Aristotle · a new plain-English translation from the original language
1| Concerning the best constitution, anyone who intends to conduct the proper inquiry into it must first determine what the most choiceworthy way of life is. For if this is unclear, the best constitution must necessarily be unclear as well; those who govern themselves best, given the circumstances available to them, ought to fare best, unless something extraordinary happens. Hence we must first come to an agreement about what way of life is, so to speak, most choiceworthy for everyone, and after that, whether the same way of life is choiceworthy in common and in private, or a different one. Assuming, then, that enough has already been said, even among the arguments in our popular writings, about the best life, let us make use of that material now as well. For truly, with respect to at least one division, no one would dispute that, there being three classes of goods—external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul—all of these must belong to the blessed. For no one would call a man blessed who has no part in courage, temperance, justice, or practical wisdom, but who is afraid of the flies flitting past him, who abstains from nothing, however extreme, if he has a desire to eat or drink, who destroys his dearest friends for the sake of a quarter-obol, and who, likewise in matters of thought, is as senseless and deceived as a small child or a madman. But while these statements, once spoken, would win agreement from virtually everyone, people differ over the matter of quantity and degree of superiority. For they think it is enough to have virtue in any amount whatever, while of wealth, property, power, reputation, and everything of that kind, they seek an unlimited excess. We shall say to them that it is easy to gain conviction about these matters from the facts themselves as well, seeing that men acquire and preserve the external goods not by means of the virtues but the virtues by means of the external goods,
2| [1323b] and that living happily—whether it consists for human beings in enjoyment, in virtue, or in both—belongs more to those who are adorned to an outstanding degree in character and thought but are moderate in their possession of external goods, than to those who possess more of these than is useful but fall short in the former. This is easy to see if one examines it by reasoning as well. External goods have a limit, like any instrument (for everything useful is useful for some end), and an excess of them must either harm those who have it or at least be of no benefit to them; but each of the goods of the soul, the more it exceeds, the more useful it is—if indeed one must apply to these goods too not only the term fine but also the term useful. And in general it is plain, we shall say, that the best condition of any two things stands to one another in the same ratio of superiority as the things themselves, of which we say these are the conditions. So that if the soul, both absolutely and in relation to us, is more honorable than property and the body, its best condition must necessarily correspond proportionally to theirs. Further, these external things are by nature choiceworthy for the sake of the soul, and all who think rightly ought to choose them for that reason, not the soul for the sake of them.
3| That happiness falls to each person in the same measure as virtue and practical wisdom and action in accordance with these, let this stand as agreed between us, calling on the god as witness, who is happy and blessed, not because of any external good, but through himself and by being of a certain nature. For this reason good fortune must necessarily be something different from happiness (for chance and fortune are the cause of the goods external to the soul, but no one is just or temperate as a result of chance or because of chance). And a further point, following from the same reasoning, needs to be maintained: that the city that is best is also happy and acts well. But it is impossible to act well for those who do not do fine actions, and no action is fine, whether of a man or of a city, apart from virtue and practical wisdom. Courage, justice, and practical wisdom in a city have the same power and form as those by sharing in which each individual human being is called just, practically wise, and temperate. But let this much stand as a preface to our discussion; for it is not possible to leave these matters untouched, nor is it feasible to pursue all the arguments proper to them, since that is the work of another kind of leisured inquiry.
4| For now let this much be laid down: that the best life, both separately for each individual and in common for cities, [1324a] is the life accompanied by virtue furnished to the point of allowing a share in the actions that accord with virtue. As for those who dispute this, we must set them aside for the present method of inquiry and examine them later, in case someone does not happen to be persuaded by what has been said. It remains to say whether happiness must be called the same thing for a single individual human being and for a city, or not the same. This too is plain: for everyone would agree it is the same. For all those who locate living well in wealth, in the case of a single person, also call the whole city blessed if it is wealthy; and those who most honor the tyrannical life would also say that the city that rules over the most people is happiest; and if someone accepts the individual on account of virtue, he will likewise say that the more excellent city is the happier one. But these are already two questions requiring examination: one, which life is more choiceworthy, the one lived through political partnership and sharing in a city, or rather the life of a foreigner, released from political community; and further, what constitution should be laid down, and what disposition of a city is best, whether sharing in a city is choiceworthy for everyone or not for some but for most. Since this last is the work of political thought and theoretical inquiry, and not the question of what is choiceworthy for each individual, and it is this inquiry we have now chosen, the former question would be a side matter, but this one the proper work of this method.
5| That the best constitution is necessarily this arrangement, in accordance with which anyone whatsoever would act best and live blessedly, is plain. But even among those who agree that the life accompanied by virtue is most choiceworthy, dispute arises over whether the political and practical life is choiceworthy, or rather the life released from all external things — a contemplative life of some sort, which some say alone is the life of the philosopher. For it is these two lives, roughly, that the men most ambitious for virtue appear to choose, both those of former times and those now — I mean two: the political life and the philosophic life. And it makes no small difference which way the truth lies; for the person of sound mind must necessarily arrange himself, and each individual as well as the constitution in common, toward the better goal. Some suppose that ruling over one's neighbors despotically, when it occurs, involves some of the greatest injustice, while ruling politically involves no injustice but is an impediment to one's own well-being. Others hold, as it were, the opposite view: that only the practical and political life is the life of a man, since for each of the virtues there are no actions belonging to private individuals any more than to those who conduct public affairs and engage in politics.
6| [1324b] Some, then, hold this view, while others say that only the despotic and tyrannical manner of constitution is happy. And among some peoples this is even the definition of their constitution and their laws — that they should be masters over their neighbors. Hence, although most legal provisions lie scattered about, so to speak, among most peoples without order, still, wherever the laws do look to some one thing, they all aim at domination — just as at Sparta and in Crete both education and the bulk of the laws are organized, virtually, with a view to wars. Further, among all the nations capable of getting the advantage, this sort of power is honored — for example among the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Celts. Indeed among some there are actual laws that goad men on toward this kind of virtue: at Carthage, they say, men receive an ornament of rings for every campaign they have served in. There was once also a law around Macedonia that a man who had not killed an enemy must wear a halter around him; and among the Scythians, at a certain festival, a man who had not killed an enemy was not permitted to drink from the cup that was passed around. And among the Iberians, a warlike people, they plant around a man's grave as many small spits as the number of enemies he has destroyed.
