Politics · Book V

Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language

1| Now concerning the other matters we set out to examine, we have spoken about nearly all of them; but from what causes constitutions change, and how many such causes there are and of what kind, and what are the destructive factors proper to each constitution, and from which constitutions into which they most often shift, and further what preserving factors there are, both in common and for each constitution separately, and further through what means each constitution would best be preserved, must be examined next in order after what has been said. We must first assume as a starting point that many constitutions have come into being with everyone agreeing about what is just, namely proportionate equality, but going wrong about it, as has also been said before. For democracy arose from the belief that those who are equal in some one respect are equal absolutely (for because they are all alike free, they suppose themselves to be absolutely equal), while oligarchy arose from the belief that those who are unequal in some one respect are wholly unequal (for being unequal in property, they suppose themselves to be absolutely unequal). Then the democrats, on the ground that they are equal, claim to share equally in everything; the oligarchs, on the ground that they are unequal, seek to have more, since to have more is to be unequal. All these constitutions, then, have some element of justice, but taken absolutely they are mistaken. And for this reason, whenever the two sides do not share in the constitution according to the conception each happens to hold, they engage in factional strife.

2| Now those who differ in virtue would have the most just claim to engage in factional strife, though they do this least of all; [1301b] for it is most reasonable that these alone should be absolutely unequal. There are also some who, being superior in birth, do not think themselves entitled to equality on account of this inequality; for men are held to be well-born when they possess the virtue and wealth of their ancestors. These, then, are, so to speak, the starting points and sources of factional strife, from which it arises; hence changes also come about in two ways: sometimes they are directed against the constitution itself, with a view to changing it from what is established into another, for instance from democracy to oligarchy or from oligarchy to democracy, or from these into constitutional government and aristocracy, or the latter from the former; but sometimes they are not directed against the established constitution, and those making the change choose to keep the same arrangement but want to have it under their own control, as in the case of oligarchy or monarchy; and further there is strife over more or less, as when an oligarchy already existing is pushed toward being more oligarchic or less, or a democracy already existing toward being more democratic or less, and similarly with the remaining constitutions, whether to tighten or relax them; and further there is strife directed at moving some part of the constitution, for instance to establish some office or to abolish it, as they say Lysander attempted at Lacedaemon to abolish the kingship, and King Pausanias tried to abolish the ephorate; and at Epidamnus the constitution was changed in part (for in place of the tribal chiefs they set up a council, but it remains compulsory for those officials who are members of the governing body to go to the popular assembly whenever some office is being voted on, and the single archon in this constitution was an oligarchic feature).

3| For everywhere factional strife arises on account of inequality, in cases where those who are unequal do not have what is proportionate to them (for a lifelong kingship is an inequality, if it exists among equals): in general, it is in seeking equality that people engage in factional strife. But equality is of two kinds: one is equality in number, the other is equality according to worth. By equality in number I mean that which is the same and equal in multitude or magnitude; by equality according to worth I mean that which is according to ratio, as for example three exceeds two, and two exceeds one, by an equal amount reckoned in number, but four exceeds two, and two exceeds one, by an equal amount reckoned in ratio; for two is an equal part of four, and one is an equal part of two, since both are halves. Though they agree that what is just absolutely is what is according to worth, they differ, as was said before, in that some, if they are equal in some respect, think themselves equal absolutely, while others, if they are unequal in some respect, claim everything for themselves as being absolutely unequal. Hence it is above all two constitutions that arise, democracy and oligarchy; for good birth and virtue are found among few, but these numerical qualities among more:

4| [1302a] for men of good birth and good men are nowhere as many as a hundred, but the wealthy are numerous in many places. But to be arranged absolutely and everywhere according to either kind of equality is a poor thing. This is clear from what results: none of the constitutions of this sort is lasting. The reason is that it is impossible, once there has been an initial and original error, not to arrive in the end at some evil. Hence numerical equality should be used in some matters, and equality according to worth in others. All the same, democracy is safer and less prone to factional strife than oligarchy. For in oligarchies two kinds of strife arise, that among the oligarchs themselves and also that against the people, whereas in democracies there is strife only against the oligarchy, and none worth mentioning arises within the people against itself; and further, the constitution composed of the middle classes is closer to democracy than to the rule of the few, and this is the safest of such constitutions. Since we are examining from what causes factional strife and changes concerning constitutions arise, we must first grasp in general their starting points and causes. These are, roughly speaking, three in number, which must be distinguished first in outline on their own.

5| For we must grasp how people are disposed when they engage in faction, and for the sake of what, and third, what are the starting points of political disturbances and of factional conflicts with one another. As for the cause, taken generally, of their being disposed in some way toward change, we should posit above all the one we have already stated. For those who desire equality engage in faction if they think they have less though they are equal to those who have more, while those who desire inequality and superiority engage in faction if they suppose that, being unequal, they do not have more but equal or less (and of these it is possible to reach out for them justly, and also unjustly): for being fewer, they engage in faction so as to be equal, and being equal, so as to be greater. So it has been stated how people are disposed when they engage in faction. As for what they engage in faction about, it is profit and honor, and their opposites. For fleeing dishonor and loss, either on their own behalf or on behalf of their friends, they engage in faction within cities. The causes and starting points of these movements, from which people are disposed in the manner stated and toward the things mentioned, happen to be in one way seven in number, in another way more. Two of these are the same as the ones stated, but not in the same way: for people are provoked against one another through profit and through honor, not in order to acquire these for themselves, as was said before,

6| [1302b] but because they see others gaining more than their share, some justly and some unjustly, of these things: further through insolence, through fear, through superiority, through contempt, through disproportionate growth; and further, in another way, through electioneering, through neglect, through smallness, through dissimilarity. Of these, what power insolence and profit have, and how they are causes, is fairly evident: for when those in office act insolently and take more than their share, people engage in faction both against one another and against the constitutions that give them their authority; and this taking more than their share happens sometimes from private property, sometimes from common property. Honor too is clear, both what power it has and how it is a cause of faction: for people engage in faction both when they themselves are dishonored and when they see others being honored; and this happens unjustly when people are honored or dishonored contrary to their worth, and justly when it is according to their worth. Through superiority, when someone is greater in power (whether one person or more) than accords with the city and the power of the constitution: for from such situations there tends to arise a monarchy or a dynasty; hence in some places people are accustomed to ostracize, as at Argos and at Athens.

7| And yet it would be better to see from the start to it that no one is so far superior, than to let it happen and cure it afterward. Through fear, both those who have done wrong engage in faction, fearing they will pay the penalty, and those who are about to be wronged, wishing to act first before being wronged, as at Rhodes the notable men banded together against the people because of the lawsuits being brought against them. Through contempt too people engage in faction and attack, for instance in oligarchies, whenever those excluded from the constitution grow more numerous (since they take themselves for the stronger party), and in democracies the well-off, disdaining the disorder and absence of rule, as also at Thebes, once the democracy had been ruined by bad governance following the fight at Oenophyta, and the Megarian constitution likewise fell when its people were beaten owing to disorder and lawlessness; and, before Gelon seized tyranny, at Syracuse; and at Rhodes, the people before their own revolt. Changes of constitutions also occur through disproportionate growth. For just as a body is composed of parts and must grow proportionately if its due measure is to remain, and otherwise it is ruined, when the foot is four cubits and the rest of the body two spans, and sometimes it might even change into the shape of another animal, if it grows not only in quantity but also in quality disproportionately, so too a city is composed of parts,

8| [1303a] of which often some part grows unnoticed, for example the multitude of the poor in democracies and in constitutional governments. And this sometimes happens also through chance events, as at Tarentum, when many of the notable men were defeated and destroyed by the Iapygians a little after the Persian Wars, a democracy arose out of a constitutional government; and at Argos, when those of the seventh tribe were destroyed by Cleomenes the Laconian, they were forced to admit some of the perioikoi; and at Athens, when they were unfortunate by land, the notable men became fewer because during the Laconian war the army was drafted from the roll. This happens also in democracies, though less: for when the wealthy become more numerous, or estates grow larger, democracies change into oligarchies and dynasties. Constitutions also change even without faction, both through electioneering, as at Heraea (for this is why they made offices filled by lot instead of by election, because they kept electing the men who campaigned for votes), and through neglect, when they allow men not friendly to the constitution to pass into the sovereign offices, as at Oreus the oligarchy of the rulers was dissolved when Heracleodorus, one of the rulers, established a constitutional government and a democracy in place of the oligarchy. Further, change occurs through the small increment. By the small increment I mean that often a great alteration of the laws happens unnoticed, when people overlook the small thing, as at Ambracia the property qualification was small, and in the end men ruled from no qualification at all, on the ground that the small qualification differed little or not at all from none.

