Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language
1| In all the crafts and sciences that are not concerned with a part only, but are complete with respect to some one genus, it belongs to a single art to study what is fitting for each genus—for example, what sort of training suits what sort of body, and which is the best training (for the finest and best-equipped body it is necessary that the best training suit), and which single training suits most bodies (for this too is a function of gymnastics); further, if someone desires not the training that reaches the required standard, nor the state of body, nor the knowledge relating to competition, it is no less the business of the trainer and the gymnastic expert to provide this capacity as well. We see the same thing occurring likewise in medicine and shipbuilding and the making of clothing and every other craft. So it is clear that it also belongs to the same science to study the best constitution—what it is, and what sort it would be if it came to be most in accordance with our prayer with nothing external standing in the way—and also which constitution suits which people (for many it is perhaps impossible to attain the best, so that the good lawgiver and the true statesman must not be ignorant of both the constitution that is strongest without qualification and the one that is best given the underlying circumstances), and further a third kind, the constitution that suits a given hypothesis (for one must be able to study a constitution that is given, both how it would arise from the beginning, and, once it has arisen, in what way it might be preserved for the longest time;
2| I mean, for example, if it has happened to some city neither to be governed by the best constitution, and to be unsupplied even with the necessities, nor by the constitution that is possible given its existing circumstances, but by some inferior one)—and beyond all these one must know the constitution that suits all cities best. Hence most of those who pronounce on constitutions, even if they speak well on other points, go wrong on the points of usefulness. For one must study not only the best constitution, but also the one that is possible, and likewise also the one that is easier and more common to all; but as things stand, some seek only the most extreme constitution, one that requires great resources, while others, speaking of some more common constitution instead, do away with the constitutions that actually exist and praise the Laconian or some other one:
3| [1289a] one must instead propose such an arrangement as men will readily be persuaded of and be able to share in, starting from what already exists, on the ground that setting a constitution right is no smaller a task than constructing one from the beginning, just as relearning is no smaller a task than learning from the beginning. Hence, in addition to what has been said, the statesman must be able to come to the aid of existing constitutions as well, as was said before. This is impossible for one who does not know how many species of constitution there are. As things stand, some think there is one democracy and one oligarchy; but this is not true. So one must not be ignorant of the differences among constitutions—how many there are, and in how many ways they are combined. After this it belongs to this same practical wisdom to see both the best laws and those that suit each of the constitutions. For laws must be laid down to suit the constitutions—and everyone does lay them down this way—not the constitutions to suit the laws. For a constitution is the arrangement in cities concerned with the offices, the manner in which they have been distributed, and what the sovereign element of the constitution is, and what the end of each community is; but laws are distinct from the things that make clear the constitution, and by them the rulers must rule and must guard against those who transgress them.
4| So it is clear that grasping both the distinctions among constitutions and the definition of each is necessary for the framing of laws as well; the same body of law cannot possibly serve every oligarchy equally, nor every democracy, given that each of these comes in more than a single form. Now since in our first inquiry concerning constitutions we distinguished three correct constitutions—kingship, aristocracy, and constitutional government (politeia)—and three deviations from these—tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, and democracy from constitutional government—and since aristocracy and kingship have been discussed (for to study the best constitution is the same as to speak of these names, since each of the two wishes to be constituted in accordance with virtue fully resourced), and further since we have already distinguished how aristocracy and kingship differ from one another, and when one must consider a rule a kingship—it remains to go through constitutional government, the one called by the name common to all, and the other constitutions, oligarchy and democracy and tyranny. Now it is also evident, among these deviations, which is worst and which second. For necessarily the deviation from the first and most divine constitution is worst, and kingship must either be a name only, without really existing,
5| [1289b] or exist through the great superiority of the one who is king; so that tyranny, being worst, is furthest removed from being a constitution at all, oligarchy is second (for aristocracy stands far apart from this constitution), and democracy is the most moderate. Indeed someone among the earlier thinkers has already declared this too, though not with a view to the same point as ours. For that man judged that, when all the constitutions were decent—good oligarchy, for instance, and the rest—democracy was the worst, but when they were base, democracy was the best. We, however, say that these are altogether mistaken forms, and that it is not right to say that one oligarchy is better than another, but only that it is less base. But let this sort of judgment be set aside for now; for us the first task is to divide how many differences there are among constitutions, given that there are several species both of democracy and of oligarchy; next, which is the most common and which is the most choiceworthy after the best constitution, and also, if some other constitution happens to be aristocratic and well constituted but does not suit most cities, what it is; next, among the others, which suits which people (for perhaps for some democracy is more necessary than oligarchy, while for others the latter is more necessary than the former); and after this, in what manner one who wishes must establish these constitutions—I mean democracies according to each species, and again oligarchies:
6| finally, when we have made, concerning all these things, as concise a treatment as the subject admits, we must try to go through what destructions and what preservations of constitutions there are, both in common and for each separately, and through what causes these are most naturally apt to come about. Now the cause of there being several constitutions is that every city has several parts in number. For, first, we see that all cities are composed of households; then again, of this multitude some must be well-off, some poor, and some in between, and among both the well-off and the poor, one part is armed and one unarmed. And we see that one part of the common people is agricultural, another engaged in trade, another engaged in menial crafts. And among the notables there are differences both in wealth and in the extent of their property—for example, in the keeping of horses (for this is not easy for those who are not wealthy to do; that is why, in ancient times, in whatever cities their power lay in horses, oligarchies existed among them, since they used horses in their wars against their neighbors, as did the Eretrians and Chalcidians and the Magnesians on the Maeander and many others throughout Asia); and further, besides the differences in wealth, there is a difference by birth and a difference by virtue,
7| [1290a] and whatever other such thing has been said to be a part of a city in our discussion of aristocracy; for there we distinguished from how many necessary parts every city consists. Of these parts, at times all of them take part in the constitution, at times fewer, at times a greater number. So it plainly follows that constitutions must be many, each differing from the others in kind, since the parts themselves differ from one another in kind. For a constitution is the arrangement of the offices, and everyone distributes these either according to the power of those who share in them, or according to some common equality among them—I mean, for example, an equality of the poor, or of the well-off, or some equality common to both. It is necessary, then, that there be as many constitutions as there are arrangements according to the superiorities and according to the differences of the parts. But there seem to be, above all, two, just as with the winds people speak of the north winds and the south winds, and the rest as deviations from these, so too of constitutions there are two, popular rule (demos) and oligarchy. For they set down aristocracy as a species of oligarchy, on the ground that it is a kind of oligarchy, and what is called constitutional government (politeia) as a species of democracy, just as among the winds they set down the west wind as belonging to the north, and the southeast wind as belonging to the south.
