Politics · Book III

Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language

1| For one who is examining constitutions, both what each is and what sort it is, the first inquiry, more or less, is to see about the city, what the city actually is. For as matters now stand, this point is disputed: some hold that the city itself carried out a given act, whereas others hold that it was not the city that acted, but rather the oligarchy or the tyrant that did so; and we see that the whole business of the statesman and the lawgiver is concerned with the city, and the constitution is a certain arrangement of those who inhabit the city. Since the city belongs among composite things, like anything else that is a whole but is put together out of many parts, it is clear that we must first inquire into the citizen; for the city is a certain multitude of citizens. [1275a] So we must consider whom one ought to call a citizen, and what the citizen is. For the citizen too is often disputed: not everyone agrees that the same person is a citizen; there is, for instance, someone who is a citizen in a democracy but often is not a citizen in an oligarchy. Those, then, who obtain this designation in some other way, for example those made citizens by grant, must be set aside; the citizen is not a citizen by virtue of living somewhere (for resident aliens and slaves also share in residence), nor are those citizens who merely share in legal rights to the extent of being liable to be sued and of being able to sue (for this belongs also to those who share this by treaty, for this too belongs to them);

2| In many places, then, resident aliens do not even share fully in these rights, but must appoint a patron, so that they share in this kind of community only incompletely; but just as we say that children too young to be enrolled, and old men who have been released from their duties, must be called citizens in some sense, though not simply and without qualification, but with an added qualification—the one incomplete, the other past their prime, or something of that sort (it makes no difference which term we use, for what is meant is clear)—so too here. For we are looking for the citizen in the unqualified sense, one who has no such defect requiring correction, since with regard to the disfranchised and to exiles too there are similar puzzles to raise and resolve. But the citizen in the unqualified sense is defined by nothing so well as by sharing in judgment and office. Of offices, some are divided by time, so that some persons are simply not permitted to hold the same office twice, or only after certain fixed intervals; but another office is unlimited, such as that of juror and assemblyman. Now perhaps someone might say that such people are not officeholders at all, and do not share in office on this account; and yet it would be absurd to deprive of office those who have the most authority. But let this make no difference: the argument is about a name, for there is no common name applying to both juror and assemblyman, so what should we call both of them together?

3| Let us then, for the sake of definition, call it an unlimited office. We accordingly posit as citizens those who share in it in this way. The citizen who best fits this description, then, applying to nearly all those called citizens, is of this sort; but we must not fail to notice that among things whose underlying subjects differ in kind, and of which one is first, another second, another next in order, there is either nothing at all common to them qua such things, or only barely something. Now we see that constitutions differ from one another in kind, and that some are posterior, others prior:

4| [1275b] for those that are mistaken and have deviated from the right form must necessarily be posterior to those that are not mistaken (in what sense we call some deviant, will be made clear later). So the citizen too must necessarily be different under each different constitution. This is why the citizen as we have described him is above all a citizen in a democracy; in the other constitutions he may be, but is not necessarily so. For in some there is no popular assembly at all, but they hold what they consider select councils instead of an assembly, and they judge lawsuits by division, as at Sparta, where one ephor judges one class of contract-suits, another another, and the elders judge homicide cases, while perhaps some other office judges some other class; and it is not the same way at Carthage either, for various offices there judge all the lawsuits jointly. But the definition of the citizen admits of correction. For in the other constitutions it is not the holder of an unlimited office who is assemblyman and juror, but the one so defined by his particular office: for it is to these, either all of them or some of them, that the function of deliberating and judging has been assigned, either about all matters or about some. Who the citizen is, then, is clear from this: whoever has the right to share in deliberative or judicial office, him we already call a citizen of that city, and a city, to put it simply, is a multitude of such people sufficient for a self-sufficient life.

5| For practical purposes people define a citizen as one born of two citizen parents, and not of only one of them, father or mother; others carry this requirement further still, demanding it for two, three, or more generations back. But when the definition is made in this quick, political way, some people raise the puzzle: how will that third or fourth generation ancestor be a citizen? Gorgias of Leontini, partly perhaps in genuine perplexity and partly in irony, said that just as mortars are the things made by mortar-makers, so too Larisaeans are the people made by their makers, since there are certain makers of Larisaeans. But the matter is simple. For if these ancestors shared in the constitution according to the definition stated, they were citizens; and indeed the phrase 'born of a citizen father or citizen mother' cannot possibly apply to the very first inhabitants or founders of a city. But a harder puzzle probably lies elsewhere: the case of those who took part in a change of constitution, as happened when Cleisthenes acted at Athens once the tyrants had been driven out—he enrolled into the tribes a great many foreigners and resident alien slaves. The dispute in their case is not who is a citizen, but whether it was done unjustly or justly. And yet one might raise a further puzzle about even this,

6| [1276a] whether one who is a citizen unjustly is not a citizen at all, on the assumption that 'unjust' and 'false' amount to the same thing. But since we see that some people rule unjustly too, people whom we shall say do rule, only not justly, and since the citizen is defined by a certain office (for the one who shares in such-and-such an office is a citizen, as we said), it is clear that we must say these people too are citizens; but the question of whether justly or not justly connects with the dispute mentioned before. Some people are puzzled about when an act belongs to the city and when it does not—for example, when a democracy replaces an oligarchy or a tyranny (in that situation some refuse to honor the contracts, holding that the tyrant contracted them, not the city, and refuse likewise many other such obligations, on the ground that certain constitutions rest on domination rather than on the common good): well, if some people actually do live under a democracy that arose in just this way, by the same reasoning we must say that what this constitution does belongs to this city no less than what was done under the oligarchy or the tyranny. This argument seems to be closely related to the puzzle of how one ought ever to say that a city is the same city, or not the same but a different one.

7| Now the most superficial way of investigating this puzzle concerns the place and the people: for it is possible for the place and the people to be separated, with some inhabiting one place and others another. This puzzle, then, we must treat as the milder one, for since 'city' is said in many ways, there is a certain ease to this kind of inquiry. And likewise, among people inhabiting the same place, when must we consider them to be one city? Surely not by their walls, for it would be possible to throw a single wall around the whole Peloponnese. Babylon too is perhaps such a case, and every city that has the circuit of a nation rather than of a city; indeed they say that when Babylon had been captured, a certain part of the city had not learned of it three days later. But the examination of this puzzle is useful for another occasion (for the size of the city—its proper scale, and whether it is better served by a single people or several—is something the statesman must keep in view); but as to people inhabiting the same place, are we to say that the city remains the same as long as the stock of the inhabitants remains the same, even though some are constantly dying and others being born, just as we are accustomed to call rivers and springs the same, even though the water is constantly flowing in and flowing out—or must we say that in the case of such a cause the people remain the same, while the city is different?