9| It is also conducive to faction when the population is not of one stock, until it grows together as one; for just as a city does not come to be out of any chance multitude, so neither does it come to be in any chance time; hence all who have so far admitted fellow settlers or new settlers have for the most part fallen into faction. For example the Achaeans settled Sybaris together with the Troezenians, then, becoming more numerous, the Achaeans expelled the Troezenians, from which the curse fell on the Sybarites; and at Thurii the Sybarites fell into faction with those who had settled with them (for claiming to have more of the land as their own, since it was theirs, they were expelled); and at Byzantium the new settlers, caught plotting, were expelled through fighting; and the Antissaeans, having admitted the exiles from Chios, expelled them through fighting; and the Zanclaeans, having received the Samians, were themselves expelled; and the Apolloniates on the Euxine Sea, having brought in new settlers, fell into faction; and the Syracusans, after the period of the tyrants,

10| [1303b] having made the foreigners and the mercenaries citizens, fell into faction and came to fighting; and the Amphipolitans, having admitted settlers from Chalcis, were for the most part expelled by these very settlers. In oligarchies the many engage in faction on the ground that they are being wronged, because they do not share equally though they are equal, as has been said before; in democracies the notable men engage in faction because they do share equally though they are not equal. Cities sometimes also fall into faction because of their location, when the territory is not naturally suited to being a single city, as at Clazomenae those at Chytrum against those on the island, and the Colophonians and the Notians; and at Athens the inhabitants are not alike, but those who dwell in the Piraeus are more democratic than those of the city proper. For just as in wars the crossing of ditches, even very small ones, breaks up battle lines, so too every difference seems to produce division. The greatest division is perhaps virtue and vice, then wealth and poverty, and so on, one difference more than another, of which the one mentioned is one. Now factions arise not over small things, but out of small things; but people engage in faction over great things. Small factions are especially powerful when they occur among those in the sovereign positions, as happened also at Syracuse in ancient times.

11| For the constitution was changed when two young men who were among those in office fell into faction over a love affair. For while one of them was away from home, the other won over his beloved; and he in turn, angered at this, persuaded the other's wife to come to him; from which, each drawing in those of their party, they set the whole governing body at odds. This is why, when such things begin, one must be on guard, and dissolve the factions of the leading and powerful men; since the mistake happens at the outset, and people call the outset half of the entire business, a slight error there carries the same weight, proportionally, as the errors found in the remaining parts. And in general, the factions of notable men make the whole city share in their fate as well, as happened at Hestiaea after the Persian Wars, when two brothers quarreled over the division of their father's estate: the poorer one, on the ground that the other was not declaring the property, nor the treasure their father had found, won over the popular party, while the other, who had a large estate, won over the wealthy. And at Delphi, a dispute arising out of a marriage contract became the beginning of all the factions that came afterward:

12| [1304a] For one man, having observed some omen when he came for his bride, went away without taking her, and the bride's relatives, as though they had been insulted, threw some of the sacred funds into his sacrifice, and then killed him as a temple-robber. And around Mytilene, factional strife broke out over a matter of heiresses and became the source of many troubles, among them the war fought against the Athenians in which Paches captured their city. Timophanes, a wealthy citizen, had left behind two daughters, and Dexander, passed over and denied them for his own sons, launched the faction and incited the Athenians against the city, since he served as its proxenos. And among the Phocians, a faction that arose over an heiress, concerning Mnaseas the father of Mnason and Euthycrates the father of Onomarchus, became the beginning of the Sacred War for the Phocians. And the constitution changed at Epidamnus too as a result of a marriage dispute: someone had betrothed a daughter, and when the father of the man to whom she had been betrothed fined him, this man, having become one of the officials, joined with those outside the constitution, on the ground that he had been wronged. Constitutions also change into oligarchy and into democracy and into a mixed constitution as a result of some office or part of the city gaining reputation or growing in power — for example the Council of the Areopagus, having gained reputation in the Persian Wars, was thought to have made the constitution more tightly governed; and again the naval crowd, having become responsible for the victory at Salamis and, through this, for the leadership that came from naval power, made the democracy stronger; and at Argos the notables, having gained reputation in the battle against the Spartans at Mantinea, attempted to put down the democracy; and at Syracuse, the people, having been responsible for victory in the war against the Athenians, shifted the government from a mixed constitution to popular rule; and at Chalcis, the people, joining with the notables to kill the tyrant Phoxus, immediately seized control of the constitution; and at Ambracia likewise the people, having joined those who attacked and expelled the tyrant Periander, brought the constitution round to themselves.

13| And in general one must not fail to notice this: that those who have become responsible for some power — whether private individuals, or offices, or tribes, or in general any part or any body of people whatsoever — set faction in motion. For either those who envy them their honors begin the faction, or these men themselves, because of their superiority, are unwilling to remain on equal terms. Constitutions are also set in motion when the parts of the city that seem to be opposed to one another become equal to each other —

14| [1304b] for example the rich and the people, with nothing in between, or only a very small middle: for if either of the two parts greatly exceeds the other, the remaining part is unwilling to run a risk against what is obviously the stronger side. This is also why those who are outstanding in virtue do not, so to speak, cause faction: for they are few set against many. Speaking generally, then, the origins and causes of factions and of changes of constitution, across all constitutions, have this character. Constitutions are set in motion sometimes by force and sometimes by deceit — by force, either compelling from the very start or later on. And deceit is itself of two kinds. Sometimes men, having deceived people at the outset, change the constitution with their willing consent, and then afterward hold power by force against their will — as in the case of the Four Hundred, who deceived the people by claiming that the King would supply money for the war against the Spartans, and, having lied, tried to hold onto the constitution. And sometimes men persuade people at the outset and then again later, with their renewed and willing consent, rule over them. In general, then, across all constitutions, the changes turn out to happen from the causes stated. One must examine, in each particular kind of constitution, what results by dividing things up along these lines.

15| Democracies, then, change most of all because of the licentiousness of the demagogues. For partly by bringing false charges against those who have property, one by one, they draw them together into a single body (for a common fear brings together even the bitterest enemies), and partly by inciting the mass of people against them as a whole. And one could see this happening in this way in many places. For indeed at Cos the democracy changed when base demagogues arose (for the notables banded together); and at Rhodes too: the demagogues were supplying pay for public service, and were preventing the money owed to the trierarchs from being paid back, and these men, because of the lawsuits brought against them, were forced to band together and put down the democracy. And the democracy at Heraclea was also put down, immediately after the colonization, because of the demagogues: for the notables, being wronged by them, were driven into exile, and then the exiles, having gathered together and come back, put down the democracy. And the democracy at Megara was put down in much the same way: for the demagogues, in order to have property to confiscate, drove out many of the notables, until they had made the exiles numerous, and these, on returning, defeated the people in battle and established the oligarchy. And the same thing happened at Cyme also,

16| [1305a] under the democracy which Thrasymachus put down. And one could see, on examining pretty much all the other cases too, that the changes have this same character. For sometimes, in order to curry favor, men wrong the notables and drive them to band together, either by redistributing their properties or by taxing their revenues through public services, and sometimes by slandering them, so as to have their possessions to confiscate. And among the ancients, whenever the same man became both demagogue and general, they used to change into tyranny: for pretty much most of the ancient tyrants arose out of demagogues. The reason this used to happen then but does not now is that then the demagogues came from among those who held military command (for they were not yet skilled at speaking), whereas now, since rhetoric has been developed, those who are able to speak play the demagogue, but through inexperience in military matters they do not make an attempt at power, except where something of this sort has happened in some small way. Tyrannies used to arise more often formerly than now also because great offices were entrusted to certain men, as at Miletus arising out of the prytany (for the prytanis had authority over many great matters). And further, because the cities were not large at that time, but the people lived out in the fields, occupied with their work, the popular leaders, whenever they became skilled in war, made an attempt at tyranny.