8| The same holds for musical harmonies too, as some say: for there as well, people posit two forms, the Dorian and the Phrygian, and they call the other arrangements either Dorian or Phrygian, according to which they resemble. This, then, is generally how people are accustomed to think about constitutions. But it is truer and better to divide as we have divided: there being one, or at most two, constitution that is well constituted, the rest are deviations — some deviating from the well-blended harmony, others from the best constitution — the more taut and more despotic ones being oligarchic, the relaxed and soft ones being popular. But one should not, as some are now accustomed to do, simply define democracy as wherever the multitude is sovereign (for even in oligarchies, and everywhere, the greater part is sovereign), nor oligarchy as wherever a few are sovereign over the constitution. For suppose there were thirteen hundred people in all, and of these a thousand were rich, and they did not give the three hundred poor free men — who are alike in everything else — any share in office: no one would say these people were governed democratically. Likewise, if the poor were few but stronger than the wealthy, who were more numerous, no one would call this an oligarchy either, nor call such a case one where, though the rest were rich, they had no share in the honors.
9| It should rather be said that there is a democracy [1290b] whenever the free are sovereign, and an oligarchy whenever the rich are, but it turns out that the former are many and the latter few; for many are free, but few are rich. Indeed, if offices were distributed by height, as some say happens in Ethiopia, or by beauty, that would be an oligarchy: for the multitude of the beautiful and of the tall is small. And yet it is not sufficient to distinguish these constitutions by these criteria alone either; rather, since there are several parts both of the people and of the oligarchic element, we must further draw the distinction that where the free are few and rule over a greater number who are not free, this is not a democracy — for example at Apollonia on the Ionian coast and likewise at Thera (in both those poleis the offices lay with men distinguished by lineage and with the original settlers who had first taken possession of the colonies — few in number, yet ruling a great many) — nor is it a democracy wherever the rich, because they exceed in number, rule, as for instance in Colophon in former times (for there the majority had acquired substantial property before the war against the Lydians arose); rather, it is a democracy whenever the free and poor, being the majority, are sovereign over the government, and an oligarchy whenever the rich and better-born, being few, are sovereign.
10| That there are several constitutions, then, and for what cause, has been stated. Let us now say why there are more constitutions than those mentioned, and what they are and why, taking as our starting point what was said before. For we agree that every city has not one part but several. Just as, then, if we were setting out to grasp the species of an animal, we would first mark off what every animal must necessarily have (for instance, certain of the organs of perception, and the part that works on and takes in nourishment, such as a mouth and a stomach, and in addition the parts by which each of these creatures moves); and if there were only this many parts, but these admitted differentiae (I mean, for example, several kinds of mouth and of stomach and of the organs of perception, and further of the parts of movement too), then the number of possible combinations of these will of necessity produce several kinds of animals (for it is not possible for the same animal to have more than one differentia of mouth, nor likewise of ears); so that when all the admissible combinations of these are taken, they will produce species of animal, and there will be as many species of animal as there are combinations of the necessary parts — in the very same way this holds for the constitutions we have mentioned. For cities too are composed not of one but of many parts, as has been said many times.
11| One part, then, is the multitude concerned with sustenance, those called farmers; [1291a] a second is the so-called vulgar element (this is the element concerned with the crafts, without which it is impossible for a city to be inhabited — and of these crafts some must exist of necessity, others for luxury or for living well); a third is the market element (by market element I mean that occupied with sales and purchases and trade and retailing); a fourth is the wage-laboring element; a fifth is the class that fights in defense, which is no less necessary than these others if the citizens are not to be enslaved by every invader. For among things impossible would surely be counting as worthy of the name polis something that is by nature servile; a polis, after all, is a self-sufficing thing, whereas what is enslaved lacks that self-sufficiency. That is why what is said about this in the Republic is clever, but not adequate. For Socrates says that a city is composed of four of the most necessary elements, and he names these as the weaver and the farmer and the shoemaker and the builder; then again he adds, on the ground that these are not self-sufficient, the smith and those in charge of the necessary livestock, and further the merchant and the retailer; and all these together make up the full complement of his first city, as though every city were constituted for the sake of the necessities rather than for the sake of the fine, and needed shoemakers and farmers equally.
12| The defensive element, however, he does not assign as a part until, with the territory growing and coming into contact with that of the neighbors, they are brought into war. But surely even among the four, or however many, partners, there must necessarily be someone to assign and to judge what is just. So if one would posit the soul as more truly a part of an animal than the body, then in the case of cities too one must set down as parts, more than those elements bearing on necessary use, the military element and the element that has a share in judicial justice, and in addition to these the deliberative element, which is the function of political intelligence. And whether these functions belong separately to different people or to the same people makes no difference to the argument; for it often happens that the same people serve as hoplites and farm the land. So that if both these and those must be set down as parts of the city, it is clear that the hoplite element at least is a necessary part of the city. A seventh is the element that renders public service by means of its property, which we call the well-off. An eighth is the element that serves in public functions, that is, the element concerned with the offices, since it is impossible for a city to exist without rulers. There must therefore necessarily be some people capable of ruling and performing this public service for the city, either continuously or by turns. What remains is what we have just now distinguished — the deliberative element and the element that judges questions of justice for those in dispute.
13| If, then, these things must happen in cities, and happen finely and justly,
14| [1291b] there must necessarily also be some who share in the virtue proper to political men. Now it seems to many possible for the other capacities to belong to the same people — for instance, that the same people be both those who fight in defense and those who farm and are craftsmen, and further those who deliberate and judge; and indeed all lay claim to virtue too, and think themselves capable of holding most offices; but the same people cannot be both poor and rich. This is why these seem most of all to be the parts of a city — the well-off and the poor. And further, because for the most part the former are few and the latter many, these appear as opposite parts among the parts of the city. Hence people also establish their constitutions according to the preeminence of these groups, and there seem to be two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy. That there are several constitutions, then, and for what causes, has been said before; let us now say that there are also several forms of democracy and of oligarchy. This is clear also from what has been said. For there are several forms both of the people and of those called the notables — for instance, of the people one form is the farmers, another is the element concerned with the crafts, another is the market element occupied with buying and selling, another is the element concerned with the sea, and of this one part is military, one commercial, one ferrying, and one fishing (for in many places each of these is present in great numbers — for instance fishermen at Tarentum and Byzantium, the trireme-crewing element at Athens, the trading element at Aegina and Chios, the ferrying element at Tenedos); and in addition to these there is the laboring element and the element that has so little property that it cannot be at leisure, and further the element that is not free-born on both sides, and any other such kind of multitude there may be.