8| [1276b] For if the city is indeed a kind of community, and it is a community of citizens in a constitution, then when the constitution becomes different in kind and different from what it was, it would seem necessary that the city too is not the same, just as we say a chorus is different when it is at one time comic and at another tragic, even though the same people are often members of it; and likewise every other community and composite too is different, if the kind of composition is different—as we say a musical scale composed of the same notes is a different scale, if at one time it is Dorian, at another Phrygian. If this is indeed how the matter stands, it is clear that we must say a city is above all the same by looking to its constitution; and we may call it by a different name or by the same name whether the same people continue to inhabit it or entirely different people do. But whether it is just or not just to dissolve a city's obligations, when it changes to a different constitution, is another discussion. Connected to what has just been said is a further question to examine: are we to take a good man's excellence and a worthy citizen's excellence as one and the same, or as not the same? But if indeed this inquiry is to reach its goal, we must first grasp the virtue of the citizen in outline. For just as the sailor is one of a group of partners, so too we say the citizen is.

9| Among sailors, though their capacities are unlike (one is a rower, another a helmsman, another a look-out, another has some other such title), it is clear that the most exact account of each will be a virtue peculiar to him, and yet likewise some common account will fit them all. For the preservation of the voyage is the work of all of them together; for this is what each of the sailors aims at. Similarly, then, in the case of citizens too, though they are unlike, the preservation of the community is their work, and the community is the constitution; hence the virtue of the citizen must necessarily be relative to the constitution. If, then, there are several forms of constitution, it is clear that it is not possible for there to be one virtue of the good citizen, the complete virtue; but we say that the good man is good in respect of one virtue, the complete one. It is clear, then, that it is possible for someone to be a good citizen without possessing the virtue in respect of which a man is good. But indeed one can also approach this same argument about the best constitution by raising the difficulty in another way. For if it is impossible for a city to consist entirely of good men, yet each man must perform his own function well, and this comes from virtue —

10| — since it is impossible for all the citizens to be alike, [1277a] there could not be a single virtue belonging to citizen and to good man. For the virtue of the good citizen must belong to all (for that is necessary if the city is to be best), but the virtue of the good man is impossible for all, unless it is necessary that all the citizens in the good city be good men. Further, since the city is composed of unlike parts — just as a living creature is composed straightaway of soul and body, and soul of reason and desire, and household of husband and wife, and property of master and slave — in the same way the city too is put together out of all these and, besides these, out of other unlike kinds; hence it is necessary that the virtue of all the citizens is not one, just as it is not one for the leader of a chorus and the one who stands beside him. That it is not, then, simply the same, is clear from these considerations; but will there be, in some case, the same virtue belonging to a good citizen and to a good man? We say that the good ruler is good and practically wise, but the citizen need not be practically wise. And some say the education of a ruler is straightaway different, just as the sons of kings are evidently trained in horsemanship and in war, and Euripides says, 'Not the clever accomplishments for me, but what the city needs' (Euripides,

11| fragment 16), as though there were some special education for a ruler. But if the virtue of a good ruler and of a good man is the same, and the one who is ruled is also a citizen, then the virtue of citizen and of man would not be simply the same, though it might be the virtue of a particular citizen; for it is not the same for a ruler as for a citizen, and it is perhaps for this reason that Jason said he went hungry when he was not a tyrant, meaning that he did not know how to be a private citizen. But indeed the ability to rule and to be ruled is praised, and the virtue of a citizen is thought to consist, in some sense, in being able to rule and to be ruled well. If, then, we posit the virtue of the good man as a virtue of rule, but that of the citizen as both, the two would not be praised equally. Since, then, it is sometimes thought that both are needed, and that the ruler and the ruled ought not to learn the same things, but that the citizen ought to know both and share in both, one might also see this from the following. For there is a despotic rule; by this we mean the rule concerned with the necessary tasks, which the ruler need not know how to perform, but rather how to make use of; the other kind is servile. By the other kind I mean the ability to perform, and to serve in, menial functions. We speak of several kinds of slave, for there are several kinds of work.

12| One part of these is held by the manual laborers; these are, as the very name indicates, those who live from their hands, [1277b] among whom is the vulgar craftsman. Hence among some peoples the artisans of old did not share in office, until the most extreme form of democracy arose. The tasks of the ruled of this sort, then, the good man, the statesman, and the good citizen need not learn, except perhaps for his own use on occasion (for then it no longer happens that one is master and the other slave). But there is a kind of rule by which one rules over those who are alike in birth and free. This is what we call political rule, which the ruler must learn by having first been ruled, just as one becomes a cavalry commander by having served under a cavalry commander, and a general by having served under a general and having served as a company-commander and as a platoon-leader. Hence this too is well said, that one cannot rule well without having been ruled. The virtue of these two is different, but the good citizen must know how, and be able, both to be ruled and to rule, and this is the virtue of a citizen — to know the rule of free men from both sides. And the good man has both as well, even if the form of temperance and justice proper to rule is different. For it is clear that, in the case of one who is ruled but free, the virtue of the good man — justice, say — would not be one thing, but would have forms according to which he will rule and be ruled, just as a man and a woman have different temperance and courage (for a man would seem to be a coward if he were only as courageous as a courageous woman, and a woman would seem talkative if she were only as decorous as a good man —

13| since household management, too, is different for husband and wife, for it is his function to acquire and hers to guard what is acquired). Practical wisdom is the virtue peculiar to a ruler alone. For the others, it seems, must necessarily be common to both the ruled and the rulers, but practical wisdom is not the virtue of the one who is ruled — rather, true opinion is; the one who is ruled is like the maker of flutes, while the ruler is like the flute-player who uses them. So then, whether a good man's excellence and an upright citizen's excellence are one and the same or distinct, and in what respect they coincide and in what respect they diverge, is now evident from what has been said. But concerning the citizen there still remains one of the difficulties. For truly, is a citizen one who is permitted to share in office, or must we count the vulgar craftsmen too as citizens? If, then, we must count as citizens even those who have no share in offices, this virtue of the good citizen cannot belong to every citizen (for such a person is a citizen); but if none of these is a citizen, in what class is each to be placed? For he is neither a resident alien nor a foreigner. Or shall we say that no absurdity results from this argument?

14| [1278a] For neither are slaves any of the things mentioned, nor are freedmen. For this is true, that we must not count as citizens all those without whom there would be no city, since even children are not citizens in the same way as men are, but the latter are citizens without qualification, the former on a certain condition: for they are citizens, but incomplete ones. Now in ancient times, among some peoples, the vulgar craftsman was a slave or a foreigner, which is why most such people are still so now; but the best city will not make a vulgar craftsman a citizen. If, however, this sort too is a citizen, then the virtue of a citizen which we described must not be said to belong to everyone, nor even to every free person, but only to those who are released from the tasks that are necessary. Of those engaged in necessary tasks, those who serve one individual in this way are slaves, while those in common service are vulgar craftsmen and hired laborers. It becomes clear from a brief examination how matters stand with them; for once stated plainly, the point becomes evident. For since there are several kinds of constitution, there must necessarily also be several kinds of citizen, especially of the citizen who is ruled, so that in one constitution it is necessary for the vulgar craftsman and the hired laborer to be citizens, while in others this is impossible — for example, if there is a constitution which they call aristocratic, and in which honors are given according to virtue and according to merit;

15| For it is not possible to practice the pursuits of virtue while living the life of a manual laborer or a hired worker. In oligarchies a hired laborer cannot be a citizen (for shares in the offices go by high property assessments), but a manual worker can be, since many craftsmen become wealthy. At Thebes there was a law that anyone who had not kept away from the marketplace for ten years could not hold office. In many constitutions the law draws in even some foreigners besides: in some democracies the child of a citizen mother is a citizen, and the same holds among many peoples for illegitimate children. Nevertheless, since it is for lack of legitimate citizens that they make such people citizens (they resort to laws of this kind because of a shortage of population), once they have an abundance of people they gradually strip citizenship away first from those born of a slave father or slave mother, then from those descended only through their mothers, and in the end make citizens only of those born of two citizen parents on both sides. It is clear from this, then, that there are several types of citizen, and that the name "citizen" is applied above all to one who shares in the offices of honor, just as Homer too wrote of someone as "an unhonored immigrant" (Homer, Iliad 9.648, 16.59) — for one who does not share in the offices of honor is like a resident alien.

