Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language
1| How many, then, and what are the differences with respect to the deliberative body, and the body sovereign over the constitution, and the arrangement of the offices, and the courts, and which sort is combined with which sort of constitution; and further, concerning the destruction and preservation of constitutions, out of what conditions each arises and through what causes — this has been stated before. But since it turns out that there are several forms both of democracy and likewise of the other constitutions as well, it will be no worse, while considering whatever remains concerning them, at the same time also to assign to each the manner proper and advantageous to it. Further, one must also examine the combinations of all the elements that have been mentioned; [1317a] for these, when paired together, make the constitutions overlap, so that there come to be oligarchic aristocracies and constitutional governments of a more democratic kind. I mean the combinations that one ought to examine but that have not yet been examined — for instance, when the deliberative body and the matter of electing officials are arranged oligarchically while the matter of the courts is arranged aristocratically; or when these together with the deliberative body are arranged oligarchically but the matter of electing officials aristocratically; or when in some other way not all the elements proper to the constitution have been put together to match. Which democracy, then, suits which city, and likewise which of the oligarchies suits which sort of multitude, and which of the remaining constitutions is advantageous for which peoples, has been stated before.
2| Nevertheless, since it is necessary to make clear not only which of these constitutions is best for cities, but also how one ought to establish both these and the others, let us go through the matter briefly. And let us speak first about democracy, for at the same time the opposite constitution will also become clear — this being what some people call oligarchy. For this inquiry one must take up all the popular features and those that are held to accompany democracies; for it turns out that the forms of democracy come to be out of the combination of these, and that there are several democracies and not one, and that they differ from one another. For there are two causes on account of which there are several democracies. First is the one stated before, that the popular masses differ — for there comes to be an agricultural multitude, and again a vulgar-craftsman and hired-labor multitude; and when the first of these is joined to the second, and again the third to both together, the democracy differs not only by becoming better or worse but also by not being the same democracy at all. The second is the cause we are now speaking of. For the features that accompany democracies and are held to be proper to this constitution, when combined, produce democracies that differ from one another; in one city fewer of them will hold, in another more will follow, and in another all of them together.
3| It is useful to know each of these, both for establishing whichever of them one happens to want, and for making corrections. For those who set up constitutions seek to gather together all the features proper to the type toward their underlying assumption, but they err in doing this, as has been said before in the discussion of the destruction and preservation of constitutions. Let us now state the defining claims, the characters, and the things people aim at. Now the underlying assumption of the democratic constitution is freedom — for this is what people are accustomed to say, that only in this constitution do men share in freedom,
4| [1317b] for they say that every democracy aims at this. Of freedom, one part is to be ruled and to rule in turn. And indeed the popular conception of justice is to have equality according to number and not according to worth; and if this is what is just, the multitude must necessarily be sovereign, and whatever seems good to the majority must be the end and must be the just, since they say each of the citizens ought to have an equal share. Hence it turns out in democracies that the poor are more sovereign than the well-off, for they are more numerous, and what seems good to the majority is sovereign. This, then, is one mark of freedom, which all popular partisans lay down as the defining boundary of the constitution; and another is to live as one wishes. For this, they say, is the function of freedom, since not living as one wishes is the mark of one who is a slave. This, then, is the second defining mark of democracy; and from it has come the notion of not being ruled — preferably by no one at all, but failing that, ruled in turn — and this too contributes, in this way, to freedom based on equality. Given these assumptions, and this being the starting point, the following are popular features: that all officials be chosen from among all; that all rule over each and each rule in turn over all; that the offices be filled by lot, either all of them or as many as do not require experience and skill; that no office be held on the basis of any property qualification, or only the smallest one; that the same man not hold any office twice, or hold it rarely, or hold few offices, except those connected with war; that the offices be of short duration, either all of them or as many as admit of it; that all sit in judgment, chosen from among all, and concerning all matters, or concerning most and the greatest and the most authoritative matters — such as the auditing of accounts, and the constitution, and private contracts; that the assembly be sovereign over all matters, or the greatest, and no office sovereign over anything, or over as few things as possible, or that a council be sovereign over the greatest matters (of the offices, a council is the most popular, wherever there is not an abundance of pay for all;