15| Among the notable people, the marks are wealth, good birth, virtue, education, and things described along the same lines of difference. The first kind of democracy, then, is the one said to rest most on equality. For the law of such a democracy says that equality means the poor have no greater share than the rich, and neither group is sovereign over the other, but both are alike. For if freedom is found most of all in democracy, as some suppose, and equality too, this would be so most of all where all share in the constitution alike, as much as possible. But since the people are the majority, and what is resolved by the majority is sovereign, this is necessarily what democracy is. This, then, is one form of democracy: that offices are filled from property assessments, but these are set low; and it is necessary that whoever acquires the assessed amount has the right to share in office, while whoever loses it does not.
16| [1292a] Another form of democracy is one in which all citizens who are free of legal liability share in office, but the law rules. Another form of democracy is one in which anyone shares in the offices, provided only he is a citizen, but the law rules. Another form of democracy has the other features the same, but the multitude is sovereign, and not the law. This occurs whenever decrees are sovereign rather than the law; and this comes about because of the demagogues. For in states that are democratically governed according to law, no demagogue arises, but the best of the citizens hold the leading positions; but where the laws are not sovereign, there demagogues arise. For the people become a monarch, one composed of many; for the many are sovereign not as individuals but all together. What sort of rule Homer means when he says that a multitude of rulers is not good — whether he means this kind, or the case where there are several rulers each acting as an individual — is unclear. At any rate, such a people, being in effect a monarch, seeks to rule as a monarch, because it is not ruled by law, and becomes despotic; so that flatterers come to be held in honor, and such a people is analogous among the forms of democracy to tyranny among the monarchies. That is why the character is also the same, and both are despotic toward the better sort, and the decrees are like the tyrant's edicts there, and the demagogue and the flatterer are the same and correspond to one another.
17| And each is strongest with his own counterpart: the flatterers with tyrants, the demagogues with peoples of this sort. These men are responsible for making decrees sovereign rather than the laws, by referring everything to the people; for it happens that they become powerful because the people is sovereign over everything, while they are sovereign over the opinion of the people, since the multitude is persuaded by them. Further, those who bring charges against the officeholders say that the people ought to judge, and the people gladly accept the invitation; so that all the offices are undermined. It would seem reasonable for someone to find fault with such a thing and say it is a democracy but not a constitution. For where the laws do not rule, there is no constitution. For the law ought to rule over everything, while the offices rule over particular matters, and this is what one should judge to be a constitution. So that if democracy really is one of the constitutions, it is clear that such an arrangement, in which everything is managed by decrees, is not even a democracy in the strict sense; for no decree can be universal. Let the forms of democracy, then, be marked off in this way. Of oligarchy, one form is that offices are filled from property assessments high enough that the poor, who are more numerous, have no share, but whoever acquires the assessed amount is permitted to share in the constitution;
18| [1292b] another form, when offices are filled from high property assessments and the officeholders themselves choose to fill the vacancies (if they do this from among all such qualified people, this seems to be more aristocratic in character, but if from certain limited persons, it is oligarchic); another form of oligarchy is when son succeeds father in office; and a fourth, when what has just been described holds, and it is not the law that rules but the officeholders. And this last is the counterpart, among oligarchies, of tyranny among monarchies, and of the last-mentioned kind of democracy among democracies; and indeed people call such an oligarchy a dynasty. So many, then, are the forms of oligarchy and democracy. But one must not fail to notice that it often happens that the constitution as laid down by the laws is not popular in character, but through custom and upbringing the state is governed in a popular way; and likewise, conversely, elsewhere the constitution according to the laws is more popular, but through upbringing and customs it is governed more in an oligarchic way. This happens especially after changes of constitution: for people do not move to the new order all at once, but are content at first to gain small advantages over one another, so that the previously existing laws remain in force, while those who brought about the change in constitution hold power.
19| That there are this many forms of democracy and oligarchy is clear from what has been said. For necessarily either all the parts of the people mentioned share in the constitution, or some do and some do not. So whenever the farming class and those possessing a moderate amount of property are sovereign over the constitution, they govern according to laws (for by working they are able to live, but they cannot be at leisure, so that having set the law over them they hold only the necessary assemblies), and the rest are permitted to share once they acquire the property assessment fixed by the laws; hence all who acquire it are permitted to share. For in general, that not all should be permitted to share is oligarchic, while that all should be permitted to have leisure is impossible without revenues. This, then, is one form of democracy for these reasons; another form exists because of the next distinction: for it is also possible for all who are free of legal liability by birth to be permitted to share, but only those able to have leisure actually do so; and that is why in such a democracy the laws rule, because there is no revenue. A third form is that all who are free are permitted to share in the constitution, but do not in fact share, for the reason already stated, so that in this form too the law must of necessity rule.
20| [1293a] The fourth form of democracy is the one that has arisen last in order of time in the cities. For because the cities have become much larger than they originally were, and there is an abundance of revenues, everyone shares in the constitution because of the superiority of numbers, and even the poor take part and govern because they are able to be at leisure, receiving pay. And this multitude has the most leisure of all, for the care of their own affairs does not hinder them at all, whereas it hinders the rich, so that they often do not take part in the assembly or in judging. Hence the multitude of the poor becomes sovereign over the constitution, and not the laws. So many, then, and of such kinds, are the forms of democracy, owing to these necessities; and these are the forms of oligarchy: when a greater number possess property, but a smaller and not very great amount, this is the form of the first oligarchy; for they make it possible for whoever acquires the amount to share, and because those who share in the government are numerous, it is necessary that not men but the law be sovereign (for the further they are removed from monarchy, and the less they have property enough to be at leisure and neglect affairs, but also not so little as to be maintained at the city's expense, the more necessary it is for them to require the law to rule over them, and not themselves).