16| But in some places this fact is concealed, for the sake of deceiving those who live alongside such people. As to whether the virtue by which a man is good and the virtue by which he is an excellent citizen should be posited as the same or as different, [1278b] it is clear from what has been said: in the case of one city they are the same, in the case of another they are different, and even then not for every citizen, but only for the statesman — the one who is, or is capable of being, in control, either alone or together with others, of the care of the community's affairs. Now that these points have been settled, we must next examine whether one should posit a single constitution or several, and if several, what they are, how many, and what differentiae they have. A constitution is an arrangement of a city with respect to its offices generally, and above all with respect to the office that has authority over everything. For everywhere the governing body has authority over the city, and the governing body is the constitution. I mean, for example, that in democracies the people has authority, while in oligarchies, on the contrary, the few have it; and we say there is also a constitution different from these. We shall give this same account concerning the rest as well. We must first lay down for what purpose a city is constituted, and how many kinds there are of rule over human beings and of association in life. This has already been said in our earlier discussions, in which household management and mastery over slaves were defined, and it was said that a human being is by nature a political animal.

17| Hence even when people have no need at all of assistance from one another, they desire to live together no less. Nevertheless the common advantage also draws them together, to the extent that each has a share in living well. This above all is the end, both for all in common and for each separately. But people also come together, and hold together the political community, for the sake of life itself, since perhaps there is some portion of the fine present even in mere living by itself, provided the hardships of life do not go to excess. It is clear that most people endure much hardship out of a clinging desire for life, on the assumption that there is some well-being and natural sweetness present in it. Moreover, it is easy to distinguish the recognized kinds of rule, for we have often given definitions about them in our popular discourses as well. For mastery, even though in truth the natural slave and the natural master have the same advantage, nonetheless rules no less for the advantage of the master, and only accidentally for the advantage of the slave — since if the slave is destroyed, mastery cannot be preserved. But rule over children and wife and the whole household, which we call household management, is either for the sake of the ruled or for some good common to both — in its own right for the sake of the ruled, as we see also with the other crafts,

18| [1279a] such as medicine and gymnastic training, though accidentally they might also be for the sake of the practitioners themselves. For nothing prevents the trainer from sometimes being himself one of those being trained, just as the pilot is always one of the sailors. Now the trainer or the pilot looks to the good of those under him, but when he himself becomes one of them, he shares in the benefit only accidentally. For the one becomes a sailor, the other one of those being trained, though he is really the trainer. Hence, too, when political offices are constituted on the basis of equality and likeness among the citizens, people think it right to rule in turn — formerly thinking it right, as is natural, to perform their public service in turn, with each in turn looking after the other's good, just as he himself, when ruling before, looked after that other person's advantage; but now, because of the benefits to be had from public funds and from office, people want to rule continuously, as if it turned out that those holding office, though sickly, were always healthy. For in that case too, perhaps, they would pursue offices in the same way. It is clear, then, that whatever constitutions look to the common advantage are correct, in accordance with what is just without qualification, while those that look only to the advantage of the rulers are all mistaken, and are deviations from the correct constitutions.

19| for they are despotic, whereas the city is a community of free persons. Now that these points have been settled, the next task is to examine the constitutions — how many there are in number and what they are — and first the correct ones among them; for once these have been defined, the deviations will also become clear. Since "constitution" and "governing body" signify the same thing, and the governing body is what has authority over cities, and it is necessary that what has authority be either one person, or few, or many, whenever the one, or the few, or the many rule with a view to the common advantage, these constitutions must be correct, while those that aim at the private advantage of the one, or of the few, or of the multitude, are deviations. For either one must say that those who share in the city are not citizens, or they must share in the advantage. We customarily call that one of the monarchies which looks to the common advantage "kingship," and the rule of the few — more than one but not many — "aristocracy" (either because the best rule, or because it looks to what is best for the city and for those who share in it), and whenever the multitude governs with a view to the common advantage, it is called by the name common to all constitutions, "polity." (And this happens reasonably enough:

20| for it is possible for one person, or a few, to excel in virtue, but for a larger number it is already difficult to be perfected with respect to virtue as a whole, [1279b] though it is possible especially with respect to military virtue, since this arises in a multitude; hence in this constitution the element that fights on the city's behalf has the greatest authority, and those who possess arms share in it.) The deviations from the constitutions named are: tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, democracy from polity. For tyranny is a monarchy directed to the advantage of the monarch; oligarchy is directed to the advantage of the wealthy; democracy is directed to the advantage of those without means; and none of them is directed to what benefits the community. We must say at somewhat greater length what each of these constitutions is. For the subject involves certain difficulties, and it is proper for someone who philosophizes about each field of inquiry, and who does not look only to practice, not to overlook or omit anything, but to make clear the truth about each matter. Tyranny, as has been said, is a monarchy exercising despotic rule over the political community; oligarchy is when those who possess property have authority over the constitution; democracy, on the contrary, is when those who do not possess a great amount of property, but are without means, have authority. The first difficulty concerns this very definition. For if the majority, being wealthy, were to have authority over the city — while democracy is said to exist when the multitude has authority — and likewise, again, if it should happen somewhere that those without means, though fewer than the wealthy, are stronger and have authority over the constitution, while where a small multitude has authority they call it an oligarchy — then the constitutions would not seem to have been well defined by this criterion.

21| But further, even if someone were to combine wealth with fewness and poverty with numbers, and so describe the constitutions this way — oligarchy as that in which the offices are held by the wealthy, who are few in number, democracy as that in which they are held by the poor, who are many in number — this too involves a further difficulty. For what shall we call the constitutions just mentioned, the one in which the wealthy are more numerous and the one in which the poor are fewer, and each of the two groups has authority over its own constitution, if indeed there is no other constitution besides the ones stated? The argument seems, then, to make it clear that being few or many in the governing body is incidental — incidental to oligarchies in the one case and to democracies in the other — because of the fact that the wealthy are few and the poor are many everywhere (which is why the causes just given do not in fact turn out to be causes of the difference); but the point on which democracy and oligarchy differ from each other is poverty and wealth,

22| [1280a] and it is necessary that, wherever people rule because of wealth, whether they are fewer or more, this is oligarchy, and where the poor rule, this is democracy; but it happens, as we said, that the wealthy are few and the poor are many. For few are wealthy, but all share in freedom; and it is on account of these grounds that both parties dispute over the constitution. We must first grasp what boundaries they set for oligarchy and democracy, and what the just is according to the oligarchic view and the democratic view. For all of them lay hold of some sort of justice, but they proceed only up to a point, and they do not state the whole of what is just in the strict sense. For example, it seems that the just is equality, and it is — but not for everyone, only for equals; and it seems that the unequal is just, and indeed it is — but not for everyone, only for unequals. What they leave out is the for whom, and they judge badly. The reason is that the judgment concerns themselves, and most people are on the whole poor judges where their own interests are concerned. So since the just is just for certain people, and is divided in the same way with respect both to the things involved and to those for whom it holds, as has been said earlier in the Ethics, people agree about the equality of the thing but dispute about the for whom — mostly for the reason just stated, because they judge badly in matters that concern themselves, but also because, since each side speaks of a justice that holds up to a point, they think they are stating what is just without qualification.