5| For here too they take away the power even of this office; for the people, having a plentiful supply of pay, draw all judicial decisions to themselves, as has been said before in the treatise prior to this one. Next comes the paying of wages, ideally to everyone — assembly, courts, offices — but if not that, then to the offices, the courts, the council, and the sovereign assemblies, or to those offices whose holders must dine together. Further, since oligarchy is defined by birth, wealth, and education, the democratic traits seem to be the opposites of these: low birth, poverty, vulgar occupation. Further, it is characteristic that none of the offices is permanent,
6| [1318a] but if some office is left over from an old change of constitution, at least its power is stripped away, and appointment by lot replaces appointment by election. These, then, are the features common to democracies. And it results from the justice that is agreed to be democratic (this is: that all have equality according to number) that what seems to be democracy in the fullest sense, and the people-rule most properly so called, comes about. For it is equal that the poor should rule no more than the wealthy, nor that the wealthy alone should be sovereign, but that all should be sovereign equally according to number; for in this way they would think both equality and freedom belong to the constitution. But the question that comes next is disputed: how are they to have this equality — must the property assessments of the five hundred be divided up among a thousand men, so that the thousand have equal power to the five hundred, or should equality in this respect not be set up that way, but rather divided so, and then, taking an equal number from the five hundred and from the thousand, should these be made sovereign over the elections and the courts? Is this constitution, then, the most just according to democratic justice, or rather the one that goes by the majority of persons? For the democrats say that whatever seems good to the greater number is just, while the oligarchs say whatever seems good to the greater property is just;
7| for they say that judgment ought to be made according to the amount of property. But both views involve inequality and injustice. For if what is just is whatever the few decide, that is tyranny (for if one man has more than all the other wealthy men, then by oligarchic justice it is just for him alone to rule); but if what is just is whatever the greater number by count decide, then wrong is done, since the wealthy minority will have their goods seized from them — a point made earlier. What equality, then, would both sides agree to? We must examine this from the definitions of justice that both parties give. For they say that whatever seems good to the greater number of citizens ought to be sovereign. Let this stand, then — yet not without qualification, but rather: since a city happens to consist of two parts, the rich and the poor, let whatever seems good to both, or to the greater number, be sovereign; but if the two parts are opposed, let whatever the greater number decide be sovereign, and also whichever side's property assessment is greater. For example, if there are ten rich men and twenty poor, and it seems good to six of the rich and to fifteen of the poorer, and four of the rich have joined the poor while five of the poor have joined the rich — then, whichever side's property assessment, when both groups are added together for each side, is the greater, that side's decision is sovereign.
8| But if the two sides come out equal, this must be reckoned a common difficulty, just as now happens when the assembly or the court is split in two: [1318b] either the matter must be decided by lot, or some other such device must be used. But concerning equality and justice, even if it is very hard to discover the truth about them, still it is easier to attain than to persuade those who are able to get more than their share; for it is always the weaker who seek equality and justice, while those in power give no thought to it at all. Now there being four kinds of democracy, the best in order is the first, as was said in the discussions before these; and this is also the oldest of them all. I call it first in the sense in which one might classify populations. For the best population is the farming population, so that it is possible to form a democracy also wherever the multitude lives by farming or by herding. For because they do not have much property, they lack leisure, so that they do not often attend the assembly; and because they have what is necessary, they spend their time at their work and do not desire what belongs to others, but find working more pleasant than engaging in politics and ruling, wherever the offices do not bring great profits. For most people are more eager for gain than for honor. Here is a sign of it: they endured the tyrannies of old, and they endure oligarchies, provided no one prevents them from working or takes anything away from them;