21| But if those who hold the properties are fewer than in the first case, while the amount of property is greater, this becomes the second form of oligarchy. For being stronger, they think themselves entitled to a greater share, and so they themselves choose, from among the rest, those who are to enter the government; but because they are not yet so strong as to rule without a law, they enact a law to this effect. And if they carry this further, being fewer in number while holding greater properties, the third advance of oligarchy occurs: that they hold the offices among themselves, under a law that requires the sons of the deceased to succeed them. And when they already far surpass others in wealth and in wide circles of associates, such a power comes close to being a monarchy, and men become sovereign rather than the law: and this is the fourth form of oligarchy, the counterpart to the last form of democracy. Further, there are two constitutions besides democracy and oligarchy, of which everyone speaks of the one, and it has been named as one of the four forms of constitution (they speak of four: monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and fourth the one called aristocracy); but there is a fifth, which is called by the name common to all of them (for they call it "constitution"), but because it does not occur often, it is overlooked by those who try to enumerate the forms of constitutions, and they employ only the four (as Plato does) in discussing constitutions.
22| [1293b] It is right, then, to call "aristocracy" the constitution we discussed in our earlier arguments (for it is only the constitution composed of those who are best without qualification, in respect of virtue, and not by some assumption relative to a particular standard of good men, that it is just to call aristocracy; for only in it is the same man both a good man and a good citizen without qualification, whereas in the others men are good relative to their own particular constitution). Nevertheless there are some constitutions which stand apart from those governed as oligarchies, and are called aristocracies, and also stand apart from what is called "constitution." For wherever they choose the officials not only by wealth but also by merit, this constitution differs from both of the others and is called aristocratic. For even in constitutions that make no common provision for virtue, there are nonetheless some who are well regarded and thought to be respectable. So wherever the constitution has regard to wealth and virtue and the people, as at Carthage, this is aristocratic; and so are those which have regard to only two of these, as the Spartan constitution does, to virtue and to the people, and there is a mixture of these two, democracy and virtue. These, then, are two forms of aristocracy alongside the first, the best constitution, and a third consists of those constitutions of the so-called "constitution" that lean more toward oligarchy.
23| It remains for us to speak both about the constitution called by this name and about tyranny. We have placed things in this order not because this form, nor the aristocracies just mentioned, are not deviations, but because, in truth, all of them fall short of the most correct constitution; and further, they are counted along with these, and these are deviations from them, just as we said at the outset. It is reasonable to make mention of tyranny last, because of all constitutions it is least a constitution at all, and our inquiry concerns the constitution. The reason, then, why the arrangement has been made in this way has been stated; now we must give an account of the constitution. For its character will be clearer once oligarchy and democracy have been distinguished. For, to put it simply, the constitution is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. Now it is customary to call those that incline toward democracy "constitutions," and those that incline more toward oligarchy "aristocracies," because education and good birth tend to accompany the wealthier. Further, the wealthy seem to have those things for the sake of which wrongdoers do wrong; hence people also call them "gentlemen" and "notable." Since, then, aristocracy wishes to assign superiority to the best of the citizens, people also say that oligarchies are composed rather of gentlemen.
24| [1294a] It seems to be among the impossibilities for a city to be well-governed by law if it is not ruled by the best men but by base men, and likewise for it to be ruled by the best men if it is not well-governed by law. But good lawfulness does not consist in having laws well laid down while not obeying them. Hence we must suppose that there are two kinds of good lawfulness: one is obedience to the laws that are laid down, the other is that the laws which people obey are themselves well laid down (for it is possible to obey laws that are badly laid down). And this admits of two forms: either obedience to the best laws possible for them, or to the best laws without qualification. It seems that aristocracy consists above all in this: that honors are distributed according to virtue (for the defining mark of aristocracy is virtue, of oligarchy wealth, and of the people freedom); but the practice of whatever seems best to the majority exists in all of them alike; for in oligarchy and in aristocracy and among the people, whatever seems best to the greater part of those who share in the constitution is sovereign. Now in most cities this form is called "constitution"; for the mixture aims only at the well-off and the poor, at wealth and freedom (for among most people the well-off are thought to occupy the place of the gentlemen); but since there are three things that lay claim to equality in the constitution — freedom, wealth, virtue (for the fourth, which they call good birth, follows from the other two;
25| for good birth is ancient wealth together with virtue), it is clear that the mixture of the two, of the well-off and the poor, must be called "constitution," while the mixture of the three must be called "aristocracy" more than any of the others, apart from the true and first aristocracy. That there are, then, other forms of constitution besides monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy has been stated, and what these are, and how the aristocracies and the "constitutions" differ from aristocracy — and it is clear that these are not far apart from one another. In what manner the so-called "constitution" arises alongside democracy and oligarchy, and how it must be established, let us discuss next in order after what has been said. At the same time it will become clear by what marks people define democracy and oligarchy; for we must grasp the division between these, and then, taking as it were a token from each, put them together. There are three standards of composition and mixture. For either we must take both of the provisions that each side legislates, for example concerning the administration of justice (for in oligarchies they impose a fine on the wealthy if they do not serve as judges, but give no pay to the poor, whereas in democracies they give pay to the poor but impose no fine on the wealthy; but common to both, and a mean between them, is to take both of these provisions, which is also why it is political, since it is mixed out of both):
26| [1294b] this, then, is one way of combining them; another is to take the mean between what each side prescribes, for example, concerning attendance at the assembly, some require no property qualification at all, or only a very small one, others a large property qualification, but common to neither is the mean property qualification between the two of these. A third way is composed of two provisions, some from the oligarchic law and some from the democratic. I mean, for example, it seems democratic for the offices to be filled by lot, and oligarchic for them to be filled by election, and democratic that there be no property qualification, oligarchic that there be one: it is aristocratic, then, and political, to take one provision from each of the two, from oligarchy that the offices be filled by election, and from democracy that there be no property qualification. This, then, is the manner of the mixture; and the criterion of a good mixture of democracy and oligarchy is when it is possible to call the same constitution both a democracy and an oligarchy. For it is clear that those who say this are affected in this way because the mixture is good; and the mean is affected in this way too, for each of the extremes appears in it: which is just what happens with the Spartan constitution. For many attempt to say that it is a democracy, because it has many democratic features in its arrangement, for instance, first, concerning the upbringing of children (for the sons of the rich are brought up in the same way as those of the poor, and are educated in a manner that the sons of the poor too could manage), and likewise at the next age, and when they become men, in the same way (for in this way the rich man and the poor man are not distinguishable) — the arrangements for food are the same for all in the common messes, and the rich wear such clothing as any of the poor too could provide.