7| And there are many other such customs among various peoples, some fixed by law, others by custom. Yet it would seem exceedingly strange, perhaps, to those willing to examine the matter, if this is the work of the statesman — to be able to contemplate how he might rule and be master over his neighbors, whether they wish it or not. For how could this be a political or legislative matter, when it is not even lawful? And it is not lawful to rule not only justly but also unjustly — though it is possible to get the mastery even unjustly. But indeed we do not see this in the other sciences either: it is not the work of the doctor or the pilot either to persuade or to force, the one his patients, the other his sailors. Yet most people seem to think that the despotic art is political rule, and what each does not claim to be just or advantageous for themselves, they are not ashamed to practice against others. For among themselves they seek to be ruled justly, but toward others they care nothing for justice. It is strange, unless by nature one thing is fit to be mastered and another is not — so that if this is indeed the case, one ought not to try to be master over everyone, but only over those fit to be mastered, just as one ought not to hunt human beings for a feast or a sacrifice, but only what is proper to hunt for such a purpose.
8| And what is fit to be hunted is whatever wild animal is fit to be eaten. But surely a single city could also be happy taken by itself, if it is well governed — that is, if it is possible for a city to be settled somewhere by itself, [1325a] making use of excellent laws, where the arrangement of its constitution is directed neither toward war nor toward getting the mastery over enemies; for let nothing of that sort be present at all. It is plain, then, that all the concerns directed toward war are to be counted noble, yet not as the highest end of everything, but rather as being for the sake of that end. It belongs to the good lawgiver to study a city, and a race of human beings, and every other community, to see how they will share in the good life and in whatever happiness is available to them. Some of the provisions laid down will, however, differ, and it is also the business of the legislative art to see, if there happen to be neighboring peoples, what practices should be trained for in relation to which peoples, or how one ought to make use of the customs proper to each. But this question could well receive its proper examination later — to what end the best constitution ought to be directed. As for those who agree that the life accompanied by virtue is most choiceworthy but disagree about the use of it, we must speak to both parties together (for some reject political offices, holding that the life of the free man is something different from the political life and most choiceworthy of all, while others hold this political life to be best;
9| for, they say, it is impossible for one who does nothing to act well, and doing well and happiness are the same thing) — that both parties speak partly rightly and partly not rightly. The former are right in saying that the life of the free man is better than the despotic life; for this is true, since there is nothing dignified in making use of a slave as a slave, since giving orders about necessary things has no share in anything noble. But to suppose that every form of rule is mastery is not correct; for the rule over free persons is no less distinct from the rule over slaves than what is by nature free is distinct from what is by nature a slave. This has been adequately determined about them in our earlier discussions. And to praise inactivity more highly than action is not true; for happiness is an activity, and further, the actions of just and temperate people have as their end many noble things. And yet, once these points have been distinguished, someone might perhaps suppose that being master of everything is best of all; for in that way one would be master of the most and noblest actions. So that the man capable of ruling ought not to yield the place to his neighbor, but rather take it from him, and neither father should count for anything with sons, nor sons with father, nor in general friend with friend, nor should he give this any thought at all —
10| For what is best is most choiceworthy, and doing well is best. This is perhaps true, [1325b] provided that the most choiceworthy of things is available to those who rob and use force; but perhaps it cannot be available, and this is a false assumption they make. For actions can no longer be fine ones for a man toward those who do not differ from him to the degree that a man differs from a woman, or a father from his children, or a master from his slaves; so that one who transgresses in this way could never afterward set right so great a wrong as he has already committed by departing from virtue in the first place. For among equals the fine and the just consist in taking turns, since this is equal and alike; but the unequal applied to equals and the unlike applied to like people is against nature, and nothing against nature is fine. Hence if there is someone else superior in virtue and in the capacity for action to the best men, it is fine to follow him and just to obey him. But there must be not only virtue but also the capacity by which he will be able to act. But if this is well said, and happiness is to be taken as doing well, then the life of action would be best both for the city as a whole and for each individual. But the man of action need not be oriented toward others, as some suppose, nor are only those thoughts practical which come about through action for the sake of results, but much more so the thoughts and speculations that are complete in themselves and pursued for their own sake;
11| for doing well is an end, so that it too is a kind of action. Indeed, we speak of acting most properly, even among external actions, of those who direct such actions with their intelligence as master-craftsmen. Nor is it necessary that cities established by and for themselves and choosing to live in this way should be without action; for it is possible for this too to happen part by part, since there are many partnerships with one another among the parts of a city. The same holds likewise for any single human being: for hardly would god and the whole universe be in a good condition, since they have no external actions beyond those proper to themselves. It is clear, then, that the same life must be best both for each individual man and in common for cities and for men together. Since what has now been said about these matters serves as a preface, and we have examined the other constitutions earlier, it is the starting point for what remains to say first what the assumptions ought to be regarding the city that is to be constructed according to one's wish. For it is not possible for the best constitution to come into being without a proportionate supply of resources. Hence one must lay down in advance many things as if making a wish, yet none of them should be impossible; I mean, for example, matters concerning the number of citizens and the territory.
12| For just as for the other craftsmen too, such as the weaver and the shipbuilder, [1326a] the material must be available in a condition suitable for the work (for the better prepared this happens to be, the finer the product of the craft must necessarily be), so too for the statesman and the lawgiver the material proper to them must be available in a suitable condition. Now the first item of the statesman's resources is the multitude of human beings — how many, and of what sort, they must be by nature — and likewise regarding the territory, how large it must be and of what sort. Most people think that the happy city must be great; but even if this is true, they do not know what sort of city is great and what sort small. For they judge greatness by the number of inhabitants, whereas one ought rather to look not to the number but to the capacity. For a city too has a certain function, so that the one most able to accomplish this must be considered the greatest — just as one might say that Hippocrates was greater as a doctor, not as a man, than someone who surpassed him in bodily size. Even so, if one must judge by looking at number, this should not be done with respect to whatever number happens to occur (for it is presumably necessary for cities to have a large number of slaves and resident aliens and foreigners as well), but rather with respect to those who are part of the city and among the components proper to it that a city is composed of;
13| for a preponderance of these in number is a sign of a great city, whereas one out of which many manual laborers emerge but few hoplites cannot possibly be great; for a great city and a populous one are not the same thing. And this too is evident from the facts: it is difficult, perhaps impossible, for an excessively populous city to be well governed; at any rate, of the cities that seem to be governed well, we see none that is left unrestricted with regard to number. This is clear also through the persuasiveness of argument. For law is a kind of order, and good lawfulness must necessarily be good order, and an excessively large number cannot share in order; for this is a work of divine power, which holds together the whole universe as well. Hence a city in which the greatness stated is combined with the aforesaid limit must necessarily be the finest; since fineness tends indeed to come about in multitude and greatness, yet there is a measure of a city's size too, as there is for all other things — animals, plants, instruments; for none of these will have its own capacity either if it is too small or if it exceeds in size, but at one time it will be entirely deprived of its nature, at another it will be in a poor condition — for instance a boat a span long will not be a boat at all, nor one of two stades, but on reaching a certain size,
14| [1326b] at one time it will make sailing poor because of smallness, at another because of excess. Likewise a city too made of too few is not self-sufficient (whereas a city is by nature self-sufficient), while one made of too many is self-sufficient with respect to necessities, as a nation is, but is not a city; for a constitution is not easy to bring about in it: for who will be general of an excessively overwhelming multitude, or who a herald unless he has the voice of Stentor? Hence the first city must necessarily be composed of the number of people that is the first number self-sufficient for living well according to political partnership; but it is possible too for a city exceeding this in number to be greater, though this, as we said, is not unlimited. What the limit of excess is, is easy to see from the facts. For the actions of a city belong partly to those who rule and partly to those who are ruled, and the work of the ruler is command and judgment; and for judging matters of justice and for distributing offices according to merit, it is necessary for the citizens to know one another, what sort of people they are, since where this does not happen to be the case, matters concerning offices and judgments are necessarily conducted poorly.
