable were willing to make a profit, while a man of lower character, having spent money, were not willing to. Hence those who are most able to rule best should be the ones who rule. But it would be better, even if the lawgiver did neglect to provide the reasonable men with wealth, at least to take care that those in office have leisure. It would also seem to be a poor arrangement for the same person to hold several offices, which is a practice held in esteem among the Carthaginians; for a single task is best carried out by a single person. The lawgiver must see to it that this happens, and not require the same man to play the flute and make shoes. So where the city is not small, it is more suited to citizen-government, and more democratic, that more people share in the offices; for as we said, each of the same tasks is done more in common this way, and each is carried out better and faster. This is clear in the case of military and naval affairs, for in both of these, one might say, ruling and being ruled run through virtually everyone. Since the constitution is oligarchic, they escape trouble best by always making some part of the people wealthy, sending them out to the cities; for by this means they cure the constitution and make it lasting.

53| But this is a matter of luck, and the lawgiver should make them free from faction. As things now stand, if some misfortune occurs and the mass of the ruled revolts, there is no remedy through the laws to restore calm. Concerning the constitution of the Spartans, then, and the Cretan and the Carthaginian, which are indeed justly held in high esteem, this is how matters stand. Of those who have set forth something about constitutions, some took no part in political actions of any kind whatever, but spent their lives as private individuals throughout; and about these, whatever was worth saying has been said, more or less, about all of them. Others became lawgivers, some for their own cities, some also for certain foreign ones, having themselves engaged in politics; and of these, some became authors of laws only, others of a constitution as well, as for example Lycurgus and Solon, for these established both laws and constitutions. Concerning the Spartan constitution we have spoken; as for Solon, some think he became a serious lawgiver, because he put an end to an oligarchy that was excessively unmixed, put a stop to the enslavement of the people, and established the ancestral democracy, mixing the constitution well: for the council on the Areopagus is oligarchic, the elective offices are aristocratic, and the law courts are democratic.

54| [1274a] But it seems that Solon did not abolish those institutions that existed before, the council and the election of officials, but that he set up the people, by making the courts drawn from all. And for this reason some blame him, on the ground that he undid the other element by making the court supreme over all things, since it was chosen by lot. For once this had gained power, people began, as if courting favor with the people as with a tyrant, to shift the constitution into the democracy of today; and Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the council on the Areopagus, and Pericles instituted pay for the courts, and in this way each of the popular leaders in turn advanced things, increasing them, into the present democracy. It appears that this did not come about according to Solon's deliberate purpose, but rather from a chance event (for the people, having been responsible for the naval command in the Persian Wars, grew full of self-confidence and took on base popular leaders, though the reasonable men opposed them); since Solon, at any rate, appears to have granted the people only the most necessary power, that of electing officials and holding them to account (for if the people were not sovereign even over this, they would be enslaved and hostile), but he established all the offices from among the notable and the wealthy, from the class of the five-hundred-measure men, the teamed men, and a third class, the so-called knights;

55| and a fourth, the laboring class, who had no share in any office. Lawgivers arose also in Zaleucus for the Epizephyrian Locrians, and Charondas of Catana for his own citizens and for the other Chalcidian cities around Italy and Sicily. Some try also to link them together, saying that Onomacritus was the first to become skilled in lawgiving, and that he trained himself in Crete, though a Locrian and residing there, in the art of divination; that Thales became his companion, that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were pupils of Thales, and that Charondas was a pupil of Zaleucus. But those who say this pay too little attention to the dates. There was also Philolaus of Corinth, who became lawgiver for the Thebans. Philolaus was by birth one of the Bacchiadae, and having become the lover of Diocles, the Olympic victor, when the latter left the city out of hatred for the passion his mother Alcyone had for him, Philolaus went off to Thebes with him; and there they both ended their lives. And even now people point out their tombs, which are visible to each other, but with respect to the land of Corinth, one is visible and the other is not: for the story is told that they arranged their burial this way on purpose, Diocles because of his revulsion at what had happened to him, so that the Corinthian land would not be visible from his grave-mound, and Philolaus so that it would be visible.

56| [1274b] They settled among the Thebans, then, for this reason, and Philolaus became their lawgiver concerning various other matters and concerning the procreation of children, what they call "laws of imposition"; and this is a law peculiar to him, legislated so that the number of the estates would be preserved. Charondas has nothing peculiar to himself except the suits for false witness (for he was the first to introduce the formal indictment for it), but in the precision of his laws he is more finished even than present-day lawgivers. Peculiar to Phaleas is the equalization of properties; to Plato, the community of women, children, and property, and the common messes for women, and further the law about drunkenness, that those who are sober should preside over the drinking party, and the military training so that men become ambidextrous through practice, on the ground that it is wrong for one of the two hands to be useful and the other useless. Draco has laws, but he legislated them for a constitution that already existed; there is nothing peculiar in his laws worth mentioning, except their harshness, on account of the severity of the penalty. Pittacus too became an author of laws, but not of a constitution; a law peculiar to him is that those who are drunk, if they commit some offense, should pay a greater penalty than those who are sober; for since more people act insolently when drunk than when sober, he did not look to leniency, on the ground that drunk men deserve more consideration, but to what is expedient. There was also Androdamas of Rhegium, who became lawgiver for the Chalcidians on the Thracian coast, whose laws concern matters of homicide and heiresses; but no one could mention anything peculiar to him. Let this, then, stand as our examination of constitutions, both those actually in force and those spoken of by certain people.

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