23| For those who are unequal in some respect, say in wealth, think they are wholly unequal, while those who are equal in some respect, say in freedom, think they are wholly equal. But they do not state the most authoritative point. For if people came together and formed a community for the sake of property, then they share in the city to the same extent that they share in property, so that the argument of the oligarchic party would seem to have force (for they say it is not just for the man who contributed one mina to have an equal share of the hundred minas with the man who gave all the rest, whether we are speaking of the original funds or of what accrues later); but if it is not for the sake of living alone but rather for the sake of living well (for otherwise there would be a city of slaves and of the other animals too — but as it is there is not, because they have no share in happiness nor in living according to choice), and not for the sake of alliance, so as not to be wronged by anyone, nor on account of exchange and mutual use of goods — for otherwise the Etruscans and the Carthaginians, and all who have commercial agreements with one another, would be citizens of a single city as it were: at any rate they have compacts about imports and agreements against wrongdoing and written articles of alliance.

24| [1280b] But there are no offices common to all of them established on this basis; rather, each side has its own separate offices, nor does either side concern itself with what sort of people the other side ought to be, nor with seeing to it that none of those under the agreements is unjust or has any vice, but only with seeing that they do no wrong to one another. But those who care about good order examine virtue and vice in the political sense. From which it is also clear that a city truly deserving the name must take care about virtue, not merely for the sake of talking about it. Otherwise the community becomes an alliance differing from the other alliances, those of allies who live apart, only in location. And law becomes a mere compact, and, as the sophist Lycophron said, a guarantor of one another's just claims, but not the kind of thing that can make the citizens good and just. That this is how it is, is clear. For if someone were to bring the locations together into one, so that the city of the Megarians and that of the Corinthians touched with their walls, even so it would not be a single city — not even if they made intermarriages with one another, though this is among the sorts of sharing peculiar to cities. Likewise, not even if some people lived apart, yet not so far apart as to have no dealings, but had laws among themselves against wronging one another in their exchanges — for instance if one were a carpenter, another a farmer, another a shoemaker, another something else of that kind, and their number were ten thousand — yet they shared in nothing else besides such things as exchange and alliance — even so this would not yet be a city.

25| For what reason, then? It is surely not because the community is not close enough together. For even if they came together while sharing in this way (though each still used his own household as if it were his city) and helped one another as if there were a mutual-defense pact, only against those who wronged them, still, to those who examine the matter precisely, this would not seem to be a city, if indeed they associated in the same manner when they had come together as when they were apart. So it becomes evident that a city is neither a partnership formed around a shared location, nor one instituted merely to prevent mutual injustice and enable exchange. These things must indeed be present if there is to be a city, but even when all of them are present it is not yet thereby a city; rather, a city is the community of households and clans in living well, for the sake of a complete and self-sufficient life. This, however, will not exist unless they inhabit one and the same location and make use of intermarriages. That is why kinship groups arose in cities, and brotherhoods, and religious sacrifices, and the shared pursuits of living together. Such a thing is the work of friendship, for the deliberate choice to live together is friendship. The end of a city, then, is living well, and these other things are for the sake of that end. A city is the community of clans and villages in a complete and self-sufficient life,

26| [1281a] and this, as we say, is living happily and finely. The political community, then, must be posited as existing for the sake of fine actions, not merely for living together. Consequently, whoever contributes most to a partnership of this kind holds a larger stake in the city than people who match or exceed them in freedom and lineage yet fall short in political virtue, or than people who outdo them in wealth while being outdone in virtue. That all who dispute about constitutions are stating some part of what is just, then, is clear from what has been said. But there is a difficulty as to what ought to have authority over the city. Is it the multitude, or the wealthy, or the reasonable, or the single best of all, or a tyrant? But all of these evidently involve difficulty. What then? If the poor, because they are more numerous, divide up the possessions of the wealthy among themselves, is this not unjust? For by god, it was resolved justly, so it seemed, by the authority in charge. Then what are we to call the extreme of injustice? Again, if all are taken together, and the majority divide up the possessions of the minority among themselves, it is clear that they are destroying the city. But surely virtue does not destroy the thing that has it, nor is justice destructive of a city;

27| So it is clear that this law too cannot be just. Further, all the actions a tyrant performs must then be just as well: for he uses force because he is stronger, just as the multitude uses force against the rich. But is it just, then, for the minority to rule, and the rich? If, then, they too do this — plunder and seize the property of the multitude — that is just: and so is the reverse. That all these views are worthless and unjust, then, is evident. But should the decent rule and have authority over everything? Then it necessarily follows that everyone else is without honor, since they are not honored with political offices: for we say that offices are honors, and if the same people always rule, the rest must be without honor. But is it better for the single best man to rule? But this is even more oligarchic still: for those without honor are more numerous. But perhaps someone might say that what has authority ought to be a human being altogether rather than a bad law, since a human being at any rate has the affections that arise in the soul. If, then, the law is oligarchic or democratic, how will it differ with respect to the difficulties raised? For the same consequences as before will follow just the same. Let there be, then, some other discussion of these other points.

28| That the multitude ought to have authority rather than the few best men might seem to be resolved by the following argument, and to present a certain difficulty — perhaps even to hold some truth. For the many, of whom each individually is not a serious man, [1281b] can nonetheless, when they come together, be better than those few — not as individuals but as a whole — just as potluck dinners are better than those furnished at one person's expense. For since there are many of them, each has some portion of virtue and practical wisdom, and when they come together the multitude becomes, as it were, a single human being with many feet, many hands, and many senses — and likewise with regard to character and thought. That is why the many judge better the works of music and those of the poets: for one judges one part, another another, and all of them together judge the whole. But this is how serious men differ from each of the many individually — just as they say that handsome men differ from those who are not handsome, and things done skillfully in a painting differ from real things: by having what was scattered apart brought together into one, since if they were kept separate, one man's eye would be finer than the painted one, and someone else would have some other part finer. Whether, then, this difference between the many and the few serious men can hold true for every people and every multitude is unclear; perhaps, by Zeus, it is clear that for some it is impossible (for the same argument would apply even to beasts too — and indeed how do some men differ from beasts, so to speak?).