15| For in both matters it is not just to act offhand, which plainly happens in cases of excessive populousness. Moreover it becomes easy for foreigners and resident aliens to share in the constitution; for it is not difficult to escape notice on account of the excess of the multitude. It is clear, then, that this is the best limit for a city: the greatest excess of multitude that is easily surveyable with a view to self-sufficiency of life. Let the matter of a city's size be determined in this way. The matter of the territory stands similarly. As for what sort it should be, it is clear that everyone would praise the most self-sufficient territory (and such must necessarily be one that produces everything, for to have everything available and to need nothing is self-sufficient); and in quantity and size, such as to enable the inhabitants to live at leisure in a manner both free and moderate. Whether we state this limit well or not must be examined later more precisely, when we come to make mention generally of property and of abundance in wealth, and how and in what manner one should relate to its use; for there are many disputes about this inquiry, on account of those who draw the manner of life to either excess, some toward stinginess, others toward luxury.
16| It is not hard to say what kind of territory is wanted (though on some points we must take the word of those experienced in military strategy): it should be hard for enemies to invade but easy for the citizens themselves to march out of. [1327a] Further, just as we said the mass of the population should be easy to take in at a glance, so too should the territory be; and for a territory, being easy to take in at a glance means being easy to send help across. As for the site of the city, if we are to design it to our wish, it ought to be well placed both with respect to the sea and with respect to the country. That, then, is one criterion we have stated (for it must be a common center for sending relief to all the outlying places); the remaining consideration concerns the transport of the crops produced, and also of timber for building and of whatever other product the territory happens to yield, so that it can be brought in easily. As to the city's association with the sea, whether it is beneficial or harmful to well-governed cities, people dispute a great deal: some say that the presence of foreigners raised under other laws is inconvenient for good order, and so is the swelling of population, since it comes about through using the sea to send out and take in a multitude of merchants, and this works against being governed well. Now that, if these consequences do not follow, it is better for both safety and for a ready supply of necessities that the city and its territory should have a share in the sea, is not in doubt.
17| For indeed, in order to bear wars more easily, those who are to be kept safe need to be able to send help by both routes, by land and by sea, and also, for the sake of harming attackers, if it is not possible on both, they will at least have it available on one of the two, by having a share in both. And whatever goods a people does not happen to have among themselves, it is a matter of necessity to receive these, and to send out abroad whatever surplus of their own produce there is; for the city ought to be engaged in trade for its own sake, not for that of others. Those who make themselves a market open to everyone do this for the sake of revenue; and a city that ought not to have a share in that kind of gain-seeking need not possess a trading-station of that sort either. Since we now in fact see many territories and cities possessing docks and harbors naturally well placed with respect to the city, so situated that they neither share the same site as the town nor lie too far off, but are kept under control by walls and other such defenses, it is clear that if some good comes about through association with them, this good will accrue to the city, while if something harmful results, it is easy to guard against it by the laws stating and marking out clearly who ought not, and who ought, to mix with one another. As for naval power, that it is best to have it up to a certain size is not in doubt
18| [1327b] (for a city ought to be an object of fear not only to itself but also to some of its neighbors, and to be able to bring help, both by land and by sea): but as to the exact quantity and size of this power, that must be examined with a view to the city's way of life. For if it is to live a life of leadership and political preeminence, it is necessary that this power too be available in due proportion to its undertakings. But the swelling of population that arises around the naval crowd need not occur in cities, since these men need be no part of the city at all. For the fighting force on shipboard is drawn from the free population, from those who also serve on land, and it is this element that has authority over and controls seamanship; and where there is an abundance of dependent inhabitants of the surrounding country and of those who farm the land, there will necessarily be no lack of sailors either. We see this actually the case with some cities even now, for instance the city of the Heracleots: for they man many triremes, though they possess a city smaller in size than others that are more moderate. On the subject of the territory, harbors, and sea belonging to cities, and on naval power, let this be settled in this way; and as to the population of citizens, what limit there ought to be we stated earlier, and what natural character they ought to have, let us now state.
19| One might grasp this fairly well by looking to the cities held in high repute among the Greeks and to the whole inhabited world, in the way it is divided among the nations. The nations in cold regions, and those around Europe, are full of spirit but rather deficient in thought and skill; hence they continue on the whole free, but lacking in political organization and unable to rule their neighbors. Those in Asia have souls that are full of thought and skill, but lack spirit; hence they continue to be ruled and to be enslaved. But the race of the Greeks, occupying the middle position geographically, shares in both, being both spirited and full of thought; hence it continues to be free, to be governed in the best manner, and to be capable of ruling all others, were it to attain a single constitution. And the Greek nations show the same difference among themselves: some have a nature that is one-sided, while others are well blended in respect of both these capacities. It is clear, then, that those who are to be easily led by the lawgiver toward virtue must be both full of thought and spirited by nature. For what some say ought to characterize guardians, namely being friendly toward those they know and fierce toward strangers, this friendliness is produced by spirit;
20| for spirit is that power of the soul by which we love. [1328a] Here is a sign: spirit is roused more against those who are close to us and our friends than against strangers, when it thinks itself slighted. Hence Archilochus, complaining suitably against friends, addresses his own spirit: for it is by friends indeed that you are being strangled. And ruling and freedom too belong to all beings through this same power; for spirit is a ruling and unconquerable thing. But it is not right to say that guardians should be harsh toward strangers; for one ought not to be that way toward anyone, and men of great soul are not fierce by nature, except toward wrongdoers. And this they feel still more strongly toward those close to them, as has been said before, if they think themselves wronged. And this happens reasonably: for those from whom people suppose a benefit is owed them, in addition to the injury they think themselves also robbed of this benefit besides; hence the saying, "for wars between brothers are harsh," and "those who have loved to excess, these also hate to excess." On the citizen body, then, how many there ought to be and what natural character they ought to have, and further on the territory, how large and of what sort it ought to be, we have given a fairly full account (for one should not seek the same degree of precision through arguments as through what is grasped by perception).