9| for quickly some of them grow rich, and others are not in want. Further, being sovereign over electing officials and holding them to account fills up whatever desire for honor they have, since among some peoples, even if they do not share in the election of officials, but rather certain persons elected in turn from among all serve, as at Mantinea, while the people are sovereign over deliberation, this is enough for the many; and one must consider this too a certain form of democracy, as it once was at Mantinea. That is why it is also advantageous — and tends to occur — for the democracy spoken of before, that all should elect the officials, hold them to account, and serve as jurors, but that the greatest offices should be filled by election and from property assessments, the greater offices from greater assessments, or else that none of them should be filled by property assessment at all, but rather by those who are capable. Those who govern this way must of necessity govern well, for the offices will always be held by the best men, since the people are willing and do not begrudge it to the respectable; and to the respectable and notable this arrangement is enough, for they will not be ruled by others who are worse than themselves, and they will rule justly, because others are sovereign over the audits of their conduct. For being kept in check, and not being permitted to do everything one might decide, is advantageous;
10| for the license to do whatever one wishes cannot guard against the base element present in every human being. [1319a] So it necessarily results that what is most beneficial in constitutions comes about: the respectable rule without error, while the multitude is deprived of nothing. That this, then, is the best of the democracies is clear, and for what reason — because of the particular character the people have. And for constructing a farming population as the people, some of the laws laid down among many peoples in ancient times are altogether useful — for instance, the law that it should not be permitted at all to possess more land than a certain measure, or land beyond a certain distance from the town and the city (indeed it was anciently established by law in many cities that not even the original allotments should be permitted to be sold; and there is also what they call the law of Oxylus, which has some such force, that one should not lend on the security of some part of the land belonging to each person); and today the practice ought to be corrected also by the law of the Aphytaeans, for it is useful with a view to what we are saying: for those people, though numerous and possessing little land, nevertheless all farm; for they do not assess whole holdings, but divide them into portions so small that even the poor can exceed the assessments. After the farming population, the best people for democracy is one where there are herdsmen who live from livestock;
11| for it has much in common with farming, and these people especially are trained in habits useful for warlike actions, being fit in body and able to camp out in the open. All the other multitudes, from which the remaining democracies are composed, are much inferior to these; for their way of life is base, and there is no work involving virtue in what the multitude of vulgar craftsmen, marketplace people, and hired laborers handle; and further, because every such class hangs around the marketplace and the town, they attend the assembly easily, so to speak; whereas those who farm, because they are scattered throughout the countryside, neither come together nor equally need this kind of gathering. And wherever it happens that the position of the land is such that the countryside is far removed from the city, it is easy to make even a good democracy and constitution; for the multitude is compelled to make its settlements out in the fields, so that, even if there is a marketplace mob, one must not hold assemblies in democracies without the multitude from the countryside. How, then, one ought to construct the best and first democracy has been stated; and it is also clear how to construct the others. For one must proceed by deviating in due sequence, always separating off the worse population.
12| [1319b] As for the last kind of democracy, because everyone shares in it, not every city can bear it, nor is it easy for it to endure unless it is well put together in its laws and customs (what tends to corrupt this constitution and the others as well has for the most part already been stated earlier). To establish this kind of democracy and make the people strong, the men in charge are accustomed to admit as many people as possible and to make citizens not only of the legitimately born but also of bastards and of those descended from a citizen on either side, I mean, for example, from a father or a mother; for all this sort of person is more at home with a people of this kind. Now demagogues are accustomed to arrange things this way, but one should admit people only up to the point where the mass of them outweighs the notables and the middle class, and should not go further than that; for by overstepping this they make the constitution more disorderly, and provoke the notables further into resenting the democracy, which is exactly what happened to cause the civil strife at Cyrene: a small evil is overlooked, but when it becomes great it is more conspicuous. Further, devices of this kind are also useful for a democracy of this sort — those which Cleisthenes used at Athens when he wanted to strengthen the democracy, and which those who established the democracy at Cyrene used as well.