27| Further, Further, that of the two greatest offices the people elects the one and shares in the other (for they elect the elders, and they share in the ephorate); others call it an oligarchy because it has many oligarchic features, such as that all offices are elective and none allotted, and that a few have authority over death and exile, and many other such things. In a constitution that is well mixed, both elements ought to seem present and neither, and it ought to preserve itself through itself and not from outside, and through itself not because a majority of those who wish to preserve it are outside it (for that could be true even of a bad constitution) but because none of the parts of the city as a whole would even wish for a different constitution. In what way, then, one ought to establish a constitution, and likewise the so-called aristocracies, has now been stated.
28| [1295a] It remains for us to speak about tyranny, not because there is a great deal to say about it, but so that it may receive its share of the inquiry, since we set this too down as one part of the constitutions. Now about kingship we drew distinctions in our first discussions, in which we conducted our inquiry concerning the kind most properly called kingship, asking whether it is disadvantageous or advantageous for cities, and whom one ought to establish, and from where, and how. And we distinguished two forms of tyranny in the course of examining kingship, because their power overlaps in a way with kingship, since both offices rested on law — for among certain of the barbarian peoples men elect monarchs holding total power, and long ago among the early Greeks there arose monarchs of just this kind, called aisymnetai — these forms have certain differences from one another, but they were kingly insofar as they were according to law and ruled willing subjects, and tyrannical insofar as they ruled despotically and according to their own judgment. There is a third form of tyranny, which seems most of all to be tyranny, being the counterpart to total kingship. Such, of necessity, is the monarchy which rules, unaccountable, over all who are equal or better, with a view to its own advantage and not to that of the ruled.
29| That is why it is against their will: for no free person willingly submits to such rule. These, then, are the forms of tyranny, and this many, for the reasons stated. But what is the best constitution and the best life for most cities and most human beings, judging neither by a virtue that is above private individuals, nor by an education that requires nature and the good fortune of resources, nor by a constitution formed according to one's prayers, but a life that most people are able to share in common, and a constitution that most cities can partake of? For even the ones they call aristocracies, about which we have just spoken, in some respects fall too far outside the reach of most cities, and in some respects come close to what is called constitutional government (which is why one must speak of both as a single kind). The judgment about all these matters proceeds from the same elements. For if it has been well said in the Ethics that the happy life is the life in accordance with virtue lived without impediment, and that virtue is a mean, then the middling life must necessarily be best — the mean that it is possible for each person to attain; and these same boundaries must of necessity hold also for the virtue and vice of a city and for its constitution, for the constitution is a certain life of a city.
30| [1295b] In every city there are three parts of the city: those who are very well-off, those who are very badly off, and third, those in between these two. Since, then, it is agreed that the moderate and the middle is best, it is clear that a middling possession of the goods of fortune is also best of all. For it is easiest to obey reason in this condition, whereas to be exceedingly beautiful, or exceedingly strong, or exceedingly well-born, or exceedingly wealthy, or the opposite of these — exceedingly poor, or exceedingly weak, or utterly without honor — makes it hard to follow reason. For the former tend to become insolent and great wrongdoers, the latter become criminals and petty wrongdoers, and among wrongful acts some arise from insolence and others from criminality. Further, these middling people are least inclined to shrink from office or to be overeager for office, both of which are harmful to cities. And besides this, those who are in a position of superiority in the goods of fortune — strength, wealth, friends, and other such things — are neither willing nor able to be ruled (and this belongs to them from home, right from childhood; for because of their soft living they are not even accustomed to being ruled in the schoolroom), while those who are in extreme want of these things are excessively humble. The result is that the one group does not know how to rule but only how to be ruled, and that in the manner of slaves, while the other group knows no rule at all how to be ruled, but only how to rule, and that despotically.
31| A city of slaves and masters comes about, then, not one of free people, the one group full of envy, the other of contempt; and these are furthest removed from friendship and political community, for community is a mark of friendship — people are not even willing to share a road with their enemies. But a city wishes, as far as possible, to be composed of people who are equal and alike, and this belongs most of all to the middle people. Hence this city, composed of the elements we say naturally make up a city, must of necessity be the best governed. And it is these citizens, of all citizens in cities, who are most preserved. For they themselves have no craving for the possessions of other people, unlike the poor, and no one else covets what is theirs, the way the poor covet the property of the rich; and because they are neither plotted against nor plot against others, they pass their lives without danger. This is why Phocylides prayed well: 'Many things are best for the middling; I wish to be of the middle rank in the city.' It is clear, then, that the political community that is best is the one that governs through the middle people, and that those cities are capable of being well governed in which the middle element is numerous and stronger — best of all stronger than both other parts, but failing that, stronger than one of them; for when added to either side it produces a tilt in the balance and prevents the opposite excesses from arising. That is why it is the greatest good fortune for those engaged in politics to possess a moderate and sufficient substance,
32| [1296a] since where some possess a very great deal and others nothing, either an extreme democracy results, or an unmixed oligarchy, or, because of both these excesses, a tyranny; for tyranny arises both out of the most youthfully headstrong democracy and out of oligarchy, but far less out of the middling constitutions and those close to them. We will state the reason for this later, in the discussion of the changes of constitutions. That the middle constitution is best is clear, for it alone is free of faction; for where the element in the middle is large, factions and divisions among the citizens occur least. And large cities are less prone to faction for the same reason, that the middle element is large; whereas in small cities it is easy to divide everyone into two groups, leaving nothing in the middle, and nearly everyone is either poor or well-off. Democracies, moreover, are safer and more long-lasting than oligarchies because of the middle people (for they are more numerous and share more in the honors in democracies than in oligarchies), since whenever, without these, the poor exceed the others in number, misfortune results and they are quickly destroyed. One must take it as a sign of this too, that the best lawgivers have come from the middle citizens: Solon was one of these (as is clear from his poetry), Lycurgus too belonged to their number, since he never held the kingship, and Charondas as well, and nearly all the other lawgivers besides.