17| And all of them did this because they were trusted by the people, and this trust rested on their hostility toward the rich — for example, at Athens, Pisistratus, by forming a faction against the men of the plain; and Theagenes at Megara, by slaughtering the cattle of the wealthy, which he seized when he caught them grazing along the river; and Dionysius, by accusing Daphnaeus and the rich, was thought worthy of the tyranny, being trusted, because of this enmity, as a friend of the people. Constitutions also change from the ancestral form of democracy into the newest kind: for wherever the offices are elective but not based on property assessments, and the people elect them, those who are eager for office, by playing the demagogue, bring things to the point where the people become sovereign even over the laws. A remedy for this not happening, or happening less, is for the tribes to put forward the officeholders rather than the whole people. The changes of democracies, then, come about almost entirely through these causes. Oligarchies change chiefly in two ways, the most conspicuous ones: one, if they wrong the mass of the people — for then anyone at all becomes an adequate popular leader, especially when it happens that the leader arises out of the oligarchy itself, as at Naxos, Lygdamis, who later even became tyrant of the Naxians.

18| [1305b] The starting point of faction arising from another quarter also has its varieties. For sometimes dissolution comes from the wealthy themselves — not those who hold office, but the rest of the wealthy class — when those who share the honors are very few in number, as has happened at Massalia, at Istrus, at Heraclea, and in other cities: those not sharing in office kept stirring up trouble, until first the elder brothers were admitted to a share, and later the younger again in turn (since in some places a father and his son never hold office together, while in others it is the older and younger brother who do not both rule at once). And in the one case the oligarchy became more constitutional, but at Istrus it ended up in a democracy, while at Heraclea it went from a smaller body to six hundred. The oligarchy changed also at Cnidus, when the notable men fell into faction among themselves because few shared in office and, as has been said, if a father held office his son could not, nor, if there were several brothers, could any but the eldest: for the common people, seizing the opportunity of their faction and taking a leader from among the notables, attacked and prevailed, since a faction-ridden body is weak. And at Erythrae too, under the oligarchy of the Basilidae in ancient times, although those in the government took good care of things, still the people, resenting being ruled by so few, changed the constitution.

19| Oligarchies are also set in motion from within themselves, through the rivalry of men who play the demagogue (and demagoguery is of two kinds: one occurs among the few themselves — for a demagogue can arise even where the men are very few, as at Athens under the Thirty, where the group around Charicles gained power by playing demagogue to the Thirty, and in the same way, among the Four Hundred, the group around Phrynichus; the other kind occurs when those who belong to the oligarchy play demagogue to the mass of the people, as at Larisa the guardians of the citizenship played demagogue to the crowd because it was the crowd that elected them, and this happens in all oligarchies where the offices are not filled by election from among those who hold the offices themselves, but where the offices come from large property assessments or from political clubs, while the electors are the hoplites or the people at large — which is what used to happen at Abydus — and wherever the lawcourts are not drawn from the governing body: for by playing demagogue in view of the trials men change the constitution, which is in fact what happened at Heraclea on the Pontus — and further, when some men try to narrow the oligarchy down into fewer hands: for those who are seeking equal treatment are forced to bring in the people as an ally). Changes in oligarchy also occur when men squander their private fortunes living dissolutely: for such men too look for revolution, and either set themselves up as tyrants or contrive one for someone else

20| [1306a] (as Hipparinus did for Dionysius at Syracuse; and at Amphipolis a man named Cleotimus brought in the Chalcidian settlers, and when they arrived he set them at odds with the wealthy; and at Aegina the man who carried through the business with Chares attempted to change the constitution for this same reason). Sometimes, then, they attempt some overturn outright, and sometimes they steal from the public funds, and out of this faction arises against them, either among themselves or between them and those who fight against their stealing — which is what happened at Apollonia on the Pontus. But an oligarchy that is of one mind is not easily corrupted from within itself. A sign of this is the constitution at Pharsalus: for those men, though few, are masters of many because they treat one another well. Oligarchies are also dissolved when they generate a second oligarchy within the oligarchy. This occurs when, though the whole governing body is small, the greatest offices are not shared by all of the few, which is what once happened at Elis: for since the constitution lay in the hands of a few elders, these became exceedingly few because the ninety of them held office for life, and the method of their election was dynastic and similar to that of the elders at Lacedaemon. A change of oligarchies also occurs both in war and in peace: in war, because of mistrust toward the people, the oligarchs are forced to employ mercenary soldiers (for the man to whom they entrust command often becomes a tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth;

21| and if command is entrusted to several men, these procure a ruling power for themselves; sometimes, fearing this, they give the mass of the people a share in the constitution, because they are forced to make use of the people). In peace, on the other hand, because of their mistrust of one another, they entrust the guard to soldiers and to a mediating officer, who sometimes becomes master of both parties, which is what happened at Larisa under the rule of the Aleuadae around Simus, and at Abydus under the political clubs, one of which was that of Iphiades. Factions also arise from some of the men within the oligarchy pushing others out and from men being brought into factional strife over marriages or lawsuits — as, for example, the cases already mentioned arose from a marriage-cause (and Diagoras dissolved the oligarchy of the knights at Eretria because he had been wronged in a matter of marriage), while the faction at Heraclea arose from a court judgment, and so did the one at Thebes, when men in each city inflicted punishment, justly in itself but done in a factional spirit, on a charge of adultery — at Heraclea against Eurytion,

22| [1306b] at Thebes against Archias (for their enemies pressed the matter with such rivalry that the men were bound in the pillory in the marketplace). And many oligarchies have also been dissolved because they were excessively despotic, when some of those within the constitution grew resentful, as happened with the oligarchy at Cnidus and the one at Chios. Changes also occur by mere accident, both in what is called a constitutional government and in those oligarchies in which men deliberate, sit in judgment, and hold the other offices on the basis of a property assessment. For often the assessment first fixed was suited to the circumstances of the time, so that in an oligarchy a few shared in it, and in a constitutional government the middle class did; but when prosperity comes about through peace or some other stroke of good fortune, the very same properties come to be worth many times the assessed value, so that everyone shares in everything — sometimes this happens gradually, by a change that comes on little by little and unnoticed, and sometimes more quickly. Oligarchies, then, change and fall into faction for causes of this kind (and in general both democracies and oligarchies sometimes shift not into the opposite constitutions but into other constitutions of the same kind — for example, from lawful democracies and oligarchies into those where the majority or the few rule absolutely, and from these back into the lawful forms).

23| In aristocracies, factions arise partly because few share in the honors, which has been said to set oligarchies in motion too, since an aristocracy is in a way also an oligarchy (for in both, few men rule, though not few for the same reason) — indeed it is for this reason that an aristocracy is thought to be an oligarchy as well. This is especially bound to happen when there is some considerable number of men who think highly of themselves as being equal in excellence, as at Lacedaemon the men called the Partheniae (for they came from the Equals), whom the authorities detected plotting and sent off as founders of Tarentum; or when certain men who are great and inferior to none in excellence are dishonored by others held in greater honor, as Lysander was by the kings; or when some man of manly spirit does not share in the honors, as Cinadon, who organized the attack on the Spartiates in the reign of Agesilaus; further, when some are excessively poor and others wealthy (and this happens especially in times of war: this too occurred at Lacedaemon at the time of the Messenian war, as is clear also from the poem of Tyrtaeus called Eunomia):

24| [1307a] Some, oppressed by the war, thought it right to redistribute the land. Again, revolutions occur if someone is powerful and capable of becoming even more powerful, so as to make himself sole ruler — as at Sparta it is thought Pausanias, who was general in the Persian War, tried to do, and Hanno at Carthage. Polities and aristocracies are dissolved above all through the departure from justice within the constitution itself. For the starting point is the failure to blend well, in a polity, democracy and oligarchy, and in an aristocracy these two along with virtue, but above all the two — I mean the common people and the oligarchy. For these are what polities try to mix, and so do most of the constitutions called aristocracies. For it is in this that aristocracies differ from the constitutions properly called polities, and this is why some of them are less and others more stable: those that lean more toward oligarchy people call aristocracies, and those that lean toward the multitude they call polities. That is why the latter sort are safer than the former: the greater number is stronger, and people are more content when they have equality, whereas those in prosperity, if the constitution gives them the advantage, seek to commit outrage and to grasp for more.