21| Since, just as with other things composed according to nature, the parts of the whole composition are not simply those things without which the whole could not exist, it is clear that we should not count as parts of a city everything necessarily present in cities, nor of any other partnership out of which some single kind of thing arises (for there must be something one and common shared by the partners, whether they take an equal or an unequal share of it) — for instance, whether it is food, or a quantity of land, or something else of that sort. But when one thing exists for the sake of another, and the other is that for whose sake it exists, there is nothing common between them at all except that the one produces and the other receives; I mean, for example, as between any tool and the work being produced, and the craftsmen who use it: for between a house and the builder there is nothing that comes to be in common, but the builders' craft exists for the sake of the house. Hence cities need property, yet property is no part of the city; and many parts of property are living beings. But the city is a partnership of similar persons, for the sake of the best life that is possible. Since happiness is the best thing, and this is an actuality and complete exercise of virtue, and it happens to be the case that some can share in it while others can only slightly or not at all, it is clear that this is the cause of there coming to be different kinds and varieties of city and several constitutions;
22| [1328b] For it is in different ways and through different means that each group pursues this, and so they make both their ways of life and their constitutions different. We must also examine how many things there are without which a city could not exist. For the things we say are parts of a city would be among these, and so they must necessarily be present. We must then take up the number of the functions, since from these the answer will become clear. First, then, there must be food; next, crafts (for living needs many tools); third, arms (for those who share in the community must necessarily have arms among themselves too, both for the sake of rule, on account of those who disobey, and against those from outside who attempt to do wrong); further, a certain supply of wealth, so that they may have enough both for their own needs and for those of war; fifth, and first in importance, care for the divine, which they call the priesthood; sixth in number, and the most necessary of all, a judgment about what is advantageous and about what is just as between one another. These, then, are the functions that every city needs, so to speak (for a city is a multitude not of just any sort but one self-sufficient for life, as we say, and if it happens to be lacking any of these, it is impossible for this community to be self-sufficient without qualification):
23| A city, then, must necessarily be composed in accordance with these functions. There must therefore be a multitude of farmers, who will provide the food, and craftsmen, and the fighting element, and the wealthy element, and priests, and judges of what is necessary and advantageous. Now that these have been distinguished, it remains to consider whether all must share in all of these (for it is possible for the same people all to be farmers and craftsmen and deliberators and judges), or whether different people must be assumed for each of the functions mentioned, or whether some of these are necessarily private to some and some common. But it is not the same in every constitution. For, as we said, it is possible either for all to share in all, or for not all to share in all but for some to share in some. And it is precisely this that makes constitutions different from one another: for in democracies all share in all, while in oligarchies it is the opposite. Since we happen to be inquiring about the best constitution, and this is the one under which the city would be happiest, and it has been said earlier that happiness cannot exist apart from virtue, it is clear from this that in the city that is governed most finely and that possesses men who are just without qualification, and not merely just relative to the hypothesis of the constitution, the citizens must live neither a life of manual labor nor a life of trade (for such a life is ignoble and opposed to virtue), nor indeed must those who are to be citizens be farmers
24| [1329a] (for leisure is needed both for the generation of virtue and for political actions). And since the warlike element and the element that deliberates about what is advantageous and judges about what is just are both present and appear to be most of all the parts of the city, the question is whether these too are to be set down as different, or whether both are to be assigned to the same people. And this too is clear, that in one way they belong to the same people, and in another way to different people. Since each of these two tasks culminates at a different stage of life, and one calls for prudence while the other calls for strength, they belong to different people in that respect; yet since men strong enough to force their will, or to block others by force, cannot go on forever accepting rule from someone else, in that respect the two roles fall to the same people. For those who are masters of the arms are also masters of whether the constitution stands or does not stand. It remains, then, to assign this constitution to the same people in both roles, but not at the same time — rather, just as power naturally belongs to the younger and practical wisdom to the older, it seems to be advantageous and just that the two be apportioned in this way between them; for this division has what is proportionate to worth. But indeed possessions too must belong to these people. For it is necessary that there be wealth for the citizens, and these are the citizens.
25| For the manual laboring class has no share in the city, nor does any other class that is not a craftsman of virtue. This is clear from the hypothesis: for being happy must necessarily exist together with virtue, and a city must be called happy not by looking at some part of it but by looking at all the citizens. And it is clear too that the possessions must belong to these people, if indeed the farmers must necessarily be slaves, or non-Greeks living round about. It remains, from those enumerated, the class of priests. And their arrangement too is clear. For neither a farmer nor a manual laborer must be appointed priest (for it is fitting for the gods to be honored by the citizens); and since the political element has been divided into two parts, namely the element of arms and the deliberative element, and it is fitting both to render service to the gods and to give rest, in connection with them, to those who are worn out by age, it would be to these that the priesthoods connected with them should be assigned. What things, then, a city cannot exist without, and how many the parts of a city are, has been stated (for it is necessary that farmers and craftsmen and every kind of hired labor exist for cities, while the parts of the city are the element of arms and the deliberative element), and each of these has indeed been kept separate, the one permanently, the other in turn.
26| It seems that this has been recognized by those who philosophize about constitutions neither now nor recently — [1329b] namely, that the city must be divided apart by classes, and that the fighting element must be different from the farming element. For in Egypt it is still this way even now, and so it is in the region around Crete: the arrangement around Egypt came about, as they say, through Sesostris legislating in this way, that around Crete through Minos. The arrangement of common meals seems to be ancient as well — the Cretan version arising around the reign of Minos, while the Italian version is much older than these. For the learned among those who dwell there say that a certain Italus became king of Oenotria, from whom, changing their name, they were called Italians instead of Oenotrians, and this coast of Europe took the name Italy, as much of it as happens to lie within the Scylletic and Lametic gulfs; these are half a day's journey apart from one another. They say that this Italus made the Oenotrians, who were nomads, into farmers, and established for them, among other laws, the common meals as well, for the first time; on which account even now some of his descendants still make use of the common meals and of some of his laws. Those toward Tyrrhenia were inhabited by the Opicans, both formerly and now called by the additional name Ausonians, while those toward Iapygia and the Ionian sea were inhabited by the Chonians, in the region called Syrtis;
27| and the Chonians too were Oenotrian by race. The arrangement of the common meals, then, arose first from this source, but the division of the political multitude by class came from Egypt; for the reign of Sesostris exceeds by far in time the reign of Minos. We must suppose, then, that pretty much everything else too has been discovered many times over the long course of time, or rather infinitely many times. For it is reasonable that need itself should teach the necessary things, while once these are already available it is reasonable that the things pertaining to refinement and abundance should receive their growth; so that one must think matters concerning constitutions have come about in the same way. That all this goes back a long way is signaled by the Egyptian case: this people is reckoned the oldest of all, and they have possessed laws and civic order continuously. Hence one must make sufficient use of what has already been discovered, and try to seek out what has been left aside. That the territory must belong to those who possess arms and who share in the constitution has been stated earlier, and why those who farm it must be different people, and how large and of what kind the territory must be; but concerning the distribution of the land and of the farmers, who and of what sort they must be, we must speak first, since we say that property must not be common, as some have said,
28| [1330a] but by use become common in a friendly way, and none of the citizens should lack food. As for common messes, it is generally agreed that it is useful for them to exist in well-organized cities; for what reason we too agree, we will say later. All the citizens must share in these, but it is not easy for the poor to contribute the assessed amount out of their private means and also manage the rest of their household. Further, expenditures for the gods are the common concern of the whole city. It is necessary, then, that the territory be divided into two parts, one common and one belonging to private individuals, and that each of these in turn be divided in two: of the common land, one part is for the services performed for the gods, the other for the expense of the common messes; of the private land, one part is toward the frontier, the other toward the city, so that, two allotments being assigned to each person, all share in both regions. For this arrangement accords with equality and with justice, and makes people more united in mind with regard to wars against neighboring peoples. For where this is not the arrangement, some take too little account of hostility toward their border-neighbors, while others take too much account of it, beyond what is fine.