13| For more tribes and phratries than before must be created, private religious rites must be gathered together into a few common ones, and everything must be contrived so that everyone is mixed together with everyone else as much as possible, and the previous associations broken apart. Further, all the devices characteristic of tyranny seem to be popular ones too: I mean, for example, license for slaves (which could be advantageous up to a point) and for women and children, and turning a blind eye to living as one pleases; for a great deal will come to support a constitution of this kind, since the majority find it more pleasant to live in a disorderly way than in a temperate one. But the task of the lawgiver, and of those who wish to establish some such constitution, is not simply to set it up — that is not the greatest task, nor the only one — but rather to see that it is preserved; for it is not difficult to hold out for one, two, or three days governing in any manner whatever. Hence one must, drawing on what has been examined earlier — what preserves and what destroys constitutions — try to build up security from these, being on guard against what destroys, and laying down such laws, both unwritten and written,
14| [1320a] as will above all embrace what preserves constitutions, and one must not think that whatever makes the city as democratic or as oligarchic as possible is what is truly democratic or oligarchic, but rather whatever will make it last the longest time. But the demagogues of today, currying favor with the people, confiscate a great deal of property through the courts. Hence those who care for the constitution must work against this, making a law that nothing belonging to the condemned should become public property and be carried into the common fund, but should instead be made sacred to a god; for wrongdoers will be no less cautious — they will be penalized just the same — while the crowd will be less inclined to vote against those on trial, since it stands to gain nothing. Further, one should always keep the public lawsuits that come up as few as possible, restraining those who bring reckless indictments with heavy penalties; for it is not the ordinary people but the notables whom prosecutors are accustomed to bring in this way, and in this constitution too all the citizens should above all be well disposed to it, or failing that, should at least not regard those in authority as enemies. Since the last kind of democracy has a large population, and it is hard for people to attend the assembly without pay, and this, where there happen to be no public revenues, is hostile to the notables (for the money must then necessarily come from a property tax and from confiscations and from corrupt courts, which have already overturned many democracies) — so, where there happen to be no public revenues, one should hold few assemblies, and and courts made up of many jurors but sitting for few days (this both keeps the rich from fearing the expense, even where the well-off receive no jury pay while the poor do, and also makes for much better judgment in the cases;
15| for the well-off are unwilling to be away from their private affairs for many days, but are willing for a short time) — but where there are revenues, one should not do what the demagogues do now (for they hand out the surplus: people take it, and immediately need the same again; such help to the poor is a leaking jar). Rather, the man who is truly a friend of the people must see to it that the multitude is not excessively poor, since this is the cause of democracy turning corrupt. One must therefore contrive some way for prosperity to become lasting. And since this is advantageous to the well-off too, the funds arising from the revenues should be gathered together and distributed to the poor in a lump sum, best of all if one can gather as much as suffices for the purchase of a small plot of land, or failing that, enough for a start in trade or farming,
16| [1320b] and, if it is not possible for everyone, then it should be distributed in turn by tribes or by some other division, while during that time the well-off should contribute the pay for the necessary meetings, being released from pointless public services. It is in some such way that the Carthaginians, by governing themselves this way, have kept the people friendly to them; for by continually sending some of the people out to the surrounding territories, they make them prosperous. It is also the mark of refined and sensible notables to take the poor in hand and, by giving them a start, turn them toward work. It is also good to imitate the practices of the Tarentines. For by making their possessions common for the poor to use, they render the multitude well disposed toward them; further, they made all the offices double, some elective and some assigned by lot, the ones by lot so that the people might have a share in them, the elective ones so that the city might be better governed. And it is possible to do this within one and the same office as well, by dividing it and making some of its holders chosen by lot and others elected. How, then, one should construct democracies has now been stated. From this it is fairly clear how one should construct oligarchies as well; for each oligarchy must be put together out of the opposite elements, reasoning by analogy against the opposite kind of democracy — the best-tempered and first of the oligarchies, the one closest to what is called a constitutional government, being the one in which the property qualifications must be divided, some lower and some higher, lower for those who are to share in the necessary offices, higher for those who are to share in the more authoritative ones;
17| and anyone who acquires the property qualification should be allowed to take part in the constitution, the size of the popular element admitted through the qualification being such that those who share in it will be stronger than those who do not; and one must always draw one's partners in the constitution from the better sort of the people. Similarly, the next oligarchy in order should be constructed by tightening the qualification a little further. But the oligarchy opposed to the last kind of democracy, the most dynastic and most tyrannical of the oligarchies, needs the more guarding the worse it is. For just as bodies in good condition for health, and ships well fitted out for sailing, can absorb more mistakes on the part of their crews without being destroyed by them, while sickly bodies, and slack ships that have gotten poor crews, cannot bear even small mistakes, so too the worst constitutions need the most guarding.