29| But nothing prevents what has been said from being true concerning some particular multitude. That is why one might use this to resolve both the difficulty stated earlier and the one connected to it: over what matters the free and the multitude of citizens ought to have authority. Such are those who have neither wealth nor any claim at all to virtue. For it is not safe for them to share in the greatest offices — since both through injustice and through folly they must inevitably do wrong in some cases and err in others; yet it is alarming not to give them a share and not to let them participate — for when many are without honor and poor, that city is bound to be full of enemies. What is left, then, is for them to share in deliberating and judging. That is why Solon, and some of the other lawgivers too, assign them to the electing of officials and to the auditing of officials, but do not allow them to hold office individually. For all of them, coming together, have adequate perception, and mixed with the better sort they benefit the cities — just as impure food mixed with pure makes the whole more useful than the small amount of pure food alone; but each one separately is incomplete when it comes to judging. This arrangement of the constitution, however, has a first difficulty: that it might seem to belong to the same person to judge who has practiced medicine correctly as it does to practice medicine and restore the sick to health from the disease currently present —

30| and that person is the doctor. [1282a] The same holds likewise for the other forms of expertise and crafts. Just as a doctor must give an account of himself before doctors, so too must others do so before those in the same field. But "doctor" refers to the ordinary practitioner, the master physician, and third, the one educated in the art — for there are people of this kind in nearly all the crafts, so to speak; and we assign the judging no less to those who are educated than to those who possess the knowledge. Then, concerning selection too, the case would seem to hold in the same way. For choosing correctly is likewise the task of those who possess the knowledge — for example, a geometer chooses correctly among matters of geometry, and a pilot among matters of piloting. For even if in some tasks and crafts laymen too have some share, they certainly have no greater share than those who possess the knowledge. So on this reasoning, the multitude should not be made authoritative either over the election of officials or over their auditing. But perhaps not all of this is well said, both because of the argument stated a while ago — provided the multitude is not too slavish (for while each individual will be a worse judge than those who possess the knowledge, all of them coming together will be either better or no worse) — and because in some matters it is not the maker alone, nor even the maker best, who would judge; there are things whose results are recognized even by those who do not possess the craft. For example, a house is a thing that can be known not only by the one who built it — the one who uses it will judge it even better (and the user is the household manager); and a pilot judges a rudder better than a carpenter does, and a guest at a feast judges the meal better than the cook does.

31| This difficulty, then, one might perhaps think is resolved adequately in this way; but there is another connected to it. For it seems strange that inferior men should have authority over greater matters than decent men do, and yet the auditing of officials and the election of officials are the greatest matters of all — and in some constitutions, as has been said, these are assigned to the popular assemblies, since the assembly has authority over all such things. And yet men take part in the assembly, deliberate, and sit in judgment starting from small property qualifications and from any age whatever, while those who serve as treasurers, generals, and hold the greatest offices do so starting from large property qualifications. One might resolve this difficulty too in a similar way. For perhaps this too is correct. For it is not the individual juror, nor the individual member of the council, nor the individual member of the assembly who rules, but rather the law-court, the council, and the people; and each of those mentioned is a part of these bodies (I mean the councilor, the assemblyman, and the juror are each a part). So it is just for the multitude to have authority over greater matters: for the people, the council, and the law-court are made up of many. And the total property qualification of all these together is greater than that of those who hold the great offices singly or in small numbers.

32| Let these matters, then, be settled in this way. [1282b] But the first difficulty stated makes nothing so clear as this: that the laws, when rightly laid down, ought to be authoritative, and the ruler — whether one person or several — ought to be authoritative over those matters concerning which the laws are unable to speak with precision, because it is not easy to give a universal ruling about everything. Yet what sort of laws rightly laid down must be, is not yet at all clear; rather, the old difficulty raised remains. For necessarily, just as with constitutions, laws too must be either bad or good, and just or unjust, in a corresponding way. Except this much is clear: that laws must be laid down with reference to the constitution. But if this is so, it is clear that laws framed according to the correct constitutions must be just, and those framed according to the deviant constitutions must be unjust. Since in all the sciences and crafts the end is a good, and the greatest good, most of all, is found in the most authoritative of them all, and this is the political power, and the political good is the just, and this is the common advantage — it is generally held by everyone that the just is something equal, and up to a point people agree with the arguments given in philosophy, in which matters of ethics have been determined (for they say that the just is something for someone, and that equals must have equal shares) — but of what things there is equality, and of what things inequality, must not go unnoticed.

33| This point raises a difficulty and a question for political philosophy. For someone might say that superiority in any good whatsoever ought to be the basis for an unequal distribution of offices, if in all other respects people did not differ at all but happened to be alike; for among those who differ, what is just and what is according to merit are different things. But if this is true, then superiority in color or in size or in any good whatsoever will give those who are superior some greater share of political justice. Or is this falsehood obvious on its face? It is clear from the other sciences and capacities. Among flute players who are equal in their art, one should not give the superior flutes to the better-born (for they will play no better on that account); rather, the one who is superior in the actual work should be given the superiority in the instruments as well. If what is being said is not yet clear, it will become clearer still if we carry it further. Suppose there is someone who is superior in flute-playing but far inferior in noble birth or in beauty; even if each of those—I mean noble birth and beauty—is a greater good than flute-playing, and they exceed him in noble birth and beauty by a greater proportion than he exceeds them in flute-playing, still the flutes ought to be given to the one who is superior in flute-playing.

34| [1283a] For superiority in wealth and superiority in noble birth ought to contribute toward the work in question, and they contribute nothing at all. Further, on this argument every good would be commensurable with every other. For if a certain amount of size is preferable, then size in general would be a rival contender against both wealth and freedom; so that if this man exceeds that man more in size than the other exceeds him in virtue, and virtue in general exceeds size, then all goods would be commensurable. For if so much size is better than so much of something else, it is clear that so much of it would be equal to so much of the other. But since this is impossible, it is clear that in political matters, too, it is reasonable that people do not dispute over office on the basis of every kind of inequality (for if some are slow and others fast, that is no reason why the ones should have more and the others less—this difference gets its honor in athletic contests); rather, the dispute must necessarily be conducted in terms of the things out of which a city is composed. That is why the well-born, the free, and the wealthy reasonably lay competing claim to honor. For there must be free men who bear an assessed property qualification—a city could no more be made up entirely of the poor than entirely of slaves.

35| But if these are required, it is clear that justice and political virtue are required as well, since a city cannot be run without these either; except that without the former conditions it is impossible for a city to exist at all, while without these it is impossible for it to be run well. With a view, then, to the city's mere existence, it would seem that either all or at least some of these have a rightful claim; but with a view to the good life, education and virtue would most justly lay claim, as has been said before as well. And since those who are equal in one respect only ought not to have equality in everything, nor those who are unequal in one respect have inequality in everything, all constitutions of this sort must necessarily be deviations. It has indeed been said before that all lay claim in some sense justly, but not all justly without qualification: the wealthy claim it because they have a greater share of the land, and the land is a common possession, and further because they are for the most part more trustworthy in contracts; the free and the well-born claim it as being close kin to one another (for the better-born are citizens in a fuller sense than the low-born, and noble birth is honored among each people in its own homeland); further, because it is likely that the better are born of the better, for noble birth is the virtue of a lineage. In the same way, we shall say, virtue too justly lays claim, for we say that justice is a virtue exercised in common, one which all the other virtues must necessarily follow.