25| And in general, whichever way the constitution leans, it shifts in that direction as each side increases its own share — for example a polity shifts toward democracy, an aristocracy toward oligarchy; or else toward the opposite, for example an aristocracy toward democracy (for the poorer citizens, being treated unjustly, drag it round to the opposite extreme), while polities shift toward oligarchy (for the only stable thing is equality according to merit and each keeping what is his own). What has been described happened at Thurii. Because the offices required a higher property qualification, the constitution changed toward a lower one and more offices; but because the notables had jointly acquired the whole territory in violation of the law (for the constitution was more oligarchic, so that they were able to grasp more), the common people, having been trained in the war, became stronger than the garrison troops, until those who held more than their share gave up the land. Further, because all aristocratic constitutions are more oligarchic in character, the notables grasp more, as also at Sparta the properties come into the hands of a few; and the notables are more able to do whatever they wish, and to intermarry with whomever they wish — which is why the city of the Locrians was destroyed by its marriage-connection with Dionysius, a thing that would not have happened under a democracy, nor under an aristocracy well blended.

26| [1307b] Aristocracies change most of all unnoticed, because they are dissolved little by little — which was said earlier as a general point holding for all constitutions, that the small is also a cause of changes. For whenever people give up something belonging to the constitution, after that they more readily move something else a little greater, until they have moved the whole framework. This happened also in the constitution of Thurii. There was a law that one should hold the generalship only once in five years; but some of the younger men, having become skilled in war and held in high regard by the mass of the garrison troops, despised those in charge of affairs and, thinking they would easily gain control, tried first to abolish this law, so that the same men might hold the generalship continuously, seeing that the people would eagerly elect them. The officials appointed to guard against this, the so-called counselors, at first set out to oppose it but were won over, supposing that once they let this law be moved they would allow the rest of the constitution to remain; but afterward, wishing to prevent further changes when others were being moved, they could no longer accomplish anything, and the whole ordering of the constitution changed into the domination of those who had attempted the innovation. All constitutions are dissolved sometimes from within themselves, sometimes from outside, whenever there is an opposing constitution either nearby, or far off but possessing power.

27| This is what happened in the case of the Athenians and the Spartans: the Athenians everywhere put down oligarchies, and the Spartans put down democracies. The sources from which changes and factional conflicts in constitutions arise have now been stated, more or less. It remains to speak about preservation, both in general and with respect to each constitution separately. First, then, it is clear that if we know the causes through which constitutions are destroyed, we also know the causes through which they are preserved; for opposites produce opposites, and destruction is the opposite of preservation. In well-blended constitutions, then, if anything else must be watched for, it is above all to guard against the smallest violation of law: for lawlessness creeps in unnoticed, just as a small expense, recurring often, destroys estates. The expense goes unnoticed because it does not occur all at once; the mind is misled by these small amounts, just as in the sophistical argument that if each thing is small, then all are small — this is true in one sense and false in another: for the whole and the total are not small, but are composed of small parts. This, then, is one safeguard to take with a view to the starting point; next, one must not trust arguments contrived as sophistries to win over the multitude,

28| [1308a] for they are refuted by the facts (what sort of sophistries about constitutions we mean has been said earlier). Further, one should observe that some constitutions endure — not only aristocracies but also oligarchies — not because the constitutions themselves are secure, but because those who come into office deal well both with those outside the constitution and with those within the ruling body: with those who do not share in it, by not treating them unjustly and by bringing their leading men into the constitution, and by not wronging the ambitious among them in matters of honor nor the many in matters of profit; and among themselves, and with those who do share in it, by treating one another in a democratic spirit. For what the champions of the people seek for the multitude, namely equality, is, among those who are alike, not only just but also advantageous. That is why, if there are more people within the ruling body, many of the democratic-style laws are advantageous — for example, that offices last six months, so that all who are alike may share in them; for those who are alike are, in a sense, already like a common people (which is why demagogues often arise even among them, as has been said before) — and further, oligarchies and aristocracies fall less often into the domination of a few, since it is not equally easy to do wrong holding office for a short time as for a long time; for it is on account of this that tyrannies arise within oligarchies and democracies:

29| for in each of the two, either the greatest men set themselves up as tyrants — in the one case the demagogues, in the other the powerful few — or those who hold the greatest offices do so, whenever they hold office for a long time. Constitutions are preserved not only by being far removed from those who would destroy them, but sometimes also by being close to them; for being afraid, people hold on to the constitution more firmly. Hence those who care for the constitution must contrive fears, so that people may keep watch and not let go of their guard over the constitution as if it were a night watch, and must make what is far off seem close at hand. Further, one must try to guard, even through the laws, against the rivalries and factional disputes of the notables, and to take in hand those who stand outside the rivalry before they too have been drawn into it — for to recognize an evil at its beginning is not a task for just anyone but for a statesman. As for the change from oligarchy or polity that arises through the property qualifications, when this happens because the qualifications remain the same while money becomes more plentiful, it is advantageous to examine the total assessed value of the community as it stands against the past — in cities where the census is taken yearly, at that interval,

30| [1308b] But in the larger cities, every three or five years, if the property assessed is a multiple or a fraction of what it was when the property qualifications for the constitution were originally set, there should be a law both to raise and to lower the qualifications: if it has increased, raising them in proportion to the increase, and if it has fallen, lowering them and making the qualification smaller. For in oligarchies and constitutional governments, when this is not done, the result is that in the one case an oligarchy becomes a dynasty, and in the other a constitutional government becomes a democracy, and out of oligarchy a constitutional government or a democracy. It is a rule common to democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, and every constitution alike that no one should be allowed to grow too far beyond due measure, but rather that one should try to give small honors over a long time rather than great ones quickly (for men are corrupted by sudden greatness, and not every man can bear good fortune); or if this is not done, at least not to take away all at once what was given all at once, but by gradual withdrawal. And above all one should try so to regulate matters by the laws that no one arises who is greatly superior in power, whether through friends or through wealth; failing that, one should arrange for such men's advancement to take them abroad. And since men also revolutionize because of their private ways of life, some office should be established to keep watch over those whose way of living is disadvantageous to the constitution — in a democracy, disadvantageous to the democracy, in an oligarchy, to the oligarchy, and likewise for each of the other constitutions in turn.

31| And for the same reasons one must guard, in turn, against whichever part of the city is prospering: the remedy for this is always to put action and office into the hands of the opposing parts (I mean that the respectable are opposed to the mass, and the poor to the wealthy), and to try either to mix together the mass of the poor and that of the wealthy, or to increase the middle group (for this dissolves the factional strife that comes from inequality). But the greatest thing in every constitution is that the laws and the rest of the administration should be so arranged that it is not possible for the offices to be a source of profit. This above all must be watched in oligarchies. For the many are not so aggrieved at being kept from ruling — indeed they are glad if someone lets them attend to their private affairs — but if they think the rulers are stealing the common funds, then both things gall them at once: exclusion from honors and exclusion from profits. There is in fact only one way in which democracy and aristocracy can exist together at the same time, if someone should contrive it.