18| [1321a] Now what preserves democracies, generally speaking, is a large population (for this is opposed to the justice that goes by merit); but for oligarchy, plainly the opposite holds — it must find its preservation in good order. Since there are four sections of the multitude in particular — the farming class, the mechanical/artisan class, the market/trading class, and the labor class — and four forces useful for war — cavalry, heavy infantry, light-armed troops, and naval forces — wherever it happens that the territory is suited to horses, there the conditions are naturally favorable for making the oligarchy strong (for the safety of the inhabitants depends on this force, and the raising of horses belongs to those who possess large properties); but where the territory suits heavy infantry, the oligarchy next in rank is favored (for the heavy-infantry class belongs more to the well-off than to the poor), while the light-armed and naval force is democratic through and through. As things stand now, then, wherever there is a large multitude of this sort, when factions split apart the oligarchs often come off worse in the contest; but a remedy for this must be taken from military commanders, who combine with the cavalry force a suitable body of heavy infantry drawn from the light-armed. It is by this means that the common people get the better of the well-off in factional conflicts: being light-armed, they contend easily against cavalry and heavy infantry. So to organize this force out of the people's own ranks is simply to organize it against the rulers themselves; instead, the age-classes should be kept distinct — some being older, some younger — and while their sons are still young they should be taught the light and unarmored exercises, while those picked out from among the boys should themselves be practitioners of these functions.
19| As for admitting the multitude to a share in the constitution, this should happen either, as said before, by those who acquire the property-assessment, or as with the Thebans, by those who abstain for a certain time from mechanical trades, or as at Massalia, by making a judgment of who is worthy among those already in the constitution and those outside it. Further, the most authoritative offices, which those within the constitution must hold, should have public services (liturgies) attached to them, so that the common people willingly do without a share in them and feel no grudge against the officeholders, on the ground that they are paying a heavy price for holding office. It is fitting for officeholders, on entering office, to perform magnificent sacrifices and to build some public work, so that the people, sharing in the feasts and seeing the city being adorned, partly with dedicated offerings and partly with buildings, are glad to see the constitution enduring; and it will also turn out that the notable men have monuments of their expenditure. But as things stand now, those in oligarchies do not do this — quite the opposite: they seek the revenues no less than the honor. That is why it is fair to say these are small democracies.
20| [1321b] How democracies and oligarchies should be set up, then, let this be the manner in which it has been determined. Following on what has been said is the need to have properly divided the matters concerning offices — how many there should be, what kinds, and over what — as has also been said before. For without the necessary offices it is impossible for a city to exist, while without those directed to good order and adornment it is impossible for it to be well governed. Further, it is necessary that in small cities there be fewer offices, in large ones more, as has in fact been said before; which offices are fitting to combine and which to keep separate must not go unnoticed. The first care among the necessary matters is that concerning the marketplace, over which there must be some office that oversees contracts and good order; for it is nearly necessary for all cities that some things be bought and some sold to meet people's mutual necessary needs, and this is the most immediate means toward self-sufficiency, for the sake of which people seem to have come together into a single constitution. A second care, adjacent and close to this, is that of public and private matters concerning the town — that there be good order, and the preservation and repair of collapsing buildings and roads, and of boundaries between neighbors, so that they have no grounds for complaint against one another, and whatever other matters of care are similar in kind to these.
21| Most people call this sort of office the city-management office (astynomia), and it has several parts in number, over which different cities in the more populous ones appoint different officials — for example wall-builders, superintendents of springs, and guardians of harbors. There is another office, necessary and closely similar to this: it concerns the same matters, but out in the countryside and the areas outside the town; some call these officials rural superintendents, others forest wardens. These, then, are three departments of care in this area; another office is that to which the public revenues are referred, from which, once guarded, funds are apportioned to each branch of administration — these officials are called receivers and treasurers. Another office is that with which private contracts and the verdicts from the courts must be registered; and with these same officials the indictments for lawsuits and their introductions must also take place. In some places this too is divided among several officials, while elsewhere one authority has charge over all these matters: they are called sacred recorders, overseers, recorders, and other names close to these. Next after this, closely connected to it but perhaps the most necessary and most difficult of the offices, is the one concerned with carrying out sentences against the condemned and those posted according to the public notices,
22| [1322a] and with the custody of persons. This office is difficult because it involves a great deal of hatred, so that where there is not much to be gained from it, people neither endure holding it nor, once they have taken it, are willing to act according to the laws; yet it is necessary, because it is of no use for judgments to be rendered about what is just if these do not reach their completion — so that if people cannot associate with one another when contracts are not carried out, likewise they cannot when actions are not carried out. For this reason it is better that this office not be a single one, but that different people be drawn from different courts, and that an attempt likewise be made to divide up the matter of the posting of the recorded notices; further, that some enforcement be carried out by other officials as well, and particularly that the newer cases be handled by the newer officials rather than by the ones already in office, and that when one set of currently serving officials has passed condemnation, the enforcement be carried out by a different set — for example, that the city-managers enforce the verdicts of the market-officials, and that others enforce the verdicts of these in turn. For the less hatred there is attached to those carrying out the enforcement, the more the actions will reach completion; whereas for the same people to be both those who condemn and those who enforce brings a double hatred, and for the same people to be in charge of everything makes them enemies to everyone. In many places, indeed, the guarding office has also been kept separate from the enforcing office, as at Athens the office of the so-called Eleven.