29| For this reason, among some peoples there is a law that those who live near the border-neighbors should not take part in deliberation about wars against them, on the ground that because of their private interest they would not be able to deliberate well. The territory, then, must necessarily be divided in this way, for the reasons stated. As for those who will do the farming, it would be best, if we may pray for what we wish, that they be slaves — but not all of one stock, nor spirited (for in this way they would be useful for the work and safe as regards not attempting revolution); second best, foreign dependents of a nature similar to those described. Of these, some should be private, belonging to those who own the estates, and others should be common, working the common land. In what manner slaves should be used, and why it is better that freedom be set before all slaves as a prize, we will say later. That the city ought to be common to the mainland, the sea, and the whole territory alike, as far as circumstances allow, has been said before; and one should pray to hit upon a site for it that is elevated, having regard to four things. First, as necessary for health (for sites that have their slope toward the east, and toward the winds that blow from the sunrise, are healthier; second, those facing north,
30| for these are milder in winter). [1330b] As for the rest, it is well for the site to have regard to political and military activities. For military purposes, it must be easy for the citizens themselves to march out from, but hard for enemies to approach and hard to surround; and it should, if possible, have on its own an abundance of waters and springs; failing this, a solution has been found by constructing reservoirs for rainwater, large and plentiful, so that the inhabitants are never left short when shut off from the countryside by war. Since one must take care for the health of the inhabitants, and this consists in the place being well situated in itself and well facing such conditions, and second in using healthy waters, and giving this careful, not casual, attention — for the things we use most, and most often, for the body contribute most to health, and the power of waters and of air has just this kind of nature. For this reason, in cities that are well governed, a distinction must be made, if the waters are not all alike or plentiful, between water for drinking and water for other uses. As for fortified sites, what is advantageous is not the same for all constitutions alike: for example, a citadel suits oligarchy and monarchy, level ground suits democracy, and neither suits aristocracy, but rather several strong positions.
31| The arrangement of private dwellings is thought to be more pleasant and more serviceable for other activities if it is laid out in straight lines, in the modern manner, the manner of Hippodamus; but for security in war the opposite is better, as it was arranged in ancient times, for that kind of layout is hard for foreigners to enter and hard for attackers to find their way through. For this reason one should share in both arrangements — for it is possible, if one lays out the city as farmers lay out what some call clusters in vine-growing — and not make the whole city laid out in straight lines, but only by sections and districts; for in this way it will be well disposed both for safety and for adornment. As for walls, those who say that cities that lay claim to virtue ought not to have them hold much too old-fashioned a view, especially seeing that the cities that prided themselves in that way have in fact been refuted by events. Against those who are similar and not much superior in numbers, it is not fine to try to save oneself through the strength of walls; but since it can also happen that the superiority of the attackers becomes greater than the human excellence found in a few, if one is to be saved and not suffer badly nor be treated with outrage, the safest fortification of walls must be thought the most warlike,
32| [1331a] especially now that precision has been achieved in missiles and siege-engines for besieging. To think it right not to throw walls around cities is like seeking out territory easy to invade and stripping away its mountainous regions, and likewise like not throwing walls around private dwellings on the ground that the inhabitants will become unmanly. But this too must not be overlooked: that those who have thrown walls around their city can use their cities in both ways, both as having walls and as not having them, while those who do not possess them cannot. If this is so, then not only must walls be thrown up, but care must also be taken of them, so that they are fitting both for adornment suited to the city and for the needs of war, both the traditional ones and those now newly discovered. For just as it is a matter of concern to attackers by what means they will gain the advantage, so too, while some means have been found, others must be sought out and thought through by those on the defense as well; for attackers do not even attempt to attack those who are well prepared in the first place. Since the mass of the citizens must be distributed among common messes, and the walls must be divided by guard-posts and towers at strategic points, it is clear that this calls for arranging some of the common messes to be located in these guard-posts.
33| These matters, then, one might arrange in this manner. As for the dwellings assigned to the gods and the common messes of the most authoritative offices, it is fitting that they have a suitable location, and the same one, except for those sacred places that the law sets apart, or some oracle received from Pytho. Such a place would be one that has a visibility sufficient for the excellence of its position, and is more strongly fortified with regard to the neighboring parts of the city. Below this place it is fitting that there be a marketplace of the kind they have in Thessaly, which they call the free marketplace; this is one that must be kept clear of all goods for sale, and neither a vulgar craftsman nor a farmer nor anyone else of that sort should venture in unless summoned by the officials. The place would be pleasant if the gymnasia of the older men also have their arrangement there; for it is fitting that this ordering too be divided according to age-groups, with some of the officials spending their time among the younger men, while the older men spend theirs among the officials; for the presence of the officials before their eyes most produces true reverence and the fear proper to free men.
34| [1331b] The market for goods must be a different one from this, and separate, having a place easy to gather at both for what is sent up from the sea and for everything from the countryside. And since the mass of the city is divided into priests and officials, it is fitting that the common meals of the priests too should have their arrangement around the sacred buildings. As for those offices which exercise oversight over contracts, the filing of suits, summonses, and the rest of that kind of administration, and further over market-regulation and what is called city-regulation, these need to be established near a market and some common meeting-place; and such is the place around the necessary market — for we assign the upper one to leisure, but this one to necessary business. And the arrangement described must be imitated also in the country districts: for there too, for the officials whom some call wood-wardens and others field-wardens, there must necessarily be guard-posts and common meals for the sake of guarding, and further there must be shrines distributed throughout the country, some to gods and some to heroes. But to spend time now being precise and talking about such matters is idle work.