32| [1309a] For it would then be possible for both the notable men and the mass of the people to have what they want. For that everyone should be allowed to rule is democratic, while that the notable should hold the offices is aristocratic; and this will happen when it is not possible to profit from the offices. For the poor will not want to rule, since there is nothing to be gained by it, but will prefer to attend to their own affairs, while the wealthy will be able to rule because they need nothing from the public funds; so that the result will be that the poor grow wealthier through spending their time on their own work, while the notable are not ruled by whoever happens along. So then, to prevent the public funds from being stolen, the handing over of the money should take place with all the citizens present, and copies of the accounts should be deposited by phratries, companies, and tribes; and to make ruling free of profit there should be honors established by law for those who serve with distinction. In democracies one must spare the wealthy, not only by not making their properties subject to redistribution, but not even their income, which in some constitutions happens without being noticed; and it is better, even when they are willing, to prevent them from performing the costly but useless public services, such as furnishing choruses, torch-races, and other such things.

33| In oligarchy, on the other hand, one must take great care of the poor, and assign to them the offices from which there is profit to be had, and if any of the wealthy commits outrage against them, the penalties should be greater than if it were against one of their own; and inheritances should pass not by gift but by lineage, and no one should inherit more than a single estate. For in this way properties would be more nearly equalized, and more of the poor would be established in prosperity. It is also advantageous, both in democracy and in oligarchy, to assign to those who share less in the constitution either equality or precedence in other respects — in a democracy to the wealthy, in an oligarchy to the poor — except for the offices that have authority over the constitution; these should be entrusted only, or mostly, to those from within the constitution. Those who are to hold the sovereign offices must have three qualities: first, friendship toward the established constitution; next, the greatest capacity for the functions of the office; and third, virtue and justice — that is, the kind of justice that corresponds to each particular constitution (for if the just is not the same under all constitutions, then there must also be differences in justice). There is a difficulty when all these qualities do not happen to be found in the same person: how should the choice be made?

34| [1309b] For example, if one man is skilled as a general but base and no friend to the constitution, while another is just and a friend but less skilled — how should the choice be made? It seems one should look to two things: of which quality do all men have more, and of which less. Hence in generalship one should look more to experience than to virtue, since fewer men share in the ability to command than share in decency; but in a guardianship or a treasury office, the opposite, since these require more virtue than most men possess, while the knowledge required is common to all. One might raise a difficulty: if a man has both capacity and friendship toward the constitution, what further need is there of virtue? For these two qualities alone will make him do what is advantageous. But perhaps it is because men who possess these two qualities can still be lacking in self-control, so that just as they fail to serve their own interests even though they know and love themselves, nothing prevents some from being the same way toward the common good. In general, whatever things we say in the laws are advantageous for constitutions, all of these preserve constitutions, and the greatest single factor, often mentioned, is this: to see to it that the mass of people who want the constitution to continue is stronger than the mass who do not want it. But beyond all these things, one must not overlook — as the constitutions that have deviated from the right kind now do overlook — the mean.

35| For many of the things that are thought to be democratic in fact dissolve democracies, and many of the things thought oligarchic dissolve oligarchies. Those who think this one thing is the sole virtue drag it to excess, not realizing that it is like a nose which, though it has deviated from the most beautiful straightness toward the hooked or the snub, is still beautiful and pleasing to look at; yet if one stretches it still further toward the extreme, first it will lose the due proportion of that part, and in the end, through the excess and deficiency of its opposite features, it will not even look like a nose at all. The same holds for the other parts of the body, and the same thing happens with the other constitutions as well. For it is possible for oligarchy and democracy to be in a sufficiently good condition even though each has departed from the best arrangement; but if one stretches either of them further, first it will make the constitution worse, and in the end it will not even be a constitution at all. So the lawgiver and the statesman must not fail to recognize which of the democratic measures preserve and which destroy a democracy, and which of the oligarchic measures preserve and which destroy an oligarchy. For neither of them can exist and endure without the wealthy and the mass of the people; but whenever an equalization of property comes about, the constitution that results from it must necessarily be a different one,

36| [1310a] And so, by ruining things with laws that go to excess, they ruin the constitutions. And people go wrong both in democracies and in oligarchies: in democracies the popular leaders do, wherever the multitude is sovereign over the laws. For they always make the city into two, by fighting the well-off, whereas they ought always to seem to speak on behalf of the well-off. And in oligarchies the oligarchs ought to seem to speak on behalf of the people, and oligarchs ought to swear oaths opposite to the ones they swear now. For now, in some places, they swear, 'I will be ill-disposed to the people and will plot whatever harm I can'; but they ought instead to hold and to pretend the opposite, declaring in their oaths that they will not wrong the people. But the greatest of all the things mentioned for making constitutions endure — the very thing everyone now neglects — is education directed to the constitution. For there is no benefit in the most beneficial laws, even ones agreed on by everyone who takes part in politics, if people are not habituated and educated in the constitution — democratically, if the laws are democratic, oligarchically, if they are oligarchic. For if there can be lack of self-control in a single person, there can also be lack of self-control in a city. But being educated with a view to the constitution is not this: doing the things that please those who hold oligarchic power or those who want democracy, but rather the things by which some will be able to run an oligarchy and others a democracy.

37| But as things now stand, in oligarchies the sons of the rulers live in luxury, while the sons of the poor become trained and toughened by hard work, so that they are both more willing and more able to bring about revolution. And in democracies — in the ones that seem most of all to be democratic — the opposite of what is advantageous has come to be established, and the cause of this is that they define freedom badly. For there are two things by which democracy seems to be defined: the sovereignty of the greater number, and freedom. For what is just seems to be what is equal, and what is equal is whatever seems so to the multitude, and this is to be sovereign; and what is free and equal is whatever a person wishes to do. The result is that in democracies of this sort each person lives as he wishes, and 'toward whatever he desires,' as Euripides says. But this is a poor thing: for one should not think that living with a view to the constitution is slavery, but rather preservation. So much, then, stated simply, for the sources from which constitutions change and are destroyed, and the means by which they are preserved and endure. It remains to go over monarchy as well — the sources from which it is destroyed, and the means by which it is naturally preserved.

38| [1310b] What happens with respect to kingships and tyrannies is roughly parallel to what has been said about constitutions. For kingship corresponds to aristocracy, while tyranny is compounded out of the last, most extreme form of oligarchy and of democracy — which is why it is the most harmful to those who are ruled, since, being compounded of two evils, it has the deviations and errors that come from both constitutions. The origin of each of these two forms of monarchy is, from the start, out of opposites. For kingship came into being to help the respectable against the people, and a king is established from among the respectable on the basis of superiority in virtue, or in the actions that spring from virtue, or on the basis of the superiority of that kind of lineage; whereas the tyrant comes from the people and the multitude, against the notable men, so that the people may suffer no injustice from them. This is clear from the facts. For nearly all tyrants, one might say, have arisen from popular leaders, having gained the people's trust by slandering the notable men. Some tyrannies were established in this way, once the cities had already grown large; others, before this, arose from kings who departed from ancestral custom and reached for a more despotic kind of rule; others arose from men elected to the sovereign offices (for in ancient times the people used to make the public magistracies and the sacred embassies long-lasting offices); and others arose out of oligarchies, when the oligarchs chose some one man as sovereign over the highest offices.

39| For in all these ways it was possible to bring the thing about easily, if only they wished, because power already lay at hand — for some, the power of kingly rule, for others the power that came with their office. For example, Pheidon around Argos and other tyrants set themselves up while kingship already existed; those around Ionia, and Phalaris, did so starting from their offices; Panaetius did so at Leontini, and Cypselus at Corinth, and Peisistratus at Athens, and Dionysius at Syracuse, and others in the same way out of leadership of the people. As we said, then, kingship is ranked alongside aristocracy. For it rests on worth — either on personal virtue, or on lineage, or on good services rendered, or on these together with power. For all who had done good service to cities or nations, or were capable of doing so, came to receive this honor — some by preventing enslavement in war, as Codrus did, others by liberating their people, as Cyrus did, or by founding or by acquiring territory, as the kings of the Lacedaemonians did, and of the Macedonians, and of the Molossians. Now the king wishes to be a guardian —

40| [1311a] so that those who possess property may suffer no injustice, and the people may suffer no outrage at all. But tyranny, as has often been said, looks to nothing held in common, except for the sake of its own advantage. And the aim of the tyrant is the pleasant, while the aim of the king is the fine. This is why, among the forms of gain, wealth is more the tyrant's, while gain in honor belongs more to the king; and the king's guard is drawn from the citizens, while the tyrant's is made up of foreigners. That tyranny has the evils both of democracy and of oligarchy is clear. From oligarchy it has treating wealth as its end (for only in this way is it possible for it to keep up both its guard and its luxury), and trusting the multitude in nothing (which is why tyrants also strip them of their weapons), and mistreating the common crowd, and driving them out of the city, and scattering them into separate settlements — both of these last being common to oligarchy and tyranny alike. From democracy it has making war on the notable men, and destroying them, secretly and openly, and driving them into exile as rivals in skill and as obstacles to its rule. For it is from these very things that plots also come about, some wanting to rule themselves, others not wanting to be enslaved.