23| For this reason it is better to keep this office too separate, and to seek the same clever device concerning it as well. For it is no less necessary than the one just mentioned, and yet it turns out that decent men avoid this office most of all, while it is not safe to put worthless men in charge of it; for they themselves need guarding more than others rather than being able to guard others. That is why there should not be a single office permanently assigned to this task, nor the same one continuously, but wherever there is some organized body of young men — cadets or garrison-troops — different men in turn from among these, and from among the officials as well, should be made to take up this care by rotation. These offices, then, being the most necessary, should be set down first; after them come those no less necessary, but arranged in a grander form, for they require much experience and much trust. Such would be those concerned with the guarding of the city, and all those assigned to the needs of war. And it is necessary, both in peace and in war alike, that there be officials in charge of guarding the gates and walls, of the review of the citizens, and of their organization into ranks. In some places, then, there are several offices over all these matters, in others fewer — for example, in small cities, one office over everything.
24| Such officials are called generals and polemarchs. [1322b] Further, if there are cavalry, light troops, archers, or a navy, an office is sometimes set up over each of these as well, called naval commands, cavalry commands, and infantry commands, and under these, divided by unit, trireme commands, company commands, tribal commands, and whatever subdivisions of these there are. The whole of this is one particular form, the oversight of military affairs. This, then, is how matters stand concerning this office. But since some offices, if not all, handle a great deal of public property, there must necessarily be another office to receive the accounts and hold them to audit, itself handling nothing else. Some call these officials auditors, others accountants, others examiners, others advocates. Beyond all these offices there is the one that is most sovereign over all; for the same office often has charge of both the final decision and the introduction of business, or else presides over the multitude, wherever the people are sovereign—for there must be some body that convenes the sovereign power, and that body must itself be sovereign over the constitution. In some places it is called the board of presidents, because its members deliberate beforehand, but where there is a larger body, it is called the council instead. The political offices, then, are roughly this many in kind. There is another form of oversight, that concerning the gods—priests, for instance, and overseers of matters connected with the sacred places, charged with preserving existing buildings, restoring those that are falling down, and everything else that is ordained with regard to the gods.
25| It happens that this oversight is in some places a single office, as in small cities, and in others many offices, kept separate from the priesthood—for example, officials in charge of sacrifices, temple guards, and treasurers of sacred funds. Next to this is the office set apart for all the sacrifices that are held in common, as many as the law does not assign to the priests but that receive their honor from the common hearth; some call these officials archons, others kings, others prytaneis. The necessary offices, then, to sum them up, concern these matters: religious affairs, military affairs, revenues and expenditures, the marketplace, the city itself, harbors, and the countryside, and further, the law courts, the recording of contracts, the execution and guarding of judgments, the auditing and examination and calling to account of officials, and finally those offices concerned with deliberation over public business. Peculiar to cities with more leisure and greater prosperity, and further ones that give thought to good order, are the supervision of women, the guardianship of the laws, the supervision of children, and the superintendence of the gymnasia,
26| [1323a] and in addition to these, oversight of athletic and Dionysiac contests, and any other spectacles of this kind that happen to occur. Some of these offices are plainly not popular in character, such as the supervision of women and the supervision of children; for the poor are necessarily compelled to use their wives and children as servants, for lack of slaves. There are three offices by reference to which certain constitutions choose their sovereign officials: guardians of the law, presidents, and council. The guardians of the law belong to an aristocratic constitution, the presidents to an oligarchic one, and the council to a democratic one. Concerning the offices, then, this covers, in outline, virtually all of them.