33| It is also clear from this why most constitutions are either democratic or oligarchic. For because in these the middle class is often small, whichever side is superior, whether the propertied class or the common people, oversteps the middle and runs the constitution in its own interest, so that the result is either a democracy or an oligarchy. Besides this, because factions arise and there is fighting between the common people and the wealthy, whichever of the two happens to get the better of its opponents does not set up a constitution that is common and fair to both, but takes the dominance of the constitution as the prize of victory, and one side makes a democracy, the other an oligarchy. Further, those Greek states that at various times held hegemony over Greece, each looking to the constitution at home, established democracies in the cities in one case and oligarchies in the other, looking not to the advantage of the cities but to their own; so that for these reasons the middle constitution either never comes about, or does so rarely and among few peoples. For only one man among all those who have ever held such hegemony was persuaded to grant this arrangement, and by now it has become the custom in the cities not even to want equality,
34| [1296b] but either to seek to rule or to submit to being ruled. What the best constitution is, then, and for what reason, is clear from this. As for the other constitutions, since we say there are several kinds of democracy and several kinds of oligarchy, it is not hard to see, once the best has been marked off, which should be ranked first and which second, and so on in order, one being better and another worse. For the one nearest to the best must always be better, and the one that departs further from the middle worse, unless one is judging relative to a given assumption. And by "relative to an assumption" I mean that often, though another constitution is more choiceworthy in itself, nothing prevents a different constitution being more advantageous for some particular people. Which constitution is advantageous for which people, and what sort for what sort of people, is the next thing to go through after what has been said. First we must grasp one point that holds generally for all constitutions alike: the part of the city that wants the constitution to continue must be stronger than the part that does not. Now every city is composed of a quality and a quantity. By quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, good birth; by quantity, superiority in numbers. It is possible for the quality to belong to one part of the city, of the parts that make it up, and the quantity to another part — for instance, that the low-born may be more numerous than the well-born, or the poor than the rich, yet not so much superior in quantity as they are inferior in quality.
35| For this reason these factors must be weighed against each other. Where the multitude of the poor exceeds the stated proportion, there democracy naturally arises, and each kind of democracy according to the particular superiority of that kind of common people: if the multitude of farmers is preeminent, the first kind of democracy; if that of the vulgar craftsmen and wage-laborers, the last kind; and similarly for the other kinds in between these. But where the multitude of the wealthy and notable exceeds more in quality than it falls short in quantity, there oligarchy arises, and in the same way each kind of oligarchy according to the superiority of the oligarchic multitude. The lawgiver must always bring the middle class into the constitution: if he makes oligarchic laws, he must aim at the middle people; if democratic laws, he must draw these same people over to the laws. And where the multitude of the middle class exceeds either both the extremes together or even one of them alone, there it is possible for the constitution to be lasting.
36| [1297a] For there is no danger that the rich and the poor will ever agree together against these people; neither side will ever be willing to be enslaved to the other, and if they look for a constitution more common than this one, they will find none other. For they would not endure ruling in turn, on account of their mutual distrust of one another; and everywhere the most trustworthy arbiter is the one in the middle, and the middle class is that arbiter. And the better the constitution is mixed, the more lasting it is. Many who set out to build aristocratic constitutions still miss the mark, and not merely by handing the wealthy an excessive share — they also play tricks on the populace. For it is inevitable that in time a real evil results from false goods; the greedy encroachments of the rich destroy the constitution more than those of the common people do. There are, in constitutions, five devices by which men contrive pretexts against the common people: concerning the assembly, concerning the offices, concerning the lawcourts, concerning the bearing of arms, concerning training in the gymnasium. Regarding the assembly: that it is open to all to attend, but a fine is imposed on the wealthy if they do not attend, on them alone or a much heavier one; regarding the offices: that those who have the property qualification are not allowed to swear off holding office, while the poor are allowed to; regarding the lawcourts: that there is a fine for the wealthy if they do not serve as jurors, but impunity for the poor, or a heavy fine for the one and a small one for the other, as in the laws of Charondas.
37| In some places it is open to all who have registered to attend the assembly and to serve on juries, but if, having registered, they neither attend the assembly nor serve on juries, heavy fines are imposed on them, so that through fear of the fine they avoid registering, and through not registering they do not serve on juries or attend the assembly. In the same way they also legislate about the possession of arms and about training. The poor are allowed not to possess arms, but for the wealthy there is a penalty if they do not possess them; and if they do not train, there is no penalty for the poor, but there is a penalty for the wealthy, so that the poor take part because of the penalty, while the wealthy do not take part because they have nothing to fear. These, then, are the oligarchic devices of legislation; and in democracies they contrive counter-devices against these. They provide pay for the poor when they attend the assembly and serve on juries, but impose no fine on the wealthy. So it is clear that if one wishes to mix the two fairly, one must bring together the practices found on each side, and provide pay for the one and a fine for the other; for in this way all would share in the constitution together, whereas on the other way the constitution belongs to one side alone.
38| [1297b] The constitution should be composed only of those who bear arms; but as to the amount of the property qualification, it is not possible to say, simply and in the abstract, how much it should be, but one must consider what is the highest amount one can fix such that those who share in the constitution are more numerous than those who do not, and set the qualification at that. For the poor, even when they have no share in the offices, are willing to keep quiet, provided no one treats them with insolence or takes away any of their property. But this is not easy; for it does not always happen that those who share in governing behave decently. And in time of war the poor are also accustomed to hang back, unless they receive provisions, since they are without means; but if someone supplies provisions, they are willing to fight. In some places the constitution consists not only of those actually serving as hoplites but also of those who have served as hoplites in the past; among the Malians the constitution was made up of these, but the offices were chosen from among those on active campaign. And the first constitution among the Greeks after the kingships arose from those who fought in war — originally from the cavalry (for the strength and superiority in war lay with the cavalry, since without proper formation the hoplite force is useless, and the experience and tactics for such things did not exist among the ancients, so that the strength lay with the cavalry); but as the cities grew and those who fought with heavy arms grew stronger, more people came to share in the constitution;
39| This is why what we now call constitutions, people in earlier times called democracies. And the ancient constitutions were reasonably oligarchic and kingly. For because of the small size of their populations, they had no great middle class, so that the people, being few in number and poorly organized, put up with being ruled. We have already said, then, for what cause there are several constitutions, and why there are others besides those commonly named (for democracy is not one in number, and likewise for the others), and further what the differences are and for what cause they arise, and besides these, which constitution is best, speaking for the most part, and of the others which sort fits which sort of people. But let us now speak again, both in common and separately about each, of what comes next, taking the starting point appropriate to them. There are, in fact, three parts of all constitutions, about which the serious lawgiver must consider what is advantageous for each: if these are well arranged, the constitution must necessarily be well arranged, and constitutions differ from one another in that each of these differs. Of these three, one is the deliberative element concerning common affairs,