41| This is also the source of Periander's piece of advice to Thrasybulus — the lopping off of the ears of grain that stand out above the rest — meaning that one must always do away with the citizens who stand out above the rest. So, as has pretty much been said, one must think of the same starting points as holding both for the changes that constitutions undergo and for those that monarchies undergo. For it is through injustice, through fear, and through contempt that many of the ruled attack monarchies; and of injustice, most of all through outrage, but sometimes also through being deprived of their own property. The ends aimed at are also the same, just as in that other case, both for tyrannies and for kingships: for monarchs possess a greatness of wealth and honor, which everyone desires. Of the attacks made on them, some are directed against the person of the rulers, others against their rule. Those made through outrage are directed against the person. And since outrage takes many forms, each of its forms becomes a cause of anger; and of those who become angry, most, one might say, attack for the sake of revenge, not for the sake of gaining superiority. For example, the attack of the sons of Peisistratus came about because they had insulted the sister of Harmodius and abused Harmodius himself (for Harmodius acted on account of his sister, and Aristogeiton on account of Harmodius); and men also plotted against Periander, the tyrant in Ambracia, because, while drinking together,

42| [1311b] with his boy, to ask him whether he was already pregnant by him. And Philip's assassination was carried out by Pausanias because Philip let him be outraged by the men around Attalus, and the murder of Amyntas the Little was carried out by Derdas because Amyntas had mocked his youth, and the eunuch's attack on Evagoras of Cyprus: for because Evagoras had taken away his wife, he killed his son, feeling himself outraged. Many attacks have also occurred because of shame brought on the body of some of the monarchs. Such was Crataeas's attack on Archelaus: he had always felt his relationship with him a burden, so that an even smaller pretext would have sufficed—but the actual occasion was that Archelaus, though he had agreed to give him one of his daughters, gave neither; instead, being pressed by war against Sirras and Arrhabaeus, he gave the elder to the king of Elimea, and the younger to his own son Amyntas, thinking in this way Amyntas would least be at odds with him and with the son of Cleopatra. But the beginning of the estrangement lay in Archelaus's taking the sexual favor as a burden. Hellanocrates of Larissa also joined the conspiracy for the same reason: since Archelaus, though he had made use of his youth, did not restore him home as he had promised, Hellanocrates thought the relationship that had occurred had been for outrage and not for erotic desire.

43| Python and Heraclides of Aenus destroyed Cotys avenging their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys because he had been castrated by him as a boy, feeling himself outraged. Many also, angered because their bodies had been maltreated by blows, either destroyed their rulers or attempted to, feeling themselves outraged—this happens also among those holding offices and royal powers. So in Mytilene, Megacles, together with his friends, attacked and killed the Penthilidae when they were going about striking people with clubs; and later Smerdes destroyed Penthilus after receiving blows and being dragged away from his wife. And of the attack on Archelaus, Decamnichus became the leader, being the first to incite those who made the attack: the cause of his anger was that Archelaus had handed him over to be whipped by Euripides the poet—Euripides had grown angry when Decamnichus said something about the bad smell of his mouth. And many others, for such causes, were either killed or plotted against. Similarly also through fear: for this too was one of the causes, just as it is in constitutional governments as well as in monarchies—for example, Artapanes killed Xerxes fearing the accusation concerning Darius, because he had hanged him without Xerxes's order, but thinking Xerxes would forgive him as one who had forgotten because of feasting. And there are attacks through contempt,

44| [1312a] as when someone saw Sardanapalus carding wool among the women (if what the storytellers say of him is true; and if not true of him, it could well be true of someone else), and Dion attacked Dionysius the younger because he held him in contempt, seeing both the citizens in that condition and Dionysius himself perpetually drunk. And some of a ruler's friends attack him through contempt: because they are trusted, they hold him in contempt, thinking they will not be found out. And those who think they are able to seize the rule also attack, in a way, through contempt: since they think they can, and contempt of the danger comes from their power, they make the attempt easily, as generals do against monarchs—for example, Cyrus against Astyages, holding both his life and his power in contempt, because Astyages's power had grown slack while he himself lived in luxury, and Seuthes the Thracian against Amadocus, being his general. And some attack for more than one of these reasons, both from contempt and for gain, as Mithridates did against Ariobarzanes. But it is above all for this last reason that men attempt such things who are bold by nature and hold a military honor under the monarchs: for courage joined with power is boldness, and it is because of both together, thinking they will easily prevail, that they make their attacks. Attacks made through love of honor are of a different kind of cause from those already mentioned.

45| For it is not the case, as with some who attack tyrants because they see great gains and great honors available to them, that each of those who attack through love of honor likewise chooses to run the risk for that reason; rather, those men act for the cause stated, but these others act as they would toward any other extraordinary deed by which men become famous and known to others—so too they make attempts on monarchs, wishing to acquire not a monarchy but glory. Still, those who set out for this reason are very few in number: for one must be prepared to have no concern at all for one's own safety, unless the deed is likely to succeed. Such men must follow the example set by Dion's own reasoning, though it is not easy for many to attain it: for he made his expedition against Dionysius with few men, saying that he was disposed as follows—that however far he might be able to advance, that much participation in the deed was enough for him, so that if it should happen that he died immediately upon setting foot on the land, that death would be a fine one for him. A tyranny is destroyed in one way, as each of the other constitutions also is, from outside,

46| [1312b] if some opposing and stronger constitution exists (for that they will wish this is evident because of the opposition of their aims: whatever people wish, they all do when they are able); and the constitutions opposed to tyranny are these—the people is opposed to tyranny as, in Hesiod's phrase, potter to potter (for the final form of democracy is itself a tyranny), while kingship and aristocracy are opposed to it because of the opposition of the constitution (which is why the Lacedaemonians and the Syracusans, in the period when they were governed well, put down the greatest number of tyrannies); but a tyranny is destroyed from within itself in one way, when those who share in it fall into factional strife, as happened to the circle of Gelon, and now to that of Dionysius—the fall of Gelon's line coming about when Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiero, played the demagogue with Gelon's son and drove him toward pleasures, so that he himself might rule, while the relatives banded together not so that the tyranny should be entirely overthrown but so that Thrasybulus should be, and those who had banded together, seizing their opportunity, cast out the whole family; but Dionysius was destroyed when Dion, who was his kinsman by marriage, made an expedition against him, winning the people to his side, and after casting Dionysius out was himself destroyed. There being two causes above all through which men attack tyrannies, hatred and contempt, the one of these, hatred, always attaches to tyrants, while from being held in contempt many of their overthrows arise.