36| But further, the many also lay claim against the few: for taken together, the many are stronger, wealthier, and better than the few, when the many are set against the few. Suppose, then, that all of these were present in a single city, [1283b] I mean the good, the wealthy, and the well-born, and also some other body that is politically active—will there be a dispute over who ought to rule, or will there not? Under each of the constitutions mentioned, the judgment of who ought to rule is beyond dispute (for they differ from one another in who holds authority: one has it through the wealthy, another through men of worth, and each of the others in its own way); but let us nonetheless consider how the matter is to be settled when these all exist at the same time. If, then, those who possess virtue are altogether few in number, in what way must the division be made? Or should the word "few" be considered in relation to the work—whether they are capable of administering the city, or are so many in number that a city could be made up of them? There is a further difficulty affecting all those who dispute over political honors. For those who claim the right to rule on the basis of wealth would seem to have no just claim at all, and likewise those who claim it on the basis of birth; for it is clear that if, again, some one person is wealthier than everyone, then by the same principle of justice it will follow that this one man ought to rule everyone, and likewise the man who is superior in noble birth ought to rule those who dispute the claim on the ground of freedom.

37| The same thing will presumably happen also with aristocracies, in respect of virtue: for if some one man is better than the other worthy men in the governing body, then by the same principle of justice he ought to have authority. And if, then, the multitude too ought to have authority because they are stronger than the few, then if one man, or more than one but fewer than the many, are stronger than the rest, these ought to have authority rather than the multitude. All this, then, seems to make clear that none of these criteria is correct, by which people claim that they themselves should rule and everyone else be ruled by them. For indeed, against those who claim the right to be in authority over the government on the basis of virtue, and likewise against those who claim it on the basis of wealth, the masses could offer some just argument of their own: for nothing prevents the multitude from sometimes being better than the few and wealthier than they are—not taken one by one, but taken all together. That is why, in response to the difficulty that some raise and put forward, it is possible to answer in this way. For some raise the difficulty whether the lawgiver, wishing to establish the most correct laws, ought to legislate with a view to the advantage of the better people or of the greater number, when the situation just described arises.

38| What is correct must presumably be taken thus: and what is correct in this sense must be taken with a view to the advantage of the city as a whole and to the common good of the citizens. A citizen, in a general sense, is one who shares in ruling and being ruled; [1284a] but he is a different sort of citizen under each different constitution, and with a view to the best constitution he is the one who is able and who chooses to be ruled and to rule with a view to the life that accords with virtue. But if there is some one person so far superior in the excess of his virtue, or more than one but not enough to make up the full complement of a city, such that the virtue of all the rest and their political capacity is not commensurable with theirs—if there are several such—or with his alone, if there is one, such people can no longer be set down as a part of the city; for they will suffer injustice if deemed worthy only of equal shares, being so unequal in virtue and in political capacity; for such a man is likely to be, among human beings, like a god. From this it is clear that legislation, too, must necessarily be concerned with people who are equal both in birth and in capacity, and that there is no law that applies to people of that sort; for they themselves are law. Indeed, anyone who tried to legislate concerning them would be ridiculous. They would probably say what Antisthenes said the lions said when the hares made speeches in assembly and claimed that all should have equality. That is why the cities governed democratically institute ostracism, for a reason of this kind: for these above all are held to pursue equality, so that they used to ostracize those who seemed to be superior in power through wealth, or a great number of friends, or some other political strength, and would banish them from the city for fixed periods of time.

39| It is also told in legend that the Argonauts left Heracles behind for a reason of this kind: the Argo was not willing to carry him along with the rest of the crew, since he so far surpassed them. This is why those who criticize tyranny, and the advice Periander gave to Thrasybulus, should not simply be thought right to find fault (for they say that Periander said nothing to the herald sent about the advice, but that by cutting off the ears of grain that stood out, he leveled the field; so that, although the herald did not know the reason for what was being done, he reported what had happened, and Thrasybulus understood that he must do away with the outstanding men). For this is advantageous not only to tyrants, nor do only tyrants do it, but the same holds for oligarchies and democracies as well: for ostracism has, in a way, the same effect as clipping and banishing those who stand out. And the same thing is done regarding cities and nations by those who hold power, as the Athenians did regarding the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians (for as soon as they had firmly secured their rule, they humbled them contrary to their agreements),

40| [1284b] and the king of the Persians repeatedly cut down the Medes and Babylonians and the others who had grown proud because they had once held power. The problem is general and applies to all constitutions, even the correct ones: for the deviant ones do this looking to their own private advantage, but the same holds true even in those that look to the common good. This is clear also in the other crafts and sciences: for a painter would not allow an animal's foot to exceed due proportion, not even if it were outstandingly beautiful, nor would a shipbuilder allow a stern or any other part of the ship to do so, nor indeed would a chorus trainer allow someone who sings louder and more beautifully than the whole chorus to sing together with it. So there is nothing, on this account, to prevent monarchs from being in accord with their cities, if they do this while their own rule is beneficial to the cities. This is why, with respect to superiorities that are agreed upon, the argument concerning ostracism has a certain political justice to it. It would be better, then, for the lawgiver to constitute the constitution from the start in such a way that it has no need of this kind of remedy; but the second-best course, if it should come to that, is to try to set it right by some such corrective.

41| This, however, is not what happened in the cities: for they did not look to the advantage of their own constitution, but used ostracism in a factional spirit. Now in the deviant constitutions, that it is advantageous to the ruling party and just is clear; and perhaps it is also clear that it is not simply just. But in the case of the best constitution there is considerable difficulty — not regarding superiority in the other goods, such as strength, wealth, and a great number of friends, but if someone should arise who is outstanding in virtue, what is one to do? For surely they would not say that such a man ought to be expelled and banished; but neither, surely, would they rule over such a man: for that would be much like claiming the right to rule over Zeus, by dividing up the offices of rule. What remains, then — and this seems to be the natural course — is that everyone gladly obeys such a man, so that men of this kind become permanent kings in their cities. And perhaps it is well, after the arguments just given, to move on and consider kingship: for we say that this is one of the correct constitutions. We must examine whether it is advantageous, for a city and a territory that is going to be well governed, to be ruled by a king, or whether it is not, but some other constitution is preferable instead, or whether it is advantageous for some and not for others.