40| [1298a] second is the element concerning the offices, that is, which offices there should be and over what matters they should have authority, and what the manner of choosing them should be, and third is the judicial element. The deliberative element has authority over war and peace, alliance and dissolution of alliance, and over laws, and over death, exile, and confiscation of property, and over the selection of officials and their audits. And it is necessary either that all these decisions be assigned to all the citizens, or to some over all of them (for instance to some single office or to several, or different matters to different offices), or that some of them be assigned to all and others to some. Now for all citizens to have authority over all matters is characteristic of a democracy, for it is this sort of equality the people seek. There are several manners of "all": one is by turns and not all together in a body (as is the case in the constitution of Telecles of Miletus; and in other constitutions too, the combined offices meet in deliberation, but everyone proceeds to the offices by turns from the tribes and the smallest divisions of all, until it has gone through all of them), and to come together only for the enactment of laws and for matters concerning the constitution, and to hear what is announced by the officials;
41| another manner is for all to assemble together in a body, but to meet only for elections to office, for the enactment of laws, for war and peace, and for audits, while other matters are deliberated by the officials appointed over each, who are chosen from all citizens or by lot; and another manner is for the citizens to assemble concerning the offices and audits, and to deliberate about war and alliance, while other matters are administered by officials who are elected, so far as this is possible — and such are the offices that necessarily must be held by those who understand the relevant matters; a fourth manner is for all to deliberate about everything by coming together, while the offices decide nothing but only make a preliminary judgment — which is the manner in which the final form of democracy now is administered, which we say is analogous to a dynastic oligarchy and to a tyrannical monarchy. All these manners, then, are democratic, whereas for some to deliberate about everything is oligarchic. And this too has several differences. For when the deliberators are chosen from moderate property assessments and are numerous because of the moderateness of the assessment, and they do not tamper with what the law forbids but follow it, and it is possible for anyone acquiring the assessment to share in it, this sort of thing is oligarchy but constitutional, because of its moderation;
42| but when not all share in deliberation but only certain selected persons,
43| [1298b] while they rule according to law as before, this is oligarchic. And when those who have authority over deliberation choose themselves, and when son succeeds father, and they have authority over the laws, this arrangement must necessarily be oligarchic. But when some deliberate about some matters and others about others — for instance all deliberate about war and peace and audits, while officials, and these elected, not chosen by lot, rule over the rest — this constitution is an aristocracy. And if some officials are elected and others chosen by lot, whether by lot simply or from a preliminary selection, or elected and chosen by lot together, some of these features belong to an aristocratic constitution, others to a polity itself. The deliberative element, then, has been divided in relation to the constitutions in this manner, and each constitution is administered according to the distinction stated. It is advantageous for the democracy that seems most fully a democracy today (I mean the sort in which the people has authority even over the laws) for the sake of deliberating better, to do the same thing that is done concerning the lawcourts in oligarchies (for there they impose a fine on those they wish to serve as judges, so that they will judge; while the democratic states give pay to the poor) — to do this also concerning the assemblies (for they will deliberate better if all deliberate in common, the people together with the notables, and these together with the multitude); and it is also advantageous for those who deliberate to be elected, or chosen by lot in equal numbers from the divisions; and it is advantageous, if the democratic element greatly outnumbers the men of political standing, either not to give pay to all but only to as many as are proportionate to the number of the notables, or to eliminate the excess by lot;
44| while in oligarchies it is advantageous either to co-opt some from the multitude, or to establish an office — such as exists in some constitutions, whose members are called "pre-councillors" and "law-guardians" — and to transact business only about matters these have deliberated on beforehand (for in this way the people will share in deliberation, yet will not be able to overturn anything concerning the constitution); further, either the people should vote for the same measures as proposed, or nothing contrary to what is introduced, or all should be given a share in giving advice, but only the officials should actually deliberate. And one should do the opposite of what happens in constitutional governments. For when the multitude votes against a measure, it should be made authoritative, but when it votes for it, not authoritative, but the matter should be referred back again to the officials. For in constitutional governments they do the reverse: the few, when they vote against a measure, are authoritative, but when they vote for it, they are not, and the matter is always referred back to the greater number.
45| [1299a] Concerning the deliberative element, then, and what has authority in the constitution, let it be distinguished in this manner. Next after these comes the division concerning the offices. For this part of the constitution too has many differences: how many offices there are, and over what matters they have authority, and concerning time, how long each office lasts (for some make the offices six-monthly, others for a shorter period, others yearly, others for a longer time), and whether the offices should be permanent or long-lasting or neither, but the same men holding office repeatedly, or the same man not twice but only once; further, concerning the establishment of the offices, from whom they should be drawn, and by whom, and how. On all these points one must be able to distinguish how many manners are possible, and then to fit which manners suit which constitutions. But it is not even easy to determine this — which posts should be called offices; for the political community needs many superintendents, and so we must not count as officials all who are elected or chosen by lot — for instance, priests first of all (for this must be set down as something different from the political offices); and further, chorus-producers and heralds are also elected, and ambassadors.
46| Among the offices, some are political — either concerned with all the citizens with a view to some single action, as a general is concerned with those on campaign, or concerned with a part, as the controller of women or the controller of children; others are offices of household management (for cities often choose corn-measurers); and others are subordinate offices, to which, if the city has the means, it assigns slaves. But, speaking most strictly, one should call "offices" those bodies to which is granted the power to deliberate about certain matters, to judge, and to command — and especially this last, for commanding belongs more to rule than the rest do. These differences make no difference, so to speak, for practical purposes (for no dispute has yet arisen among those who quarrel over the name), but they do involve a further line of theoretical inquiry. Which offices, and how many, are necessary if there is to be a city at all, and which are not necessary but are useful for a serious constitution — this is a question one might raise more with regard to every constitution, and especially with regard to small cities. For in large cities it is possible, and indeed right, for one office to be assigned to one function (since many people can go into the offices, because the citizens are many, so that some offices stand vacant for long intervals and others are held only once each; and in every case a function is better attended to when the care of it is single rather than divided among many concerns).
47| [1299b] But in small cities it is necessary to gather many offices into few hands, since owing to scarcity of population it is not easy for many people to hold office — for who will there be to succeed them in turn? Small cities sometimes need the same offices and laws as large ones do; except that large cities need the same offices often, while for small cities this arises only after a long interval. This is why nothing prevents assigning many responsibilities to one office at once (for they will not obstruct one another), and, to meet the scarcity of population, the offices must be made like a combination spit-and-lampstand. If, then, we can say how many offices must necessarily exist in every city, and how many are not necessary but ought nonetheless to exist, one who knows this will more readily see which offices it is fitting to combine into a single office. It is also fitting not to overlook this: which matters require many local officials, each responsible for his own district, and which require one authoritative office over the whole — for instance, with regard to good order, whether there should be one market-controller for the marketplace and a different official for each other place, or the same one everywhere; and whether the division should be made by subject matter or by the persons governed — I mean, for instance, one official over good order generally, or a separate one for children and another for women. And also with regard to the constitutions: whether the kind of office differs by constitution or not at all — for instance, in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy, whether the authoritative offices are the same, only not drawn from equal or similar people but from different people under different constitutions (for instance, in aristocracies from the educated, in oligarchies from the wealthy, in democracies from the free), or whether certain offices exist precisely because of these differences among the constitutions themselves — and whether there are cases where the same offices suit and cases where different ones suit (for in some places it is fitting for the same offices to be large, in others small).