47| A sign of this: of those who have acquired tyrannies, most have also kept their rule safe, while those who inherit them almost all lose them at once, one might say. For living for enjoyment, they become easy targets of contempt and hand many opportunities to those who attack them. One must also count anger as a part of hatred: for in a certain way it becomes the cause of the same actions. And often it is even more effective for action than hatred: for men attack more intensely through anger, because the passion does not employ calculation (and this above all tends to accompany fits of temper because of outrage—the cause through which both the tyranny of the Pisistratids was overthrown, and many others as well)—but hatred is the stronger cause: for anger is accompanied by pain, so that it is not easy to calculate, whereas enmity is without pain. To speak summarily, one must set down as many causes of tyranny as we have stated for unmixed and extreme oligarchy and for the most extreme democracy: for these constitutions actually turn out to be divided-up tyrannies. Kingship, on the other hand, is least destroyed from outside causes, which is why it is also long-lived; but most of its destructions come about from within itself. It is destroyed in two ways,

48| [1313a] one when those who share in the kingship fall into factional strife, and in another way when those who administer it try to do so in a more tyrannical manner, claiming to be masters of more things and beyond the law. Kingships no longer come into being now; rather, if monarchies do come into being, they are tyrannies more than kingships, because kingship is a rule exercised over willing subjects and has authority over greater matters, while there are now many who are alike, and no one so outstanding as to match the greatness and dignity of the office. Hence for this reason men do not submit to it willingly; but if someone rules through deception or force, this is now held to be tyranny. In hereditary kingships, one must set down, besides the causes already stated, as a further cause of their destruction, that many kings become objects of contempt, and that, not possessing tyrannical power but only royal honor, they commit outrages: for the overthrow then becomes easy, since the moment the subjects are unwilling he will no longer be king, whereas a tyrant remains a tyrant even against the will of his subjects. Monarchies, then, are destroyed through these and other such causes. They are preserved, evidently, to put it simply, by the opposite causes, but to speak of each case in particular: kingships are preserved by being led toward greater moderation. For the fewer the matters over which kings are masters, the longer their whole rule must necessarily last:

49| For they themselves become less despotic and more equal in character, and are less envied by those they rule. This is why the kingship among the Molossians lasted a long time, and that of the Spartans, because from the start the rule was divided into two parts, and again because Theopompus moderated it, in other respects and in particular by establishing the office of the ephors alongside it: for by taking away from its power he increased the kingship in duration, so that in a way he made it not smaller but greater. Indeed this is what they say he answered to his wife, when she said it was no shame to him that he would hand down to his sons a kingship smaller than the one he had received from his father: "Not so," he said, "for I hand down one that will last longer." Tyrannies, on the other hand, are preserved by two wholly opposite methods. One of these is the traditional one, and it is the one by which most tyrants administer their rule. Most of these devices, it is said, were established by Periander of Corinth, and many similar ones can also be found from the Persian empire. There are the measures long since mentioned as conducing, as far as possible, to the preservation of a tyranny: to lop off those who stand out and to do away with men of high spirit, and to allow neither common messes nor political clubs nor education nor anything else of that sort,

50| [1313b] but to guard against everything from which the two things that usually arise are high spirit and mutual trust; and to permit neither leisure gatherings nor other assemblies that make for leisure, and to do everything by which people will be as unacquainted with one another as possible (for acquaintance produces greater trust among people toward one another); and to require that those residing in the city always be visible and spend their time about the gates (for in this way they would least escape notice as to what they are doing, and by being always accustomed to servility in small things they would grow accustomed to having a low spirit); and all the other measures of this sort that are Persian and barbarian devices of tyranny (for they all have the same effect); and to try not to let anything escape notice that any of the ruled happens to say or do, but to have spies, as at Syracuse there were the so-called female informers, and the eavesdroppers whom Hiero used to send out wherever there was some gathering or assembly (for people speak more freely less often when they fear such people, and even if they do speak freely, they are less likely to escape notice); and to set people against one another and bring them into conflict, friends against friends, the people against the notables, and the wealthy against one another. And it is a tyrannical device to make the ruled poor, so that no guard may be maintained and so that, being occupied with their daily livelihood, they may have no leisure to plot. An example of this is the pyramids in Egypt, and the votive offerings of the Cypselids, and the building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Pisistratids, and the works of Polycrates around Samos: for all these have the same effect, keeping the ruled occupied and poor.

51| And there is the levying of taxes, as at Syracuse (for under Dionysius it happened that within five years people had contributed their entire property in taxes). The tyrant is also a warmonger, so that his subjects may be kept occupied and remain continually in need of a leader. And whereas kingship is preserved through friends, it is a tyrannical trait to distrust one's friends most of all, on the ground that, while all wish to overthrow him, these are the ones most able to do so. And the things that occur under the last kind of democracy are all tyrannical: the rule of women in households, so that they may report against their husbands, and a loosening of control over slaves, traceable to one identical cause: neither slaves nor women conspire against tyrants, and since both fare well under such regimes, they are bound to feel goodwill toward tyrannies and toward that kind of democracy alike; for the common people too wish to be sole ruler. This is why the flatterer is honored among both, among the people the demagogue (for the demagogue is a flatterer of the people), and among tyrants those who consort with them in a servile manner, which is the work of flattery.

52| [1314a] And indeed for this reason tyranny is fond of base men: for tyrants delight in being flattered, and no one with a free spirit would do this, but decent men show affection without flattering. And base men are useful for base purposes: for as the proverb says, nail drives out nail. And it is a tyrannical trait to take no delight in anyone dignified or free (for the tyrant claims that he alone is entitled to be such, and whoever rivals his dignity and acts the free man takes away his pre-eminence and the despotic character of his tyranny: they hate such people, therefore, as subverters of their rule); and it is tyrannical to make use of foreigners rather than citizens as fellow diners and companions for the day, on the ground that citizens are hostile but foreigners make no rival claim. These practices and others of the sort are tyrannical and preservative of the rule, but they lack nothing in depravity. And, so to speak, all of them are comprehended under three heads. For tyranny aims at three things: first, that the ruled should be small-minded (for no one of small spirit would plot against anyone); second, that they should distrust one another (for a tyranny is never overthrown until some come to trust one another; this is also why tyrants make war on decent men as harmful to their rule, not only because such men do not think it fitting to be ruled despotically, but also because they are trustworthy both to themselves and to others, and do not inform against either themselves or others);

53| and third, an incapacity for action (for no one attempts what is impossible, so that no one overthrows a tyranny either, if the power for it is lacking). These, then, are the three heads to which the designs of tyrants may be traced back; for one could refer all tyrannical measures to these underlying aims: some to the end that the ruled may not trust one another, others that they may not have power, and others that they may be small-minded. Such, then, is the one method by which preservation comes about for tyrannies. The other has a concern that runs almost opposite to what has been said. One may grasp it from the corruption of kingships. For just as one manner in which kingship is corrupted is by making the rule more tyrannical, so the preservation of tyranny lies in making it more kingly, guarding only the one thing, its power, so that it may rule not only over the willing but also over the unwilling. For if a tyrant lets go of this, he lets go also of his tyranny. But while this must remain as a fixed presupposition, as it were, the rest he must do, or at least seem to do, playing the part of a king well. First of all, by seeming to care for the common interests,

54| [1314b] not spending on gifts of the kind at which the masses become angry, when they see money taken from them while they work and toil for it grudgingly, but given lavishly to mistresses and foreigners and craftsmen; and by rendering an account of what he takes in and spends, as some tyrants have already done (for by administering in this way one might be thought a steward rather than a tyrant; and there is no need to fear ever running short of money while master of the city); indeed for tyrants who go abroad from their own country this is actually more advantageous than to leave it collected in a hoard: for those left guarding the city would be less likely to attack the government, and to tyrants who go abroad the guards left among the citizens are more to be feared than those who accompany them: for the latter go abroad with him, while the former stay behind. Next, he must be seen collecting taxes and public services for the sake of good management, and so that, should he ever need to use them for occasions of war, he may; and in general he must present himself as a guardian and steward, as it were, of common funds rather than of his own; and he must appear not harsh but dignified, and moreover of such a character that those who meet him feel not fear but rather reverence toward him. Yet this is not easy to achieve for one who is not readily held in contempt; hence, even if he takes no care for the other virtues, he must at least care for military excellence, and cultivate a reputation of that kind about himself.