42| First, then, we must distinguish whether kingship is a single kind or has several varieties. [1285a] This much, at least, is easy to grasp: that it comprises several kinds, and the manner of rule is not the same in all of them. For the kingship in the Spartan constitution seems to be the kingship most in accordance with law, yet it is not sovereign over everything; rather, when the king goes out beyond the territory he is leader in matters of war, and further, matters relating to the gods have been assigned to the kings. This kingship, then, is a kind of generalship with full and permanent powers: for the king is not sovereign to put anyone to death, except in certain circumstances, as among the ancients on military campaigns, by the law of the strong hand. Homer makes this clear: for Agamemnon put up with being spoken ill of in the assemblies, but once they had gone out on campaign he was sovereign even to put men to death; at any rate he says: 'But whomever I find apart from the battle... it will bring him no safety to flee the dogs and the birds, for death is beside me' (Homer, Iliad 2.391). This, then, is one form of kingship — a generalship for life; and of these kingships, some are hereditary, others elective. Alongside this there is another kind of monarchy, such as are the kingships among some of the barbarians. All of these have a power very close to that of tyrannies, but they are also in accordance with law and hereditary:

43| for because the barbarians are by nature more servile in character than the Greeks, and those of Asia more so than those of Europe, they put up with despotic rule without any resentment. These kingships, then, are tyrannical for this reason, but secure because they are hereditary and in accordance with law. And the guard kept around such kings is a king's guard, not a tyrant's, for the same reason: for citizens keep guard over kings under arms, while foreign mercenaries guard tyrants; for kings rule in accordance with law and over willing subjects, while tyrants rule over unwilling subjects, so that the one kind has its guard supplied by the citizens, the other kind is guarded against the citizens. These, then, are two kinds of monarchy; and there is another, which existed among the ancient Greeks, whom they call aisymnetai. This is, to put it simply, an elective tyranny, differing from the barbarian kind not in failing to be in accordance with law, but only in not being hereditary. Some held this office for life, others for certain fixed periods of time or for certain tasks, as for example the Mytileneans once chose Pittacus against the exiles, whose leaders were Antimenides and the poet Alcaeus. Alcaeus makes clear that they chose Pittacus as tyrant in one of his drinking songs:

44| for he reproaches them because 'they set up Pittacus, of ill birth, as tyrant of their spiritless and ill-starred city, all crowding together and loudly praising him.' [1285b] These offices, then, both are and were tyrannical because they involve despotic rule, but kingly because they are elective and exercised over willing subjects. A fourth kind of kingly monarchy consists of those that arose in the heroic age, exercised over willing subjects and hereditary, in accordance with law. For because the first holders of such power had become benefactors of the multitude, whether through crafts or through war, or by bringing people together or by procuring territory, they became kings over willing subjects, and hereditary for those who succeeded them. They were sovereign over leadership in war and over sacrifices, all those that were not the province of priests, and in addition to these they judged lawsuits. This they did, some without taking an oath, others taking an oath, the oath being the raising up of the scepter. Now those of ancient times ruled continuously over matters within the city, matters at home, and matters beyond the borders; but later, as the kings themselves gave up some of these prerogatives, and the masses took away others, in the other cities the sacrifices alone were left to the kings, while wherever it is worth speaking of a kingship at all, they retained only the leadership in matters of war beyond the borders. These, then, are the kinds of kingship, four in number: one belonging to the heroic age (this was over willing subjects, but on certain fixed terms:

45| For the king was both general and judge, and had authority over matters relating to the gods; second is the barbarian kind of kingship (this is a hereditary rule of a master over slaves, but according to law); third is what they call an aisymnetia (this is an elective tyranny); fourth is the Laconian kind among these (this is, to put it simply, a hereditary generalship for life). These, then, differ from one another in this way; and there is a fifth species of kingship, whenever one person has authority over everything, just as each nation and each city has authority over its common affairs, ordered according to household management. For just as household management is a kind of kingship over a household, so this all-embracing kingship is the management of a city or a nation, one or several. There are, then, more or less two species of kingship about which we must inquire, this one and the Laconian; for most of the others fall between these two, since they have authority over fewer matters than the all-embracing kingship, but over more than the Laconian. So the inquiry concerns, more or less, two questions: one, whether it is advantageous for cities to have a permanent general, and whether he should hold this office by birth or in rotation, or whether it is not advantageous,

46| [1286a] and second, whether it benefits a city for a single person to hold power over all, or whether it does not. Now to examine this kind of generalship belongs more to the study of laws than of constitutions (for this can occur in all constitutions), so let it be set aside for now; but the remaining kind of kingship is a species of constitution, so we must study this and run through the difficulties it involves. The starting point of the inquiry is this: whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws. Those who think it advantageous to be ruled by a king hold that the laws state only the general rule, and do not give orders for particular circumstances as they arise, so that in any craft whatever it is foolish to rule by written rules (and in Egypt physicians are permitted to alter their treatment after the fourth day, but if they do so earlier, they do so at their own risk). It is clear, then, for the same reason, that the constitution that rules by written rules and laws is not the best. But then again, that general account must belong to the rulers as well. What lacks the affective element entirely is better than what has it inherent in its nature: now law does not have this, but every human soul must have it.

47| But perhaps someone might say that instead of this, he will deliberate better about particular cases. That he must, then, necessarily be a lawgiver, and that laws must be laid down, but not with authority where they go astray, is clear, since with regard to everything else the laws must have authority; but for whatever the law is unable to judge, either at all or well, should the one best man rule, or should everyone? For even now people come together and judge, deliberate, and decide, and all these decisions concern particular cases. Now any one person, taken singly, is perhaps worse; but the city is made up of many, and just as a feast to which many contribute is finer than one supplied by a single person, so for this reason a crowd judges many matters better than any single individual. Further, the many are more resistant to corruption—just as a greater quantity of water is harder to foul, so a multitude is less easily corrupted than a few; for when a single individual is overcome by anger or some other such passion, his judgment is necessarily corrupted, whereas among the many it would be hard for all of them to grow angry and go wrong at the same time. Let the multitude in question be free men, doing nothing contrary to the law except where the law is necessarily deficient. If, however, this is not easy to find among many, but suppose there are several who are good, both as men and as citizens, is a single ruler more resistant to corruption, or rather those who are several in number but all good?

48| [1286b] Is it not clear that the several are? But they will form factions, while the one is free of faction. But against this one should perhaps object that they too are serious-minded in soul, just like that one man. If, then, we must call the rule of the several, all of them good men, an aristocracy, and the rule of the one a kingship, aristocracy would be more choiceworthy for cities than kingship, whether the office carries power behind it or not, provided it is possible to find several similar men. And this is perhaps why cities were ruled by kings in earlier times, because it was rare to find men greatly superior in virtue, especially since at that time they inhabited small cities. Further, they used to establish kings on the basis of benefaction, which is the work of good men. But when it came about that many men similar in virtue arose, they no longer tolerated this, but sought something held in common, and established a constitution. But when the rulers, growing worse, enriched themselves from the common funds, it was reasonable that from this source oligarchies arose at some point; for they made wealth a mark of honor. From these, first there were changes into tyrannies, and from tyrannies into democracy; for since they were always contracting power into fewer hands out of shameful greed for gain, they made the multitude stronger, so that the multitude rose up and democracies arose. And since it has also come about that cities are larger, it is perhaps no longer easy for any constitution other than democracy to arise.

49| But if someone were to hold that being ruled by a king is best for cities, how will matters stand with regard to his children? Should the family also rule as kings? But if the offspring turn out to be whatever sort they happen to be, this is harmful. But, it will be said, being in authority, he will not hand it over to his children if they are unfit. But this is no longer easy to believe; for it is difficult, and requires virtue greater than is found in human nature. There is also a difficulty concerning power: should the man who is to be king have some force at his disposal, by which he will be able to compel those unwilling to obey, or how else is it possible for him to administer his rule? For even if he holds authority according to law, doing nothing contrary to the law according to his own will, it is nonetheless necessary for him to have power by which he will safeguard the laws. Now perhaps it is not difficult to determine the matters concerning such a king; for he must have force, but the force must be of such a size as to be stronger than any one person or any group of several, but weaker than the multitude, just as the ancients used to grant bodyguards, whenever they established over the city someone whom they called an aisymnetes or a tyrant; and someone, when Dionysius asked for guards, advised the Syracusans to give him only that many guards.