35| For it is not hard to conceive such things, but rather to do them: talking about them is the business of a wish, but their coming about is the business of luck. Hence, as regards such matters, let the fuller treatment be dropped for now. But about the constitution itself — out of what elements and of what kind the city that is going to be blessed and to be governed well must be composed — this must now be stated. And since there are two things in which the good state of everything comes about, and of these two one lies in the goal and end of actions being set down correctly, the other in finding the actions that lead to that end (for these can either be discordant with each other or in accord: sometimes the goal is set down well, but in the doing men fail to hit it, and sometimes they succeed in everything that leads toward the end, but they set the end itself badly, and sometimes they fail in both, as in medicine: for sometimes people judge badly what sort of thing a healthy body ought to be, and also fail to hit upon the things productive of the standard they have set themselves; and in the arts and sciences both of these must be mastered, the end and the actions that lead to the end) — it is clear, then, that all men aim at living well and at happiness, but that of these some happen to have the means and others not, owing to some luck or nature (for living well requires some equipment as well,
36| [1332a] less of it for those better disposed, more for those worse off), while others go about seeking happiness incorrectly right from the start, even though the means are available. Since the task before us is to see the best constitution, and this is the one according to which a city would be governed best, and a city would be governed best according to which it is most possible for it to be happy, it is clear that we must not let it escape us what happiness is. We say — and we have determined this in the Ethics, if that discussion is of any use — that it is the complete activity and exercise of virtue, and this not conditionally but without qualification. By 'conditionally' I mean the necessary things, and by 'without qualification' the fine; for example, in the case of just actions, just retributions and punishments proceed from virtue, but they are necessary, and they have their fineness in a necessary way (for it is more choiceworthy that neither the man nor the city should need any such thing), whereas the actions directed at honors and abundance are, without qualification, the finest actions. For the one kind is the removal of some evil, while actions of this other kind are the opposite: they are constructions and generations of goods. The excellent man would make good use even of poverty and disease and the other pieces of bad luck;
37| but blessedness lies in their opposites (for this too has been determined according to the ethical discussions, that the excellent man is one for whom, on account of virtue, the things good without qualification are good; and it is clear that the use he makes of them must be excellent and fine in an unqualified sense). This is why people suppose that the causes of happiness are the external goods, as if one were to attribute a brilliant and fine performance on the lyre to the instrument rather than to the skill. It is necessary, then, on the basis of what has been said, that some things be already present and others be provided by the lawgiver. Hence we pray to hit upon, in the constitution of the city, those things of which luck is in control (for we posit that it is in control of them); but that the city be excellent is no longer the work of luck but of knowledge and choice. And in fact a city is excellent by virtue of the citizens who share in the constitution being excellent; and in our case all the citizens share in the constitution. This, then, is what must be examined: how a man comes to be excellent. For even if it is possible for all to be excellent collectively without each citizen being so individually, the latter — each being excellent individually — is more choiceworthy; for that all are excellent follows from each being so. But in fact men become good and excellent through three things.
38| These three are nature, habit, and reason. For one must first be born, for example, a human being and not one of the other animals; then one's body and soul must also be of a certain quality. But in some cases there is no benefit in being born so: [1332b] for habits bring about change; for some traits go either way by nature, and through habits move toward the worse or the better. Now the other animals live mostly by nature, though a few also to a small extent by habits, but man lives also by reason: for he alone has reason. So these must be in harmony with one another. For men do many things contrary to their habituations and their nature because of reason, if they are persuaded that it is better to be otherwise. As for what qualities by nature those who are going to be readily manageable by the lawgiver must have, we have determined this earlier; what remains is now the work of education. For some things men learn by being habituated, others by hearing. And since every political community is composed of rulers and ruled, this must be examined: whether the rulers and the ruled must be different people, or the same throughout life; for it is clear that education too will have to follow this division. Now if some were as different from the rest as we suppose the gods and heroes to be different from men, having at once a great superiority first in body, then in soul, so that the superiority of the rulers over the ruled were beyond dispute and evident, it is clear that it would always be better for the same people to rule and the others to be ruled, once and for all.
39| But since it is not easy to obtain this, nor is it the case, as Scylax says it is among the Indians, that the kings are so far superior to the ruled, it is clear that for many reasons all must necessarily share alike in ruling in turn and being ruled. For equality is the same thing for those who are alike, and it is hard for a constitution established contrary to justice to endure. For all those throughout the countryside who wish for revolution have the ruled on their side, and for those in the governing body to be so numerous as to be stronger than all these together is one of the impossibilities. But that the rulers must differ from the ruled is beyond dispute. How this is to be, then, and how they will share in ruling, the lawgiver must examine. This has been spoken of before. For nature has given the division by making the very same kind of thing, one part younger, one part older, of whom it is fitting for the one to be ruled and the other to rule; and no one is aggrieved at being ruled on the basis of age, nor thinks himself superior, especially since he will himself receive this same contribution back once he arrives at the age required. In one way, then, it must be said that the same people rule and are ruled, and in another way that they are different people.
40| [1333a] So education too must in a way be the same, and in a way different. For they say the one who is to rule well must first be ruled. (Rule, as was said in our first discussions, is of two kinds: one for the sake of the ruler, the other for the sake of the ruled. Of these we say one is despotic, the other is rule over free people. Some of the things commanded differ not in their tasks but in their purpose. That is why many tasks that seem to be menial it is fine even for free young people to perform as service: for actions do not differ so much in themselves with respect to what is fine and not fine as in their end and their purpose.) Since we say that the virtue of the citizen and the ruler is the same as that of the best man, and that the same person must first become ruled and later become a ruler, this would be the task the lawgiver must attend to: how men become good, and through what practices, and what the end of the best life is. The soul is divided into two parts, of which one has reason in its own right, while the other does not have it in its own right but is capable of obeying reason:
41| of which we say the virtues are those in accordance with which a man is in some way called good. As to which of these two the end lies in more, for those who divide as we do it is not unclear how one should speak. For the worse is always for the sake of the better, and this is equally evident both in matters of craft and in matters of nature: and the better is that which has reason. This too has been divided in two, in the way we are accustomed to dividing it: for one kind of reason is practical, the other theoretical. So it is necessary that this part too has been divided in the same way, evidently. And we shall say that actions stand in the same proportion, and that the actions of that which is by nature better must be more choiceworthy for those able to attain either all of them or the two: for what is always most choiceworthy for each is whatever it is possible for him to attain of the highest. The whole of life, too, is divided into business and leisure, and into war and peace, and of practicable things, some are directed to what is necessary and useful, others to what is fine. Concerning these, the same choice must hold both for the parts of the soul and for their actions: war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, and the necessary and useful for the sake of the fine.