55| Further, he himself must not be seen committing outrage against any of his subjects, whether boy or girl, nor must anyone else about him; and likewise the women of his household must behave the same way toward the other women, since many tyrannies have been destroyed through outrages committed by women. As for bodily pleasures, he must do the opposite of what some tyrants nowadays do (for they not only indulge in this from early morning and continuously for many days, but also want to be seen by others doing it, so that people will admire them as fortunate and blessed men); rather, he must above all be moderate in such things, or, failing that, at least avoid being seen by others doing them (for the sober man is neither easy to attack nor easy to despise, but the drunk man is, and the wakeful man is not, but the sleeping man is). He must do the opposite of nearly everything said long ago (for he must build up and adorn the city as though he were a guardian and not a tyrant). Further, he must always be seen to be exceptionally devoted to the gods (for people fear suffering something contrary to law less from rulers of this kind, if they think the ruler is god-fearing and mindful of the gods, and they plot against him less, believing that the gods too are his allies),

56| [1315a] but he must appear such without foolishness. And he must honor those who prove good at some particular thing to such a degree that the citizens would never think they could be honored more even if they were self-governing, and he must bestow such honors himself, but assign punishments through other officials and courts. A common safeguard for every monarchy is to make no one man great, but if anyone must be made great, to make several such men (for they will keep watch over one another); and if it is ever necessary to make some individual great, at least not one bold in character (for such a character is most inclined to attack in every kind of action); and if it seems necessary to strip someone of power, this should be done gradually and not by removing all his authority at once. He must further abstain from every kind of outrage, and above all from two kinds — bodily punishment and outrage against the young. This precaution must be taken most of all with the honor-loving; for while the money-loving take it hard when their property is slighted, the honor-loving and the decent among men take it hard when they are dishonored. Therefore the ruler must either not deal with such men at all, or must be seen inflicting punishments in a fatherly way and not out of contempt, and his dealings with the young must appear to arise from erotic motives and not from the exercise of power; and in general he must buy off apparent dishonors with greater honors.

57| Of those who make attempts on a ruler's life, the most to be feared, and requiring the greatest vigilance, are those who do not choose to preserve their own lives after destroying him. Therefore one must be especially on guard against those who believe themselves outraged, or those close to them, to have been outraged; for men who make an attempt out of spirit are reckless of themselves, just as Heraclitus also said, declaring it hard to fight against spirit, since it buys its satisfaction at the cost of the soul. Since cities consist of two parts, the poor and the well-off, it is best for the ruler to suppose that both classes are preserved by his rule, and that neither is wronged by the other in any way; but whichever class turns out to be stronger, he must make that one especially his own, so that, if this advantage is secured, he need not free the slaves or disarm the citizens; for one of the two parts added to his own power is sufficient to make him stronger than those who attack him. It is superfluous to go through each such point individually; the aim is clear,

58| [1315b] namely that he must appear to his subjects not as a tyrannical figure but as a household manager and a king, not as one who seizes what belongs to others but as a guardian, and he must pursue moderation in his way of life, not excess; further, he must associate familiarly with the notable men and win over the masses through popular leadership. From this it necessarily follows not only that his rule will be finer and more enviable, since he rules over better men and not men who have been humbled, and since he will not go on being hated and feared, but also that his rule will last longer; and further, that he himself will be disposed in character either nobly toward virtue, or at least half-decent, and not wicked but half-wicked. And yet of all constitutions oligarchy and tyranny are the shortest-lived. The tyranny at Sicyon lasted the longest of all — that of the sons of Orthagoras and of Orthagoras himself; it endured a hundred years. The cause of this was that they treated their subjects with moderation and were in many respects subservient to the laws, and Cleisthenes, because he proved a capable warrior, was not easy to despise, and for the most part they won over the people through their attentive care. At any rate it is said that Cleisthenes crowned the man who judged against him in a contest as the winner; and some say that the statue seated in the marketplace is an image of the man who so judged. They also say that Pisistratus once submitted to being summoned to trial before the Areopagus.

59| Second is the tyranny at Corinth, that of the Cypselids; for this too lasted seventy-three years and six months. Cypselus was tyrant for thirty years, Periander for forty-four, and Psammitichus son of Gordias for three years. The causes of its duration are the same as in the previous case: Cypselus was a popular leader and throughout his rule went about without a bodyguard, while Periander, though he became tyrannical, was nonetheless a capable warrior. Third is that of the Pisistratids at Athens. But it was not continuous, for Pisistratus was twice driven into exile during his tyranny; of the thirty-three years involved, he himself held tyrannical power for seventeen, his sons for eighteen, the combined total thus amounting to thirty-five years. Of the remaining tyrannies, there is that of Hiero and Gelon at Syracuse. This too did not last many years, but altogether eighteen years in total; for Gelon, after being tyrant for seven years, died in the eighth, Hiero ruled for ten, and Thrasybulus was driven out in his eleventh month. Most tyrannies have been altogether short-lived. As for what concerns constitutions and monarchies, the causes from which they are destroyed and again preserved, this has now been said about nearly all of them.

60| [1316a] In the Republic, Socrates discusses the changes constitutions undergo, but he does not discuss them well. For in the case of the best and first constitution, he does not give an account peculiar to it of its change. He says the cause is that nothing remains stable, but everything changes within a certain cycle, and that the origin of these changes lies in those numbers of which the base ratio of four to three, coupled with the number five, yields two harmonies — meaning, when the number of this diagram becomes solid — as though nature at some point produces men who are inferior and stronger than their education can master. Now perhaps this claim itself is not badly made (for it is possible that there are some men whom it is impossible to educate and turn into virtuous men), but why should this particular kind of change be peculiar to the best constitution he describes, any more than to all the others and to everything that comes into being generally? And, by means of the time period through which he says all things change, do things which did not begin together also change together? For instance, if a thing came into being the day before the turning point, does it then change at the same time as the rest? Besides this, for what reason does it change from this constitution into the Laconian one? For all constitutions more often change into their opposite than into a neighboring one. And the same argument applies to the other changes as well.

61| For out of the Laconian constitution, he says, it changes into oligarchy, and out of this into democracy, and into tyranny out of democracy. And yet they also change in the reverse direction, for example from popular rule into oligarchy, and more often than into monarchy. Further, concerning tyranny he says neither whether there will be a change nor whether there will not, nor, if there will be, through what cause and into what sort of constitution; and the reason for this is that he would not easily have been able to say, for it is indeterminate, since according to him the change ought to be into the first and best constitution, for in that way it would become continuous and form a cycle. But in fact tyranny changes even into tyranny, as the tyranny of Sicyon changed from that of Myron into that of Cleisthenes; and into oligarchy, as at Chalcis the tyranny of Antileon; and into democracy, as that of the family of Gelo at Syracuse; and into aristocracy, as that of Charillus at Lacedaemon, and at Carthage. And it changes into tyranny out of oligarchy, as in Sicily most of the ancient tyrannies did — at Leontini into the tyranny of Panaetius, and at Gela into that of Cleander, and at Rhegium into that of Anaxilaus, and likewise in many other cities. It is also absurd to suppose that it changes into oligarchy for this reason, that those who hold office are lovers of money and money-makers,

62| [1316b] but not because those who far exceed others in property think it unjust for those who possess nothing to share equally in the city with those who possess something. And in many oligarchies it is not permitted to make money, but there are laws that forbid it, whereas at Carthage, which is governed democratically, men do make money, and it has not yet changed. It is also absurd to say that the oligarchic city is two cities, one of the rich and one of the poor. For how has this city been affected any differently than the Laconian, or than any other whatever, in which not all possess equal property, or not all alike are good men? And though no one has become poorer than before, they change none the less from oligarchy into popular rule, if the propertyless become more numerous, and from popular rule into oligarchy, if the well-off class proves stronger than the multitude and some are careless while others pay attention. And though there are many causes through which the changes occur, he mentions only one, that men become poor through dissolute living and being ground down by loan-interest, as though at the beginning all, or most, were rich. But this is false. Rather, whenever some of the leaders lose their properties, they stir up revolution, but whenever it is others who lose them, nothing terrible happens, and even then they change none the more into popular rule than into some other constitution. Further, even if men do not share in honors, and even if they are wronged or treated with insolence, they form factions and change constitutions, even without having squandered their property, because it is possible for them to do whatever they wish — of which he says the cause is excessive freedom. And since there are several oligarchies and several democracies, Socrates speaks of the changes as though each were a single thing.

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