48| All the same, there are also certain offices peculiar to particular constitutions, for instance that of the preliminary councillors; for this office is not democratic. A council, by contrast, is a popular institution: there needs to be some such body whose task is to deliberate in advance on behalf of the people, so that the people can be free of that business — but if its members are few in number, this body is oligarchic, and the preliminary councillors must necessarily be few, so that the office is oligarchic. But wherever both these offices exist together, the preliminary councillors are set up over and against the councillors: for the councillor is a democratic figure, the preliminary councillor an oligarchic one. The power of the council is also dissolved in those democracies where the people itself, gathering in assembly, transacts all business in person.
49| [1300a] This tends to happen whenever there is an ample supply of pay for those who attend the assembly: for, being at leisure, they gather together often and decide everything themselves. The controller of children and the controller of women, and any other official with authority over such a charge, is an aristocratic office, not a democratic one — for how could one prevent the wives of the poor from going out of doors? — nor an oligarchic one either, for the wives of oligarchs live in luxury. But let this much be said on these matters for now; we must try to go through the arrangements of the offices from the beginning. The differences fall under three heads, and once these are combined, every possible mode will necessarily have been captured. Of the three, one is: who are the ones who appoint the officers; second: from among whom; and the remaining one: in what manner. Under each of these three there are three further differences. For either all the citizens make the appointment, or only some do; and either from all the citizens, or from some determinate group (for instance, by property assessment, or by birth, or by virtue, or by some other such qualification, as at Megara, from those who had returned together and fought together against the people). And these appointments are made either by election or by lot — and again these can be combined in pairs, I mean: some offices filled by some citizens, others by all; and some from all, others from a determinate group; and some by election, others by lot.
50| Of each of these differences there will be four further modes. For either all appoint from all by election, or all appoint from all by lot — and this either from the whole body at once, or in rotation, as by tribes and demes and phratries, until it has passed through the whole citizen body, or always from the whole body at once — or else partly in one way and partly in the other. Again, if it is only some who make the appointment, this is either from all by election, or from all by lot, or from some by election, or from some by lot, or partly in one way and partly in the other — I mean, some offices filled from all by election, others by lot, and some from a determinate group by election, others by lot. So there come to be twelve modes, apart from the two combined ones. Of these, three arrangements are democratic: that all should be appointed from all, either by election, or by lot, or by both together (some offices by lot, others by election); that not all should appoint at once, but from all or from some, by lot or by election or by both, or that some offices should be filled from all and others from some, both ways (by "both" I mean some by lot, others by election), is a polity's arrangement; and that some offices should be filled from all, either by election, or by lot, or by both (some by lot, others by election), is oligarchic.
51| And it is still more oligarchic when both these features — filling from some, by both means — apply together. That some offices are filled from all and others from some is a polity's arrangement in an aristocratic style, [1300b] whether by election or by lot for the different offices; while that some offices are filled from some by election is oligarchic, and likewise that some are filled from some by lot (and if this last does not occur, the case is similar), and that some are filled from some by both means. That some are filled from all, and that the rest are all filled from some by election, is aristocratic. The modes concerning the offices, then, are this many in number, and they are divided among the constitutions in this way. Which mode is advantageous for which constitution, and how the arrangements ought to be made, will become clear together with an account of the powers of the offices and what they are. By the power of an office I mean, for instance, authority over revenues, or authority over guarding the city; for generalship is another kind of power again, as is authority over contracts made in the marketplace. It remains, of the three functions, to speak of the judicial one. We must take up its modes as well on the same basis. The difference among law-courts falls under three heads: from whom the judges are drawn, what matters they judge, and how they are appointed. By "from whom" I mean whether they are drawn from all the citizens or from some; by "what matters," how many kinds of law-courts there are; by "how," whether the judges are appointed by lot or by election. Let us first, then, distinguish how many kinds of law-courts there are.
52| These are eight in number: one for auditing officials, another for cases where someone wrongs the community, another for matters bearing on the constitution, a fourth for disputes between officials and private citizens over penalties, a fifth for private contracts of some size, and besides these the court for homicide and the court for cases involving foreigners (of homicide there are kinds: whether tried before the same judges or before different ones, cases of premeditated killing and cases of involuntary killing, and cases where the fact is agreed but the justice of it is disputed, and a fourth kind, cases brought against men who have already been exiled for homicide when they return, such as the court at the Phreattys is said to be at Athens; but such cases are few over the whole of time even in large cities; and of the court for foreigners, one kind is for suits of foreigners against foreigners, another for suits of foreigners against citizens), and further, besides all of these, one for small contracts, of a drachma, five drachmas, or a little more. For judgment must be given about these too, but they do not call for a large body of jurors. But let these be set aside, along with the courts for homicide and for foreigners, and let us speak about the political ones, since it is from these, when they are not well arranged, that factional divisions arise, and the upheavals of constitutions.
53| Now necessarily either all the citizens judge all the matters that have been distinguished, chosen by election or by lot, or all judge all of them, some by lot and some by election, or for some of the same matters some judges are chosen by lot and others by election. [1301a] These, then, are four ways in number; and there are as many others taken part by part. For again the judges may be drawn from some to judge all matters by election, or from some to judge all matters by lot, or some matters by lot and some by election, or some courts may be composed, for the same matters, of members chosen partly by lot and partly by election. These, then, as has been said, are the ways that correspond in reverse to those already named; and further there are the same ways combined, I mean, for example, some drawn from all the citizens, some from some of them, some from both together (as if in the same court some members were drawn from all and others from some), and either by lot or by election or by both. As many ways, then, as it is possible for the courts to be composed, have been stated; of these, the first are popular, namely those drawn from all to judge all matters; the second are oligarchic, those drawn from some to judge all matters; the third are aristocratic and constitutional, those drawn partly from all and partly from some.