42| Toward all these things, then, the statesman must legislate with his eye fixed, both on the parts of the soul and on their actions, but more on the better things and the ends. And the same way holds concerning ways of life and the choice of activities: one must be able to engage in business and to wage war, [1333b] but more to keep peace and be at leisure, and to do the necessary and useful things, but the fine things must be done more. So it is with a view to these aims that both children, while still children, must be educated, and the other ages too, all that need education. But those of the Greeks now thought to have the best constitutions, and those of the lawgivers who established these constitutions, appear to have organized the affairs of their constitutions neither with a view to the best end nor with a view to all the virtues in their laws and education, but have vulgarly inclined toward those things thought to be useful and more conducive to gain. In a similar way to these, some of the later writers too have declared the same opinion: for in praising the constitution of the Lacedaemonians, they admire the aim of their lawgiver, because he legislated everything with a view to mastery and to war. These views are easily refuted in argument, and have now been refuted by the facts. For just as most people admire ruling over many, because a great abundance of good fortunes results from it, so too Thibron evidently admired the lawgiver of the Spartans, and so does each of the other writers about their constitution, because through having been trained for dangers they ruled over many:
43| and yet it is clear that, since the Spartans no longer possess rule now, they are not happy, nor was their lawgiver good. This is ridiculous - if, while remaining within his laws, and with nothing hindering their use of the laws, they have lost living well. Nor do they conceive rightly about the kind of rule which the lawgiver ought evidently to hold in honor: for rule over free people is finer than despotic rule, and accompanied more by virtue. Further, a city must not be considered happy, nor its lawgiver praised, for this reason - that he trained it to conquer with a view to ruling its neighbors: for this involves great harm. For it is clear that any citizen able to do so must try to pursue this as well, so that he may be able to rule his own city - which is exactly what the Spartans charge King Pausanias with, even though he held so great an honor. None of such arguments and laws, then, is statesmanlike or beneficial or true. For the same things are best both privately and in common, and the lawgiver must instill these in the souls of men: and training in warfare must be practiced not for the sake of this - that they may enslave those who do not deserve it - but first, so that they themselves may not be enslaved to others, and next, so that they may seek leadership for the benefit of the ruled,
44| [1334a] and not for mastery over everyone; and third, so as to be masters over those who deserve to be slaves. That the lawgiver ought to be more concerned to arrange both his legislation about warfare and the rest of his legislation for the sake of leisure and of peace, the facts bear witness to the arguments. For most cities of this kind are preserved while at war, but perish once they have acquired empire: for they lose their temper, like iron, when they keep the peace. The lawgiver is responsible, for not having educated them to be able to be at leisure. Since the same end appears to hold both in common and privately for men, and the same standard must necessarily hold for the best man and for the best constitution, it is clear that the virtues directed to leisure must be present: for the end, as has often been said, is peace as against war, leisure as against business. Useful for leisure and for the passing of life are those virtues whose function lies in leisure, and also those whose function lies in business. For many of the necessities must be present so that one may be able to have leisure: that is why the city must be temperate and courageous and enduring: for according to the proverb, there is no leisure for slaves, and those unable to face danger courageously are slaves to whoever attacks them.
45| Courage and endurance, then, are needed for business, philosophy for leisure, temperance and justice in both periods, and more so when people are at peace and at leisure: for war compels people to be just and temperate, while the enjoyment of good fortune and being at leisure amid peace tend rather to make them insolent. Much justice and much temperance are needed, then, by those thought to fare best and to enjoy all the things counted blessed - for instance, if there are any such, as the poets say, in the Isles of the Blessed: for these will need philosophy and temperance and justice the most, the more they are at leisure amid an abundance of such goods. That the city that is going to be happy and excellent must share in these virtues, then, is clear. For if it is shameful to be unable to use good things, it is still more shameful to be unable to use them in leisure - to appear good while occupied in business and at war, but slavish when at peace and at leisure. That is why virtue must not be practiced the way the Lacedaemonian city practices it. For they do not differ from others in this respect,
46| [1334b] by not thinking the same things are the greatest goods as the many do, but because these come to be more through some virtue: since these are greater goods, and their enjoyment is greater than that of the virtues, and this because it is for its own sake, is clear from what has been said; but how and through what means this will come about, this we must now consider. We happen to have distinguished earlier that there is need of nature, habit, and reason. Of these, what sort the nature must be has been determined earlier; what remains to consider is whether people should be trained by reason first or by habits. For these must be in harmony with each other, the best harmony; for it is possible for reason to have missed the best assumption, and to have been led astray likewise through habits. This much then is clear first of all, just as in other cases, that generation proceeds from a starting point, and the end proceeds from some starting point to another end, and reason and intellect are for us the end of nature, so that it is with a view to these that we must prepare the generation and the training of habits; next, just as soul and body are two things, so too we see two parts of the soul, the one without reason and the one having reason, and their states are two in number, of which one is desire and the other is intellect; and just as the body is prior in generation to the soul, so too the part without reason is prior to the part having reason.
47| This too is clear: for spirit and wish, and further appetite, belong to children as soon as they are born, but calculation and intellect naturally come to be present as they advance in age. So attending to the body must necessarily precede attending to the soul, and attending to desire comes next; desire, though, is tended for intellect's sake, while the body is tended for the soul's sake. If then the lawgiver must from the start see to it that the bodies of those reared become as good as possible, first he must take care about the union of man and wife — when, and being of what sort of persons, people should form marital intercourse with one another. In legislating about this partnership he must have regard both to the couple themselves and to their span of life, so that they may come down together in their ages to the same season, and their capacities not be out of tune, with the man still able to beget while the woman is not, or the woman still able while the man is not (for these things produce factions and differences between them); further, he must have regard also to the succession of children — for children must neither fall too far behind their fathers in age (for the gratitude of children toward fathers who are too old brings no benefit, nor does the help of fathers toward children)
48| [1335a] nor be too close together in age (for this involves much difficulty; for such persons have less of the respect due, as it were, to age-mates, and closeness in age is a ground for reproach in household management); further — and this is the point from which we set out on this digression — how the bodies of those begotten may turn out according to the lawgiver's wish. Now nearly all these things result from one kind of care. For since the end of begetting has been fixed, speaking for the most part, at the number of seventy years for men, and fifty for women, the beginning of the union in point of age should come down to within these periods. Now the pairing of the young is poor for the production of children; for in all animals the offspring of the young are incomplete, and more often female, and small in form, so that the same must necessarily hold also in the case of human beings. Here is evidence: in as many cities as it is customary to pair young men and young women, the bodies of the offspring are incomplete and small. Further, in childbirth the young suffer more and more of them perish; hence some say that the oracle was given to the Troezenians for this very reason — that many were perishing because the younger women were being married off, and not with reference to the gathering of crops.