50| [1287a] Concerning the king whose every act follows only what he himself wishes, our discussion now stands, and we must undertake the inquiry. For the king who is said to rule according to law is not, as we said, a species of constitution (for it is possible for a permanent generalship to exist in all constitutions, as in democracy and aristocracy, and many make one person authoritative over the administration; for such an office exists around Epidamnus, and around Opus too, though to a lesser degree). But concerning what is called all-embracing kingship (this is the kind in which the king rules over everything according to his own will), some think that it is not even according to nature for one person to have authority over all the citizens, where the city is composed of similar people; for among people who are by nature similar, the same justice and the same worth must by nature hold, so that just as it is harmful to bodies for unequal people to have equal nourishment or clothing, so it holds also with regard to honors; and likewise it is harmful for equal people to have unequal honors. This is why it is just for no one to rule rather than be ruled, and likewise to hold office in rotation. And this, already, is law; for order is law.

51| Therefore it is more preferable for the law to rule than for any one of the citizens to rule; and by this same reasoning, even if it is better for certain people to rule, these should be established as guardians of the law and servants to the laws. For it is necessary that there be some offices, but they say it is not just for this one man to be the law, given that all are alike. But indeed, whatever the law does not seem able to determine, a human being would not be able to discern either. But the law, having trained rulers on purpose, sets them over the remaining matters, to judge and administer with the most just judgment. Further, it grants the power to correct whatever, upon trial, seems better than what is established. So the one who bids the law to rule seems to bid god and intellect alone to rule, while the one who bids a human being to rule adds also a beast; for appetite is such a thing, and spirit perverts rulers, even the best of men. Hence law is intellect without desire. And the analogy from the crafts seems to be false — the claim that being treated medically by the book is a poor thing, but that it is preferable to use those who possess the crafts. For doctors do nothing contrary to reason out of friendship, but earn their pay by making the sick healthy;

52| whereas those in political offices are accustomed to do many things out of spite and favor, since even doctors, when they suspect that, once trusted, they will be corrupted for profit by their enemies, would then rather seek treatment from the books. [1287b] But indeed, sick doctors bring in other doctors for themselves, and trainers who are exercising bring in other trainers, on the ground that they are unable to judge the truth because they are judging about their own affairs and are in the grip of feeling. So it is clear that in seeking what is just they are seeking the mean; for the law is the mean. Further, the laws that go by custom are more authoritative, and concerned with more authoritative matters, than the laws that go by writing, so that if a human ruler is safer than written laws, he is still not safer than laws that go by custom. But indeed it is not easy for one man to oversee many things; there will therefore need to be more officers established by him, so that how does this differ from having this arrangement in place right from the start, rather than having the one man establish it in this way? Further — a point already made before — if the upright man is just to rule because he is better, then two good men are better than one; for this is what is meant by "two going together" (Homer, Iliad 10.224), and by Agamemnon's prayer, "ten such counselors as this for me" (Homer, Iliad 2.372). And indeed even now, on some matters, the officers are authoritative to judge, as the juror is, concerning matters which the law is unable to determine, since concerning matters it can determine, no one disputes that the law would rule and judge best.

53| But since some matters can be encompassed by laws and others cannot, these latter are what create the puzzle and the inquiry whether it is preferable for the best law to rule or the best man; for the things people deliberate about in order to legislate are among the things that cannot be so encompassed. They do not, then, dispute this point — that it is not necessary for a human being to be the one who judges concerning such matters — but rather they dispute that it should be not one alone but many. For each officer, having been trained well by the law, judges well, and it might perhaps seem strange if one thought a man judged and acted better with two eyes and two ears, with two feet and two hands, than many judging and acting with many; since even now sole rulers supply themselves with a multitude of eyes, ears, hands, and feet: those who are loyal to their power and to their own persons, these they appoint as co-rulers. Now if they are not friends, they will not act according to the monarch's choice; but if they are friends both to him and to his rule, then a friend is equal and alike, so that if he thinks these men ought to rule, he thinks that men who are equal and alike ought to rule in like manner. These, then, are roughly the things said by those who dispute against kingship. But perhaps this holds in this way for some cases, and not so for others.

54| For there is by nature something despotic, and something else kingly, and something else political, and one thing is just and advantageous for some people, another for others; but there is nothing tyrannical according to nature, nor any of the other constitutions that are deviations, for these come about contrary to nature. [1288a] But from what has been said it is clear that among people who are alike and equal it is neither advantageous nor just for one person to be sovereign over all — neither when there are no laws, but he himself acts as the law, nor when there are laws — nor for a good man to rule good men, nor for a not-good man to rule not-good men, not even if he is superior in virtue, except in a certain way. What this way is must be stated; and it has in fact already been stated in some manner before. First one must distinguish what is fit for kingship, what is fit for aristocracy, and what is fit for constitutional government. A population fit for kingship, then, is one naturally suited to produce a family outstanding in virtue for political leadership; one fit for aristocracy is one naturally suited to produce a population capable of being ruled, as free men, by those who are leaders in virtue, with a view to political rule; and one fit for constitutional government is one in which there is naturally found a warlike population capable of being ruled and of ruling in turn, according to a law that distributes offices to the well-off according to merit. So whenever it happens that either a whole family, or else some one individual among the rest, comes to differ in virtue so much that his excellence exceeds that of all the others, then it is just for this family to be royal and sovereign over all, and for this one man to be king.

55| For as has been said before, this holds not only in accordance with that criterion of justice which those who establish constitutions habitually put forward — those who establish aristocracies, and those who establish oligarchies, and again those who establish democracies (for all of them lay claim on the basis of some superiority, though not the same superiority) — but also in accordance with what was said earlier. For it is not fitting to kill or exile or ostracize such a man, nor to think it right that he should be ruled in turn; for it is not natural for the part to exceed the whole, and this is what has happened in the case of the man who has such an enormous excess. So it remains only to obey such a man, and for him to be sovereign not in turn but absolutely. Concerning kingship, then — what differences it has, and whether it is not advantageous for cities or is advantageous, and for which cities, and how — let this much be determined in this way. Since we maintain there are three correct constitutions, the finest of them is necessarily the one governed by the finest people; and that constitution is the one in which it turns out that a single individual out of all, or an entire family, or a multitude, surpasses the rest in virtue, some fit to be ruled and others to rule, with a view toward the most desirable life — and since it was demonstrated in our earlier discussion that a good man's virtue and the virtue of a citizen of the finest city are necessarily identical, it is evident that a man becomes upright, and that a city might be organized under aristocracy or kingship, along the very same path and through the very same means;

56| [1288b] so that the education and the habits that make a man upright will be roughly the same as those that make him political and kingly. Now that these points have been determined, we must try to speak of the best constitution — in what manner it is naturally suited to come about, and how it is to be established. It is necessary, then, for the one who is going to undertake the appropriate examination of it...

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