49| Further, it is advantageous also for temperance that marriages be made when the women are older; for young women who have had intercourse are thought to be more prone to licentiousness. And the bodies of males also seem to be harmed in their growth if they have intercourse while the seed is still growing; for this too has a fixed period, beyond which it does not continue to increase much, or only a little. Hence it is fitting for women to be joined in marriage around the age of eighteen, and men at thirty-seven or a little before; for at that time, when their bodies are at their prime, the union will take place, and the couple will come down together in due season toward the cessation of child-bearing; further, the succession of children will occur for those who are beginning their prime — if the generation happens straightaway in due proportion — while for the parents it will occur when their age has already declined, toward the number of seventy years. Concerning, then, when the union should be made, this has been said; but as for the season of the year, one should use the times that most people use, having rightly determined even now that this cohabitation should take place in winter. And people themselves must already, with a view to child-bearing, take note of what is said by physicians and by natural scientists;
50| for physicians speak adequately about the right times of the body, [1335b] and natural scientists about the winds, praising the north winds more than the south. As for what sort of bodily condition would be of most benefit to those being begotten, this must be spoken of more precisely in the treatise on the rearing of children, but it is enough to state it in outline even now. For neither the condition of athletes is useful for a citizen's good condition, nor for health and child-bearing, nor is the condition that is overly cared-for and overly toil-worn, but rather the condition in between these. One should have a condition that has been worked, but worked by labors that are not violent, nor directed at one thing only, as the condition of athletes is, but directed toward the actions of free persons. And this should hold alike for men and for women. Pregnant women too must take care of their bodies, not being idle nor using a scanty diet. This the lawgiver can easily bring about by ordering them to make a daily walk, for the service of the gods to whom the honor concerning birth has been allotted. As for the mind, however, it is fitting for pregnant women to pass their time more at ease, the opposite of the body; for what is begotten clearly draws on the mother as plants draw on the earth. Concerning the exposure and rearing of children, let there be a law that nothing deformed shall be reared; but on account of the number of children, if the order of customs prevents any of those born from being exposed, then
51| the amount of child-bearing must be limited; and if any couples have children beyond this limit, before sensation and life have come to be in the child abortion must be procured; for it is the presence or absence of sensation and life that will mark what is pious and what is not. Since the beginning of the age at which man and woman should begin their union has been determined, let it also be determined how long a time it is fitting to perform this service toward child-bearing. For the offspring of those too old, like those of the too young, come to be incomplete both in body and in mind, and the offspring of those grown old are weak; hence the limit should be set according to the prime of the mind. This, in most cases, is the same as some of the poets have said, who measure age by periods of seven years, around the time of fifty years. So that those who exceed this age by four or five years should be released from begetting children openly; but for the remaining time they should be seen to have intercourse evidently for the sake of health or some other such reason. As for intercourse with another woman or another man, let it be simply not noble to be seen touching such a person in any way whatsoever, once one is married and called husband; but if during the time of child-bearing anyone is seen doing such a thing,
52| [1336a] let him be punished with a loss of privilege appropriate to the offense. Once the children are born, we must think that the nourishment given makes a great difference to the strength of their bodies, whatever kind it is. It is evident, both from observing the other animals and from observing the peoples who take care to train their young to a warlike condition, that a diet abundant in milk is most suited to their bodies, and one with less wine because of the diseases it causes. Further, it is beneficial to allow them as much movement as children of that age can manage. And to prevent their limbs from being twisted through softness, some peoples even now use certain mechanical devices which keep the bodies of such infants straight. It is also beneficial to accustom them from early childhood to cold, for this is most useful both for health and for the business of war. That is why among many of the barbarian peoples there is a custom, in some cases of dipping newborns in a cold river, in others of wrapping them in only a light covering, as the Celts do. For in everything that admits of habituation, it is better to habituate children from the very start, but to habituate them by gradual approach; and the constitution of children, because of their natural heat, is well suited by nature for training against cold. So concerning the earliest period it is beneficial to take this kind of care, and care resembling it.
53| As for the age next following this, up to five years, during which it is not yet good to lead them toward any learning nor toward compulsory exertions, so that their growth is not hindered, they must nonetheless get enough movement to escape bodily inactivity; and this must be provided both through other activities and through play. The kinds of play must be neither illiberal nor laborious nor lax. And as for the stories and tales such children ought to hear, this must be a care for the officials called superintendents of children. For all such things must pave the way toward the pursuits that come later; that is why the greater part of children's play should be imitations of the serious occupations that come afterward. Those who forbid, by law, children's stretching fits and crying are wrong to do so; for these are beneficial toward growth, since they become in a way a kind of exercise for the bodies — the holding of the breath produces strength in those who exert themselves, and this is what happens also to infants when they strain and cry. The superintendents of children must also oversee how these children pass their time, and in particular see to it that they are as little as possible in the company of slaves. For this age,
54| [1336b] up to seven years, must necessarily have its rearing at home. It stands to reason, then, that even at this age they should be kept free of illiberal things heard and seen. Speaking generally, the lawgiver must banish obscene speech from the city altogether, as he would banish anything else (for from the easy speaking of any shameful thing comes closeness also to the doing of it) — and above all he must banish it from among the young, so that they neither say nor hear anything of that kind. And if anyone is found saying or doing any of the forbidden things, one who is free but not yet reckoned old enough for a reclining place at the common meals is to be punished with loss of privileges and with blows, while one older than this age is to be punished with the illiberal penalties fitting for slavish conduct. And since we banish the saying of such things, it is clear that we must also banish the viewing of indecent pictures or performances. The officials, then, must take care that there be no statue or painting that is an imitation of such actions, except in the case of certain gods to whom the law itself assigns even mockery as their due honor. And in connection with these the law permits those who have already reached the age fitting for it to offer worship to the gods both on their own behalf and on behalf of their children and wives; but the young must not be allowed to be spectators of lampoons or of comedy, before they reach the age at which they will already share in reclining at table and in strong drink, since by then their education will have made them wholly unaffected by the harm that comes from such things.
55| For the present, then, we have made this discussion only in passing; later, giving it closer attention, we must determine more precisely whether it ought not to be permitted at all, or ought to be permitted, working through the difficulties, and if so how. For the present occasion we have mentioned it only as necessary. Perhaps Theodorus the tragic actor was not speaking badly when he said something of this sort: he never allowed anyone, not even one of the inferior actors, to make his entrance before him, on the ground that audiences grow attached to the voices they hear first. The same thing holds in our dealings with other people and with things generally: we are fonder of whatever comes first. That is why everything base must be made strange to the young, and above all whatever involves depravity or ill will. When the five years have passed, the next two, up to seven, must already be spent as onlookers at the studies they will later have to learn. There are two ages by which education must necessarily be divided: the period from seven to puberty, and again the period after puberty up to twenty-one years. Those who divide the ages of life by periods of seven years generally speak not badly, [1337a] but the division must follow the divisions marked out by nature; for every craft and every form of education wishes to fill up what nature leaves deficient. First, then, we must consider whether some order ought to be established concerning children; next, whether it is beneficial to make the care of them a common matter or to leave it to private management, as happens now in most cities; and third, of what kind this care ought to be.